


Book Reviews



Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Conflict Redux

Edited by Gurmeet Kanwal & Monika Chansoria

KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2013, 232 pages, Rs. 740

Pakistan's nuclear programme is India-centric with a view to marginalise India's conventional edge. With a first use nuclear weapon policy, Pakistan would seek to lower the threshold for usage of these munitions to coerce India not to respond militarily when subjected to an asymmetric *jihadi* strike. Pakistan has undertaken dastardly terrorist attacks with Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) trained militants against civilian targets in India and has not been confronted with a military response from India. This has led to a strategic brinkmanship. Pakistan keeps playing the nuclear card with dexterity, compelling India to constantly find an answer to the nuclear dilemma. The development of the 60-km Tactical Nuclear Weapon (TNW) Nasr has added a new dimension. This book, edited by Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria has many renowned contributors, who address many issues regarding this weapon. Apart from the editors, there are contributions by Bharat Karnad, Vijay Shankar Shankar, Kapil Kak, Arun Sahgal, Sasikumar, Nagappa, Shalini Chawla, Rajesh Rajagopalan and Manpreet Sethi.

The introductory chapter clearly states that the nuclear weapons of Pakistan are for deterrence, and providing parity with India in the politico-strategic realm. The actual possibility of use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons is zero. The book quotes senior Pakistani officers who have categorically stated that the Indian response to Pakistan's first use would be a total holocaust. The chapter

points out that in late 2010, with 90 TNWs, it was difficult for Pakistan to stop an Indian Armoured Division moving dispersed on a 30 km frontage. There would be a minimum inescapable requirement of 436 TNWs to stop an armoured division. The reported accelerated production of plutonium from three military dedicated reactors in Khushab and a fourth under construction, would result in an inventory of 200 warheads by 2020. To further compound the existing problem, the issue of miniaturising the warhead to fit into the Nasr missile with a 30 cm diameter is a complex engineering problem. The chapter also speaks of grabbing a city close to the border which would present nuclear targets to the Pakistan Strategic Plans Division to employ nuclear weapons.

The book lucidly brings out the help provided by China in developing nuclear weapons and delivery systems for Pakistan. This was done despite China signing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1982. China supplied inputs regarding enriched uranium and a 25 kiloton bomb in 1983, and the production facility for the M-11 missiles. Further, China sold 5,000 ring magnets to Pakistan to be used in high speed centrifuges. With regard to TNW, the book correctly establishes that circumstantial evidence points to covert assistance given by China to Pakistan.

The paper on Pakistani doctrinal thinking with regard to nuclear weapons, interestingly states that if the need arises, Pakistan could be irrational in using nuclear weapons, even involving the destruction of its own people if pushed beyond a limit. Further, the paper describes the implications of thresholds pertaining to preemptive response, early response, delayed response and accumulated response. Pakistan is likely to resort to the use of TNWs as perceived low cost strategic weapons under conditions where it perceives a major operational defeat such as unacceptable loss of territory threatening high value targets, serious degradation of military potential and attacks on critical infrastructure important for its war-waging effort. The control of TNWs remains unstated but given their limited range, they would have to be placed under the theatre commanders for effective employment. The response by India as given in the paper is a graduated retaliation likely to cause extensive damage to Pakistan. Further, in the Pakistani attempts to convey threshold ambiguity, the nuclear trip wires are not seen as uniform. These appear to be much shorter and tighter in the Punjabi heartland, relatively more stretched in Sindh and loose in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). Thus, the Pakistani response would be different, depending on the sector addressed. TNWs are part of the Pakistani nuclear doctrine and India has to, therefore, calibrate its response to this aspect.

The paper on command and control in the context of TNWs highlights the set-up needed to handle this threat from Pakistan. The draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine prepared by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) of the National Security Council has stated that the authority to release nuclear weapons for use rests with the Prime Minister of India. On January 04, 2003, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) adopted and made public key elements of India's nuclear doctrine as also the command and control structure. The Prime Minister and the CCS now comprise India's Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). In the NCA, the Political Council headed by the Prime Minister is the sole authority for ordering a nuclear strike. The Political Council is advised by an Executive Council headed by the National Security Adviser (NSA). The Executive Council executes decisions through the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Strategic Forces Command. As regards Pakistan, the Pakistan Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) exercises control over the nuclear weapons. They have a Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and each of the Services has a Strategic Forces Command (SFC). Though the nuclear weapons are stored by the SPD, in the case of TNWs, these would have to be with the SFC of the Army, thereby, leading to fully mated nuclear weapons being stored with the theatre commanders, causing decentralised deployment of this critical asset. This could lead to unauthorised or accidental launches for which India must be prepared.

The details of the imageries obtained indicate that Nasr is a 300 mm missile mounted on a Chinese A 100 Transport Erector Launcher (TEL). The Pakistani TNWs have been developed to pour cold water on India's cold start doctrine and as, per the book, India should respond with its second strike capability. The book could have brought out counter-measures like the Iron Dome to the Nasr which degrades its capability, if successfully intercepted.

The book is extremely well researched and compiled. It is a must read for officials in the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs, strategic analysts and all serving and retired officers of the armed forces.

Review by Maj Gen **PK Chakravorty**. The reviewer was an adviser to BrahMos Aerospace.



Warring Navies-India and Pakistan

Commodore Ranjit B Rai (Retd) and Joseph P Chacko

India Publications Company, 2014, 264 pages, Rs 399

*God and a Soldier people adore
In time of War, not before;
And when war is over and all things are righted
God is neglected and an old Soldier slighted.*

Crippling of the NRP *Afonso de Albuquerque* on December 18, 1961, by the INS *Betwa* and *Beas*, the raid on Dwarka (site of the Somnath temple) on September 07, 1965, by the Pakistani task force, the reasons for the Navy's 'Sweet Fanny Adams' in 1962 and 1965, the mystery around the sinking of the PNS *Ghazi* in December 1971, the immense unrecognised contribution of the Mukti Bahini at sea, the missile boat attacks on Karachi, the exploits of the INS *Vikrant* in the Bay of Bengal, the loss of the INS *Khukri* on December 09, 1971, the story of forgotten and unsung heroes Roy Chou and Aku Roy, and many such other indelible watermarks left by brave sailors on the operational history of the Indian Navy have found their way in the book titled *Warring Navies – India and Pakistan*. The book not only attempts to speak for the naval fraternity of India and Pakistan but goes beyond to include fascinating and comprehensive details of Operation Lal Dora in Mauritius (1983), Operation Flowers are Blooming in Seychelles (1987), Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka, Operation Cactus in Maldives (1988) and Operation Talwar during Kargil.


The Warring Navies is indeed a welcome addition to the limited body of literature which exists on operations of the Indian Navy. This book is the second one on the subject by Commodore Ranjit Rai and is co-authored with Joseph P Chacko. *The Warring Navies* provides a ringside view of operations conducted by the Indian Navy post-independence. The authors provide a lucid commentary of all major military operations, juxtaposed with contemporary geo-politics, which makes a very interesting and absorbing read. The authors have also made an endeavour to present the Pakistani view of many important incidents that have shaped the history of naval operations in the subcontinent. The book includes an introduction by General Ved Malik, a maritime perspective by Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat and a regional perspective by Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar.

Commodore Ranjit Bhawani Rai has commanded four naval warships, and the Naval Academy, served twice as the Director of Operations and later as Director Intelligence, and has enriched the book with his vast personal experience and comprehensive research to provide an all-inclusive account of the naval operations. Commodore Ranjit has also travelled extensively and interacted with veterans to include Petty Officer Chaman Singh, MVC, in Rewari, Lt Cdr J K Roy Choudhury, VrC, settled in Lebong, Darjeeling, Commander V P Kapil, VrC in Delhi, Major Chandrakant, VrC, 1 Guards (4 Rajput) in Delhi and Sajid Zahir from Dacca, as well as Lieutenant General JFR Jacob. He has also travelled to Pakistan in 2010 to meet Pakistani naval officers and historians and even met the wives of some officers who took part in the 1965 and 1971 Wars and has referred to the books by the Pakistan Book Club. Joseph is a defence journalist, entrepreneur and the publisher of *Frontier India*, a portal publishing news and current affairs.

Apart from the details of naval operations and their geo-political context, one continuous thread that runs along most of the chapters is regarding the dire need of having a Chief of Defence Staff. It emerges unambiguously that operations in the past, right from Operation Vijay in 1961, have had a tri-Service participation, and, hence, involved contentious issues during the planning to include resource allocation, prioritisation of operational tasks and, ultimately, their execution. The Prime Minister and the Raksha Mantri, therefore, need to have a single point of advice and this is possible only if there is a Chief of Defence Staff. The authors cite many an occasion from the past, purely from the operational perspective, to emphasise the necessity of the institution.

The book makes an interesting read, particularly in the light of the fact that it comes from the pen of a man who has seen most of it himself. It is recommended to be part of all libraries in premier military establishments of the country and needs to be read by the coming generations, lest they forget the glorious acts, the valour and the sacrifices of the brave men in whites.

Review by Col **Sanjay Sethi**. The reviewer is a Senior Fellow, CLAWS.



Fighting to The End: Pakistan Army's Way of War

C Christine Fair

Oxford University Press, 2014, 347 pages, Rs 750

Fighting to the End – The Pakistan Army's Way of War, Dr. C Christine Fair's book divided over eleven chapters, is an informative and exhaustive account, based on painstaking research pursued by her since the early 1990s. The work draws its data and inferences from the Pakistani military professional writings spanning almost six (plus) decades. The author admits that the military writing she has used as base material does not constitute military doctrine. The Pakistani military (unlike modern Western militaries or, for that matter, India's) does not publish its official doctrine. What these writings do show up, believes Fair, is the Pakistan military's "strategic culture". The book primarily delves deep into "ideological" and "philosophical" dimensions of the Pakistan Army. The reason for the basis of her Army-centric research, is primarily owing to its all important role in nationhood. As argued by author; unlike a conventional scenario wherein, a country has an Army, in Pakistan the Army has a country.

As per the author, the Pakistan Army's basic discourse has been India-centric, wherein India is seen as an aggressor, out to destroy Pakistan. Fair argues that Pakistan is persistently "revisionist" vis-a-vis India, with which it has been locked in enduring rivalry since 1947-48, ostensibly over Kashmir. As argued by the author, Pakistan initiated and lost four wars with India, to include loss of half of its territory in 1971. The philosophy of "asymmetrical war" as practised by Pakistan has its roots in 1947, rather than in the late 1980s (as is generally believed) and the same has backfired since 2002. Pakistan's power differential with India has been continuously widening and in spite of setbacks, the author finds a stubborn Pakistan ever more committed to revisionism, with increased vigour to resist the rise of India.

Conventional wisdom projecting Pakistan as a "security seeking state" located in a rough neighbourhood, is refuted by the author. She challenges the notion of reducing the Indo-Pak puzzle to "Kashmir", and argues that resolution of the same shall not make Pakistan discard Islamist proxies and its obsession with the British inherited notion of "strategic depth". She refutes Pakistan claims over Kashmir, which is more than being merely a security seeking demand. There

are deep ideological and philosophical differences that Pakistan nurtures against India, which are unlikely to fade away by simply resolving border disputes, territorial in nature.

The author has justified the US' assistance and aid to Pakistan over the years which were based on the belief that the same would build up Pakistan conventionally, making it jettison its insecurity and aggressiveness towards India. She opines that Pakistan is purely an ideological and "greedy state", fundamentally dissatisfied with status quo – following revisionism of all kinds, to enhance its prestige and as a competitive tool to achieve non-security goals. Any appeasement of the Pakistan Army would only reinforce its revisionist pursuits.

The author has stressed that Pakistan's sense of insecurity and ideological differences vis-à-vis India have loomed from partition, based on the two-nation theory. As perceived by Pakistan, partition has been an *unfair* and *unfinished* agenda thrust upon its people delivering an insecure Pakistan, wherein India acquired the heartland with all the goodies and positives of the Raj while Pakistan was made to do with troubled frontiers and an ethnically diverse portion, widely separated. Fair notes that from the 1950s, Pakistan under Ayub Khan has used the religious plank to rally the nation and indoctrinate its people against India. A conscious attempt was made to disseminate the Army's ideological revisionist narrative through Pakistani textbooks and to coopt religious-political forces. As a result, in her words, "both military regimes and civilian governments alike pursue the army's revisionist agenda"

The key findings that emerge from the book could be summarised as, firstly, the Army is the custodian of Pakistan's ideology and geography. Secondly, India is civilisationally 'Hindu' opposed to Pakistan's ideological foundations based on the two-nation theory. Thirdly, the Pakistan Army must resist India's rise and for that, the primary tool would be "*jihad* under the expanding nuclear umbrella". The author highlights that Pakistan's stubbornness to pursue the hard line, in spite of setbacks, is mainly due to its unique concept of 'victory' and 'defeat'. As per the prevalent thought in Pakistan, in confrontations of various hues with India, as long as the Pakistanis survive and preserve the ability to strike back, they are not considered defeated. And that is how, even the 1971 War is taken as a victory in Pakistan.

In her attempt to draw out a prognosis for the future, the author remarks that in its revisionist quest, the Pakistan Army will continue to take significant risks, rather than do nothing. She has flagged a few aspects that could stand out as game changers, namely, the transition to democracy, the role of civil society to

give impetus to change, and the economic drivers. All the stated factors presently are rife with grave challenges. Professor Fair correctly notes that the extrinsic factors are also unlikely to induce a fundamental change in the strategic culture of the Pakistan Army.

Many Armies have run their countries, but most of them eventually had to yield to democratic change and civilian control. The Pakistan Army has been an exception in this regard and has exercised extraordinary powers, even during a civilian government. An appreciation of what makes the Pakistan Army tick should be a high priority for India's policy-makers and interested agencies and towards this, Dr. Fair's solid work has done complete justice.

Review by Col S Ranjan. The reviewer is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS.