
Unstable Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia

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*One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture
In general, in battle, one engages with the orthodox and gains victory through
the unorthodox.*

– Sun Tzu, *Art of War*

Introduction

In an earlier article titled the “Myth of Nuclear Deterrence”, the author discussed the philosophy of nuclear deterrence, inoperability of nuclear deterrence, applied deterrence, faith and rationality in nuclear deterrence, and minimum unacceptable damages. This is a continuation of that article, which concluded on the note that India must develop a nuclear and conventional arsenal to compete with China’s. Nuclear deterrence is no deterrence in today’s climate to stop conventional wars, and it is no deterrence when the damage capable of being inflicted on an enemy is not bothersome to the enemy. In this regard, India’s current arsenal hardly scares China.

This article studies the nuclear issue in the China-India-Pakistan context. It shows that unstable deterrence is no deterrence, while stable deterrence does not stop conventional wars. India needs to do itself proud if it wishes to have a place among the great nations of the world.

Pakistani and Chinese Nuclear Policies

It is for reasons of maintaining a high psychological ground that India cannot

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allow itself to be bullied by China's nuclear weapons superiority. It is unthinkable how any unacceptable damage on China that is less than what China can impose on India will deter China from using the nuclear threat. China is the only country that in its doctrine does not disavow the first use of nuclear weapons against nuclear states¹, while Pakistan reserves the right of first strike against any country, irrespective of nuclear weapons capability.^{2,3} In a confrontation with such hostile countries, India should not be found wanting. Moreover, the quantum of minimum deterrence for India has to be based on the yield of the delivered weapon. Hence, the issue is not one of numbers, but of the amount of damage

capable of being inflicted.⁴ Consequently, India has no choice but to go full steam and ensure effective nuclear deterrence on par, irrespective of the cost, which is actually quite manageable given India's emerging economic standing, especially given the low cost of nuclear weapons infrastructure compared to industrial infrastructure and conventional weapon production platforms, not to say that weapon production platforms should be minimised.⁵ (The issue of uranium resources is beyond the scope of this article). In addition, India must fully exploit its software engineering advantage to programme its guided missiles and anti-missiles for theatre-based Commands. It is possible that this may further encourage China to further build up its nuclear arsenal beyond its current limits. If this leads to an arms race, so be it: there is no reason to believe that an arms race isn't already in full swing in the China-India-Pakistan context. Moreover, it was not India that brought its borders to China, but China that conjoined its borders with India through the invasion of Tibet. Thus, India has to defend itself against claims on Indian territory by China.

However, once the nuclear confrontation and deterrence issue is put on the back-burner, after threats and counter-threats among rational leaders, the use of conventional weapons is a different story, since an irrational China can one day aim to resort to force to settle its self-created border dispute in India's eastern sector, as well as seek to push south to sever Assam from India and have its own Indian Ocean port. A supra-rational India may wish to wrest Aksai Chin or Mansarovar from China, not to forget that the liberation of

An irrational China can one day aim to resort to force to settle its self-created border dispute in India's eastern sector, as well as seek to push south to sever Assam from India and have its own Indian Ocean port.

Tibet is a distant dream. Do not forget that China believes that the accession of Assam to India was an aberration of history,⁶ implying that when the time comes for it to choose, China can expand its territorial claims to 'liberate' Assam. And do not forget Mao's aggressive statements of ruling Asia and possibly the world.⁷ It is the same Mao that the current Communist regime of China holds in the highest esteem, given the prestige they accord to Mao's dead body, embalming it and preserving it (till eternity) in a show to the world, a tradition that would be considered most abhorrent and irreligious in India. Indeed, no other country has done this to their leaders, ever—not even the Egyptians, who only embalmed their Pharaohs but did not put them up for daily display to visitors.⁸ Mao's philosophies might be encouraging to the Communist Chinese, but they are a flashing danger signal for China's neighbours, and continue to be so even in these days of globalisation and economic revival. When scholars claim that there is a lack of trust of China among India's leaders, it is based on facts since past Chinese aggressions, its military profile, and lack of commitment to no-first use make its neighbours unsettled.⁹ There is a way for nations to live in peace, but that doesn't seem to be so in the Sino-Indian context, especially since China has based most of its strategic ballistic missiles in the Tibetan Plateau and continues to build strong military reinforcements along the Indian border, in spite of strong world opprobrium at its occupation of Tibet.

Pakistan's Threat and Prognosis

Pakistan gambled during the Kargil War on nuclear deterrence to restrain India from launching an all-out war across the international border. When it was reported that Pakistan had begun to mobilise nuclear-tipped missiles, Bill Clinton personally picked up the telephone and threatened Nawaz Sharif with consequences. Though India was also reported to have moved its own nuclear missiles close to the border, it is widely believed that the implicit threat of a Pakistani first-strike against India might have influenced India in not crossing the international border.¹⁰ Thus, in spite of both nations possessing nuclear weapons, conventional conflict took place and did not escalate to nuclear launch.

Pakistan again threatened India with nuclear attack in 2002 were India to launch a conventional invasion of Pakistan in the wake of the terrorist attack on India's Parliament.^{11,12} This time, the threat was constructively explicit. India baulked, much as Colin Powell also bought Pakistan's deterrence gamble and

feared that President Musharaff could use a first strike, since Musharaff gave no assurances.¹³ India's leaders reacted with illogical behaviour, since they lacked the guts to discount the threat, not that they couldn't. In addition, Powell, a man of mediocre accomplishments and record,¹⁴ became intimidated by Pakistan's threat. It should be noted that the US has a habit of "jumping" each time the word "nuclear" is uttered in South Asia, though it worries little about conventional conflicts.¹⁵ Those two particular Pakistani nuclear threats of 1999 and 2002, which I consider a continuum since they are so close to each other in time, are perhaps the only incident in nuclear history where an applied nuclear threat possibly deterred an adversarial nation from going to conventional war when tempers were high and mobilisations were complete. The only other possible explanation for India's recalcitrance is that India felt it did not have the firepower or will power to fight a full-scale conventional war.

If Pakistan's deterrence is challenged by India, the deterrence ceases to be deterrent.

Former Prime Minister Vajpayee reportedly mentioned to an Indian Army chief that India could not fight a war with Pakistan because Pakistan had an *atom bomb* that they could use on India.¹⁶ Such cowardice is unbecoming of the prime minister of a large country.¹⁷ There is no reason for Indian leaders to forget that even India possesses the atom bomb. It appears just a matter of time before India gets leaders in its democratic society who have the guts to stare Pakistan down. If Pakistan's deterrence is challenged by India, the deterrence ceases to be deterrent.¹⁸ If India believes that its strike corps can launch a successful *blitzkrieg* through the heart of Sindh, Pakistan's first-use threat fails in the first instance.¹⁹ At that time, we can expect that no number of threats from Pakistan or the international community will be likely to work on India.²⁰ The threat from Pakistan will cease to be credible when a courageous leader takes the helm.²¹ That's the time when a credible threat becomes a 'myth'. Any first-use by Pakistan would only invite massive retaliation and wrath from India, leading to the extinction of Pakistan as a war-capable nation, at the very least, or total cessation as a nation, at the worst. An immense loss of life might occur, no doubt, on both sides, but such are the dangers of having a policy that permits first-use. Quite apparently, Indians (and New Delhi) are tired of non-stop Pakistani heckling across the border and irritants on a daily basis.²² There are already calls for direct intervention in Pakistan to weaken it irreparably.²³ Indian soldiers might also get frustrated and exert force on the central government for multiple

limited conventional wars, since the blood and tears they have shed in all their wars and major battles have not been allowed by India's politicians to bear fruit and eliminate its conflicts. In the wake of the Mumbai bombings of 26/11, New Delhi Television (NDTV) reported that Indian patience was running thin²⁴ — a symptom of Indian sentiment and impatience.

Pakistani Proliferation and Islamisation

Pakistan emerged as the greatest proliferator of nuclear weapons in the name of AQ Khan. The untold damage Khan did to the world is only still being realised. It is known that he supplied nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and Sudan.²⁵ To assist in Libya's discreet manufacturing programme, he set up manufacturing plants in Morocco, Mali, Senegal, and South Africa. Even Iraq's few centrifuges during Saddam Hussein's time are credited to Khan, thereby proving that Iraq was pursuing weapons of mass destruction.^{26, 27} Pakistan singularly helped North Korea explode its nuclear device in November 2006; this is not to mention that the sixth nuclear bomb that Pakistan detonated at Chagai Hills in 1998 was reported to be a North Korean bomb, which is quite probable. Moreover, the darling of the West, Benazir Bhutto, personally carried back missile parts or missile blueprints from North Korea after a visit to Pyongyang in December 1993.²⁸ Since North Korea and Pakistan both became short of cash by 1997, it is believed that Pakistan bartered nuclear technology for Pyongyang's missile technology;²⁹ consequently, North Korea's clumsy Nodong satellite became Pakistan's Ghauri. Such events are distressing enough, and it is quite puzzling why the US lacks the integrity to stop sleeping with those who sleep with their enemies.

Furthermore, though Pakistan won't sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it seeks to become the caretaker of the Islamic world, as the leader of the Islamic bomb and defender of the faith. Pakistan now offers nuclear securities to Saudi Arabia in exchange for hard cash and oil — in its own mini nuclear umbrella for the Islamic world.^{30,31,32} Religiously fundamental Pakistan, with the help of godless China, has created an unprecedented and dangerous world. To rid the world of the evil that has taken root in Pakistan, India will have to brace itself for a possible nuclear war and be undeterred by a nuclear threat, yet endeavour physically to neutralise that evil, which is when nuclear deterrence will be no deterrence at all against conventional war.

All Islamic terrorists have drawn inspiration from the *madrasas* of Northwest Pakistan. The *madrasas* have, by and large, imparted religious education, coming into existence as a result of the Society Act of 1860 promulgated

by the British Indian administration.³³ Their students supposedly fought British imperialism way back in the late 19th century. And, the term “Islamism” apparently came into its contemporary connotations in the late 1970s in France,³⁴ probably after President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan decided to islamise Pakistan by banning alcohol, horse-racing, and nightclubs. One would think that those philosophies would have been relegated to the trash heap of history after Pakistani independence in 1947, since Pakistan epitomised the vision of a “modern” Islamic country at that time, in the image of its whisky-loving founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, given that Islam frowns on alcohol. However, Islamism fired the zeal of the Mujahideen, who fought the Soviet Union to extinction in Afghanistan.^{35,36} Eventually, the Mujahideen who became the Taliban were Pakistani protégés who brought havoc to

the world with 9/11, while Pakistan was only one of three Islamic countries to recognise the Taliban regime. 9/11 distinctly changed the world in a direction the peace-loving world did not wish to go. Till today, Islamism seeks supremacy for the Islamic world at the cost of others. This type of intolerance by them is difficult to tolerate. When thought through deeply, with a little reliance on intuition, the sane and civilised free world has little choice but to destroy this type of evil that is being nurtured in Pakistan, which is showing no signs of abating.³⁷ An argument of rational contention is that if the terror emanating from Pakistan cannot be dismantled within a few years, it is arguably wiser and conscionable to brace oneself for the death of millions through nuclear war than to risk the terror of misguided militants and their intolerant religion for hundreds of years to come. Warriors don’t always count their dead nor the cost of war when war is fought on moral principles. In this case, the terror from Pakistan has continued undiminished for 20 years in the wake of the rigged elections in Kashmir of 1987,³⁸ though Pakistan supplied covert support to various militant groups in India, starting with the Naga militants in the 1960s.

India’s strategic depth and population creates an environment of unstable deterrence, where Pakistan may try as hard as it may within its economic constraints, and even eat grass to pacify itself, but can realistically not reach parity with India, unless the unpragmatism of India’s politicians increases with time rather than decreases.

While India's rigging of elections was wrong, Pakistan's organised infiltration into Kashmir was wrong and illegal, as well, contravening international law.³⁹ Two wrongs don't make a right.⁴⁰

Unstable Deterrence

Any "switch-on-switch-off" deterrence is bound to fail. First off, it is self-explanatory that nuclear deterrence seeks to prevent a stronger conventional army from invading a weaker one. Much like a poker game, nuclear deterrence makes those with stronger cards fold in the face of weaker opponents. Nuclear deterrence also aims to prevent a nuclear attack by any country on another. But what if the game of nuclear deterrence is improperly played? What if the bluff is called? What if the threat is dismissed and there is no retaliation? What if the opponent has insider information?

Now, stable nuclear deterrence is explained as deterrence when both parties have first-strike survival and second-strike capabilities.⁴¹ There is no difference between stable deterrence and credible deterrence, except that the study of stable deterrence allows us to explain what unstable deterrence is. Thus, weaponisation, deployment, delivery, targeting, and early warning are fundamental in this element for stable (and credible) deterrence. In such a situation, nuclear war can be expected to be 'understood' by each party to be meaningless. Thus, stable deterrence creates trust that each party will avoid war. Yet, this only brings nuclear war and "nuclear winters" to a halt, but does little for deterring conventional wars. Thus, when China finds that India has equal retaliatory capabilities as itself, it will tend to 'respect' India and will 'trust' India to avoid nuclear war just as it expects India to trust it to avoid war.

But, in the context of India and Pakistan, this 'trust' is hard to come by. Second-strike capabilities by Pakistan do not promise to inflict unacceptable damage on India that has 1.1 billion people. Assuming that all of India's arsenal of 50 tiny nuclear bombs (assumed at 5 kilotons each) can kill 75 million people in Pakistan, it will mean destroying 50 percent of Pakistan's population and industrial centres. But, all of Pakistan's 50 nuclear bombs (assumed at 15 to 20 kilotons each) would destroy about 100 million Indians, which is 10 percent of India. This unequal equation, weighed heavily in India's favour, owing to India's strategic depth and population, creates an environment of unstable deterrence, where Pakistan may try as hard as it may within its economic constraints, and even eat grass to pacify itself, but can realistically not reach parity with India, unless the unpragmatism of India's politicians increases with time rather than decreases.⁴² Hence, deterrence

becomes meaningless, or a myth, or perhaps a 'dirty' word. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons may still not be used as escalation to a conventional war, for the fear of what a nuclear war may do. For instance, what would Pervez Musharaff have done if Atal Bihari Vajpayee had not been the 'chicken' in 2003?

Unstable deterrence is further manifest when nations are unable to resolve differences by themselves and need outside party intervention to rescue them. Thus, when India and Pakistan must run to the United States each time they wish to be bailed out, mutual deterrence has not worked. It also needs to be realised that since the situation in Pakistan is so volatile, and India-Pakistan cross-border violations and ceasefire violations occur on a daily basis, the nuclear status, instead of deterring the nations from going to war, has probably destabilised the India-Pakistan relationship more than it would have been otherwise.⁴³

Moreover, deterrence becomes unstable any time the nuclear threat is applied, for then it would mean that deterrence did not work implicitly. In stable deterrence, in contrast, both parties recognise the danger and damage that each can inflict on the other, and so refrain from raising the stakes or annoying the other party. This, at least, is the conventional understanding of stable/unstable deterrence.

Thus, unstable deterrence will not stop war, while credible (stable) deterrence will not stop conventional wars. The lesson is that while every major nation cannot do without nuclear weapons, it cannot rely exclusively on nuclear weapons for national security, and must be prepared to advance and modernise its conventional forces to fight the wars that will eventually arise.

The Stability/Instability and Instability/Instability Paradoxes

The stability/instability paradox that served faithfully during the Cold War basically espouses that as states attain nuclear weapon status, thereby bestowing on them strategic stability, conventional war becomes more likely between them since both feel content that war will not escalate to the nuclear level, allowing them the freedom to slug it out conventionally,^{44,45,46} in addition, if the two sides find that conventional war becomes less costly, they are more

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likely to battle out their differences. The ‘paradox’ is actually because stable nuclear capability creates deterrence on the first count, but simultaneously, encourages conventional war since neither party is afraid of nuclear war. The first part of the stability/instability equation is related to stable deterrence where the full cycle of weaponisation, deployment, delivery, targeting, early warning, and command and control are well administered, thus, deterring nuclear war. The second part of the stability/instability equation pertains to conventional battles. Thus, the stability/instability equation states, “*strategic stability encourages conventional stability yet permits conventional instability.*”

In the India-Pakistan context, it has been adequately observed that nuclear weapons have not brought greater peace to them. Instead, since the 1998 explosions of both states, the conflict level has increased such that the increase is statistically significant. S Paul Kapur demonstrates convincingly that through 1971 to 1980, the border was relatively quiet and peaceful in the aftermath of the Bangladesh War; between 1980 and 1989, there was a frequency of 0.24 disputes per month; between 1990 and 1998, a *de facto* period when both parties knew the other possessed a nuclear bomb, the frequency of disputes increased to 0.72 per month; finally, in the overt nuclear period after 1998, the frequency of disputes was 0.82 per month.⁴⁷ Kapur backs up his findings with statistical tests, showing that the differences are statistically significant and cannot be attributed to chance. While this could be a sign of robustness of the stability/instability paradox, conventional conflict could also result from strategic instability. In the India-Pakistan context, it is possible that Pakistani adventurism is guided by conventional instability escalating to nuclear war. Therefore, Pakistan can practise sub-nuclear conflict and adventurism, resting soundly in the belief that it has India believing that any conventional escalation by India will lead to strategic instability. Hence, we have a situation of *strategic instability* given *conventional instability*. Thus, whether from the stability/instability or instability/instability perspectives, the fact is that conventional deterrence from possession of nuclear weapons has been proven to be a myth in the Indian-Pakistani context. And, given the instability/instability perspective, any deterrence at all—nuclear or sub-nuclear or conventional or sub-conventional—is a possible myth.

The logic of the stability/instability paradox is read from left to right, while the logic of the instability/instability paradox is read from right to left.

Essentially, nuclear capability permits an adventurous nation to take liberties with its opponent to address long-standing rivalries. If the said nation does not

wish to live in peace, it can hide behind its nuclear shield and carry out limited actions indefinitely till the other nation reaches its limit. India is not currently showing that it has reached its limit. Even if its pride is hurt, India finds itself unwilling to mete out equal punishment to its opponent, while continuing with low-level defensive battles. Hence, sub-nuclear war in the guise of conventional war continues unchecked. Next, a weapon state that behaves as a “loose cannon” creates intrinsic instability. Pakistan is displaying all the characteristics of a “loose cannon” with its internal strife, Islamisation, military power-grabs, and corrupt civilian politics. Consequently, Kapur terms the India-Pakistan situation as the instability/instability paradox. In the context of this latter paradox, a direct relationship exists between nuclear capability and conventional conflict, in contrast to an inverse relationship between nuclear deterrence and conventional conflict as encapsulated in the stability/instability paradox.⁴⁸

Instability should create greater deterrence, since fear of the “loose cannon” type of opponent increases.

The perspective that a few bombs can deter a mighty and aggressive opponent is actually an insane proposition. When a nation has only a few bombs and thinks it can deter stronger enemies, such as India thinking it can deter China, it is fooling only itself. No nation genuinely believes that India's deterrence is credible vis-à-vis China.⁴⁹ Such “half-hearted” deterrence also serves to be a “myth” of real deterrence. Thus, no strategic deterrence is “no deterrence”, full strategic deterrence does not deter conventional war, and half-hearted deterrence is a laughable deterrence that amounts to no deterrence. From all sides and angles, strategic deterrence is an incomplete deterrent. Hence, no large nation can afford to sacrifice its conventional weaponry, training, or response to asymmetric warfare by sole reliance on nuclear weapons.

Risks of Pakistan and China

India's politicians, bureaucrats, diplomats, and scientists scarcely exhibit a deep understanding of pragmatism and national pride or the excellence it takes to be a global power. Their full grasp of nuclear operations leaves much to be desired. Its military generals, marshals, and admirals believe in taking orders from their civilian bosses and so often don't say much for fear of rocking the boat and curtailing their careers.⁵⁰ Pakistan, too, is a nation racked with leadership uncertainty and internal threats, a nation on edge, with nerves perpetually taut,

riding two horses at the same time (the Taliban and the US). This combination is, of course, unique in the world, and again, no similarities or lessons can be conclusively drawn from the Cold War period. But, this combination makes for unstable deterrence, which places India and Pakistan on the top risk centres for nuclear war and conventional war. In addition, fearing that Pakistan's nukes may fall into terrorist hands, it has been generally talked that the US could potentially invade Pakistan solely to safeguard their own interests. These situations magnify unstable deterrence and create a very risky environment on the subcontinent. It would be logical to conclude that the world's most dangerous flashpoint for war is the subcontinent.⁵¹ Hence, credible deterrence is compromised while the chances of conventional war are further enhanced.

Some may say that instability should create greater deterrence, since fear of the "loose cannon" type of opponent increases. Well, that could be true if the threatening nation were scared of the second strike. Yet, when fear departs, for whatever sentimental or supra-rational reason, one reverts to the earlier argument of nuclear deterrence not deterring conventional war. Not all humans can be threatened, and rational and irrational humans both fall into that category. In fact, one can wonder whether conventional war, in fact, could actually be prescribed to resolve problems now before they can get potentially worse in the future. Such an argument will refute those who claim that "war is no solution." Unfortunately, well-planned and well-orchestrated war has been a solution technique for all of humanity's history.⁵²

In addition, the chance of conventional war breaking out anew between India and Pakistan is high because of the daily cross-border violations that have gone on relentlessly. With China, the border situation is not so volatile, and even if not under full control, does not currently threaten to escalate to nuclear war, unlike the case with Pakistan; however, China's continuous claims on Arunachal, frequent border crossings by its troops wherever they can, and non-stop harassment of Indian politicians and diplomats indicate that it has definite long-term designs on Indian territory, implying that conventional war between the two is a distinct possibility, notwithstanding nuclear capabilities. This is further self-evident from India's no first-strike policy, such that if China invades, the war will not be escalated to nuclear war by India.

Conclusion

This article discussed that neither unstable deterrence, nor half-hearted deterrence, and neither the stability/instability paradox nor the instability/instability paradox

can deter conventional war. There are important unresolved issues to resolve in this world that will necessarily continue to involve conventional force, especially in the China-India-Pakistan context where the ground situations are unstable. It is evident that India, on its part, needs to devote much more time and resources to defence production and planning for war rather than begging for peace. It can be logically concluded that increased focus on flexible warfare, asymmetric response, increased firepower, and doubled or tripled indigenous production of armaments is necessary for India since it lives in a dangerous neighbourhood that is not of its making. An argument can also be made that India needs thus to expend 4.5-5.0 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence in the immediate future, probably starting this year itself. Consequently, direct focus on improving India's engineering resources is a desideratum. It must be remembered that war is inevitable; in the long run, the nations that better prepare for war are the ones that prevail, while others bite the dust. India doesn't need to experiment with moralism nor fall into the smooth talk of foreign experts and nations that advocate dismantling of nuclear weapons. India must defend itself by itself: history has taught ample lessons and it is time now to apply those lessons in the real world.

(N.B. This is the concluding part of a two-part article on nuclear deterrence in South Asia by the author. The earlier part was published in the Winter 2009 issue of the *CLAWS Journal*.)

Notes

1. China's Nuclear Doctrine, NTI, <http://www.nti.org/db/China/doctrine.htm>, September 25,
2. Sharon Squassoni, "Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons", CRS Report for Congress, Received through the CRS Web, Order Code RS21237, February 17, 2005, http://209.85.173.132/search?q=cache:ZRVoLmv1laQJ:www.ndu.edu/library/docs/crs/crs_rs21237_17feb05.pdf+pakistan+right+to+nuclear+first+strike&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=8&gl=us
3. Rajat Pandit, "PM Convened N-Command Meeting on Sat", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, December 25, 2008, Page 1.
4. This includes 'flexible response' and graduated deterrence, where damage can be inflicted by all or any tools and weapons available to a nation, including psychological and economic.
5. Floors and ceilings to the cost of delivering nuclear weapons can be established empirically considering the quantum of materials, manufacturing, machining, and manpower required to produce them. They cost less than fighter airplanes and frigates

- each, but more than trucks and bulldozers. Mass production of delivery missiles can further bring down the costs per unit. Further, it is vastly more cost-effective to pursue effective missile systems in contrast to fighter aircraft and naval ships, since guided missiles can inflict as much destruction at lower net costs. [The writer is a cost engineer and brings his expertise to weigh on the subject].
6. Dinesh Mathur, "Chinese Perceptions of Various Territorial Disputes," *CLAWS Journal*, Summer 2008, p.135.
 7. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, *The Unknown Story: MAO* (New York: Anchor Books, 2006).
 8. Nowhere else in the world are dead bodies put up for display.
 9. Amarjit Singh, "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Nahi," *Realpolitik*, February 2007, pp. 46-49.
 10. Arpit Rajain, *Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia* (New Delhi : SAGE Publications, 2005), pp. 48-55.
 11. Phil Reeves, "Pakistan Hints its Nuclear Threat Was Real," *Independent World*, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/pakistan-hints-its-nuclear-threat-was-real-612459.html>, December 31, 2002.
 12. It is believed that General Musharaff did not explicitly hold out the threat of nuclear retaliation, but tacitly warned that he may use "unconventional conflict" in retaliation.
 13. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june02/powell_5-30.html, PBS Newshour, May 20, 2002.
 14. Christopher Hitchens, "The Case Against Colin Powell," *Toronto Globe & Mail* <http://www.commondreams.org/views/122600-103.htm>, December 26, 2000
 15. During the Kargil War, Bill Clinton intervened personally, making phone calls to the opposing leaders. The 1998 tit-for-tat tests resulted in sanctions by the USA. But, during the conventional Indo-Pak conflicts, the USA was content with post-war accords and minor display of strength, such as the USS *Enterprise* being sent to the Bay of Bengal in 1971, though the USSR naval task group tailed the *Enterprise* for three weeks after the war was over.
 16. Personal communication with an Indian analyst who would prefer not to be named, New Delhi, January 5, 2009.
 17. Former Prime Minister I K Gujral continues to advocate to the present day that use of any force against Pakistan, now or later, is inconceivable owing to nuclear weapons in both countries [based on personal communication with General Ved Malik, December 28, 2008]. Mr. Gujral made remarks to this effect during the discussion after a talk given by General Ved Malik at the India International Centre on December 18, 2008, attended also by Brajesh Mishra and Naresh Chandra. Apparently, it was Mr. Gujral who had

- stopped Indian troops from cross-border retaliations when he was prime minister, a ruling that continues to remain in force till today, the result of which can be concluded as being that terrorists from Pakistan continue to operate with impunity in India.
18. Henry Kissinger quoted in Kamal Matinuddin, *The Nuclearization of South Asia* (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 171-172—“[A] deterrent which one is afraid to implement when challenged, ceases to be a deterrent.”
 19. John J Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Cornell University Press, 1983), cited in Devin T Hagerty, *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, MA, 1998), p. 113.
 20. In 1948, Jawaharlal Nehru fell victim to the ploys of the United Kingdom to halt the war of liberation in Kashmir; in 1965, Lal Bahadur Shastri succumbed to Alexei Kosygin’s machinations to return the Haji Pir Pass that India troops had wrested at substantial loss of life; in 1972, the United States reportedly twisted Indira Gandhi’s arm to return 93,000 prisoners of war (POWs) to Pakistan, or else face “consequences”; in 2001, during the Indian airline hijacking incident, Vajpayee’s government released Al Qaeda operatives under the supposed influence of Bill Clinton who insisted that the hijacking be resolved peacefully (of course, the USA rued that arm-twisting when only a few months later some of the same released operatives became involved in planning the 9/11 attacks); after Operation Parakram in 2003, Colin Powell claimed he “stopped” war between India and Pakistan, possibly playing on Vajpayee’s fears of a nuclear war. Refer MD Nalapat, “Outside View: Two Responses to Terror,” http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Outside_View_Two_responses_to_terror_999.html, Manipal, India (UPI), January 15, 2009.
 21. Credible deterrence is activated only when the leader of a submitting country considers the threat of the threatening country as threatful. See Matinuddin, n. 18. Thus, General Musharaff’s nuclear threats on India were ‘credible’ because Vajpayee fell for them. In the event that the threat is not perceived, and the threatening nation fails to follow through when its threat is ignored, the threat lacks credibility.
 22. Hu, Richard Weixing, “India’s Nuclear Bomb and Future Sino-Indian Relations,” *East Asia: An International Quarterly*, March 22, 1999.
 23. Lt Gen Harbhajan Singh (Retd), “Engaging Pakistan,” *Hindustan Times*, Chandigarh, February 11, 2009.
 24. Reports at NDTV News Channel, December 25, 2008.
 25. Gordon Corera, *Shopping for Bombs* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
 26. *Ibid.*, pp. 103-105.
 27. That weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were not found in Iraq after the 2003 US invasion is true; but it is also true that there was irrefutable evidence that Iraq

- possessed WMDs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) knew in 2001 that Iraq was refining uranium, which could be for no other purpose except nuclear weapons. Moreover, the USA had themselves supplied the Iraq regime with chemical weapons that were not all exhausted, so obviously they knew that Iraq possessed WMDs! Chemical weapons can quickly be burnt, spilled on the ground, or thrown into rivers; yellowcake can be hidden in barns with cowdung cakes; hence, it becomes a search for a needle in a haystack to uncover WMDs (see Amarjit Singh, "Success of War Must be Examined," *Another Perspective, Star Bulletin*, 12(7), Sunday, January 7, 2007, <http://archives.starbulletin.com/2007/01/07/editorial/commentary3.html>).
28. Corera, n. 25, p. 87
 29. *Ibid.*, p. 90
 30. "Saudi-Pakistani Nuclear Linkage Marks the Opening of a Sunni Muslim Security Umbrella," http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6506/is_ai_n29038229, APS Diplomat News Service, November 10, 2003.
 31. Ewen MacAskill and Ian Traynor, "Saudis Consider Nuclear Bomb," <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/sep/18/nuclear.saudiarabia>, Vienna, September 2003.
 32. "Nuclear Deal: Pakistan Gets Free Crude Oil From Saudi Arabia," SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM, <http://www.sullivan-county.com/id3/pause.htm>, November 4, 2003
 33. B Muralidhar Reddy, "More Restrictions on *Madrasas*," <http://www.hindu.com/2005/12/03/stories/2005120305611400.htm>
 34. "Islamism," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamist#History_of_usage, accessed February 2009.
 35. B Raman, "Pakistani Madrasas: Questions & Answers," http://www.icrd.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=105&Itemid=104, August 5, 2005.
 36. "Islamism," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamism#Pakistan.27s_Islamization_campaign
 37. It is easily demonstrated that terror attacks on India have been continuing unabated since the Kashmir insurgency after the end of the Russian-Afghan War. In fact, cross-border terror attacks on India have only increased since 9/11. The last two years—2007 and 2008 – have especially seen an escalation of Pakistan-based terror on India. Instead of giving Pakistan two years to solve the problem, India has waited patiently for 20 years. Should India continue its soft policies under these circumstances?
 38. Piero Scaruffi, "A Timeline of the Indian Subcontinent," <http://www.scaruffi.com/politics/indian.html>, 1999.
 39. Virginia Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War* (I B Taurus & Co Ltd, 2003).
 40. 'Nixon's rule' is a joke that "if two wrongs don't make it right, try a third!" The

ingeniousness of Pakistani adventurism against Kashmir and India for over six decades leaves no conclusion except that Pakistan has tried not only three but more than three wrongs.

41. Dr. Zulfiqar Khan, *India-Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry: Perceptions, Misperceptions, and Mutual Deterrence* (Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), p. 40.
42. This unpragmatism is considerable. Bharat Karnad relates an ironic incident where Vajpayee as foreign minister in Desai's government, voted in the Cabinet for elimination of nuclear testing and weaponisation, at the probable urgings of Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta. The other negative vote was Morarji Desai's. Refer Bharat Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security* (MacMillan India Ltd., 2002), pp. 340-341.
43. S Paul Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 2.
44. Rajesh Rajagopalan, "What Stability-Instability Paradox: Sub-national Conflicts and the Nuclear Risk in South Asia," SASSU Research Paper No. 4, http://209.85.173.132/search?q=cache:a80GNr2Gml4J:www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/R_Rajagopalan.pdf+stability-instability+paradox&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=4&gl=us, accessed Feb 2009.
45. Kapur, n. 43, p. 33.
46. Michael Krepon, "The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia," May 2003, <http://209.85.173.132/search?q=cache:jbk6bKXvbOIJ:www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/kreponmay03.pdf+stability-instability+paradox&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us>, accessed Feb 2009.
47. Kapur, n. 43. p. 29.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
49. Karnad, n. 42, p. 333.
50. Ashley Tellis, *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), p. 287. "[I]ndian security managers appear determined to regulate the role of the military in nuclear matters to the maximum extent possible."
51. Hence, the consequences of nuclear fallout that can be environmentally damaging to the world, increase, with the tens and hundreds of bombs in the arsenals of India and Pakistan. This is in contrast to the situation in the Korean Peninsula, where even if the chance of Kim Jong Il using nuclear weapons is higher, the consequences to the world's environment are much lower because North Korea probably has all of six tiny bombs in its arsenal.
52. For those who say that "war is no solution", we only have to look at World War II which conclusively brought to an end the pain and torture that Germany and Japan subjected the world to. If the Allies had not gone to war, the solution would not have come.