
Homeland Security: India's Internal Security Reforms

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Internal Security Scenario

India's internal security remains a major area of concern. In the years following our independence, the Indian government focussed its energies mainly on the maintenance of law and order, communal peace and harmony, crime control and counter-insurgency, which was mainly confined to the northeast in the early years. However, in the past five decades or so, the ongoing insurgency in the northeast, the extinguished insurgency in Punjab, the dissidence and proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) the burgeoning Naxalite violence which is currently affecting 16 states (194 districts) of the Indian Union, the *jihad* terrorism unleashed by our unscrupulous western neighbour, poor governance in most states, all put together, have become serious enough to destabilise the Indian state if allowed to grow unchecked.¹ This realisation seemed to have dawned on a sluggish United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government after the 26 November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai.

In the days following the attacks, people came out on the streets, though peacefully, to protest the inaction on the part of the government in the face of growing internal threats and challenges. Public reaction to the growing terrorist activities in India should be seen in the light of a large number of incidents of terrorist attacks, during the year 2008, in different parts of the country. These included the terrorist attack on a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) camp in Rampur, serial bomb blasts in Jaipur, Bangaluru, Ahmedabad, Delhi, Tripura, Imphal and Guwahati, and on 26 November 2008, the savage attack by terrorists who came from Pakistan via the sea route to Mumbai in which around 166 civilians and police/

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security forces personnel were killed, including 26 foreign nationals, and several hundred persons were injured.²

As the public anger became palpable, the government was forced to act speedily. India's home minister and the chief minister of Maharashtra became the first two political casualties. The new home minister announced a spate of reforms, which were already in the pipeline. In the meanwhile, the perception was growing stronger that India's external and internal security was getting inextricably linked, especially on its western borders. A large number of India's internal security problems, are connected to *jihadi* groups based in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Pakistan's intelligence agencies and the military are funding, training, and abetting terror in India. These linkages now stand fully exposed; however, despite a restrained but tough stance taken initially, the national leadership now seems confused regarding the way forward. The likelihood of war with Pakistan, if their sponsored terror activities continue unabated, cannot be ruled out.

The succeeding paragraphs give some relevant details of India's internal security reforms and their lack of it in certain areas. Maritime security has not been included as that forms a major input by itself and has to be dealt with separately.

Measures to Strengthen the Internal Security Apparatus

In view of the repeated terror attacks on the Indian soil and the disjointed actions by the state government and the police following the attacks in Mumbai, and the public outcry thereafter, the government was forced to speedily undertake a number of internal security reviews and adopt measures which could either preempt future terror attacks or at least improve the crisis management after such attacks occur. Several measures have been taken/are underway since then. These are briefly indicated below.

Strengthening the Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs)

- The CPMFs have been expanded by the creation of 40 additional battalions [20 each in the Sashastra Sena Bal (SSB) and Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP)] with a view to strengthen border security arrangements. Recently, a proposal for the creation of 29 additional battalions of the Border Security Force (BSF) has also been approved. A decision has been taken to raise 10 specialised battalions in the CRPF, trained in commando/jungle warfare techniques to deal with Naxalites and other extremists/insurgents, particularly in forested and other difficult areas and terrains, are in various stages of being raised.

- The overall ceiling of recruitment in the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) has been raised from 96,000 to 1,45,000, and 15,000 personnel have augmented the actual strength of the CISF in the last four years.
- Four operational regional hubs of the National Security Guards (NSG), in Chennai, Hyderabad, Kolkata and Mumbai, and two regional centres of the NSG in Hyderabad and Kolkata, are being established.
- Five acres of land has also been allotted to the NSG at the airport in Delhi and a Quick Reaction Team has already been positioned there, to enable immediate movement in the event of any emergency.
- Notifications have also been issued under clause (d) of sub-section (i) of section 6 of the Aircraft Act, 1934, and section 137 of the NSG Act to empower the government/NSG to requisition any aircraft in the event of any emergency.
- A scheme of Rs. 4,185 crore, is being implemented for modernisation of CPMFs to increase their operational capabilities. Under this scheme, the CPMFs are being equipped with latest weapons, surveillance and communication equipment, vehicles, body protection gear/equipments, etc.
- Procurement of one 100-seater large transport aircraft and two 50-seater medium transport aircraft for the Air Wing of the Border Security Force (BSF) is underway.
- A decision has also been taken to procure 8 Dhruv helicopters from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). Four helicopters are expected to be delivered during 2009 and the remaining in 2010. These aircraft will help the CPMFs to carry out their duties in a more effective manner and will also be used for logistical and other operational support purposes, particularly in the Naxalite affected areas.

Strengthening of Intelligence Machinery

- A Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) has been created and operationalised in the Intelligence Bureau at Delhi. MAC will share intelligence with all other intelligence agencies, including agencies of the state governments and union territories. Likewise, all other agencies will share intelligence with MAC.
- Subsidiary MACs (S-MAC) have been established in many state capitals and, in due course, S-MACs will be established in every state capital. A Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI) has also been set up.
- A large number of posts in the Intelligence Bureau, which had been frozen as a part of the policy of optimisation, have also been revived and additional posts sanctioned, in order to strengthen its capabilities.

- Action has also been initiated to set up a National Intelligence Grid to evolve online and real-time flow of intelligence and security related information between the Centre and the states.
- A proposal for an amount of Rs.147.80 crore has been approved on 30 January 2009, for this purpose, and the establishment of secure online connectivity between the various agencies represented in MAC, between MAC and the S-MACs, and the S-MACs and the State Special Branches, is at an advanced stage of implementation.
- Special efforts are also being made to strengthen the intelligence capabilities of the states by earmarking funds for this purpose under the Police Modernisation Scheme.

Strengthening Legal and Investigative Framework

- The National Investigation Agency (NIA) Act, 2008, has been enacted to provide for the setting up of the NIA to investigate selected cases of offences under certain Acts which have been mentioned in the Schedule and which, *inter-alia*, include the Unlawful Activities Prevention Amendment (UAPA) Act.
- The NIA has been constituted and a director general appointed, along with other officers and staff, and infrastructure. Three cases have since been taken over for investigation by the NIA. ³

Imperfections of the State Security Structure

Politicisation of the State Police

Although the government has taken some important measures to strengthen the central forces and rectify the intelligence machinery at the national level, the weaknesses of the state police and the legal structure of India remain unaddressed. One of the most glaring weaknesses is the politicisation of the Indian police. Police forces in large parts of India are heavily communalised, politicised and corrupt. One of the most fitting examples of politicisation of the police, at its worst, was seen in Gujarat during the religious terrorism against the minority community in 2002, for which no one has been held politically accountable, leave alone establishing criminal responsibility. Such politicisation makes the police force biased, ineffective, and corrodes the police leadership and such police officers cannot be expected to lead a police force from the front when a situation so demands. More light has been thrown on the aspect of insulating the police administration later on in this article.

Dealing with the Naxalites

The current police operations, especially in Chhattisgarh, Jharkand, Orissa and Bihar against the Naxalites, lack vibrancy and expertise. In a rather muted comment, *The Economist*, a highly respected international weekly, on 25 June 2009, writes, "There are not enough brave politicians, honest officials and well-trained police to fight India's Maoist insurrection."⁴

The fact is that despite a large number of increases in the strength of Central Police Forces (CPFs) and upgradation of their weapons and equipment, the state police remain untrained, ill equipped and poorly led. The major weaknesses in the affected states are as under:

- Lack of political will to come to grips with the problem of militancy.
- Lack of training and modern equipment for conducting anti-Naxal operations in the affected areas.
- Lack of human intelligence, which is actionable at the tactical levels, which would enable operations against the Naxalites.
- Inability of the states to gain moral and material ascendancy over the Naxalites by which the states concerned could deal with the militants from a position of advantage which is essential in counter-insurgency and counter-guerrilla warfare.
- Inability of the police leadership to motivate the constabulary in the states.
- Inability of the Centre or the states to carry out any developmental work to win over the hearts and minds of the people as the writ of the government does not run in the areas controlled/dominated by the Naxalites and the government staff are unwilling to serve in such areas.

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Development

The Planning Commission had detailed a group of experts to work on the development challenges in the extremist affected areas. This group submitted its findings in April 2008. An excerpt of this report reveals the extent and the gravity of the problem: "The development paradigm pursued since independence has aggravated the prevailing discontent among marginalised sections of society.

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This paradigm has been conceived and imposed from above, insensitive to the needs and concerns of the poor, causing displacement, destroying social organisation, cultural identity, resource base, and has generated multiple conflicts undermining their communal solidarity making them increasingly vulnerable to exploitation. There are different kinds of movements and to call them all 'law and order problem' is to find a rationale for suppression. The tensions must be contextualised in terms of social, economic and political background. The people's right to livelihood and a dignified and honourable

existence must be brought back on the agenda." In the Naxal context, it is indeed a tall order because it requires a revolutionary administrative change in some of the most poorly governed states of the Indian Union.

Legal Framework and Police Structure

India's legal framework and the police structure have a colonial legacy and are not in tune with the recent legislations relating to the Panchayati Raj, human rights, and right to information, etc. The Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), 1898, the Police Act, 1861, and the Evidence Act, 1871, were put in place to maintain the British rule in India by force. Each of the above Acts gives priority to the offences against the state, whereas traditional crime and criminal procedures are given a lower priority and are enunciated later in the concerned Acts. Similarly, the Police Act, despite its preamble, gives the pride of place to collection and communication of intelligence relating to public order and peace. The prevention and detection of crime is included among the duties of the police only in Section 23. Thus, structural reform of the police has to be implemented along with far-reaching legal reform.⁵

Bibek Debroy the well known Delhi-based economist, writing about police reforms in the *Indian Express* on 05 August 2009 says: "We have known what needs to be done for almost 30 years. Eight reports from the National Police Commission (led by Mr Dharam Vira, ICS) including a Model Police Act, began to flow in 1979. Confronted by legislative and executive inaction, what does one do? Perhaps resort to courts and PILs. So we had the Prakash Singh and NK Singh PIL in the Supreme Court in 1996; the Ribeiro Committee in 1998-99; the Padmanabhaiah Committee in 2000; the Police Act Drafting Committee (headed by the noted Jurist

Soli Sorabjee) in 2005. Finally, we got a model Police Bill in 2006. State Governments would implement it. Then the Home Minister promised a new Police Act (to replace the legislation from 1861) would be passed by the Parliament and implemented in union territories in 2007—nothing happened in Delhi and close to nothing happened in the States.”⁶

Supreme Court Intervenes

The Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed in the Supreme Court by former Director General of Police (DGP) Prakash Singh and NK Singh pleaded that despite clear-cut and exhaustive recommendations of the National Police Commission, governments were not taking them seriously and there were virtually no reforms taking place in the Police Department. After many years of arguments and counter-arguments of governments, involving non-governmental organisations (NGOs), organisations of civil society and media houses, the Supreme Court passed an order on 11 January 2007. The apex court directed both union and state governments to implement recommendations of the commission. The court also gave some valuable guidelines and suggestions. This judgment has now become the guiding principle of police reforms in India. The main points of the judgment passed are as given in the succeeding paragraphs.

Establishment of a National Security Commission: This was for the union government to implement. The commission would comprise the prime minister (PM) and other functionaries of the government. It would also have chief ministers (CMs) of all federating states as members. Apart from this, the commission would also invite experts from different walks of life.

Establishment of a State Security Commission: This direction was for the state governments to implement. The idea was similar as above and it was aimed at providing inputs to the state governments on various related issues.

Selection of DGP from a Panel and Fixation of His Tenure: This was to ensure that the DGP should not be frequently removed and transferred. The top police functionary should be given maximum amount of functional freedom to perform and deliver. The selection of DGP from the proposed panel was to be done by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) and officers of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).

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Separation of Law and Order from Investigation: In fact, this was one of the most important recommendations of the commission. With the changing pace of time, the nature, pattern, *modus operandi*, magnitude and intensity of crimes have undergone a metamorphosis. To tackle it, we require a dedicated team of officers to investigate and prosecute. The separation of law and order from crime is one such step in this direction.

Police Establishment Board: This board was to make the transfer and posting of subordinate police officers more institutionalised and immune from political interference.

Constitution of Complaint Authority: The Supreme Court asked the state governments to constitute a police complaint authority headed by a sitting or retired judge to look into complaints against erring police officers so that complaints against them are looked into by an authority other than the police itself because over a period of time, serious complaints against the police like murder, dacoity, rape, loot, fake encounter, etc have frequently been levelled, but many of the complaints, especially by the poorer sections of the society, are suppressed.

Police Reforms Undertaken So Far

The key to all reforms is insulating the police administration and delinking law enforcement from executive control. This has been effectively adopted in many countries. However, in India, the political masters and the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) bureaucracy control the police. Former DGP Prakash Singh states, "The politicians and the IAS bureaucrats exercise a stranglehold on the State Police structure and, hence, they are not willing to allow this power base to be eroded." Most of the states, while visibly accepting the Supreme Court judgment, have resorted to many ways of diluting, delaying and circumventing it. The Commonwealth of Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) which tracks compliance of the Supreme Court directives has confirmed that the states most compliant are in the northeast: Arunachal, Mizoram, Nagaland, Meghalaya and Manipur. Barring Madhya Pradesh, none of the larger states is compliant with any of the directives.

As many as 12 states have enacted new legislation, four have completed drafting and tabled Bills and nine are currently drafting them. But the essence lies in the content of the legislation. The legislation drafted must not fall short in areas like accountability, transparency, superintendence and control over the police and people's participation. Some states have resorted to some meaningful police reforms such as Meghalaya, Arunachal, Himachal, Tripura, Karnataka, Kerala, MP and Rajasthan. The Rajasthan experiment is most versatile and

successful and covers 150 police stations in 11 districts. What needs to be studied and emulated from the Rajasthan experience is:

- What were the reasons that led to the reforms?
- What were the factors that led to the success?
- Can they be replicated elsewhere?
- How were the communities persuaded to get involved and invest their time and resources?⁷

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National Human Rights Commission

A bright ray of hope was the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission by an Act of Parliament in 1993, and although it is fully financed by the government, it has taken many independent steps (for example, taking the position at the World Conference on Racism that caste was a form of discrimination; and the Gujarat riots where the commission said that there was government and police inaction). Both the police and government follow the NHRC's directives, as it is a statutory body. For example, in 1996, the commission said that it will be mandatory to report custodial deaths/rapes within 24 hours to the commission and to the Police Headquarters and a First Information Report (FIR) must be registered in the police station.

The UPA government, in its second term, must take the necessary steps to restructure, depoliticise and humanise the Indian police force and take the initiative for legal reform. There are many ways by which the central government can influence the states. One way could be through preconditions to financial allocations. The absence of these reforms, when added to poor governance and indifferent administration in most of our states, constitutes a lethal mix for alienating large sections of our population leading to militancy, insurgencies and adverse law and order in the states. These give rise to greater demand for police and paramilitary forces and the vicious circle gets drawn without deriving societal benefits.

Modernisation and New Raisings

Modernisation of State Police Forces

While police in India is a state subject, the Union Home Ministry under the Modernisation Scheme provides assistance in cash and kind to the state governments and union territories in the form of 100 percent grants-in-aid to be utilised for expenditure of non-recurring nature such as: purchase of vehicles,

wireless equipment, computers and other sophisticated equipment and for development of critical infrastructure in extremist effected areas, setting up crime and criminal tracking network and systems and for establishment of counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist schools. This year, the total assistance to the states amounts to Rs 1,924 crore (\$392 million) and Rs 176.80 crore (\$36 million) to union territories.

Raising of India Reserve Battalions (IRBs) in States

IRBs have been raised in the states for strengthening the capabilities of the states, and to reduce their dependence upon CPFs to deal with various types of law and order and internal security situations. The scheme of raising India Reserve Battalions in the states was introduced in the early 1970s. The scheme provides for assistance to the states by way of the costs, including one year's provision of salaries, and some element of the infrastructure/ capital cost. Apart from creating a well-trained armed police force in the states, IRBs could also be deployed outside the state. Considering the response of the states in terms of actual raising of sanctioned battalions, the level of financial assistance has been progressively stepped up. Presently, 75 percent of the standard raising costs of Rs.17 crore and assistance for infrastructure and capital costs with a ceiling of Rs.15 crore is being provided to the state governments for raising IRBs. So far, 145 IRBs had been sanctioned; including 60 in the last 5 years, and 102 battalions have been raised. The Ministry of Home Affairs is closely monitoring the progress.

Task Force to Fight the Naxals

After the recent reverses suffered by the state and the CPFs in Chhattisgarh and elsewhere in Naxal affected areas, the government has decided to set up a central force to tackle the Naxals. It is proposed to set up a 26,000-strong task force that will be equipped and trained to carry out clearing operations in Naxalite affected areas of the country. It is learnt that 26 battalions, picked from across paramilitary forces, will be placed under an officer of additional director general rank. Sources said the process has already started and troops are being identified for this purpose. They will receive specialised training in different places, including military training institutions. The aim is to first prepare and train the force at the earliest. Having already spoken to chief ministers of Naxal-affected states for coordinated operations, the Ministry of Home Affairs feels there is now a broad understanding that drastic steps will have to be taken and most state governments are on board with this decision.⁸

Budget Allocation to Central Police Forces

One obvious fallout of the security reviews that have taken place after the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai is the substantial increase in the budget allocated to the Home Ministry for police modernisation and other security related reforms. Under the head police, Demand No: 53, includes Central Police Forces (CPFs); Delhi Police; Modernisation of Police Force; Hi-Tech Surveillance and Creation of Infrastructure for Borders and Coastal Security; Provision for Infrastructure in Left Wing Extremist (LWE) Affected Areas; Crime and Criminal Tracking Network; Assistance to Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terror Schools; Criminal Investigation and Vigilance; and Setting up of Integrated Check Posts. The increase of the total budget (Revenue and Capital) is Rs 12,094.61 crore (\$2.5 billion) which is an increase of 56 percent if we compare the Budget Estimates (BE) of last year, Rs 21,715.25 crore (\$4.48 billion), to the BE of the current year which is Rs 33,809.86 crore (\$6.9 billion). However, if we compare the figures of the Revised Estimates (RE) of last year, Rs 25,439 crore (\$5.2 billion), to the BE of the current year, then the increase is 33 percent.

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The capital budget this year which is Rs 7,528.82 crore (\$1.54 billion) is an increase of Rs 3,573.32 crore (\$730 million) from last year's RE which is an increase of 90 percent over last year's RE figure of Rs 3,955.50 crore. The revenue budget marks an increase of Rs 4,797.54 crore (\$980 million) i.e. 22 percent from last year's RE. (See Table 1 for details of the budget allocation to each force).

**Table 1: Budget Allocations, 2009-2010
Central Police Forces and Delhi Police (in Rs crore)**

	RE	BE	Increase	
	2008-2009	2009-2010	(Fig)	(%)
CRPF	5,510.10	6,973.86	1,463.76	26.5%
BSF	5,376.99	6,488.14	1,111.15	20.6%
ITBP	1,305.07	1,540.16	235.09	18.0%
CISF	2,001.15	2,430.98	429.83	21.4%
AR	1,731.22	2,329.11	597.89	34.5%
SSB	1,266.29	1,558.10	291.81	23.0%
NSG	204.08	313.80	109.72	53.76%
TOTAL	17,394.90	21,634.15	4,239.25	24.37%
Delhi Police	2,087.74	2,932.53	844.79	28.8%
	BE	RE	BE	

	2008-09	2008-09	2009-10	
Total Expenditure	21,715.25	25,439.00	33,809.86	Police Forces
Budget Increase	BE 2008-09 to BE 2009-10, Rs12, 094.61 Crore = 56%			
Budget Increase	RE 2008-09 to BE 2009-10 Rs 8,370.86 crore = 33%			

Modernisation of Central Police Forces

In order to meet the challenges posed by militancy, insurgency and terrorist activities in various parts of the country, the government had approved a five-year plan (2002-07) for modernisation of 6 CPFs viz. Assam Rifles, BSE, CRPF, CISE, ITBP and NSG with an outlay of Rs.3,740.71 crore (\$760 million). The period of implementation of the scheme was later extended by three years i.e. up to 2009-10. An amount of Rs. 2,462 crore (\$502 million) has been spent under the scheme till 31 March 2009.

The government had separately approved a modernisation plan for the SSB involving an expenditure of Rs. 444.33 crore (\$90 million) over a period of three years starting from 2005-06. As in the case of other CPFs, the period of implementation has been extended till 31 March 2010. An amount of Rs. 250 crore (\$50 million) has been spent till 31 March 2009. The provisions made under the scheme for modernisation of the CPFs are in addition to the normal provisions being made for weaponry, equipment, communications, mobility, clothing, tentage, etc. in the normal budget.

Delhi Police (DP)

Delhi Police is charged with the responsibility of maintaining and enforcing law and order in Delhi. Its responsibility also extends to traffic management, providing VIP security, licensing and foreigners registration, etc. Law and order is a reserved subject that has been retained by the central government. The expenditure of DP is being met by the central government with effect from 01 August, 1996. This year, DP has been given Rs 844.79 crore (\$172 million) more in view of its increasing responsibility of maintaining law and order and to combat the threat of terrorism in the national capital. The budgetary allocation for Delhi Police this year is Rs 2,932.53 crore (\$598 million).

Expenditure of Central Police Forces

Actual annual expenditure of the CPFs is increasing rapidly. In the last eight years, the expenditure has doubled. The total budget allocated in 2009-10 for all is Rs 21,634.15 crore (\$4.4 billion) that is about four times the expenditure during the year 1999-2000. (See Table 2 for the detailed chart).⁹

Table 2: Actual Expenditure on CPFs During the Period 1999-2000 to 2008-09
(in Rs crore)

Year	AR	BSF	CISF	CRPF	ITBP	NSG	SSB	Total
1999-2000	584.81	2,021.72	740.54	1,528.72	394.59	89.16	317.51	5,677.05
2000-2001	635.32	2,157.78	802.30	1,653.25	416.06	90.34	322.28	6,077.33
2001-2002	776.25	2,399.02	860.55	1,894.42	417.08	82.79	327.03	6,757.14
2002-2003	711.20	2,668.41	936.65	961.13	470.25	95.90	325.77	6,169.31
2003-2004	929.15	2,970.24	982.19	2,087.78	468.32	113.81	315.92	7,867.41
2004-2005	1005.64	2,635.76	1,061.24	2,516.96	552.72	128.00	381.84	8,282.16
2005-2006	1314.17	3,560.45	1,134.07	3,228.03	576.25	140.28	581.97	10,535.22
2006-2007	1478.29	3,398.85	1,225.59	3,642.40	707.99	151.19	779.92	11,384.23
2007-2008	1541.81	3,879.00	1,376.23	3,911.69	1,000.73	163.90	943.70	12,817.06

Conclusion

The CPFs together with the internal security element of the Ministry of Defence (Rashtriya Rifles) and the state police forces of all 28 states of the Indian union and seven union territories, along with 145 IRBs, altogether number considerably more than five million men in uniform. Thus, combining India's armed manpower for internal security (minus the Indian armed forces) and their budget allocations should, by all reckoning, have ensured civil security and internal stability in India. However, it is ironic that these huge numbers of armed security personnel and the expenditure incurred on them, along with the security measures undertaken by the government so far, do not seem to make the public feel any safer, and large swathes of national territory, some say up to 42 percent, still remain ungoverned. All are aware that the weaknesses lie in the areas of political and administrative accountability, transparency, superintendence and control over the police, proper training and equipping of the police force, and people's participation that would also ensure actionable intelligence. The government needs to introspect and rectify the fault lines by evolving pragmatic development plans and operational strategies and vigorous implementation of the same.

Currently, it seems that except for establishing some cantonments in certain sectors, employment of the army to fight the Naxals is not envisaged. However, from the existing state of affairs in Chhattisgarh and Jharkand and in other states too, it does not seem that the state police forces have the necessary motivation and the 'stomach' to fight the Naxals. Years of politicisation and neglect cannot be undone in a hurry and one option available to the government is that instead of raising ad hoc organisations like the Task Force against Naxals, existing Rashtriya

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Rifles sectors which are organised like divisional headquarters and comprise all types of staff (operational, logistics and intelligence) or existing infantry divisions may be employed for a fixed period of say one year to clear the militants from specified areas and hand over the same to the state and CPFs. By this time, it is hoped that the police will gear themselves up for the mission. The areas of operations of the army will have to notified as disturbed areas and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act will have to be promulgated by the central government. Development plans will have to be progressed side by side. If the government means business, the strong steps must be taken immediately. Prolonging the disease will only make the surgery more complicated.

Notes

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