Illegal Bangladeshi Migration: Evaluating India-Bangladesh Approaches

Sanjay Bhardwaj

In an overarching concern to protect its territorial integrity and social harmony, illegal cross-border migration is regarded as a vital issue for India’s national security. The inter-state relations are marked by a kind of turbulence on account of several illegal transnational activities and ethno-cultural conflicts. These could be attributed to a great extent to Bangladeshi migration to India. The linkages between the internal politico-security landscape and the external environment have made the issue of illegal migration critical for the national security strategy.

Historically, there is significant variation in border control priorities. Military defence and economic regulations have traditionally been central to the border concerns, but many of the states are retooling and reconfiguring their border regulatory apparatus to prioritise policing.¹ These are more realist views to control illegal border activities and ensure territorial security and, thus, are fundamentally above inter-state relations. However, in the last few decades, state boundaries have become irrelevant with the advent of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) revolution premised on satellite and information technologies

Dr Sanjay Bhardwaj is Assistant Professor, Centre for South Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
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...and the consequences of globalisation of economies and cultures. Thereby, the concept of border management has also undergone a sea-change. The erstwhile problem of migration has now metamorphosed from being a demographic, economic and cultural challenge into a national security threat owing to the violent non-state actors’ activities occurring across the borders. The relevance of military and economic borders has declined significantly but with the growing vulnerability and trans-national activities, policing of the border has expanded considerably. In fact, the policing objective of a state is to deny territorial access to undesirables, whom Peter Andrew terms as “Clandestine Transnational Actors” (CTAs). The CTAs are as dramatically varied as their motives. They may be driven by economic and political asylum, high profits and market demand or the desire to carry out politically or religiously inspired acts of violence. They may be highly organised or disorganised and operate regionally or globally. What has changed over time is the increasing nexus between the migrants and the CTAs, and their methods and speed of cross-border movement.

Being the centrepiece of South Asia, the ‘hot’ to ‘tepid’ Indian borders also face severe security threats from these CTAs. The cross-border movement of illegal migrants has spoiled the environment to the extent that cross-border firing and killings between, or by, the border security agencies have become a regular phenomenon. In delivery, the role of the state has remained profoundly coercive. These concerns have been elaborated in the light of arising socio-economic and politico-security threats to the Indian state and its border management priorities to control illegal migrant movements. This research has highlighted the socio-economic and psychological problems faced by the people of India.
and also analysed the political manoeuvring taking place due to the flow of migrants from Bangladesh to India.

**Migration: Nature and Origin**

Migration on a permanent or temporary basis has been one of the most important survival strategies adopted by people for centuries in the face of natural or human caused disasters. Wars, persecution, climatic changes, environment degradation and economic factors have been the primary movers of people.\(^4\) Literally, migration means crossing the boundary of a political or administrative unit for a certain minimum period and intermingling with similar ethno-lingual people on a permanent basis. Internal migration refers to a move from one area to another within a country. International migration means crossing the frontiers that separate one country from another. However, some scholars argue that internal and international migration are part of the same process, and should be analysed together.\(^5\)

The issue of migration assumes enormous significance in India-Bangladesh relations, particularly after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975. After India’s role in the liberation of Bangladesh, both countries followed a policy of expanding and deepening their friendly ties. Post-1975, the anti-Mujib military regimes formulated their state policy based on radical Islamisation and anti-Indianism. Resultantly, extensive migration was witnessed\(^6\) and has remained a continuous process due to fear and insecurity among the Hindus. In fact, about ten million Hindus took refuge in India during the liberation war of Bangladesh.\(^7\) Many went back but a sizeable undocumented section stayed back and mingled with the mainstream of India’s life.\(^8\) West Bengal, a destination for poor Bangladeshis, is bounded by Bangladesh on the eastern side, with nine border districts.\(^9\) According to an estimate by the Border Police Department, about 1,000 people cross the border each day and enter West Bengal.\(^10\) This ongoing migration has disturbed the demographic
profile of many of the bordering Indian states. Traditionally, these infiltrators have been engaged in smuggling of goods, drugs, gold, and cattle lifting\textsuperscript{11}.

However, the issue of migration from Bangladesh has been a controversial subject for a long time. Initially, migration had started in the late 19th century British India and subsequently continued upon the partition of India, and even after the creation of East Pakistan in 1947 and Bangladesh in 1971. In fact, between 1911 and 1931, more than a million Bengalis migrated from Mymensing to the low density districts of the Brahmaputra valley in Assam and by 1951, more than half a million Bengalis had migrated to Assam. This influx continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s and the population in Assam increased by 35.1 percent between 1951 and 1961 (compared with an all-India decennial growth rate of 21.6 percent); between 1961 and 1971 (according to the 1971 census), it increased by 34.4 percent compared to the all-India average of 24.6 percent.\textsuperscript{12} Though this migration had been taking place historically, these people were not recognised as Bangladeshi migrants until 1971. It was after the creation of Bangladesh that those who migrated from Bangladesh began to be considered illegal Bangladeshi migrants. The Indira-Mujib Agreement of 1974 makes 1971 the cut-off year for accommodating the migrants of Bangladesh as Indian citizens. But the problem remained a contentious issue between the two countries, because the migrants would generally conceal the correct year of their migration to India.\textsuperscript{13}

**Migration and Conflict**

The issue of Bangladeshi migration in India has become a major concern for policy makers in recent years. Indeed, India’s eastern border is facing major illegal activities viz. the influx of illegal migrants, migration
invoked violent conflicts, terrorism, insurgency, trafficking of drugs, human, arms and animals. According to the Group of Ministers (GoM) Report, there are approximately 15 million Bangladeshi nationals who have migrated illegally and settled in different states of India.\textsuperscript{14}

The issue of migration is now viewed as a threat to the internal security of India. Thus, the demand for tightening the border, and its, fencing, to prevent illegal migration has become one of the critical components of India’s policy and strategy.

Migration of Bangladeshis into India, especially into Assam and Tripura, has led to numerous clashes, most of which revolve around the land and language issues. The resentment of the Bengalis in Tripura has led to even greater violence than in Assam, perhaps because of the fact that the original majority communities of Tripura have now been reduced to minorities. According to a report, there are two million voters whose names had been deleted from the voter list of Bangladesh during 1991-95. This, itself substantiates the large scale of immigration from Bangladesh to India.\textsuperscript{15} The growth rates of the Muslim population, according to the 2001 census, “are the highest precisely in the districts that share a border with, or lie close to the border with Bangladesh, for example, in Assam this is particularly in Dhubri, Barpeta, Karimganj, and Hailakandi.” By contrast, in upper Assam, the “heartland of the indigenous Assamese Muslims,” the growth rates for both Muslims and Hindus are quite similar. These contrasting figures, says Wasbir Hussain, lend “credence to the widely held belief that illegal migration from Bangladesh” has been the source of the gradual increase in the proportion of Muslims in Assam.\textsuperscript{16}
Since partition, the migration issue has been dominant in the politics of Assam but it was only in the late Seventies that the movement against illegal migration gained vibrancy. During the period of the Assam Movement\textsuperscript{17} against illegal migration, ethnic and religious riots, demonstrations and general civil disorder resulted in as many as 5,000 deaths and dislocation of one million people. The two large massacres of migrant Muslims in Nellie and Chaolkhowas Chapori gave the anti- migration forces an increasingly xenophobic tenor.\textsuperscript{18} The six-year-long movement came to an end with the signing of the Assam Accord between the Government of India and the All Assam Students Union (AASU) in 1985. Clauses 9.1 and 9.2 of the Assam Accord solely pleaded:

The international border shall be made secure against future infiltration by erection of physical barriers like barbed wire fencing and other obstacles at appropriate places. Patrolling by security forces on land and riverine routes all along the international border shall be set up. Besides the arrangements mentioned above and keeping in view security considerations, a road all along the international border shall be constructed so as to facilitate patrolling by the security forces.

It is, therefore, due to the Assam movement, that the Government of India took the infiltration issue gravely and proposed the border fencing along the India-Bangladesh border way back in the 1980s. Prior to this also, there were demands from different corners to control the illegal movements across the border. However, it can be well understood that a fear psychosis has been operating quite deeply upon the issue of Bangladeshi migration in the society of Assam. The fact that Assam lags behind in the developmental agenda, and the ruling class needs issues to divert the attention of the people from their failure to deliver, has led to aggravation of the situation, from ethnic conflict to the consequences of migration.
Causes of Migration from Bangladesh
The “push” and “pull” factors are the most important variables in migration. “Push” or the impelling factors refer to the poor economic conditions and the resultant economic misery and lack of opportunities for advancement which push people out of a region in search of better livelihood opportunities. The “push” factors are, thus, the ones, which more or less compel people to leave a place. “Pull” factors, on the other hand, are factors like better employment opportunities, higher wages, facilities and amenities of modern life that encourage migration. In the case of Bangladeshi migration, multiple factors have paved the way for migration to India and other parts of the world.

Porous Border
The present context of migration neglects the historical population movements in the subcontinent. In fact, the entire issue of ‘illegal’ migration from Bangladesh to India is an absurd concept as there is no idea of legal migration in this region, involving one of the longest border sharing areas between countries. It covers a length of 4,096.7 km abutting six out of seven Bangladeshi divisions (Chittagong, Dhaka, Khulna, Rajshahi, Rangpur and Sylhet) and five Indian states viz. West Bengal (2,216.7 km), Tripura (856 km), Meghalaya (443 km), Mizoram (318 km), and Assam (262 km). The border includes plains, mountains, rivers, wetlands, jungle terrain, agricultural lands, national parks, sanctuaries, reserve forests, large estuaries and enclaves with remarkable biological and environmental diversity. Not being fully demarcated on the ground, the boundary, in many places, cuts through rivers, mountains, char lands, agriculture lands, and public institutions, and has resulted in the emergence of many enclaves on the border areas. This unique intermix of habitation as close as on the boundary itself, leaves the border areas heavily populated. Similarly, the people of both countries work in close proximity, using the land till the last
The lack of permanent boundary pillars and fencing on the border creates patrolling problems, and facilitates illegal movement across the border.

Most notably, the border has 6.5 km of undemarcated boundaries, spread into three sectors. First, in the Assam sector (2.5 km of Lathitila/Dhumabari); second, in the West Bengal sector (1.5 km of the Berubari sector at Mouza Daikhata-56 Khudipara-Singhpara); third, in the Tripura sector (2.5 km of the Muhuri river of the Belonia sector at Naokhali/Comilla). There are also some adversely possessed exchangeable and non-exchangeable enclaves. India has 111 enclaves in Bangladesh (17,258.24 acres) and Bangladesh has 51 enclaves (7,083.72 acres) inside India. This facilitates easy cross-border movement. Adverse possession takes place due to the riverine nature of the border at certain places that leaves chars after the floods. The flows of 54 cross-border rivers constitute approximately 1,000-km-long riverine borders. When the velocity drops, sedimentation rates increase, and the rivers change their course, braiding into multiple channels. The sifting river roots, soil erosion or frequent floods also cause illegal migration on the border. However, the people living in low-lying areas along the rivers often move up towards the mainland during floods and these internally displaced people are often termed illegal migrants. It is interesting to note that it is not only Bangladeshis but Indians also who are crossing the border for some or the other reason.

Contesting Identities

The national identities construction in Bangladesh has led the persecution of minority communities. The construction of a unique linguistic-
secular/religious identity ignored the multiple identities and has, thus, served to provoke confrontation and violence. In fact, the nationalist project has revolved around two distinct constructs: the ‘Bengali’ and the ‘Bangladeshi’ identities. The ‘Bengali’ identity has been largely drawn from the sycretic-linguistic traditions of Bengal. The Bangladeshi identity was forged by taking recourse to Islamic loyalties that were first crystallised during the movement for Pakistan and later by a process of systematic Islamisation by the ruling military and political regimes. These constructions have systematically excluded the minority communities in their nationalistic framework; the Bengalis to the non-Bengalis and the Islamist to the non-Islamist. Raja Devashish Roy, a barrister and chief of the Chakma Circle in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) maintains that the adivasis of Bangladesh have been denied their identity in the Constitution (1972). Amena Mohsin argues that there was no room for accommodating the minorities within this new state discourse. After the amendment of the Constitution and declaring Islam as the state religion, the ethnic minorities found themselves to be minorities in both the ethnic and religious sense.

**Political Manoeuvring**

In the early 1990s, the democratically elected government of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) issued two government policies of persecution of the religious minorities. The Home Ministry directed the commercial banks to control withdrawal of substantial cash amounts against account holders of the Hindu community. The commercial banks were asked to stop disbursement of business loans to the Hindu community in the districts adjoining the Indo-Bangladesh border. In 1993, the government initiated a survey of vested properties. Corrupt government officials at the district level listed properties whose owners were alive and still living in Bangladesh. One of the factors resulting in the loss of traditional lands has been the Vested Property (Continuance of Emergency Provisions) Act, 197424,
A recent study has gone into the causes and consequences of deprivation of Hindu minorities in Bangladesh due to the Vested Property Act. which has been applied unjustly against both Hindus and other ethnic communities. Local officials and law enforcement agencies usually side with people of the majority community against the minorities in land cases, and the latter are gradually becoming dispossessed.25 A recent study has gone into the causes and consequences of deprivation of Hindu minorities in Bangladesh due to the Vested Property Act. The study has brought to light that approximately one million Hindu households have been dispossessed of over 1.64 million acres of landed property. The Hindu minority has suffered under the governments of both the Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). 26. Since 1947, the Hindu population in Bangladesh has been reduced from 30 per cent to less than 8.5 percent because of such religious persecution and political terrorism27.

Rise of Terrorism and Islamic Fanaticism

Various factors were responsible for the resurgence of Islamic intolerance in Bangladesh in the last decade, as manifest in the spurt of terrorist activities, extremism and communalism. The tide of rising Islamism in Bangladesh was witnessed in the last BNP government. The BNP and its alliance partners have always been votaries of ‘religious territorialism’ as opposed to the AL which traditionally has been seen as the supporter of ‘liberal-secular values’. After the 2001 elections, there was a tremendous increase in the attacks on minorities, moderate Muslims and democratic forces. The BNP alliance was notably supported by the Jamaat-i-Islami, and the Islamic Okiyo Jote.

The Islamist militant groups such as the Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (with close links with Afghan *jihadis*), Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami Bangladesh (with close links with Al Qaeda) and, Hizbut Tohid have
expanded their transnational networks, with the support of the last BNP government. Reports also suggest that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in collaboration with the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) of Bangladesh and extremist Islamist groups, has networked and coordinates activities with insurgent groups in India’s northeast and Islamist extremist elements in Bangladesh. The proliferation, and then, the sustenance of illegal madrasas in the border areas of Bangladesh has led to a potential Talibanisation of the society in Bangladesh. The Al Qaeda and Taliban escapees had arrived in Bangladesh after the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Bangladesh has also been used by insurgent groups of the Indian northeast, like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), and Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam, who started getting training in Bangladesh since 1992.

The growth of Islamic fundamentalism and extremism was fuelled by the constant economic underdevelopment, poverty and unemployment in the country. The religious fundamentalist forces were able to use the unemployed and illegal immigrants for small incentives. In fact, Bangladesh is predominantly an agriculture-based society, with more than 40 percent of the population still living below the poverty line. Domestic factors and international Islamic actors provided a rationale for taking advantage of these poor, illiterate and unemployed youth for the promotion of Islamic fundamentalism. Bangladeshi men and women are also trafficked for commercial purposes, and as domestic servants, bonded labour and sexual workers. Burmese women are also trafficked to India via Bangladesh. There are people on both sides of the Bangladesh-India border involved in this trafficking chain. The main trafficking route is the Dhaka-Mumbai-Karachi-Dubai one. The spread of deadly diseases like AIDS due to drugs and sexual contact is the latest fear.
Socio-Economic Complexities

India and Bangladesh have very close socio-cultural, linguistic and racial affinities which have evolved from a common historical legacy and geographical proximity. The condition on the border has now become difficult due to the influx of illegal migrants which has increased the density of the population in the border areas. The intermingled ethnic groups continue to enter into matrimonial alliances and subsequently nurture relations to the extent of settling down, particularly in Assam. The poor, mostly from Bangladesh, are bound to cross the boundary in search of economic security. This holds that migration is primarily a product of economic and political crises that push people into leaving their homelands, usually involuntarily. Poor governance, economic disparities and frequent political confrontation and stand-off in the country also caused migration from Bangladesh. The frequent strikes, boycotts and political violence have reduced the scope of employment even for daily wagers. The above factors compel the people to move towards an emerging India for better employment opportunities and stability. The Indian economy is growing at a faster rate and the migrant workers get plenty of employment in the construction, agriculture and tertiary sectors.

India-Bangladesh Ties: Policy Options

Several recommendations relating to effective management of land borders, monitoring and surveillance of illegal cross-border migration and activities, deployment and restructuring of the border guarding forces and all round development of border areas have been discussed as follows:

- Border fencing has become one of the central components of India’s migration control strategy. The project was sanctioned (1986) in two phases: Phase I (1987-1999) and Phase II (2000-2007) which proposed a fencing of 3,438 km. However, the work in the second phase is still going on as the project is yet to be finished. The Annual
Report 2012-13 indicates that the entire 2,762.11 km India-Bangladesh border has been fenced. In reality, the fencing and Border Security Force (BSF), with limited resources, cannot stop the infiltration. The BSF keeps vigilance along the long porous border. Besides patrolling, they intercept illegal migrants from across the border, but curtailing all infiltration remains a challenge. It requires proper implementation and monitoring of the fencing with efficiency, transparency, political commitment and strong will. The negative attitude of corrupt border security agencies often helps the illegal migrants to cross over the border.

- With a view to ameliorating the miseries on the Indian side of border, the Indian government has initiated an integrated scheme under the Border Area Development Programme (BADP), which is focussing mainly on social, economic and political development of the border areas. The BADP became functional in the Seventh Plan period with the twin objectives of balanced development of the border areas through adequate provision of infrastructure facilities and promotion of a sense of security amongst the local population. In the process, to diminish the problem of migration, a collaborative India-Bangladesh approach should be adopted either under the ongoing BADP or some separate initiatives. This will also break up the nexus between the CTAs and local people.

- The whole issue of illegal migrants should be judged from the human angle since these people have been uprooted from their homes by either political, religious, social or economic forces prevailing in the place of their origin. Thus, an effective development strategy, good
During the election campaign in the summer of 2014, Narendra Modi relentlessly criticised rivals in Bengal and Assam for allowing illegal Bangladeshi immigrants to stay in India, terming them a drain on resources that were meant for the locals. Governance and institutionalisation of liberal democratic values in Bangladesh can address the problem of migration to a large extent. Since 2009, India and Bangladesh have laid down a framework of cooperation for development. In this process, they have signed a deal for a $1 billion soft loan. This will finance 14 development projects of Bangladesh, particularly for infrastructure building and connectivity. India and Bangladesh have also agreed, in principle, for transit facilities to connect with Nepal and Bhutan and India’s northeastern states. These programmes would help in filling critical gaps in the social and physical infrastructures on both sides of the border and also inculcate a sense of security and integration among the people.

- Granting special work permits in some cases can be an effective mechanism to control the migration caused conflict in India. Other actions can range from creating a no man’s land, developing awareness programmes among the border area inhabitants and allocating UID (Unique Identity Cards) to the population of the border regions as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, instead of devising futuristic policies, more time and energy is invested on the controversy of illegal migrants who have already arrived and have been living in the country for some time. Most of the debates and incidents of protests are on the issue of driving these people away rather than on stopping, or limiting, the entry of fresh migrants. Detection, deletion and deportation are virtually impossible. First of all, there is no easy mechanism of identification, and, secondly, the Bangladesh government still refuses to take back any deported so-called Bangladeshis. Moreover, such an
attitude towards the migrants already living in the country would only alienate them further rather than integrating them.

- The issue of illegal Bangladeshi migrants is often looked at through the political prism in India and used for vote-bank politics, especially at the state level. During the election campaign in the summer of 2014, Narendra Modi relentlessly criticised rivals in Bengal and Assam for allowing illegal Bangladeshi immigrants to stay in India, terming them a drain on resources that were meant for the locals. The new government in India may raise the issue of illegal migrants with their counterpart, but any attempt to actually displace them would be both impractical and fraught with security challenges internally, and would hurt ties with Bangladesh.

- One way a dialogue on the contentious subject could help both nations is if India proposes a system of work permits allowing Bangladeshi nationals easy entry into India to work and live here. That would give a legal status to these men and women who currently live in daily uncertainty, allay genuine security concerns and help towards resolving this long-festering problem. Migration and national security have become intertwined in this age of globalisation. And, in turn, the state must consider them in an integrated manner in order to understand the implications of human flows, to maximise their benefits, as well as to respond to their challenges. Thus, there is a need to change perceptions about illegal Bangladeshi migrants. They can be developmental partners in India’s growing economy. Skilled and unskilled cheap labour could minimise development costs and accelerate economic growth.

Considering Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s interest in developing the eastern part of India, his government should give as many concessions as possible to its eastern neighbours. India should take the lead in settling all existing irritants and disputes. Given the current state of mutual trust
and the levels of confidence and comfort between Bangladesh and India, there is enough space to work in order to tap the full potential of the two countries. The people of both countries have given a mandate on the agenda of ‘development’. Therefore, it is in the interest of both countries that there should be close cooperation and interaction between Bangladesh and India on the issues of economic prosperity. Modi has to come out from the fanatic segments, federal forces and coalition partners to deliver on the promises made in the election campaigns. Bangladesh must be persuaded to develop a consensus policy approach on all the contentious issues viz. protection of minorities, national identity, political stability and development strategy.

Notes
2. CTAs are non-state actors who operate across national borders in violation of state laws and who attempt to evade law enforcement efforts; Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. K Mukherjee writes on India’s beginning of the work on ID cards for border residents.
11. Datta, n. 8.


17. The Assam movement started in 1979 and became violent in the later stage. The movement was led by the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and supported by almost all the people of Assam. The velocity of the movement was high in Brahmaputra valley.


24. The Vested Property (Continuance of Emergency Provisions) Act 1974 has a legacy of Pakistan’s ordinance of Enemy Property Act that was promulgated in 1965. The law says the properties of Indian nationals residing in Pakistan or Pakistani citizens residing in India will be identified as enemy property.


27. Ibid.


33. “India: Country Brief: Drug Intelligence Brief,” Drug Enforcement Administration, Intelligence Division, January 2004. This report was prepared by the Europe, Asia, and Africa Strategic Intelligence Unit of the Office of Strategic Intelligence, and reflects
Representing one culture, one language, one society and one geo-economics, these people were politically divided in 1947.


