

# **Faultlines in Pakistan and Implications for India**

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# Faultlines in Pakistan and Implications for India

## General

Until the arrival of Muslim traders, missionaries, and armies in the late 7th and early 8th centuries, the population of South Asia was primarily Hindu and Buddhist. However, by 1100 A.D., a number of Indo-Muslim states had been established and by the 16th century, the Mughals dominated the entire northern India. The British formally disbanded the Mughal Empire in 1858, when about more than a quarter of India's population was Muslim. The Muslims were largely concentrated in East Bengal, North-West Frontier, Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan, with large Muslim minorities in present-day Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.

There was no major suggestion / impetus for a separate Muslim state until 1930, when the Punjabi poet-politician Mohammed Iqbal raised concerns regarding "protection of Muslim identity, interest and under-representation in a Hindu majority India". Over time, as the prospects of British withdrawal from India increased, the Muslim League, led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, declared its support for the idea of Pakistan in its Lahore session in 1940. He propagated the concept of the **two-nation theory**, demanding an independent state for the Muslims, where they could fashion their lives according to the dictates of the Holy Quran and Sunnah.

Following negotiations among the British, Indian National Congress and Muslim League, British India was partitioned into two independent states: a Muslim majority 'Pakistan' and India, on August 14 / 15, 1947, respectively. Pakistan came into existence as an economically fragile state with deep structural faultlines. Its major political party, the Muslim League, had shallow roots in the newly created Pakistan and the early demise of Jinnah and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali created political turmoil, leading to the powerful radical groups, especially in the Western wing, propounding an alternative Islamic vision for the state.

Pakistan was an amalgamation of unorganised provinces with 1,600 km of separation between its Eastern and Western wings, making its political

management a nightmare. The Eastern wing comprised the single province of East Pakistan (divided Bengal), while the politically dominant Western wing consisted of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Punjab (divided Punjab), Sindh, Baluchistan, and Karachi as the federal capital territory. Pakistan could not reconcile with the independent disposition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and forcibly tried to annex it in October 1948. The Maharaja of J&K having failed to contest the assaulting Pakistani marauders, signed the Instrument of Accession with India to save his subjects from the savagery of mass rapes and murders, post which the Indian Army was inducted into J&K. A ceasefire brokered by the United Nations (UN) in January 1949 left about three-fourth of the state with India, and the balance was illegally occupied by Pakistan. Since then, Kashmir has figured in most India-Pakistan crises, including the 1965 War and the misadventure in Kargil in 1999. Occupation of J&K has been the central goal of all of Pakistan's foreign and security policies for more than six decades. Pakistan has tried all means—diplomatic, military and sub-conventional—to change the status quo, but to no avail.

Ever since the partition, Pakistan has remained turbulent and chaotic, afflicted by a number of faultlines. The fierce regional affiliations and demands for greater autonomy, lack of identity, ever increasing incidents of terrorist attacks, and sectarian and ethnic violence pose major threats to Pakistan's sovereignty and internal security situation. The state of Pakistan's economy continues to be fragile and is largely sustained by huge amounts of foreign aid and expatriate remittances. While the armed forces stand as a bulwark against the emerging centrifugal forces, growing religious and ethnic fissures within the forces do not bode well for the country.

This paper covers various aspects of faultlines in Pakistan, the implications for India, and the likely response options, as per the following sequence of chapters:

- Chapter I - Ethno-Nationalism.
- Chapter II - Islamisation / Talibanisation of Pakistan.
- Chapter III -The Pakistani Security Forces.
- Chapter IV - Sectarianism in Pakistan.
- Chapter V - Fragile Political Scenario.
- Chapter VI - Economic Crisis.
- Chapter VII –Sub-Standard Education System.
- Chapter VIII –Implications for India and Response Options

# Chapter I

## Ethno-Nationalism

*We are starting in the days where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.*

— Extract, Mohammad Ali Jinnah's speech of  
August 11, 1947

- Since partition, all the provinces of Pakistan continue to be in a persistent state of turmoil.
- East Bengal: Civil war leads to the creation of Bangladesh.
- Baluchistan: Use of brute military force to subjugate the Baluch demand for greater autonomy / independence, leading to unrest and insurgency in the province.
- Punjab: Bloody and violent partition. Support base of Islamic fundamentalism. Demand for separate province for Saraiki-speaking population.
- NWFP: Disputed Durand Line and frontline state serving as a base for terrorists.
- FATA: Region restive since British rule, and turmoil continues till date. Safe haven for terrorist organisations.

Since partition, every province of Pakistan has been in a constant state of turmoil. There are grievances of political and economic mismanagement, sectarian violence, increasing fundamentalism and regional aspirations for greater autonomy. The major ethno-linguistic groups i.e. the Bengalis in East Pakistan, Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis, Pashtuns and the Urdu-speaking migrants, the Mohajirs, in West Pakistan, over a period of time, have sought an independent identity and demanded the formation of an ethnically or linguistically homogeneous province. The country's second partition in 1971, leading to the creation of Bangladesh, was primarily along ethno-linguistic lines as the Bengalis were dissatisfied by the hegemony of West Pakistan, specially the Punjabis.

Pakistan's delicate ethnic balance and the endless negotiations it entails, also contribute to the sluggish pace of the country's development. The more than five-decades-long delayed construction of the hydroelectric dam at Kalabagh on the Indus was stymied by NWFP and Sindh, that feared that they would lose water to the Punjabi industry. More than ten years after immense coal reserves were discovered in the Thar desert, their mining is still in limbo because of disagreement between the government of Sindh province and the federal government. The federal government is unwilling to impose its will, for fear of political retribution and creation of a new surge in Sindhi nationalism. Pakistan abounds in such cases of ethnic and provincial mistrust, adversely impacting its development and economic growth.

### **East Pakistan**

After it was evident that the partition of India was a certainty, the Bengal Provincial Muslim League leaders<sup>1</sup> proposed an independent status for the unpartitioned Bengal. However, the proposal was rejected and a massive population migration occurred between East Pakistan and West Bengal. The Hindus who migrated to India from East Bengal were those who were economically better placed, while the poor Hindus, belonging to the lower castes, found it difficult to migrate, and stayed back. Unlike Punjab, where due to large scale violence, the population transfer happened almost immediately, in Bengal, since the violence was limited only to Kolkata and Noakhali, the migration happened gradually, over three decades. The situation in East Pakistan worsened in the months preceding and during the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971. The Pakistan Army systematically targeted ethnic Bengalis, regardless of religious background, to quash the civil unrest against West Pakistan's political, economy and social hegemony.

The traumatic events of the 1971 civil war and subsequent secession of East Pakistan (creation of independent Bangladesh) had psychologically unsettling effects on Pakistan. The loss of East Pakistan not only meant a loss of people but also changed the nature of the state. East Bengal, though Pakistan's poorest region, was home to a more moderate Islam, had contributed an important and diverse Bengali element to Pakistani society and culture, and maintained a political balance. With the loss of East Pakistan, Punjab became more dominant and hegemonic, being both more populous and economically prosperous than Sindh, Baluchistan, or the frontier provinces, leading to

resentment. The brutal civil war had demonstrated that ethno-nationalism could override religious solidarity. This seriously undermined the two-nation theory which was the foundation on which the state of Pakistan was created. The attempt to construct Pakistani nationhood based on religious identity had failed.

## **Baluchistan**

It is the largest province of Pakistan (42 per cent of the landmass) with the least population density (5 per cent of the total population). Though it has vast natural resources, Baluchistan is one of the poorest and most backward regions of Pakistan. Shortly after independence, Baluchistan became restive as separatist insurgents rejected the Khan of Kalat's<sup>2</sup> decision to accede to Pakistan. The nationalist movement by the separatists, seeking independence, led to violence, unrest and political disorder in the region. Since partition, a number of major wars have been fought between Baluch separatists and the Pakistani state forces. The first war was fought immediately after partition in 1948, and the second war, a decade later, in 1958. Each war lasted a few months, ending with mass human rights violations, illegal detentions, destruction of property and mass exodus of the local population to safer havens due to the unabashed use of military power and the high-handed approach of the civil establishment. Baluchistan's third war began in 1962 and terminated after six years in 1968. It ended with the Baluchis again suffering heavy losses. From 1973-75, a far bloodier war was fought when Bhutto ordered full-scale mobilisation of the armed forces to suppress the Baluch separatist movement and control the deteriorating situation. The Army deployed about 80,000 troops, reinforced by helicopter gunships, armoured vehicles and mortars, while the Baluchis had some 1,000 guerrillas, armed with ancient rifles. The separatists suffered heavy losses with more than 3,300 casualties and some 7,000 families displaced, seeking refuge in Afghanistan. There was a temporary ebb in the level of insurgency for two decades, however, in the 2000s, the insurgency resurged and a large number of attacks on Pakistani troops, police, and civilians were carried out by the separatists. On August 12, 2009, the Khan of Kalat declared himself the ruler of Baluchistan and formally announced a Council for Independent Baluchistan. The council claimed the allegiance of all the separatist leaders.

Besides the separatist movement, Baluchistan has also been menaced with the overspill of the Afghan Taliban since 2001. Pathans form as much as

40 per cent of Baluchistan's population, with a majority residing in the Quetta region. The strong Pathan concentration in the province is a cause of concern for the Pakistani establishment as they fear that the spread of Pashtuns from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Baluchistan would lead to a heightened level of unrest and violence, and the demand for greater autonomy / independence.

Baluchistan continues to be a battleground<sup>3</sup> with the freedom-seeking Baluchis on one side, and the brutal state forces and unjust polity on the other. The discovery of more than 800 graves of abducted Baluchis in Tutak and 18,000 persons missing without trace are a testimony of the high-handed approach of the security forces and the atrocities meted out by the state to the Baluchis

To prevent dissension, and suppress the aspirations of the Baluchis, Pakistan as a state policy has repeatedly used brutal military power and kept the province educationally, economically and socially backward. In spite of Baluchistan having the largest reserves of Pakistan's mineral and energy resources, its control over benefits accruing from its vast assets is marginal. The development of Gwadar port and settling of a large number of non-Baluchis in the region have deprived the ethnic Baluch population of the economic opportunities arising in the region. The Baluchis see these as mechanisations of the federal government to swamp the province with a non-ethnic population, specially the Punjabis. Baluch nationalists have persistently protested against the marginalisation of the local population and demanded allocation of their entitled share of revenue and economic opportunities arising in the province. However, the government has paid little heed to the concerns of the Baluchis, leading to disgruntlement and unrest. The blowback of the political and military injustice meted out to the Baluchis has caused the insurgency, previously limited to Marri and Mengal, today spreading to every nook and corner of Baluchistan, including sections of the educated youth.

## **Punjab**

Punjab is Pakistan's second largest and most densely populated province. The partition resulted in the larger western portion of Punjab becoming part of Pakistan. The partition of Punjab was a bloody and violent affair often described as one of the ten great tragedies of the 20th century. The state was in total turmoil, with no functional governance and administrative bodies, leading to mass carnage, robbery and plunder. The violence and

ethnic cleansing that took place in Punjab dwarfed the violence that took place in other parts of India as between August 15 and December 31, 1947, between 500,000 to 800,000 people were killed. Some 73 per cent of the people who came to Pakistan as migrants were Punjabis and the majority settled in Punjab. The mass inter-migration of the population destroyed the very fabric of Punjabi culture and traditions. The scars of partition led to Punjab becoming the biggest proponent of Islamic fundamentalism, providing recruits for, and refuge to, various terrorist organisations, especially those operating against India.

Punjab, with almost 56 percent of the country's population, dominates Pakistan. It provides most of the manpower for the Army, and without Punjabi support, no military government in Pakistan would be possible. Many Punjabis believe that they are the state and determine the direction of Pakistan, and are convinced that if anything worthwhile has to happen in Pakistan, Punjab will have to take the lead. However, the Punjabis also fear that their dominance may cause the breaking up of Pakistan, a country on which they themselves depend, implying that their ascendancy has to be veiled and qualified by compromises with the other provinces. There is a view among the Punjabis that they are, in fact, "leaning over backwards" to accommodate the other provinces.

Punjab is not nearly as strong or united as it may seem, as it is threatened by the separatist movement of the Siraiki-speaking people located in southwest Punjab and northern Sindh. Siraiki is a distinct language spoken by approximately 10 percent of Pakistan's total population, in both Punjab and Sindh. The Siraiki-speaking people seek an independent, linguistically homogeneous province. The movement has continued for many years, but has been forcibly suppressed by Punjab's establishment. Besides the Siraiki issue, within Punjab also, there are deep fissures between southern Punjabi 'feudals' and northern Punjabi 'industrialists' who feel superior to the others. The Muslim religious leaders in Punjab are also fractured along theological, political, personal and religious lines.

Punjab, for long, has been home to Islamic revivalism. Radicalisation, sectarian and ethnic violence have made serious inroads in the province. The mushrooming *madrassas* in Punjab have long been a key recruiting ground for militant groups. The headquarters of the Tablighi Jamaat in Raiwind, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) in Muridke, besides a number of other minor radical

groups, have given Punjab the notorious distinction of playing a lead role in supporting and propagating radical Islam and terrorism, especially against India. The wave of terrorism in Punjab gained momentum and hit Pakistan itself when its forces stormed the Red Mosque in 2007 and the US launched drone attacks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the area bordering Afghanistan.

Due to the ever growing popularity of terrorist organisations, the Pakistani state is wary of targeting them, lest the masses join the Pakistani Taliban and attack the state establishments. Thus, there exists a permanent state of tension in Punjab which is capable of spiralling out of control on the minimum pretext. If Pakistan was to break up due to Islamist extremism, then it is in Punjab that this would happen, as it is the backbone of Pakistan's being and existence.

### **Sindh Province**

In comparison to Punjab, there were practically no riots or violence in the Sindh province during the partition even though almost its entire Hindu population of about 800,000 migrated to India, less the poor Scheduled Caste Hindus.<sup>4</sup> The exodus of the Hindu middle class crippled the Sindhi society and its overall economy hit rock bottom. However, gradually the vacuum created by the migration of the Hindus was filled by the influx of large numbers of Muslim refugees (Mohajirs) coming from various parts of India. Within less than five years after partition, the Sindhi speaking population declined from 87 per cent to 67 per cent in Sindh, and in Karachi, the migrant population of Mohajirs became a majority, and the Sindhis a minority. Post the tumultuous partition, though Sindh achieved religious unanimity, it lost its cultural harmony and composition. It now comprises a sandwiched society, with Sindhis in the lower and upper classes and the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs as the middle class—the latter were not only alien to Sindhi culture and language but insisted on a distinct identity and independent political status. Karachi, the capital city, over a period, became the epicentre of disunity and continues to be engulfed in major ethnic and sectarian battles among the migrant Mohajirs, Pakhtuns, Punjabis, Baluchis and the indigenous Sindhis as also, the Shia-Sunni conflict. The various ethnicities largely loathe each other, but maintain a low level of violence as they do not want to destroy their livelihoods for the sake of ethnic and sectarian dreams.

## Mohajirs

The creation of Bangladesh in 1971 destroyed the very premise of Muslim nationalism on which Pakistan was created, an ideology which most Mohajirs believed in passionately and had made immeasurable sacrifices to realise. The turning point in the Mohajirs' thinking for a separate identity within Pakistan came in August 1979, when Altaf Hussain, a student activist, was arrested and imprisoned by Zia-ul-Haq for making a speech on Mohajir rights in Karachi. On his release, he founded a political party to further the interests of the Mohajirs – the 'Mohajir Qaumi Movement' (MQM). The MQM built up a powerful armed wing, leading to large scale ethnic violence, including the Mohajirs, Sindhis and Pathans. By 1992, the ethnic violence had become so severe that it was adversely affecting the economy of Karachi, necessitating the deployment of the Army to restore basic order. The Army has tried a number of times to control the violence in Karachi by conducting military operations in a typical Pakistani fashion, a mixture of ruthless force and diplomacy, however, it is yet to achieve any long-term significant results. The ethnic violence continues unabated in Karachi and other parts of Sindh.

## North-West Frontier Province/Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (NWFP/KP)

In July 1947, the British government vide the Indian Independence Act, 1947, declared that the future of the NWFP would be decided by a referendum. On July 02, 1947, the referendum was held and according to the official results, out of 572,798 registered voters, only 292,118 votes were cast: 289,244 (99.02 per cent) in favour of Pakistan and only 2,874 (0.98 per cent) in favour of India. Thus, the NWFP became the fourth province of Pakistan, with Pashtuns as the majority ethnic group. It has a population of some 21 million, with 3 million or so being Hazaras. It is the second poorest province, after Baluchistan, with a dismal state of literacy and health care facilities.

In 1949, the Durand Line, the inter-state boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan, was denounced by Afghanistan as it laid claims on large swathes of land abutting its boundary. Afghanistan supported the secessionist movement of Pashtunistan in the NWFP to further its territorial interests. The border dispute continues to simmer and is a major cause of tension between the two states.

The NWFP, renamed as KP in 2010, remained heavily affected by events in Afghanistan. During the Soviet occupation, the NWFP became a frontline state, serving as a recruiting, training and supplying base for the Mujahideen, to fight the Soviets. The unrest in Afghanistan led to the exodus of over 5 million Afghans into the region, creating a massive refugee management problem. Post the withdrawal of the Soviets, the civil war in Afghanistan led to the rise of the Taliban, which had a large administrative support base in KP. Following the US intervention in Afghanistan after 9 / 11, the province has been deeply embroiled in the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) and is being repeatedly targeted as it is here that much of the Afghan Taliban leadership has been based since 2001. Unrest and violence continue to haunt the province.

### **Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)**

FATA is almost a semi-autonomous tribal region bordering Afghanistan and is largely inhabited by the Pashtuns. During the colonial era, the British could never succeed in completely calming the unrest in the region. The tribes of the frontier were considered by the British to be too heavily armed, too independent-minded, and too inaccessible in their steep and entangled mountains to be placed under regular administration. Instead, the British introduced a system of indirect rule, which was inherited by Pakistan and remains officially in force even today – though, in practice, it has largely collapsed due to the Taliban insurgency. Limited administrative and judicial authority is exercised by the local Political Agent (PA) and his subordinates. The PA is appointed by the government, and rules largely through local councils (*jirgas*) of tribal notables (*maliks*) on the basis of the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which are themselves drawn chiefly from the *pashtunwali*. The *pashtunwali* is not a code of law, rather a set of guidelines for regulating what is known in anthropology as ‘ordered anarchy’. The FCR are often pointed to as a key obstacle to progress and development in the tribal areas, but replacing them is another matter, as a majority of the inhabitants of FATA do not want to come under the Pakistani state law in its existing form.

In the beginning of the 1980s, the character of the region underwent a tumultuous shift with the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR and entry of the Afghan Mujahideen into FATA, to seek safe havens. At the beginning of the 2000s, the local terrorist groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

and later the Afghan Taliban and other militant organisations started entering FATA to take refuge, and established bases to undertake terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In March 2004, on the insistence of the US, the Pakistan Army launched operations against the terrorists in the tribal areas, but met with fierce resistance and was forced to negotiate a truce, an indicator of the extent of the Taliban's control over the region. Over a period, Pakistani troops have launched a number of operations in the region but have repeatedly failed to achieve any consequential success, only incurring heavy casualties. The Zarb-e-Azb, the ongoing operations in North Waziristan, like all preceding endeavours, has achieved sub-par success, with no reported extermination of any senior terrorist leaders or major change in the security situation in Pakistan. Violence and turmoil continue unabated in the region as hitherto and unrest prevails.

### **Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK)**

Post partition Pakistan could not reconcile with the independent status of J&K, and on October 22, 1947, Muslim tribal militias, duly supported by Pakistani regular forces crossed the border to forcefully annex the state of J&K. Unable to face the onslaught of the assaulting forces, Maharaja Hari Singh, on October 26, 1947, signed the Instrument of Accession, and on October 27, the Indian forces were inducted for operations in the state. On April 21, 1948, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 47<sup>5</sup> for deciding the future of J&K, "Both India and Pakistan desire that the question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of free and impartial plebiscite". However, both countries failed to arrive at an agreement due to differences over interpretation of the procedure and the extent of demilitarisation, which required withdrawal of all the Pakistani nationals and tribesmen as well as the Indian Army, less those troops required to maintain peace and ensure a free and fair plebiscite, from the respective areas of occupation. The withdrawal never took place and the war in Kashmir continued till January 01, 1949, whereafter a formal ceasefire was arranged through UN mediation. On July 27, 1949, under the auspices of the Truce Sub-Committee of the United Nations Commission, the Karachi Agreement was signed by the military representatives of India and Pakistan<sup>6</sup> "to establish a ceasefire line in the state of J & K, mutually agreed upon by the Governments of India

and Pakistan”, till the future status of the state of J & K could be determined in accordance with the will of the people. Thus, came into existence Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), comprising one-third of Kashmir.

Pakistan divided POK into the Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir (as it is called by Pakistan). The Northern Areas (renamed ‘Gilgit-Baltistan’ in August 2009), by some ambiguous declaration was unilaterally placed by the central government of Pakistan under its direct rule, though with no specified status in the Constitution.<sup>7</sup> The region does not enjoy any worthwhile fundamental, legal, political or civil rights.<sup>8</sup> Kashmir continues to get mentioned as a disputed territory.

In 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of territory in Aksai Chin to China to facilitate the construction of the Karakorum Highway between Beijing and Karachi. This highway passes through Indian territory and has been constructed illegally without India’s permission.

### **Political Turmoil**

A supposed parliamentary form of government exists in POK with the President as the constitutional head, the Prime Minister as the chief executive, duly supported by a Council of Ministers. However, the elected representatives are more ceremonial, with the real power resting with the federal government of Pakistan. Thus, de facto, POK is under the direct rule of the central government with its integral political institutions being anything but representative and democratic. Every government in Islamabad has tried to install a puppet government of its own choice in POK, in total disregard of democratic principles and the aspirations of the people. In 1955, following massive uprisings against the Pakistani misrule and the high handed-policies, the Pakistan Army, for some time, imposed Martial Law in POK and brutally quashed any dissent or protest, and any political institution suspected of aiding the cause was victimised. The continuing suppression of the local population has led to an acute sense of discontent and alienation, resulting in a rising demand for freedom from Pakistan.

### **Demographic Inversion**

As part of a strategy by Pakistan, the demographic composition of POK since 1947 has been largely altered with the intent to turn the original inhabitants (mostly Shias) into a minority. Forceful appropriation of land and encouraging the Sunni population<sup>9</sup> from outside the region to settle in POK has led to

a process of demographic inversion, causing increased sectarian violence between the majority Shias and migrant Sunnis. Sunni extremist parties, actively patronised by the Pakistani state, continue to target the minority population in the region. The blatant killing of Shias over time has unleashed fear and uncertainty among the people and there is an open outcry about the government's apathy and indifference to control the situation. Forceful recruitment of youths in various terror organisations is a common practice and any dissent is ruthlessly curbed. POK is being increasingly subjected to the *jihadi* ideology, destroying the very fabric of religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence.

### **Economic Exploitation**

Pakistan has been systematically exploiting and draining the region of its natural resources and the revenue generated is siphoned off to the other provinces. POK remains one of the most backward and neglected areas, with no industry, and its economy largely dependent on tourism.

Additionally, with no worthwhile university or professional college in the region, only 2.2 per cent of the students are graduates<sup>10</sup> High illiteracy rates and limited avenues for employment, are raising the level of disgruntlement amongst the local youths and further straining the fragile economy.

### **Human Rights Violations**

Since its occupation, POK has been treated as a colony by Pakistan and virtually denied all basic rights through various draconian legislations. POK has no functional democratic institutions and the local government is firmly controlled by the oppressive Pakistani regime. In the recent anti-Pakistan agitation in POK on September 15, visuals of brutal use of force by the Pakistan Police, Rangers and Army to suppress the voices of protests / dissent were relayed the world over, showing the despicable state of affairs in POK and the absolute disregard for humanitarian rights and values.

### **Conclusion**

Besides Punjab and, to an extent, Sindh, the other provinces of Pakistan are in state of utter despair, marginalised and irrelevant to the functioning of mainstream Pakistan. Their populations have been deprived of all basic

amenities and humanitarian rights. In spite of being a major source of natural minerals and water, they remain backward and financially starved, as all revenue generated is diverted towards furthering the interests of the federal government, which is predominantly dominated by the Punjabis.

POK, KP, FATA and Baluchistan present a dismal picture of socio-economic and political disempowerment. The people of these regions have hardly any avenue to express their legitimate grievances. Pakistan has virtually declared these areas out of bounds for foreigners and journalists except for occasional, tightly controlled guided tours organised in selective regions by the Army or the intelligence agencies. The restricted access to these backward areas has prevented the exposure of the atrocities being committed in the region by the Pakistani state to the international community. The federal government engages in extensive surveillance of the media and organisations voicing dissent, and arbitrary arrests and detentions are common. In most cases, the detainees are subjected to brutal torture and several cases of custodial death have been reported. Impunity for acts of torture and mistreatment of civilians by the military and intelligence services remains the norm, with no fear of judicial reprisal.

These provinces, have over a period, exhibited a sense of alienation from the central Pakistani establishment and repeatedly displayed a strong independent cultural orientation. They have been persistent in their demand for independence or greater autonomy.

## Chapter 2

# Islamisation / Talibanisation of Pakistan

*I would like to remind the house that the Father of the Nation, Quaid-i-Azam, gave expression of his feelings on this matter on many occasions, and his views were endorsed by the nation in unmistakable terms, Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of this subcontinent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam, because they wanted to demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea to the many diseases which have crept into the life of humanity today.*

— Liaquat Ali Khan, first Prime Minister of Pakistan,  
while moving the Objective Resolution in March 12, 1949.

- Pakistan became an Islamic Republic on March 23, 1956.
- Adoption of Islam as a unifying ideology.
- Rise of radical Islam can be traced to rule of Gen Zia.
- Mushrooming of *madrassas* and Islamisation of education.
- Evolution of militant organisations during an anti-Soviet *jihad*.
- Islamic movement in Pakistan connected with the global *jihad*.
- Pakistan's role in GWOT post 2001 led to increased activity of the Pakistani Taliban and attacks against the state institutions.

Pakistan came into being as a state for the Muslims. Based on the demands of the Islamists for an Islamic Constitution, the Objectives Resolutions which would become the Preamble to the Constitution, were formulated. After nine years of efforts, Pakistan was successful in framing a Constitution which was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on February 29, 1956, and it was enforced on March 23, 1956, proclaiming Pakistan as an Islamic Republic. The decision to make Pakistan an Islamic State was motivated by the fact that Pakistan had multiple identities and the adoption of Islam as the unifying ideology offered the best prospect of countering the divisive potential of Pakistan's diversity, which, however, failed in the case of East Pakistan.

A majority of the people in Pakistan attributed the defeat of 1971 to the Bangladeshis being not truly Islamic, and were convinced of the idea of an Islamic Pakistan, which was seized upon by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He applied Islamic rhetoric to Pakistan's foreign and strategic policy, hosting a major Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting in Lahore in 1974. He also supported several extremist groups opposing the Afghan government. Gradually, Islamist parties gained such prominence that the Pakistan government had to seek compromises with the Islamists.

The rise of radical militant Islam in Pakistan can be traced to the rule of Gen Zia-ul-Haq (1979-89).<sup>11</sup> Zia, himself a devout Deobandi Muslim, espoused and promoted a regime ideology based on the orthodox version of Sunni Islam, and soon after assuming power, embarked on the process of state Islamisation. During his years in power, Zia extended and reinforced the Islamisation of Pakistan based on the belief that the more devout the country was, the better country it would be, and that Islam made a man a better citizen. Extending the Islamic reforms introduced by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Zia also developed a tactical alliance with the Tablighi Jamaat or 'Society for Spreading Faith' to balance the more secular and liberal parties, which were strong opponents of his regime. The number of mosques grew exponentially in Pakistan during the Zia and Bhutto regimes, an indicator of the growing Islamisation of the country. At the time of partition, there were only about 250 religious schools in Pakistan which, by the 1980s, rose to almost 45,000, of which about 10 to 15 percent preached hatred and intolerance towards other religions and imparted military training.

Politically, during the election in 1970, the religious parties secured only 10 per cent of the total national vote. However, during the presidency of Zia, with state patronage, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), a religious party, expanded its influence in state institutions and its members were given Cabinet portfolios. Zia's Islamisation campaign also included cruel restrictions, especially on women, under the Hudood Ordinance.<sup>12</sup> The ordinance which attempted to impose a set of punitive Islamic laws on Pakistan and the *Qanun-e-Shahadat* or the Law of Evidence (1984), reduced the testimony of a woman to half that of a man in a Pakistani court of law. Zia also implemented ordinances on *Ushr* and *Zakat* (Islamic tax) and established *Shariah* courts to hear cases under Islamic law. In 1982, and

again in 1986, he made changes in the Pakistan Penal Code to include the death penalty for those convicted of blasphemy.

Besides, during Zia's governance, an Islamic religious cut from bank accounts was deducted to fund the local religious institutions. American and Saudi money also poured into Pakistan to fund the Afghan *jihād* and help fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. The money was also accompanied by *Wahhabi* propaganda literature and preachers from Saudi Arabia who, with the help of Pakistani Deobandi groups, oversaw the creation of new *madrassas* and mosques in Pakistan. Their purpose was to increase the influence of Sunni *Wahhabi* Islam in Pakistan and prepare recruits for the *jihād* in Afghanistan. Groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) received Saudi funding, allowing them to expand their operations. The LeT's compound in Murdike, near Lahore (Punjab) was established in 1988 with Saudi money with the explicit purpose of spreading the teachings of *Wahhabi* Islam. Zia also left an enduring mark of Islamisation on Pakistan's education system, wherein he introduced a core curriculum of orthodox interpretation of Islam in Pakistan's schools, colleges and universities, besides creating numerous *madrassas* propagating radical Islam.

A majority of Pakistan's militant organisations germinated during the occupation of Afghanistan as an anti-Soviet *jihād* which served the interests of both the US and Pakistan. Pakistan's strategic relationship with Afghanistan had all along been driven by the fear that Afghanistan, under the rule of the non-Pashtuns, may become an Indian client state, leading to India's strategic encirclement of Pakistan, and create a two-front war scenario for Pakistan. Gen Kayani, once defined "strategic depth" for Pakistan as having "a peaceful and friendly Afghanistan". The Pakistani establishment, therefore, believes that it needs to maintain close relations with the Afghan Taliban since they are Pakistan's only potential allies in Afghanistan. Thus, a Taliban-controlled government under Pakistani influence remains the Pakistani high command's priority position and, hence, Pakistan has always been fully committed to the Taliban, and Pakistani arms supplies, military advisers, training and Islamist volunteers played an important part in their various victorious campaigns. The Pakistani security services also encouraged some of their old Pathan allies in the war against the Soviets to join the Taliban – notably the formidable Jalaluddin Haqqani and his clan along the Afghan border with Pakistani Waziristan.

Pakistan's obsession with India in general and Kashmir in particular adversely affected its development into a robust, modern, secular nation—rather, it led Pakistan to the route of terrorism and self-destruction. Under Zia, the military and its intelligence wing, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) forged close ties with Islamist parties to mobilise support for the *jihad* against the Soviets and spread terrorist violence in India. While the religious parties were certainly not a monolith, Zia was successfully able to unite them under the banner of Islam in support of the military government's external and domestic policies. The Jamaat-e-Islam (JI), as well as Zia's other Islamist ally, the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), organised training camps, conducted recruitment efforts and other terrorist activities to support the *jihadi* war in Afghanistan and create unrest in Kashmir.

After the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the ISI deployed these militant groups for a new *jihad* to wrest control of Kashmir from India. The Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), spearheaded the Kashmir insurgency that had erupted in 1989. JUI *madrassas* provided recruits for Deobandi militant groups operating in Kashmir, particularly the LeT, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and its offshoot, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) which also had developed a close affinity with the Afghan Taliban. Most of the militant organisations in Pakistan had a smooth going for themselves till the beginning of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) which started after the events of 9/11.

On September 11, 2001, Musharraf's statement that US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage threatened to "bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age" if Pakistan failed to cooperate in the US attack on Afghanistan seems to have been greatly exaggerated; but even if the language was more diplomatic than that reported by Musharraf, the threat from the US to Pakistan in the immediate wake of 9/11 was undeniable. Given the mood in America and in the Bush Administration at that time, hesitation by Pakistan would indeed have been very dangerous for the country.

With the concurrence of the Pakistani high command, Musharraf agreed to help the US by establishing two US air bases in Pakistan to support the campaign against the Taliban; supplying US forces in Afghanistan; arresting Al Qaeda members and preventing Taliban forces from retreating from Afghanistan into Pakistan. The first two promises were substantially kept, but the third only to a very limited extent.

Musharraf was able for a while to sell his policy of helping the US in Afghanistan to the Pakistani establishment and people by his convincing argument that America would otherwise destroy Pakistan. However, the alliance with the US over Afghanistan was never a popular strategy in Pakistan.

Since 2001-02, the Taliban militants expanded their presence, influence and clout in Pakistan's tribal areas and beyond, including the frontier areas. Linkages with other militant groups allowed the Pakistani Taliban to spread to other parts of the country, such as Punjab and the port city of Karachi. Failed military operations and badly negotiated peace deals with the militants have only aided the process by providing the militants the space to advance their ideological agendas. For instance, in parts of Waziristan, the government negotiated a deal in April 2004 allowing the local militants to establish parallel Taliban-style policing and court systems. This facilitated the spread of "Talibanisation" into the other tribal agencies and even KP. In Bajaur Agency, the Taliban successfully enforced Friday as the weekly holiday instead of Sunday. In Khyber Agency, they banned music and also fined taxi drivers and citizens found guilty of listening to music in their cars. Kurram Agency, which has a significant Shia population, has seen an upsurge in sectarian conflict. Violence between the two sects has escalated and attacks on Shias by Sunni hardliners have not remained restricted to the tribal areas but have also spread in Baluchistan, Sindh and other parts of the country.

The U-turn by Gen Musharraf and the Pakistan Army's targeting of the Afghan Taliban as a frontline state in GWOT and the attack on the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad in July 2007, led to an explosive growth of militant activities: the truce between the militants and Army, in force for ten months, was called off and the Pakistani Taliban or Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was formed. Different militant groups operating in the Pathan areas came together to form the Pakistani Taliban, a loose alliance, with Beitullah Mahsud as Amir or overall leader. The TTP declared itself an ally both of the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda in a defensive *jihad* against the US occupation of Afghanistan, and the Pakistani establishment. The attack on Lal Masjid was condemned by all as the locals felt that the issue could have been resolved through negotiations but Gen Musharraf intentionally spilled the blood of innocent people to please his foreign masters. All over Pakistan, sympathisers of the Taliban justify the Taliban's terrorism against the state as they feel that the Pakistani Taliban's war is not intended as a war against Pakistan

and was not initiated by Beitullah Mahsud and his allies but by the Pakistan government and Army. These Pakistanis portray this struggle as a defensive action to protect the legitimate *jihad* from a treacherous stab in the back by the Pakistani servants of America, who also “massacred innocent Muslims” at the Red Mosque. The Pakistani security forces have been facing repeated attacks by radical Islamic elements operating under the umbrella organisation of the TTP. Their *jihad* is aimed not just at “infidels occupying Afghanistan”, but also the “infidels” who are ruling and running Pakistan and maintaining the secular values of Pakistani society. “They aim to cleanse Pakistan and turn it into a pure Islamic state”.

Mahmoud Al Hasan, a leader of the extremist Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, declared Benazir Bhutto and Musharraf as “slaves” of the US. Bhutto, in addition, was also labelled as an infidel and deserved to die as she was the enemy of Islam and *jihadis*”.

The well-planned suicide attack on Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, that killed her, demonstrated the reach of the radical groups. On her return to Pakistan, one of her e-mails said,<sup>13</sup> “Those who support the Taliban and oppose me continue to have high positions in government. Musharraf doesn’t remove them nor has he kept any of the promises he made, guaranteed by third parties. Yesterday (before Musharraf’s state of emergency), television channels broadcast a meeting in Bajaur where a *mullah* claimed that he and his group will kill me in Rawalpindi. The fact that militants hold open meetings without fear of retaliation proves that the Musharraf regime is totally inept, unwilling, or colluding in their expansion.”

Presently also, the internal security situation in Pakistan remains grim. Pakistan, with a large population of underprivileged youth—illiterate / *madrassa* educated—and the prevailing socio-economic conditions, make it much easier for fundamentalist religious groups to harness the rich recruitment pool of young disillusioned men and propagate in them the idea of radical Islam. Darul Uloom Haqqania, a seminary in the KP, one of the largest *madrassas* in Pakistan, displays tanks and Kalashnikovs much like a military training school. Approximately 3,000 young students, mostly from the underprivileged, deprived classes, pass out every year from the seminary and are expected to spend their lives in the service of Islam, and dedicate their lives to *jihad*. Additionally, a new brand of *jihadi* females is emerging in Pakistan; these ‘burqa-clad’ students, who belong to *madrassas*, brandish

sticks while they demand imposition of *Shariah* laws and the banishment of all “dens of vice”.

The *jihadi* movement is rapidly spreading to new areas of Pakistan; the danger of radicalisation of the country and the radical movement influencing some other parts of the South Asian region cannot be ruled out. During, the Karachi Defence Expo in 2015, Gen Raheel Sharif stated with concern that the main threat to Pakistan was from the **supra-national forces of disorder**, implicitly referring to non- state actors, a first when India has not been mentioned as a primary existential threat to Pakistan.

Aggravating the internal security situation in Pakistan is the fact that, despite being banned, the terrorist organisations continue to operate with impunity, conducting protest rallies and giving speeches and sermons inciting hate and violence. The efforts of the Pakistan government to curb the militant activities of *madrassas* have been half-hearted; resulting in violence and lawlessness spreading to new areas in Pakistan. The security forces have proved ineffective in dealing with the Taliban elements calling for Islamic laws. It also seems that the Afghan Taliban has struck a deal with Pakistan, of not stirring up militancy among the Pathans in return for being left alone. However, under US pressure, at times, Pakistan has been forced to take some half-hearted steps against the Taliban, but, in order to protect its interest, has generally leaked information of the impending operations to the Afghan Taliban, to help them move out to safer locations till the operations last.

## Conclusion

Pakistan is a failing state, suffering from a bitter internal war. It remains the epicentre of the global *jihadi* movement and the principal breeding ground of Islamic radicalism. A large number of *madrassas* in Pakistan have not even responded to government schemes of registration; on the other hand, generous funding by foreign contributors such as Saudi Arabia has led to the massive growth of a number of radical institutions. Further, the political turmoil in Pakistan has created a dangerous and chaotic environment in which the influence and following of the militant groups that want to establish an Islamic republic in Pakistan, has increased greatly. Antagonism towards non-believers, Ahmediyas, moderate Muslims, Sufism and Shias reflects the growing intolerance of radicals towards the minorities. A rise in such trends in Pakistani society is clearly visible and these trends have pushed Pakistan

further into the lap of radical Islamists. Moderate Muslims, who would like the secular culture to survive and the current unrest to be controlled, have become helpless spectators in the face of increasing political chaos and coercive religious violence.

Radicalisation presents a threat at several levels, with the worst case scenario being the possibility of Pakistan becoming a Talibanised state, with a formal structure of a rigid Islamic state dominated by a strong religious hierarchy. However, if Pakistan were to become a Talibanised state, the society at large, and the ruling elite, would have to accept the religious ideology that is being propagated by certain ultra-conservative clerics. The possibility of a violent takeover by any religious group replicating the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan presently seems remote but there are disturbing developments visible in the country, with large segments of the society veering towards radicalisation. To examine the present trend towards radicalisation, one has to look at the developing mindset of different socio-economic ethnic groups and the Army. Conservative and rigid religious beliefs exist in many segments of the society, besides the tribal areas that are under the influence of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The rich urban groups would prefer democracy and modernisation even though they would like Pakistan to become a truly Islamic state.

To deal with the deteriorating security situation, the Pakistan Army has yet to demonstrate its will and the capability to ward off the *jihadi* challenge. Rather a large number of Pakistani troops have chosen to join the Taliban and not fight their 'brothers'. The terrorists infiltrating into Kashmir would continue to operate freely as tools of the Pakistani foreign policy, duly patronised by the Army and ISI. In view of the prevailing situation, the Line of Control (LoC) and border areas are likely to remain relatively calm, as Pakistani forces are involved in the internal security problems and perhaps a power struggle within their own ranks. The scenario of the Indian bogey that the Pakistan Army may raise to unite the nation by disturbing peace on the borders is unlikely as this may prove far too risky and it would be beyond the capability of the Pakistan Army to open another front.

## Chapter 3

# The Pakistani Security Forces

- Pakistan's armed forces comprise the seventh largest military in the world.
- The rise of Islamism in the Army gained impetus under the presidency of Gen Zia.
- Insider collusion in all attacks on armed forces' installations.
- Large scale surrender to the militants by officers and men to join radical outfits.
- Interference of the Army - main bane of political instability in Pakistan.
- ISI, an 'invisible government' involved in manipulative politics, and patron of terrorist organisations.

The Pakistani armed forces comprise the seventh largest military in the world in terms of active troops. Islam is the predominant faith of the Pakistani armed forces, with 99 percent of Pakistani military personnel adhering to the religion: 70 percent of Pakistan Army officers are Sunnis, and the remaining are Shias and other minorities. Historically, about 71-75 percent of the Army is drawn from Punjab, and the balance are Pakhtuns (15-21 percent), Muhajirs and Sindhis (3-5 percent) and Baluchis (about 0.3 percent).

The Pakistan military has traditionally been a secular, disciplined and professional organisation. However, over time, there has been infiltration of the force by the overwhelming strength of radical Islamists sympathisers. The arrest of a Pakistani Brigadier<sup>14</sup> for his ties with the Hizbul-Tahrir, a radical Islamist group; the gunning down of two senior Pakistani officials, one by his own security guard; the attack on the Karachi naval base, with inside assistance; and refuge to Osama bin Laden, all highlight the increasing radicalisation of the security forces.

The rise of Islamism in the Pakistan Army gained impetus under the presidency of Gen Zia. His emphasis on Islam, in an already conservative society, encouraged Islamic zealotry in the Army. It opened the doors for intolerant bigots and fanatics, and suddenly a large number of subordinates "got religion". It was Zia who oversaw the transition of a largely secular Army into a Islamist Army. Zia allowed the Tablighi Jamaat (an Islamic

missionary society) to operate freely within the Army. The armed forces, during this period, took upon themselves the role of protector of Pakistan's Islamic identity, and Islam became synonymous with the Army. Under Zia, Islamisation went beyond the ban on alcohol: a large number of signboards quoting the Quran were displayed around the cantonments, and a number of officers grew beards and visited mosques. The observance of religious practices and beliefs was encouraged under Zia's 'Islamisation' programme and made mandatory for the security forces to follow. The sincerity with which an individual followed religious practices and beliefs formed an important input for his Annual Assessment Report, determining his future career progression prospects. For the first time, the Army began to recruit officers and soldiers from various religious seminaries, a majority being from the Sunni *madrassas*. Islamic literature and philosophy were also introduced in the curricula of various training courses conducted in Regimental Centres, Schools of Instruction and Staff College, Quetta. The book *Quranic Concepts of War*, whose foreword was written by Gen Zia-ul-Haq, was accepted as the Pakistan's military doctrine. According to the book, Islam divided the world into two camps – the Dar-ul-Islam (the world of Islam - the believers) and the Dar-ul- Harb (people defiant to Allah - the non-believers). The onus is on the believers to make the non-believers subservient to Allah, which may involve repeated conflicts between two, till the latter become believers.

The sharp turn towards religious fundamentalism by the Army, which was the only surviving secular institution in the country, set a trend which is unlikely to be reversed in the near future. The dreadful consequences of the Army influenced by extreme Islamist propaganda led to the dilution of command structures and desertions of a large number of highly trained ex-soldiers, including explosive experts and engineers, to extremist groups. The situation became grave post the 9/11 attack when the Pakistan military was coerced into an alliance with the US for the GWOT, which a majority of Pakistani society, including the families of the soldiers, disapproved of. They felt that the Pakistani military had become subservient to the Americans and the actions against militants comprised a campaign against fellow Muslims being conducted on the orders of the US. In spite of receiving billions of dollars in military aid from the US (leading to the portrayal of the Pakistan Army by some sections of the society as “an Army for hire”), there is deep

resentment in the Army also against the US, causing serious problems of morale, loyalty and motivation.

The influence of religious fundamentalists and the close association of the Pakistan Army with radical *jihadi* elements fighting against the US, continue to impact the soldiers' religious and *jihadist* orientation. There is ample evidence of the links between Army personnel and Islamic hardliners, and the role of subverted soldiers in propagating radical ideology and assisting in attacks on own military establishments. The attack on the General Headquarters (GHQ) in 2009, the failed assassination attempt on Pervez Musharraf, the Mehran base raid in 2011, to mention a few, were planned and coordinated by soldiers from within the Service. The hostile reaction of the Army on the killing of Osama bin Laden by the US was an indicator of the growing radicalisation of the Pakistan Army. There have also been complaints by a Pakistan Air Force commander about pilots refusing to shave off their beards, a mark of Islamic observance, and air crews sabotaging the F-16s to prevent them from flying missions close to the border with Afghanistan.

More than 40 terrorist attacks over the past three years against military installations, duly assisted by insiders, comprise a sign of revolt and growing religious fanaticism within the organisation. As per retired RAdm Tanvir Ahmed, "We don't need to look for enemies outside our borders, we have plenty within". The ongoing counter-terrorist operations in Waziristan and FATA have not produced the desired results, as a fairly large section of soldiers and officers harbours strong radical views and cannot be trusted to sincerely confront the *jihadi* challenge.<sup>15</sup> Over a period, about 250 Pakistani soldiers, including officers, have reportedly surrendered to the militants without firing a single shot. Some disillusioned officers and men have even chosen to join the militant organisations. The reverses faced by the Pakistan Army indicate the growing reluctance of its ranks to fight their own people, as they feel that they are being used to kill their Muslim brethren at America's behest. Under these circumstances, the increasingly radicalised Army cannot be expected to play a meaningful role in combating *jihadi* terrorism, resulting in unrest and violence, contributing to the cause of fundamentalist organisations.

Besides the Army, there have also been instances of mass desertion and refusal to fight the militants, especially in the Pathan-dominant Frontier Corps. The personnel of the locally recruited paramilitary police, or *khassadars*, and the Frontier Constabulary, who are supposed to patrol the line between FATA and

NWFP are highly unreliable. Since 2004, the Frontier Corps has seen repeated incidents of units refusing to fight or even deserting *en masse* to join the Taliban.

### **Intervention in State Governance**

The main bane of political instability and ineffective democratic institutions in Pakistan is the primacy of its Army, which neither permits the elected government to function independently nor owns responsibility to singularly govern the state. Given the Army's deep distrust of politicians, the Pakistan Army practises a policy of divide and rule wherein it shifts its support among and between the various political parties. It keeps the party in power insecure, threatened by withdrawal of its support or of political leaders patronised by it. This diarchy, which is also known as the hybrid civil-military relationship model, is difficult to sustain and has failed to provide any effective form of governance. Unlike other Armies where the charter and role of the security forces are drawn up by the political leadership, with the primary responsibility of mitigating the external security challenges, the Pakistan Army is completely involved in managing both the internal and external affairs of the state, with the ruling political party relegated to managing peripheral issues. A number of Army Chiefs have used this ideology to ensure the dominance of the forces in conducting the affairs of the state and concurrently ensuring that the political structures remain weak and unstable to challenge the writ of the Army.

### **Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)**

The key military institution for manipulation of politics is, of course, the ISI. It is unabashed about the need to keep an eye on politics, the bureaucracy and civil society as part of internal security. Its justification for undertaking clandestine and covert operations is based on the self-propagated theory that there is a need to monitor some political parties, elements of the bureaucracy and civil organisations that are committed to breaking up Pakistan, and have close links with India and Afghanistan.

The ISI Directorate has, over six decades of nationhood, emerged into a powerful institution in Pakistan. The agency is a central organ of Pakistan's military machine and has played a major—often dominant—role in the country's volatile politics. The ISI is run as “a state within a state”. It has mounted surveillance on parties and politicians, often infiltrated, coopted, cajoled or coerced them into supporting the Army's centralising agenda. The

bureaucracy of Pakistan has also not been untouched by the wiles of the ISI. A negative security report from the ISI can adversely affect the career of a bureaucrat, thus, ensuring that civil servants remain subservient to the Army and pose no serious threat to the military's hegemony.

Till the 1970s, the organisation had a limited external agenda which was largely India-centric. However, with every successive military dispensation, the ISI has grown in strength and its involvement in the affairs of the state has increased. The Afghan *jihad* turned the ISI into the most powerful department of the country. From 1985 onwards, the ISI has been actively involved in political manipulations. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif successfully used the ISI to collect evidence of corruption against political rivals like Benazir Bhutto and other bureaucrats. The agency played a frontline role in initiating the power struggle and internecine war between the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) [PML (N)], contributing to the political instability and crisis in governance. The Director-General ISI (DG-ISI) Gen Asad Durrani (Retd) admitted that funds were distributed by the organisation to manipulate the 1990 elections against the PPP.

The ISI, also called an **'invisible government'**, has been actively involved in playing a duplicitous game: while supporting the GWOT, it also maintains clandestine links with the Taliban and other terrorist organisations. It is hard to believe that the ISI had no clue about the presence of Osama bin Laden, who was living right under the nose of the Pakistan military until his death. In documents leaked in April 2011 on the Wikileaks website, US authorities described the ISI as a "terrorist" organisation at par with Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

The import of the ISI wielding power in the country has a strong bearing on Islamabad's national security and foreign policy. It is a major decision influencing element in the policy formulation process and tends to maintain an anti-India stance, furthering the agenda of its mentor, the Pakistan Army. A case in point comprises the efforts by the political dispensation to improve ties between India and Pakistan through the promotion of trade and commerce. However, the Pakistani intelligence agency, through its vile mechanisation, impeded any positive development in the field by harassing and threatening the businessmen keen on trade with India.

Besides, the ISI is involved in the domestic politics as it maintains strong linkages with Islamic fundamentalist groups which are anti-India and anti-

Afghanistan in character. The ISI's long association with the militants, first in Afghanistan and then in Kashmir, has led some ISI officers to develop close personal relationships with the cadre that they are supposed to control. A number of retired middle-ranking ISI officers have reportedly joined the LeT and other militant groups. The military and ISI continue to provide them shelter and there is deep unwillingness to take serious action against them as they are seen as assets to manipulate Afghanistan and create unrest in India. The Pakistani security establishment is of the belief that post withdrawal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces, India will support non-Pathan forces to encircle Pakistan, hence, to counter the same, it needs to support the Pathans. Both the ISI and the Army have been committed to supporting terrorism in India, by keeping the various terrorist organisations 'on the shelf'.

The ISI is known to have a close relationship with the Harkat-ul-Ansar and LeT which are extremely active in waging terrorist operations against the Indian state. Despite denials from Islamabad, there is plenty of evidence of the direct involvement of the ISI in propagating terrorism in India and its role in the 2008 Mumbai (Bombay) attacks in which 165 people were killed. The ISI is quite convinced that what they did to the Soviets in Afghanistan they can do to India in Kashmir, through the Islamist militants. This relationship between the ISI and fundamentalists, fostered on anti-India interests, clearly characterises a close-minded approach to any improvement in relations with India.

Further the 10-year-long Afghan War not only bestowed on the ISI huge experience of covert warfare, it also created for it a vast reserve of motivated manpower that could be used as its proxy in the geostrategic horseplay of the regional powers. However, post 2001, following the decision of Pakistan to support the US' war on terror, the Islamist proxies created and supported by the Army and ISI turned against the state. Thousands of Pakistani civilians and soldiers have been killed and maimed by these home grown extremist elements creating internal strife and unrest.

### **Nuclearisation of Pakistan**

One of Bhutto's most significant decisions was to initiate the nuclear weapons programme in Pakistan. Bhutto saw the programme as a way to bridge the ever increasing gap of conventional military capabilities between India and Pakistan by keeping the threshold of conflict low, by threatening India with its

nuclear weapons and providing an alternative to the Pakistani armed forces. By building the bomb, Pakistan thought that it would reduce the Army's role and could face India on an equal footing, a magic bullet that could resolve all problems.

The nuclear test by Pakistan led to sanctions by the US, the cutting off of economic and military aid adversely impacting its already fragile economy and military capabilities. Besides the US, fourteen other countries, including Japan, Germany, Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Sweden also suspended bilateral aid programmes to Pakistan. In short, Pakistan, which was heavily dependent on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), due to the sanctions by the US-led coalition withholding IMF support, witnessed the collapse of its economy, loss of confidence due to the balance of payments crisis and a significant decline in developmental activities. The dream run of the Pakistani economy under Ayub Khan was seriously jolted under Bhutto, with partial responsibility lying with the imposed nuclear sanctions. However, the US suspended the sanctions each time developments in Afghanistan made Pakistan a strategically important "frontline state," such as the 1981 Soviet occupation and the war on terrorism post 9/11.

Recently, Pakistan, in alignment with its nuclear ideology, as a counter to India's hypothetical Cold Start strategy, has sought to deploy Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs), also referred to as battlefield nuclear weapons, to deter India from undertaking proactive operations.

### **Pakistan's Presumptions**

In contrast to India's and China's nuclear policy of no first use, Pakistan has always maintained that it would employ nuclear weapons to blunt any offensive by India's conventional forces. In 2002, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, the first head of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), outlined four scenarios<sup>16</sup> in which Pakistan would consider using nuclear weapons against India:

- If India conquers a large part of Pakistan.
- If India destroys large parts of Pakistan's Army or Air Force.
- If India tries to strangle Pakistan economically.
- If India tries to destabilise Pakistan politically, including by creating large scale internal subversion.

Pakistan's strategy of nuclear brinkmanship hinges on the presumption that India is unlikely to respond with its strategic nuclear assets against Pakistan's low yield TNWs because of its weak polity, soft national policies and high degree of sensitivity to international criticism, conveniently ignoring the tenets of the stated Indian nuclear doctrine.

Pakistan's deployment of TNWs [e.g. Nasr missile, which has a range of around 37 miles (60 kilometres)] dangerously undermines deterrence stability and escalation control in the subcontinent.<sup>17</sup> With the power to use TNWs vested with the formation commanders and not under a centralised command structure comprising both political and military representatives, the likelihood of their misuse or accidental use increases manifold, based on the threat appreciated by each commander and his response thereto.

With increasing radicalisation of the Pakistani armed forces and their nexus with various terrorist organisations, the security of the TNWs deployed in the forward areas is disconcerting, and they are vulnerable to capture by the terrorists. Fool-proof security of TNWs is a military commanders' nightmare, involving deployment of large scale first line troops on static duties, which may not be operationally viable. However, the consequences of nuclear weapons in the possession of the Pakistan military falling into the hands of terrorists would be horrendous. Additionally, in keeping with Pakistan's previous track record, another cause of concern is the proliferation of nuclear technology to rogue nations and terrorist organisations for financial remuneration by the Pakistani state.

The decision to escalate a conventional conflict into the realm of a nuclear conflict would lie with Pakistan and it must not pre-suppose that employment of nuclear weapons, however small, would not invite a similar response from India. As per the Indian nuclear policy, any nuclear attack on India, irrespective of size, would invite massive retaliation, hence, the need for Pakistan to be forewarned before indulging in any adventurism.

## Chapter 4

# Sectarianism in Pakistan

*You are free, you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or cast or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the State ...*

— *Extract of Mohammad Ali Jinnah's speech of August 11, 1947*

- Pakistan has the world's second largest Muslim population and the largest number of Shias after Iran.
- Zia-ul-Haq implemented a nationwide Islamisation policy.
- Sectarianism in Pakistan became an arena for competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
- Shia-Sunni divide, Deobandi-Barelvi divide, killing of Hazaras, Ahmadiyah declared apostates.
- Sectarian organisations responsible for much of the violence in Pakistan.
- Religious groups play an important role in politics and are patronised by mainstream political parties.

Pakistan has the world's largest number of Muslims after Indonesia and the world's largest number of Shias after Iran. Although precise figures are unavailable, it is estimated that Sunnis comprise 80 to 85 percent of Pakistan's population, while Shias make up around 10 to 12 percent, 3.6 percent are others (including Christians and Hindus) and 2.3 percent are Ahmadiyahs, who are officially considered non-Muslims by virtue of a 1974 constitutional amendment. Sunni-Shia relations in Pakistan remained largely peaceful until the late 1970s. Not only were Sunni-Shia relations non-violent, they were also not particularly important when it came to politics. This began to change in the early 1980s, under the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq who implemented a nationwide Islamisation policy, which privileged particular schools of extremist Sunni thought and began to polarise Sunni-Shia relations. The Iranian Revolution of 1978–79 further stoked the issue. Zia's regime reformed the Constitution extensively, entrenching orthodox interpretations of Sunni Islam, which

alienated both Shias and Barelvis. The reforms included an ordinance to enforce *zakat* (religious tax), which allowed for automatic deduction of this tithe from personal bank accounts, contradicting Shia jurisprudence. Islamic parties, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, which had assisted the Army in bringing down Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, were allowed to extend their influence into the bureaucracy and institutions of public education in exchange for supporting the military.

Sectarianism in Pakistan also became an arena for a broader geopolitical competition between the Governments of Saudi Arabia and Iran for wielding greater influence in Pakistan. Additionally, the anti-Soviet Afghan *jihād*, supported and financed by both the United States and Saudi Arabia, further fuelled the sectarian war. This funding stream strengthened and armed Sunni groups on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and established a network of *madrassas* (religious schools) following the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith sub-sects of Sunni Islam throughout the country. In turn, Iran provided funding to Pakistani Shia clerics who had returned from studying in Najaf and Qom to establish their own religious seminaries in Pakistan.

In the mid-Eighties, a group of Sunni clerics led by Haq Nawaz Jhangvi formed, under state patronage, the anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,<sup>18</sup> with aid from Saudi Arabia. The SSP operated as a political party, achieving some success in the Punjab elections, but was primarily involved in sectarian terrorism. In response, the Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP), a Shia extremist group, was formed to defend the Shia community and allegedly carried out a number of retaliatory killings. Gen Pervez Musharraf banned both the SSP and SMP in 2001-02. However, the SSP was reestablished under a new name, first, as the Millat-i-Islamia Pakistan in 2003 and subsequently as the Ahle-Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat (ASWJ). The ASWJ contested elections in 2013, despite the organisation's formally banned status. A militant offshoot of the SSP, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi that was formed in 1996, is viewed as responsible for much of the sectarian violence occurring in Pakistan even today. Such extremist groups consider Ahmediyas, Shias, as well as some sub-sects of Sunni Islam such as Barelvis, as apostates / infidels deserving death. The targeting by the Sunni militants of the traditionally moderate Barelvis led to the emergence of radical Barelvi groups such as the Dawat-i-Islami and militant Sunni Tehreek (ST) to counter-balance the growth of the Deobandi Tablighi Jamaat.

All the sectarian groups have a specific institutional base, the *madrassas* or Islamic seminaries, and their growth and effectiveness is directly linked to the rise of these institutions. At the time of partition, there were less than 300 religious schools in Pakistan which currently have increased to more than 40,000, of which some 10 to 15 percent preach hatred and provide military training to carry out terrorists' activities. Deobandi *madrassas* frequently issue anti-Shia *fatwas* calling for a constitutional amendment to declare Shias as non-Muslims. The political parties have not only turned a blind eye to the activities of these organisations, they seek their help for securing votes during elections. According to data from media reports based on the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), since 1988, while the number of sectarian incidents has ebbed and slowed, the last five years have seen levels of violence average almost 100 incidents per year. The rate is below the peak years of the early 1990s, but the incidents themselves have become increasingly dangerous, with an average of more than 1,000 people getting killed or injured in sectarian attacks every year from 2009 to 2013, which is three times the annual rate during the 1990s.

The whole of Pakistan is inflicted with the scourge of sectarian clashes and violence. Cities such as Karachi which underwent a large demographic upheaval because of the influx of Pashtuns and Baluchis have suffered relatively more than the others in recent years. Some of the most deadly attacks have involved the targeting of the Hazara Shia community that lives primarily in Baluchistan and the Northern Areas. The Human Rights Watch estimates that "of Shias killed across Pakistan in 2012, around a quarter of the victims were Quetta Hazaras. In 2013, a little under half of those killed were from that community." Many Hazaras have relocated to other parts of Pakistan or sought asylum abroad.

In recent years, sectarian tensions in Pakistan are being played out in a national context where the writ of the state is facing a broader and more concerted challenge from militants who justify their actions on the basis of a claim to Islamic legitimacy. Sectarian organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Lej) have strong ties with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the umbrella organisation responsible for much of the violence in Pakistan today, and several former Lej leaders have assumed important positions within the TTP's ranks. Although estimates of the number killed or injured in sectarian attacks vary depending on the source, all statistics indicate that sectarian

violence in Pakistan remains a major problem today. Violence motivated by sectarianism has taken many forms in Pakistan. Prominent representatives from each sect have become victims in *quid pro quo* targeted killings. Armed attacks are launched against each other's mosques and schools. Funerals and religious processions have been bombed, as have popular venues frequented by a certain sect. A 2013 Pew Research Centre Report found that almost two in three Pakistanis surveyed considered Sunni-Shia tensions in their country to be a "very big" or "moderately big problem". For a fragile Pakistan, violent ethnic or sectarian conflict is a major cause of concern because counteracting such tendencies is highly taxing on the state's meagre resources.

Pakistan's religious groups also play an important role in politics and have often benefited from periods of strong state support. While they pursue distinct agendas in terms of both religious and civil goals, most share the same fundamental objective – to propagate the ideology of Islam in all aspects and, more importantly, wield authority in the hierarchy of the governance of the state, through means which may not always be lawful.

## Chapter 5

# Fragile Political Scenario

- Pakistan has had more than 20 governments and 30 plus years of military rule since partition.
- Political betrayal of the Awami League led to the creation of Bangladesh.
- Corrupt, self-serving, power hungry politicians destroyed the faith of citizens in democracy.
- The PPP and PML(N) alternatively came to power, but were repeatedly ousted by military dictators for inept governance.
- The main bane of political instability in Pakistan is its Army, which does not allow the elected government to rule without interference.

Pakistan, since partition, has seen more than 20 governments, including 14 elected or appointed Prime Ministers, five interim governments and 33 years of military rule under four different leaders. Excluding the military and interim governments, the average life span of a politically elected government has been less than two years, being either dismissed by Presidents or removed from power by Army Chiefs.

Pakistan was politically unstable from the outset. The fledgling state suffered an immediate leadership crisis when Pakistan's founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah died within just over a year after partition, on September 11, 1948, and his chief confidante, Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated on October 16, 1951. The political system was deprived of experienced leaders, triggering political instability and chaos. The Muslim League also soon fractured, as its leaders lacked a political base in the newly formed Pakistan.

While the provinces continued to foster and develop their basic political structures, those responsible for the establishment of the central government were either politicians with no mass base or bureaucrats with very limited administrative experience. The political parties were also accused of corruption and high-handed behaviour, leading to maligning of the democratic system and setting the stage for a takeover by military dictators. The major afflictions that prevented the establishment of a robust

political and democratic system in Pakistan and which continue to ail it till date are as given below:

- **Struggle to Build a Unified Secular Islamic State:** Jinnah's vision of a liberal Pakistan lacked roots. The man who had repeatedly emphasised the differences between Muslims and Hindus, now pointedly urged the new Pakistanis – the Hindu, Sikh, Christian and Muslim—to forget the past and work together. A few speeches could not erase four decades of rhetoric on the differences between Hindus and Muslims and the threat to Muslims from the larger Hindu community. There also existed deep political differences and distrust between the populations of East and West Pakistan, the former being Bengali, while the latter was divided among several linguistic groups, with almost half being Punjabi. The East Pakistanis, in spite of being in a majority, were denied their rightful political space and were undemocratically sidelined by the hegemonic West Pakistan.
- **Building of a Robust Constitution:** A country's Constitution provides the basic framework for the governance of a nation, and Pakistan, since partition, had three of them: in 1956, 1962, and 1973. All these Constitutions were amended significantly from time to time, most notably in 1985, when Zia enhanced the powers of the President vis-a-vis the Prime Minister, who could be removed by the President, and the provincial Chief Ministers by the Governors. Prime ministerial authority was revived in 1997 by Nawaz Sharif, only to be once again subordinated to that of the President in 2002 by Gen Musharraf. The Pakistani Constitution continues to be vulnerable to amendments, to suit the interests of the leaders in power, rather than ensure good governance of the state.
- **Elections:** Pakistan did not hold its first national election until 1970 and thereafter there has been no shortage of elections. Few elections were truly free of the Army's intervention as the Army believes that a majority of the politicians are corrupt and the Army's involvement is mandatory to ensure the conduct of fair elections. Even after coming to power, under the overarching umbrella of the Army, the Pakistani political parties have never been allowed to play any central role in the governance of Pakistan. Thus, unsure of the political dispensation, the majority population is unwilling to give democracy a respectable chance,

leading to Pakistan's long experiment with autocracy, oligarchy and frequent military coups.

- **The Feudal System:** Patronage and kinship form the basic elements of the Pakistani political system. The power and dominance of the landed aristocracy remain unchallenged. The feudals continue to resist any attempts to introduce social change or enhancement of education and economic standards amongst the workers. The labourers are denied even basic fundamental rights and their participation in the democratic process is cosmetic and meagre, aligned to the diktat of the land owner / industrialist.
- **Lack of Ideology:** The political parties in Pakistan lack an ideological core, a loyal cadre, or roots amongst the masses. They remain badly splintered along deep ethnic, regional and religious lines, ensuring that no party ever succeeds in gaining an absolute majority. Even if it did, it wouldn't mean much, because for most politicians, the party means little compared to personal interests and clan loyalty, hence, governments are always insecure. There is a continued feeling of scepticism, lack of trust and mass irritation against the government due to the lack of long-term policies and ideology, gross instances of corruption, autocracy, nepotism and absolute indifference towards the concerns of the electorate.
- **A Withered Judiciary:** Pakistan, over a period, has degraded its rich judicial history by convoluted mechanisations. The courts have become increasingly sensitive to political and monetary influence and align their rulings to favour those in power. The pliability of the judges makes it easier for the rich and powerful to mould the law as per their convenience, all in the name of national interest or security.

The above major inherent weaknesses in the political structures from the early stage proved to be a crippling disadvantage for Pakistan's political development and stability. The change of ministers in quick succession and disbanding of various ministries created political turmoil and instability, leading to Pakistan getting its first military dictator, Gen Ayub Khan, in 1958, a little over a decade after partition.

Between 1958 and 1971, President Ayub Khan brought together an alliance of senior Army officers, civil bureaucracy, industrial and landed elite to replace the parliamentary government by a system of Basic Democracy.

He disqualified all the old politicians under the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order, 1959. A small number of 1, 20,000 Basic Democrats divided equally between the two wings of Pakistan, elected the members of both the Provincial and National Assemblies. The Basic Democracy system did not empower the individual citizens to participate in the democratic process, but opened up the opportunity to bribe and buy votes from the limited voters who were privileged enough to vote.

Ayub Khan's skewed political policies and refusal to acknowledge the majority status of East Pakistan exacerbated the disparities between West and East Pakistan. The mounting regional discontent in East Pakistan and urban unrest in West Pakistan helped undermine Ayub Khan's authority, forcing him to relinquish power in March 1969.

After Ayub Khan, Gen Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan headed the second military regime from 1969-71. By that time, the country had been under military rule for 13 of its 25 years of existence. A civil war-like situation developed in East Pakistan in 1971. National elections in the previous year had delivered a resounding victory to the Awami League, a political party led by Mujibur Rahman, whose entire electoral base was in East Pakistan. Politicians in the Western wing colluded with the Army and prevented the transfer of power to the elected government, leading to disenchantment and armed rebellion in East Pakistan, clearing the way for the creation of Bangladesh. The dismemberment of Pakistan discredited both the civil bureaucracy and the Army. Gen Yahya Khan was left with no choice but to hand over power to the PPP led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The impact of the defeat of the 1971 War led to the loss of 54 percent of Pakistan's population, 15 percent of real estate and more than 90,000 officers and men were taken prisoners. The loss of East Pakistan dramatically narrowed Pakistan's cultural and social diversity, to its ultimate disadvantage and the balance of power subtly shifted from secular, "mainstream" forces toward the Islamists.

Post 1971, the gap between his promised manifesto and the marginal successes of his somewhat haphazard reforms prevented Bhutto from consolidating any worthwhile mass support base. He relied on the coercive arm of the state to snuff out political opposition and neglected the build-up of the PPP as a truly popular national party. The corrupt, ineffective and high-handed governance policies of Bhutto led to violent urban unrest, giving the Army under Gen Zia-ul-Haq the pretext to make a powerful comeback and

on July 05, 1977, Pakistan was placed under military rule yet again and the 1973 Constitution was abrogated.

On assuming power, Gen Zia banned all political parties and expressed his determination to transform Pakistan into an Islamic state. In December 1985, after confirming his own position in a controversial “Islamic” referendum, he introduced a series of amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The Eighth Amendment turned out to be the most draconian as it gave the President explicit power to remove any government, if he felt it was necessary to secure national interests. During his presidency, Gen Zia used this amendment repeatedly to expel a number of Prime Ministers, mainly on a whim or insecurity over a shift in power.

The democratic era that was ushered post the sudden demise of Zia was equally turbulent. The elections in November 1988 were based on political parties for the first time in 15 years. None of the parties won a majority, but the PPP under Benazir Bhutto got the maximum seats, hence, was invited to form the government with alliances. But soon bitterness crept in between the ruling dispensation, its alliances and the opposition. Large sums were doled out by the PPP as bribes to sway the affiliation of the politicians, draining the state economy. Corrupt politicians and poor administration scarred the image of Bhutto’s government and in 1990, the President dismissed Bhutto, and once again, fresh elections were held within two years and Mr Sharif came into power. He was dismissed within three years in 1993 by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan who was accused of conspiring with Benazir Bhutto to dismiss him. The Supreme Court declared the dismissal unconstitutional and reinstated Sharif. However, President Ghulam, through bribes and scheming, influenced a rebellion in Punjab, forcing the Army Chief to intervene and both the President and Prime Minister were asked to resign and fresh elections were ordered.

In the fresh elections, the PPP claimed a majority and Bhutto was appointed as Prime Minister. However, Bhutto was unable to run a just government and she fell back into the old ways of corruption, misuse of state resources and was soon dismissed. Fresh elections were again planned in February 1997, the fifth in twelve years. From 1988 to 1999, a little over decade, nine different governments (four interim, appointed, four elected and one following the military coup of October 1999) ruled Pakistan. All too frequent elections during the period affected

the legitimacy of the electoral process and the people lost faith in the democratic system.

The two leading parties [PPP and PML (N)] continued to alternatively form a government but were repeatedly ousted by military dictators due to inept governance, corruption and incidents of increasing violence. The civilian<sup>19</sup> governments, over time, became resigned to being manipulated by the military for some reason or the other, as also, as alleged by some, in order to maintain its primacy. In June 2013, 66 years after partition, the first successful political transition from one civil government to another took place, raising hopes among the international community of a stable political landscape in Pakistan. However, as the internal situation again deteriorated, gradually, the power started shifting from the civil dispensation to the Army. The Army was also unhappy with Sharif for allowing the legal action against Pervez Musharraf as well as showing interest in resolving outstanding disputes with India and his attempts to improve bilateral ties with India, thereby affecting the Army's interests.

## Conclusion

Mohammad Ali Jinnah had always envisioned a democratic Pakistan. Many of his successors waged decades-long struggles to establish a sustainable democratic system in which elected civilian leaders had a clear primacy in the country's governance. However, this effort faced a serious reversal due to immature and corrupt political leaders and direct military intervention in the country's governance. Pakistan's military continues to dictate the country's foreign and national security policies even when not directly governing. In late August 2014, the Army announced that it was taking on a "facilitative" role in resolving the political impasse among Mr Sharif, Imran Khan and Tahir-ul-Qadri, but it was a precursor to a "soft coup", with Mr Sharif reduced to a "ceremonial Prime Minister" and the military ruling through the backdoor. The main bane of political instability in Pakistan is its Army, which neither allows the elected government to rule without interference nor takes responsibility to singularly govern the state. This diarchy, also known as the hybrid civil-military relations model, is creating ambiguity, and failing to provide effective governance.

## CHAPTER 6

# Economic Crisis

- Pakistan's economy grew at an impressive rate of 6 per cent for the first four decades.
- Bhutto's populist nationalising policies derailed Pakistan's journey of economic development.
- Widespread corruption, economic mismanagement, volatile internal situation and fiscally imprudent economic policies adversely affected the economy's growth.
- Pakistan becoming a self-sustaining economy is more of an illusion as its economy continues to survive on foreign aid and remittances from expatriates rather than domestic revenue.

Since partition, Pakistan's economy has experienced an uneven journey. It grew at a fairly impressive rate of 6 per cent for the first four decades, an achievement very few nations can boast of. Its per capita income doubled, inflation remained low, and poverty declined significantly.<sup>20</sup> By 1969, Pakistan's exports were higher than the exports of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia combined. Pakistan was seen as a model of economic development worldwide, and there was praise for its economic prowess. Many countries sought to emulate Pakistan's economic planning strategy and one of them, South Korea, copied Karachi's second "Five-Year Plan". Though speculative, it is possible that, had these economic policies and programmes continued over the next two decades, Pakistan would have emerged as another miracle economy. The presidency of Ayub Khan is often dubbed as the "Great Decade"<sup>21</sup> during which various economic development plans and reforms, ensuring expeditious economic growth, were promulgated. He was a strong believer of liberalisation and his export-promotion strategy led to the strongest economic growth in the history of the Pakistan. However, Ayub's economic policies were highly business friendly, resulting in wealth being concentrated in the hands of a few. During his regime, the private sector gained immense power and controlled the national economy, and

educational reforms, human development and scientific achievements gained a lot of ground. Between 1949 and 1954, the industrial output grew about 34 percent in West Pakistan and 21 percent in the Eastern wing.

However, post Ayub, Bhutto's populist policies of nationalising industries, banks, insurance companies, educational institutions and other organisations, derailed the ongoing journey of Pakistan's economic growth and modernisation. His nationalisation programmes ignored the realities of market economics, driving out foreign investment and Pakistani capital alike. New investments all but dried up, and many émigré business families fled overseas, taking as much of their capital as they could. Some families deindustrialised, returning to trading, which required low capital outlays. This setback hit Pakistan so badly that the countries that were lagging behind Pakistan in growth and economic indicators in the late 1960s, not only overtook it but also became huge success stories. The growth rate in the 1970s fell to 3.7 per cent per annum from 6 per cent recorded in the 1960s. Income inequalities rose and inflation accelerated, hurting the poor the most. The combined effect of the 1971 War and Bhutto's misconceived policies ruined Pakistan's flourishing economy.

Post Bhutto's adverse economic nationalisation policies, to resurrect the failing economy, Zia ordered the end of centralised control and promulgated policies to improve both the foreign and domestic environments in the country. By the late 1980s, the financial environment in Pakistan improved and became conducive for investment. Under Zia's presidency, the economy rose from under 4 per cent to 6.5 per cent. The dramatic spurt in Pakistan's economy was driven by massive aid from the US, China and Saudi Arabia, besides remittances by 3 million Pakistani migrant workers.<sup>22</sup> Remittances sent by Pakistani nationals living abroad had always served as an effective poverty coping mechanism in Pakistan. There had been an increasing trend in the remittances by expatriates over the past years, from \$ 3.87 billion in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2003-04 to \$ 13.18 billion in FY 2011-12. Compared to other countries in the region, this trend, though it ebbed a little, remained comparatively high even at the height of the global crisis in the summer of 2009.<sup>23</sup>

The withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan in 1990s saw foreign aid from the US almost drying up. Additionally, the shaky democracy under

Benazir and her populist policies led to a burgeoning fiscal deficit, amplified by ineffective domestic revenue collection processes. With recession hitting the globe, the inflow of remittances from immigrant Pakistanis also reduced.

From 1988 to 1999, a little over a decade, nine different governments ruled Pakistan. Frequent changes in the government and reversal of the decisions taken by the preceding government created an environment of uncertainty and Pakistan lost its credibility among the international financial community and local investors. Additionally, widespread corruption, economic mismanagement, personal interests and fiscally imprudent economic policies of the ruling dispensation dominated the decision-making process, ignoring the recommendations of the intelligentsia and professional business institutions.

In the 1990s, Pakistan's economic growth plunged drastically from 6/7 per cent to between 3/4 per cent, the poverty level rose to 33 per cent, inflation was in double digits and the foreign debt amounted to nearly the entire Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Pakistan. Pakistan's total public debt as percentage of GDP was the highest in South Asia – 99.3 per cent of its GDP.<sup>24</sup> In 1998, the economic growth reached its lowest ebb at 2.6 per cent.

During the mid-2000s, under President Gen Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani economy resurged. Between 2003–07, the national GDP more than doubled from the prevailing 3-4 per cent to averaging 7 per cent yearly, and the country's debt burden halved, restoring investors' confidence. Pakistan succeeded in reducing poverty by one-half and saw a dramatic expansion of the urban middle class as more than 13 million jobs were created. In 2005, Pakistan was included by the Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group as one of the "Next Eleven (N-11)" – a group of countries with economies that "might have the kind of potential for global impact, essentially an ability to match the G7 in size". The improved economic state facilitated Pakistan's reentry in the international capital markets as large capital inflows financed the current account deficit and contributed to an increase in gross economic development.

By October 2007, Pakistan, through its exceptional fiscal policies, raised its foreign exchange reserves to a handsome \$16.4 billion, its trade deficit was controlled, exports boomed and lot of foreign investment flowed in. The country's real GDP and international trade volume increased almost three times and the per capita income more than doubled.

However, the economic honeymoon was shortlived and from the beginning of 2008, Pakistan's economy started to decline. The prevailing security situation and Pakistan's role in the war on terror as a frontline state created anxiety amongst both domestic and foreign investors, forcing a massive exodus of financial capital from Pakistan to other neighbouring countries and the Middle East. The adverse domestic environment inflicted a debilitating blow to Pakistan's economy, leading to burgeoning trade deficits, high inflation and balance of payment crisis.

Growth in Pakistan has never translated into budgetary security because of the way its political system works. A major structural flaw lies in the area of tax collection, which is lax, and only about half of what is due is collected. The agriculture sector in Pakistan pays virtually no tax because the landed gentry controls politics and, therefore, has a grip on the government. Since Pakistan's official economy is unable to tap into this wealth that is available in the country but is beyond its reach, revenue shortages and the balance of payments position remain a problem. To replenish the party coffers, businessmen are given state loans and thereafter allowed to default without any retribution or reprisal due to the politicians and the political parties. The corrupt officials are also protected by the politicians so that they can both share the proceeds, with no questions asked.

The current state of the economy, despite the recent performance remains sluggish. The real GDP of Pakistan grew from 3.83 per cent in 2012 to 4.13 per cent in 2014 [International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database (April 2015)]. The rate of unemployment declined marginally from 7.6 per cent in 2005-06 to 6 per cent in 2013-14 [Economic Survey of Pakistan (2014-15)], but the numbers remain high because of its huge youth population. Pakistan's population, over time, grew at a rate which is one of the highest in the world. The large youth population is likely to create a serious problem for Pakistan as a combination of lack of education, high unemployment and increased materialistic aspirations comprise a confirmed recipe for social unrest. Lack of economic opportunity within Pakistan and the inability to leave the country produces masses of young men who are ripe for exploitation by political and fanatic religious leaders for terrorist and illicit political activities.

Pakistan has a poor export performance, which is primarily based on textiles which comprise 55.5 per cent of total exports. A poor second

comprise other goods like sports equipment, leather goods, footwear which are approximately 19 per cent. Textiles, though a major contributor to exports, have a low base technology and are vulnerable because of the availability of cheap Chinese goods.

The military run business enterprise, the “Fauji Foundation”, one of the largest business conglomerates in Pakistan,<sup>25</sup> has grown exponentially from Rs 152 million in 1970 to Rs 9.8 billion in 2000. The strong growth is mainly because of large unwarranted subsidies and concessions given by the government at the expense of others. Pakistan’s disproportionately high defence spending, \$ 7 billion in 2014 ( 18 per cent of the national budget) and \$7.81 billion in 2015, a hike of 11 per cent, is adversely affecting allocations to various social sectors like public health, education, water supply, etc.<sup>26</sup>

The cumulative effect of political turmoil, short-sighted fiscal policies, fragile security environment and lack of will to implement harsh policies critical for a healthy economic state shook the investors’ confidence and has discouraged foreign investments and aid. Thus, Pakistan’s economy continues to linger in a fragile state, oscillating from one crisis to another. It has the most inefficient and antiquated industrial infrastructure. Its production capabilities are limited to very basic and simple fabrication, that too without any significant manufacturing capacities. The sole cornerstone of Pakistan’s industrial base is its textile industry and, to some extent, agriculture. It has a huge energy deficit and negligible indigenous production capability, with large dependence on imports. Pakistan is one of the poorest in terms of income, and lowest in social indices. The cost of living in Pakistan continues to soar and the economic asymmetry between the poor and the rich continues to widen—it is already among the largest in the world. More than 60 per cent<sup>27</sup> of the population earns less than \$2 a day and faces an uncertain economic future.

Corruption, poor governance and terrorism are the greatest obstacles in the economic development of the country. Abuse of public office for personal gains by politicians and the bureaucracy, amassing private wealth at the expense of the population, and no serious policy on accountability are adversely impacting the credibility of the nation. The ineffective tax collection machinery, with no retribution for tax evasion, is a major obstacle in the generation of indigenous revenue, wherein almost half the revenue due is not collected as much of the economy remains outside the government’s reach.

The main challenges to ensure Pakistan's economic growth include ensuring stern action against the corrupt, recovery of plundered money, enacting anti-terrorism and money laundering laws, bridging budget deficits, and recovering taxes from the powerful and mighty. However, no government is willing to address the above issues as they are anti-populist and would hurt the government's self-interest.

Currently, the Pakistani economy continues to remain fragile.<sup>28</sup> Taking advantage of the political disruptions, natural calamities, volatile internal situation, etc., the governments have always tried to shift the blame for their poor economic performance on such peripheral matters. While the above factors do have economic repercussions, it would be farcical to infer that in the absence of these events, the economy would have performed better, in view of the skewed economic policies which have been pursued by various governments. The dream of Pakistan becoming a self-sustaining economy remains an illusion as its economy continues to survive on foreign aid and remittances from expatriates rather than domestic revenue.

## Chapter 7

# Sub-Standard Education System

*... the importance of education and the type of education cannot be over-emphasized ... there is no doubt that the future of our State will, and must, greatly depend upon the type of education we give to our children, and the way in which we bring them up as future citizens of Pakistan ... we should not forget that we have to compete with the world which is moving very fast in this direction.*

— Quaid-e-Azam, in his message to the conference in 1947

- At partition, Pakistan's overall literacy rate was 14 per cent.
- Pakistan is ranked 113th out of 120 registered UN members.
- A dent was made in the education system by Zia with a focus on religious teachings.
- Education in Pakistan polarised along socio-economic lines.
  - Traditional '*madarassas*' – for the poorest.
  - Urdu medium government schools for the majority.
  - Private schools for the elite.
- Youths from government schools and *madrassas* barely literate to tenant any job of significance, leading to discontentment.
- Since independence, the literacy rate grew from 14 per cent to 58 per cent – almost half the adult population of Pakistan is still unable to read or write.

Pakistan at independence comprised regions which were among the least developed in the world, with the overall literacy rate being just 14 per cent. In the more backward regions of the country, e.g., Baluchistan, the literacy rate was even lower, virtually zero<sup>29</sup> in the case of rural women. Even post partition, the education sector was neglected, and not given due priority. The primary focus was on the build-up of the defence forces, industrialisation and infrastructure development. This continued for almost half a century, resulting in the standard of primary and secondary education remaining much below par.<sup>30</sup>

The real dent in the education system came during the Zia decade, wherein the focus shifted from modern contemporary education to

Islamic religious teachings and the number of *madrassas* mushroomed, aided by the state exchequer. However, subsequent dispensations also continued to neglect the education sector, as other services competed for Pakistan's meagre budget, with the Army getting a disproportionately large share.

Further, the conservative rural population of Pakistan does not encourage education of girls, leading to a highly skewed ratio of boys and girls in primary schools [10 (boys) : 4 (girls)]. As per the Human Development Report, Pakistan is placed at 136th position for having just 49.9 per cent educated population and according to the research conducted by UNESCO, Pakistan is ranked 113th out of 120 registered UN members.

Pakistan's educational incongruity lies not in the access to educational facilities but in the access to the **type** of educational facility. Education in Pakistan is polarised along socio-economic lines, with children from varying socio-economic backgrounds subscribing to the corresponding class of schools, with very little intermingling between them. The education system in Pakistan can be divided into three distinct segments: the traditional '**madrassas**', the religious schools affiliated to various religious seminaries propagating their religious teachings and beliefs; the **Urdu medium government schools** which cater for a majority of the children; and lastly, the **private schools** for the children of the rich and the powerful.

**Madrassas:** Education in Pakistan post partition got heavily influenced by religion. At the time of independence, there were about 250 *madrassas* in Pakistan. Within a decade, the number almost doubled, and by 2000, there were 7,000 *madrassas*. In 2004-05, the government estimated there were 13,000 seminaries in Pakistan and, today, according to unofficial estimates, the numbers range between 15,000 to 25,000 and, in some cases, as high as 45,000.

Social and economic factors and the government's failure to promulgate educational reforms and develop infrastructure have contributed to the popularity of the *madrassa* system. With an annual population growth rate of nearly 2 per cent and 35 per cent of the population earning less about \$1.00 per day, *madrassas* have become the leading source of education for the impoverished urban and rural populations. The orientation of the curriculum is primarily along religious lines, producing graduates with narrow-minded

orthodox ideological alignment. Presently, about 1.3 per cent of Pakistani children going to school are enrolled in *madrassas*. Though the percentage may appear inconsequential, it translates into a large youth population of about 1.5 million students.

The explosion of *madrassas* promoting radicalisation and Islamic ideology originated under Gen Zia and proliferated during the decade of his presidency, with funding from the state. In 1979, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets made Pakistan the frontline ally of US in its fight against the Soviets and the spread of Communism in Afghanistan. Saudi and US money poured into Pakistan to fund *madrassas* responsible for recruiting and training *jihadis* and other vehicles of Islamist militancy to help the Afghan *jihadis* to fight the Soviets. *Madrasa* proliferation did not end with Zia or with the end of the Afghan *jihadi*—the Pakistan military's patronage of these institutions continued even under civilian rule during the 1990s which coincided with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Sunni-Deobandi groups like the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and its later offshoot, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), grew out of these so-called *jihadi madrassas*. The countrywide network of mosques and *madrassas* comprises a major source of *jihadi* recruitment to date, providing recruits for internal sectarian conflicts, the “*regional jihad*” in Afghanistan and India, and the “*global jihad*” against the West. In fact, both the SSP and LeJ have been responsible for providing recruits, finances and weapons to the TTP, contributing to its rise. These groups are also accused of serving as Al Qaeda's principal allies in the region.

**Urdu Medium Government Schools:** The government-run Urdu medium schools cater for the education of over 90 per cent of the school-going children. A majority of students in these schools belong to the lower middle or middle class strata of society. Pakistan has more than 80,000 government primary schools, but nearly a quarter of these have teachers who are untrained and incompetent. The quality of education is dismal, with virtually no control or accountability to achieve any laid down standards or outcomes. Many of the schools established in the 1990s turned out to be “ghost” schools, without teachers, buildings, or students. The situation is depressing, and the neglect by the government continues to further exacerbate the matter.

**Private Schools:** The elite and empowered class of the population has all but abandoned the public education system and enrol their children in private sector schools, which provide high quality education and facilities. Access to these private schools is limited to the powerful and rich, with strong socio-economic credentials.

The stratification in the education system has resulted in significant differences in the outlook of students. Students passing out of the *madrassas* have a more fundamentalist and *pro-jihadi* outlook, while the students of Urdu-medium schools are relatively less radicalised and have a more tolerant idea of Islam. The children from the English medium school have a more secular outlook, with greater acceptance of modern concepts and ideologies. Further, the children from the private schools treat their counterparts from *madrassas* and Urdu speaking institutions with disdain and avoid interacting with them. The idea of the haves versus the have nots creates acrimony and hostility between the classes which is present in the *jihadi* propaganda of virtually all Islamist outfits.

The youths graduating from government schools and *madrassas* are creating generations of ill-educated and barely literate young men incapable of performing any job of significance. Consequently, due to the non-availability of a skilled and educated workforce, both locals and foreign companies are apprehensive of investing in Pakistan, leading to rampant unemployment and poverty. Besides, a majority of the young girls, due to social taboos, do not receive any serious education and are, thus, incapable of contributing towards the betterment of the quality of life.

The state of higher education in public universities and colleges is equally pitiable with a sub-standard quality of education. Some universities have become recruitment pools for radical thinkers and activists, leading to fights in the campuses between students aligned to various religious sects. Due to the pathetic standards of higher public educational institutes, a number of private universities have mushroomed, but the high fee structure and limited vacancies deny admission to the majority.

Pakistan ranks among the fifteen most backward countries as per literacy rates in the world. The elite manage to provide quality education to their children through private school, colleges and universities, and the bulk of them leave Pakistan forever. As for the middle and lower middle classes, the Urdu medium schools and *madrassas* equip them with a sub-standard education,

restricting their employment to middle level jobs. The fundamental religious leaders, through their affiliated *madrassas*, aim to propagate their own agenda of creating a theocratic pool to forward their ideology.

Since independence, numerous endeavours have been made by Pakistan to enhance the literacy level, and enrolment of children in schools, especially in the rural areas, however, the results have been dismal. In the 2000s, the Pakistan government started increasing its investment in the development of the human resource: efforts were made to benchmark the education standards in school and admission of girls was incentivised, but very sub-optimal results have been achieved.

After more than 68 years of independence, the literacy rate in Pakistan has risen from 14 per cent to 58 per cent only – almost half the country's adult population is still unable to read or write. This has led to economic stagnation, despondency, unemployment and disillusionment among the young, making them vulnerable to radical influence and unlawful activities.

## Chapter 8

# Implications for India and Response Options

- Pakistan is an insecure state which views India as its eternal foe, seeking to destroy it.
- Persistent desire to maintain parity with India.
- Pakistani strategy of 'mix of terror and talks' with India.
- It will continue to use terrorism as a state policy and create unrest in India.
- Response Options:
  - Military Options
    - Kinetic
    - Nuclear
    - Non-Contact Warfare
  - Diplomatic Initiatives
  - Economic and Trade Relations
  - Cultural Exchanges
  - Perception Management
  - Exploitation of Faultlines

Since its creation, Pakistan has been bedeviled by one crisis after another. Today, ethnic, religious and social faultlines have deepened so much that Pakistan is on the verge of tearing itself apart, with a likely fallout on India. Pakistan, since independence, has accused India for all its afflictions. According to Dr Fair,<sup>31</sup> Pakistan views India as “its eternal foe that not only seeks to dominate Pakistan but to destroy it”. The Pakistani establishment, over a period, has largely managed to influence the domestic opinion against India by brainwashing its population through a doctored history, the threat of Indian hegemony, and continuous anti-India propaganda. The Pakistan Army, the main power centre, has taken upon itself the responsibility of being the sole custodian for ensuring Pakistan’s integrity, ideology and its Islamic identity which, purportedly, is being threatened by India. Defeat for the Pakistan Army would be accepting Indian supremacy as it would

tantamount to losing its primacy in managing the affairs of the state, which is absolutely unacceptable. It is this fear, which propels Pakistan to take calculated risks for changing the status quo periodically and project the Pakistan Army as the lone instrument of state capable of standing up against the Indian might and dominance. Apart from initiating three regular wars with India and the Kargil misadventure, Pakistan has constantly supported insurgencies in India and waged a proxy war in Kashmir as a state policy to seek strategic parity with India, and resist its rise. The proposed deployment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) in the forward areas has increased the threshold of risk of nuclear engagement as Pakistan believes that it can deter India from escalating the level of conventional conflict by deploying TNWs. There are some thinkers who believe that a grand bargain by India to resolve the Kashmir dispute (to Pakistan's satisfaction), may facilitate dissipating the Kashmir impasse and bring peace between the two neighbours. However, Dr Fair, while rubbishing the grand bargain theory, describes Pakistan as a state that is fundamentally unsatisfied with the status quo and would continue to propagate its anti-Indian stance, no matter what.

For the Pakistan Army, a policy of '**mix of terror and talks**' is the strategy for India. It keeps the Indian security forces preoccupied and the Pakistani public satisfied by the false propaganda of its successes. International empathy towards the Indian cause, specially by the primary aid givers, China and the United States, is restricted to lip-service, meekly cautioning Pakistan of ceasefire violations and sponsoring terrorist activities in India as it suits their interest in keeping a rising power like India under check. The implications of the growing faultlines in Pakistan are as given under:

- Pakistan would continue to use the asymmetric option in Kashmir and others parts of India to create unrest and violence to showcase parity with India.
- It would foster and maintain links with underground fundamentalist elements, Indian Mujahedeen sleeper cells and elements of Al Qaeda in the Subcontinent (AQIS) / Islamic State (IS) inside India to create turmoil and disorder at the opportune time.
- The Pakistan Army, as hithertofore, will continue to support and

employ non-state actors as a state policy against India. Additionally, to maintain its primacy in the affairs of the state, the Army would continue to violate the ceasefire and create tension along the borders to ensure its relevance.

- Organisations like the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, under the umbrella of Pakistan, would continue to flourish and launch dramatic terrorist attacks against India with impudence, without fear of judicial reprisal or reprimand.
- Pakistan would continue to raise the nuclear bogey and by deploying TNWs at the operational levels, it intends to deter India from taking proactive action and bridge the conventional asymmetry. Pakistan is convinced that with nuclear capability, it can freely wage sub-conventional conflict and create unrest in the hinterland and along the Line of Control (LoC) / IB (International Boundary) in India, without facing severe military consequences.
- Indian economic growth hinges on domestic stability. Upsurge of terrorism would undermine the investors' confidence and adversely affect economic development in India.
- The cost of sustained tension with Pakistan is a huge external check on India's rise, necessitating money and the policy-makers' attention that could be far better utilised on other social, economic and developmental priorities.
- There is always the possibility that the beleaguered Pakistani regime may try to mobilise support at home by creating tension with India. In the current context, due to extended deployment, it is unlikely that the Pakistani military is in a position to credibly play a game of brinkmanship with an increasingly powerful India, but in the future, the contingency remains.
- Finally, the worst case scenario of a collapsing Pakistan would pose an enormous challenge for India. The most direct result would be a massive wave of refugees, like the deluge that streamed out of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) during the Pakistani counter-insurgency operations in 1971. This social and logistical burden would be compounded by uncertainty over the control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and the political future of Pakistan's provinces and power centres.

## Response Options

The Indian decision-makers have an array of response options available to cater for any likely fallout from the existing/future turmoil in Pakistan. These options range from punitive military action, including a nuclear response, on one end of the spectrum, to confidence-building measures and cultural exchanges, on the other. Adopting a single option as a common reaction to all contingencies may not be prudent. Each situation would warrant a mix of responses addressing the issue concurrently at a number of levels.

- **Military Options:** The various military responses can be calibrated based on the quantum of force application. The severity of the response would be determined jointly by the military and the government depending on the criticality of the situation. The various response options are:
- **Punitive Action by Limited Ground Offensive:** A punitive response to Pakistan's adventurism would involve a swift limited ground offensive aimed to destroy Pakistan's war-waging machinery and terrorist facilities, and to capture territory. The intent being to increase the cost of an asymmetric war for Pakistan, and to impose caution. The Indian Navy to be employed to block the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and precision air strikes to be conducted to destroy terrorist camps and bases. The possibility exists of even a limited response by India escalating into a full scale war, affording Pakistan an incentive to raise the bogey of the use of the nuclear weapon, an eventuality the Indian Army must be prepared for.
- **Precision Air Strikes:** Employment of the Air Force to deter Pakistan is seemingly a less escalatory option but sufficiently punitive. However, employment of air power does not obviate the need of ensuring the readiness of the ground forces to prevent escalation. The Air Force will be operating in a contested air space and should be prepared for a counter-offensive.
- **Employment of Long Range Vectors / UAVs / Drones:** Employment of precision long range vectors, armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), drones and ground launched ballistic missiles to strike terrorist targets in depth is a viable option. However, it would establish a new precedent and lower the threshold for use of these weapons,

mandating India to develop counter-measures and be prepared to thwart a similar threat from Pakistan.

- **Fire Assaults / Status Quo:** Employment of artillery guns and medium / small arms fire as hitherto is the least escalatory option. However, it is unlikely to yield any worthwhile result or change Pakistan's adversarial policies towards India or coerce it to dismantle its terrorist infrastructure. Limited deterrence against unprovoked firing by Pakistan and infiltration by terrorists can be achieved.
- **Hot Pursuit / Cross-Border Raid:** Hot pursuit / raid beyond own geographical boundaries to kill the terrorists and destroy their infrastructure is an effective option, denying them even a safe haven across the border. The operations must be coordinated at the highest level, based on real time intelligence. Special Forces / specialist sub-units of the infantry to be trained and equipped to undertake these operations. The shots that resounded in the cross-border raid by 21 PARA SF in Myanmar on June 08/09, 2015, echoed the world over and conveyed a stern message of Indian resolve to respond punitively to any misadventure even in the enemy state.

### **Response Options to Pakistan's Nuclear Threat**

- **Nuclear Response:** India's policy on the employment of nuclear weapons is very clearly laid out. India. As per its nuclear doctrine, India is committed to no-first-use of nuclear weapons and not using these weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. Additionally, nuclear weapons will only be used against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere" and the response will be "massive retaliation"<sup>32</sup>. To counter India's rising conventional capabilities, Pakistan has tailored its nuclear programme by focussing on battlefield nukes. However, whatever sophistry Pakistan may indulge in to justify its recourse to use tactical nuclear weapons, India's nuclear policy does not differentiate between tactical and strategic weapons, as the use of either would constitute a nuclear attack against India and would invite a massive retaliatory strike with strategic nukes. For Pakistan to presume that a tactical nuclear strike on counter-force military targets would avert a counter-value strike against its cities and population centres by India is a dangerous illusion. India has very unambiguously

stated its policy on an intended response to a nuclear attack, and any assumption by Pakistan regarding India's will / capability to respond would be at its own peril. Employment of TNWs to stall an Indian offensive would in no way deter the progress of military operations and would continue till the stated objectives have been achieved. The offensive and follow-on support forces would be equipped to satisfactorily fight the dirty war.

- **Non-Nuclear Options:** Fighting a nuclear war at whatever level is not a recommended option and goes against the policy of nuclear deterrence. India has been a responsible nuclear power, practising restraint and responsible behaviour in spite of numerous threats and provocations by Pakistan. The growing desire of Pakistan to proliferate nuclear weapons at operational levels has dangerous security implications, threatening not only India but the world order. The toxic mix of a radicalised Army, *jihadi* terrorism and nuclear adventurism propagated by Pakistan, poses a major global threat.
  - The vulnerability of nuclear weapons getting pilfered to *jihadi* organisations is not an impossibility and may well become a global nightmare.<sup>33</sup> The US and China, the two main aid benefactors of Pakistan, besides others, must exert pressure on Pakistan to restrain its nuclear adventurism and discourage it from deploying nuclear weapons at the operational level, the fool-proof security of which is beyond Pakistan's capabilities.
  - To address the concerns of the international community, diplomatic pressure to be applied particularly through the P5 nations, Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and UN Security Council (UNSC) to restrain Pakistan's over-zealous nuclear proliferation drive.
  - India must undertake prophylactic measures to deter infiltration by terrorists to carry out any high profile terrorist activity warranting a punitive response by India, which is capable of spiralling out of control.
  - The decision to employ large scale conventional forces or nuclear retaliation should be taken after detailed deliberations involving all the stakeholders. The Indian forces undertaking offensive operations must be kitted to fight dirty and achieve the desired objectives,

with minimal casualties. There would be a need to deploy early warning platforms to undertake preventive actions and launch timely retaliatory operations. The momentum of a conventional attack would not be stalled by the threat or employment of TNWs by Pakistan.

For any set of options to be effective, India has to make the cost of adventurism by Pakistan prohibitive, especially its Army. India must call off the Pakistani nuclear bogey by broadcasting unambiguous response options as per the tenets of the Indian nuclear doctrine, in case of a nuclear intervention by Pakistan. Any military action by India is likely to provoke Pakistan and even a limited offensive may speedily spiral into a full scale conflict. Hence, irrespective of the options being exercised, the ground forces, elements of the Air Force, Navy and Strategic Forces Command have to be in a constant state of readiness and poised to respond to any contingency to deter Pakistan. In Maj Gen Bakshi's<sup>34</sup> words, even limited air strikes "must be accompanied by a partial or complete mobilisation of the armed forces to cater for any Pakistani response." Use of precision munitions, air strikes and cross-border operations are attractive options but the counter-strike capabilities of the enemy need to be appreciated and factored in while securing own assets. Concomitantly with punitive military action, diplomatic efforts to favourably shape the international environment to compel Pakistan to discontinue its anti-India policies and refrain from escalating the scope of conflict are critical.

### **Non-Contact Warfare (NCW) Option**

Non-contact warfare, also called fifth generation warfare, is characterised by longer stand-off ranges and sharper precision with sound "information warfare" capabilities. This type of warfare involves application of all national capabilities in an integrated manner, while ensuring minimum physical contact of own forces, to conduct distant operations to achieve a quick decisive victory by disrupting, denying and destroying the enemy's war-waging potential and his command and control systems through remote delivery of destructive kinetic energy and soft power by relentless information operations. The main motivation behind this thought is to minimise casualties, limit collateral damage, and disaffect Pakistan's nuclear bogey.

The two Gulf Wars, operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Yemen rebels, involving control of drones from centres thousands of kilometres away, hacking of vital computer networks and manipulation of markets, demonstrate a war dimension unknown earlier. The underlying principle of NCW is to damage military capabilities, communications, finance or trade in an overt or covert conflict without firing a single shot. It is predicted that in the next 40 to 50 years, 70 per cent of engagement would be through unmanned systems.

Military aspects of NCW have both offensive and defensive discourses. It is presently in the nascent stage of development, but is a potent tool that can be effectively employed against our adversaries. With growing dependence on information technology and electronics, any disruption in the networked systems would have catastrophic repercussions. Certain technologies that can be militarily exploited are as discussed below:

- **Nano Technology Robotics and Artificial Intelligence:** Many conflicts of the future are going to be replaced by ubiquitous robots which will have the capability to undertake autonomous missions with precision. The development in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has given facilities like offensive weapon systems, remote attack capabilities, decision support systems, medical and casualty evacuation. Future robotic development is going to give us facilities to scan the cyber space and undertake unmanned strikes in inhospitable terrains, minefields and enemy territories.
- **Aerial Platforms:** Use of UAVs and Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) for precision targeted military operations has strategic significance and must be exploited. For Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) applications, use of UAVs will not only be relatively difficult to detect but also will have long endurance for combat support missions. The future Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) are going to be airborne for much longer duration, remaining undetected. These systems can also be used to destroy enemy Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) facilities, logistics nodes, and terrorist bases and training camps in depth areas.

- **Electro-Magnetic Spectrum:** Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) based on LASERS (Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation) and EMP (Electro-Magnetic Pulse) can be used discretely as radiation above and below the visible spectrum. Potential applications of this technology include the anti-personnel weapon system, potential missile defence system and the disabling of lightly armoured vehicles such as cars, drones and electronic devices such as mobile phones. High altitude EMP and high power microwaves can control, defeat and destroy multiple enemy electronic systems and ISR capabilities.
- **Cyber Warfare:** Cyber warfare shifts the focus from conventional to the “virtual” domain. Cyber attacks are an ongoing process which continue in a silent way during both peace and war. By hacking the defence system of a country, it is possible to control its operational and logistic networks. Doctored videos in the social media can create social unrest. An unseen battle in the cyber space is perpetually on and will become more complex in the future with the kind of investments being made in cyber technology. The US has started hitting the IS with “cyber bombs” as part of its new arsenal of tactics against the dreaded terror group, as per Mr Robert Work, US Deputy Secretary of Defence.<sup>35</sup>
- **Space Technology:** Satellite and anti-satellite technology, will change the ISR platform to gain and deny information. The hypersonic vehicles will develop a reusable launch vehicle and facility for launching small satellites into the earth’s orbit and may be weapon systems in the future. Space systems will control and manage Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), an important development need for India having two nuclear power adversaries on its western and northern borders.
- **Social Media:** Real time use of social media, along with mobile technology, is going to find a new place in the future warfare. Trolls or paid commentators will be used to sway local social media trends, a tool which can be employed by own forces for propaganda.

The possibility of exploiting NCW, with the availability of a large technological and Information Technology (IT) base in India, is immense. There is a need for India to develop a roadmap to absorb emerging

technologies and optimally exploit the existing capabilities to develop a potent NCW capability. Organisational interoperability, integration and synergy with the national security systems, including aspects of counter-measures, need to be evolved.

### Non-Military Options

- **Diplomatic Initiatives:** The business of diplomacy to resolve contentious issues has to be an ongoing process, irrespective of the other options being exercised. Both Pakistan and India need to conduct constructive bilateral engagements with the aim to resolve all outstanding issues and ensure peace in the region. Mutual trust between the two countries can evolve only through genuine and sustained dialogue and a perceptible step-by-step peace process. Improved relations would concomitantly aid in lowering of tensions, improvement in economic and trade relations, and averting any terrorist act escalating into a major conflict. Any interaction should not be held hostage to predetermined agendas and stated positions, but be flexible, aimed at amicable resolution of issues based on pragmatism and not emotion. Besides, back-channel diplomacy to resolve sensitive issues also needs to be exploited.

Since partition, it has been India that always took the initiative to proactively engage Pakistan diplomatically, while Pakistan, as a rule and without exception, reciprocated by stabbing India in the back (as conceded by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Pakistan's incursion in Kargil post the Lahore Declaration) by carrying out major terrorist activity / border firing / military adventurism on Indian soil. Hence, it is prudent that besides, engaging Pakistan, the Indian political leaders and diplomats apprise the international community of the role being played by Pakistan as the breeding ground and node for propagating and exporting terrorism worldwide and not restricting its nefarious activities to India. No nation should feel secure from being inflicted with the scourge of terrorism. Pressure through the UN, international monetary aid organisations and other benefactors of Pakistan needs to be invoked, to compel Pakistan to cease supporting terrorism as a state policy and fight the GWOT truly, without duplicitous policies.

The Pakistan Army is a major stakeholder in all critical aspects of state

governance. It is important that India recognises the true power centre and engages with it to resolve contentious issues. Since independence, India has restricted its interaction primarily to political leaders, and inhibition to deal with the Pakistan military has yielded negative results. Hence, it is sensible that for any meaningful outcome, India should engage directly with the Pakistan military hierarchy, as is being done by the rest of the world, while concurrently also interact with Pakistan's polity. Interaction with the Pakistan military needs to be carried out at both political and military levels. There is a need to enhance the frequency of interaction between the Directors General Military Operations (DGMOs) and border guarding forces to put in place a robust mechanism to resolve the border issues amicably and prevent escalation of tensions. Regular bilateral visits between senior military officers and joint training exercises on matters of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), piracy, etc. may be organised between the two nations. It is in the interest of both nations to do away with the war hysteria and resolve issues diplomatically.

**POK:** Since 1948, Pakistan has illegally occupied POK and lays claim on the rest of the state as well. The state of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part India and it is important that India reviews its policies and earnestly contests its illegal occupation by Pakistan to put forth its claim for unification of POK with it. It needs to repeatedly highlight to the international community the pathetic state of affairs prevailing in the region and the atrocities being committed by the Pakistan government to quell any voice of dissidence.

- India must provide political, diplomatic and financial support to the people of POK and assuage their grievances due to the illegal occupation by Pakistan.
- The Indian leaders, diplomats and dignitaries visiting Pakistan must ensure regular interaction with the representatives of POK, and raise their concerns in the international fora.
- Any bilateral talks with Pakistan must include "cessation of Pakistan's illegal occupation of POK in the agenda.
- India must invite political representatives, educationists and luminaries from POK and highlight their grievances and problems.<sup>36</sup>
- The proposal sometimes forwarded by the Pakistani hierarchy about

the creation of institutions for **joint management of Kashmir** must be quashed forthrightly. This arrangement questions the very right of Indian sovereignty over POK. The region is an integral part of India and would be governed solely by it.

- The Kargil-Skardu road has for centuries, been used for connecting the people of both regions—politically, culturally and economically. This route, if opened, can become an important trade and tourism link for the people of Ladakh and POK and help revive historical relations. Moreover, this would also put an end to the prolonged yearning of the people on either side to meet their dear ones, who got separated after the illegal occupation of the region by Pakistan.
- Other nations, with interest in the region, including China, must be made aware of India's apprehensions, as POK is a legitimate part of India. Any activity in the region without India's permission would qualify for violation of Indian sovereignty.
- India must demand the establishment of a UN Observer Group in POK, to monitor and report the situation as prevailing in the region.
- **Economic and Trade Relations:** This key area carries maximum promise as all relations in the future are going to be driven by economic linkages and interests. Even during the worst of times, with increased violence and terrorist activities, trade between India and Pakistan continued to flourish, though at a low level, confirming that money matters. According to data released in May 2014 by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, India, the volume of bilateral trade recorded a net increase of \$410 million from April 2013 to March 2014. Pakistan's exports to India grew by 28 percent while Indian exports to Pakistan increased by 19 percent. Bilateral trade has increased to \$2.4 billion, which may soar to \$6 billion in the next two years if Pakistan agrees to grant "Most Favoured Nation" (MFN) status to India. Trade has the potential to galvanise the Pakistan-India relationship by creating powerful stakeholders with large financial interests in either country. Businessmen and entrepreneurs can exert pressure on the respective governments to ensure peace and stability in the region and unlock the existing barriers to exploit mutually advantageous economic

- opportunities.
- **Cultural Exchanges:** With Pakistan and India having a common history and languages, cultural exchanges can help erase the prevailing misconceptions, bridge the trust deficit and improve ties between the people of the two countries. The interactions may be carried out by conducting trade fairs, cultural festivals, concerts, plays, movies, sports events, etc. Adoption of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and consultations with different segments of the informed public, media, politicians, intelligentsia and strategic opinion-makers would help clear the webs of suspicion created by establishments / people with vested interests. The pressure by the civil societies and intelligentsia to ensure peace and harmony in the region and focus on development would compel the governments to change their confrontationist attitude and heed to the demands of the masses.
  - **Perception Management:** The media has a critical role in creating and managing perceptions. It can steer government policies, generate sympathy, legitimise acts of violence and articulate a particular narrative. It is important that to project the correct picture and ensure true representation of the facts and sentiments, the media must maintain the highest principles of integrity and not use jingoistic and hyper-nationalistic assertions or push fabricated narratives, to cater for the interests of the vested few. Regular media conclaves, conferences and seminars need to be organised to exchange ideas, share opinions, views and concerns. India must also highlight the role of Pakistan as a nursery for exporting terrorism the world over, the dismal situation as prevails in POK and the need to resolve the long pending issue of POK's unification with India.
  - **Exploitation of Faultlines:** Pakistan is inflicted with a plethora of faultlines—ethnic, sectarian, religious, socio-economic, etc—making it vulnerable for exploitation by India through covert operations and funds. All of the factors that allow Pakistan to use non-state actors and create unrest in India, in principle also apply to India and allow it to reciprocate in the same measure. Besides, India enjoys better ties with all of Pakistan's neighbours less China and has a larger conventional military capability, economy and more reputable standing in the comity

of nations, hence, is arguably better poised to respond in a more punitive and belligerent manner. However, India has been remarkably constrained in spite of decades of Pakistani provocation, but in case Pakistan continues to create unrest in India by employing terrorism as a state policy and disrespecting the ceasefire obligations, then India will be justified in reciprocating in the same coin by exploiting the faultlines and creating anarchy in Pakistan.

## Conclusion

The appeasement of Pakistan should not be a policy option and India must employ verbal bellicosity and muscle flexing in its dealings with Pakistan, when required. Failure to respond vigorously would surely encourage more audacious adventurism by Pakistan. India must continue to engage Pakistan diplomatically, monitoring carefully the dynamics of the power equations between the Army and the civilian dispensation. The diplomacy must involve interaction with both the political and military leaders of the two countries.

It clearly stands out that India does not lack the ways and means to punish Pakistan either militarily or otherwise in case it continues to target India and create unrest and violence. However, prudence demands that conventional military confrontation between the two countries should never be allowed to escalate beyond a point, and the use of nuclear weapons is not an option at all. Hence, there is a need for India to develop a suite of policies that should impose significant and escalating costs upon Pakistan, diplomatically, politically and militarily<sup>27</sup> without crossing the critical threshold. India must also seek the intervention of the international community to compel Pakistan to cease using terrorism as a state policy, and any military action by India which is instigated by the Pakistani adventurism, must be supported by them. Additionally, India must concentrate on strengthening its economy, military and homeland security and expedite police reforms, better intelligence coordination and hone capabilities to undertake covert operations behind enemy lines. India must also use all available regional leverages to influence the rogue behaviour of Pakistan, having an adversarial affect on the regional security. Concurrently, efforts to improve economic and trade relations with Pakistan, and regular cultural exchanges must be initiated to help build trust between the two nations. Both countries should initially harvest low hanging fruits like the

Sir Creek dispute, etc, to enhance positivity before resolving the more sensitive issues.

India must also continue to reiterate its claim on POK and remind the international community at every available opportunity that POK is a legitimate part of the Indian Union that is under the illegal occupation of Pakistan. The blatant violation of human rights, deliberately keeping the region in a state of abject poverty, illiteracy and backwardness needs to find a mention in all international fora by India.

# Conclusion

Pakistan came into existence on August 14, 1947,<sup>37</sup> as a Muslim majority state. The creation of Pakistan involved the largest demographic movement in recorded history, and nearly 17,00,000 people, Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs, moved in both directions between India and the two wings of Pakistan. Sixty million of the 95 million Muslims of British India became citizens of Pakistan while the balance 35 million Muslims remained in India, making them the largest Muslim minority community in a non-Muslim state.

Scarred from birth, Pakistan's quest for survival has been as compelling as it has been uncertain. Despite the shared religion of its majority Muslim population, Pakistan has been engaged in an unending struggle to define its national identity and evolve a stable and robust political system for its diverse population. Pakistan is known to have over 20 languages and over 300 distinct dialects. This diversity has led to persistent regional tensions and failure to form a Constitution, catering to the true aspirations of the state and its population.

All of Pakistan's struggles hinge on its unachievable desire for parity with India, bringing it on the verge of becoming an almost failed state. The creation of Bangladesh in 1971 questioned the very ideology of Pakistan's origin, a state for the Muslims. Political developments in Pakistan continue to be marred by provincial agendas seeking greater autonomy / independence. The resentment of the smaller provinces of Sindh, Baluchistan, and the NWFP against the hegemony of the Punjabi majority, the primary beneficiary of power and profit, runs deep. Due to the absence of a strong and effective central political party, Pakistan continues to rely on its Army and civil services for governance.

Predicated on the internal situation prevailing in Pakistan, it can be averred that more than half the country has slipped into anarchy and the remaining may follow suit if Islamabad does not drastically reassess its national policies and ideologies. The Pakistan Army continues to get targeted by the monster it has created and is greatly over-stretched because of internal security commitments and border deployments. Internally, the anti-India rhetoric that sustained the Pakistan Army till now is no longer effective. Today, the

internal instability within Pakistan is fast acquiring proportions which could lead to a major law and order breakdown—all due to the sheer myopic policies pursued by its military junta. Lack of economic growth, high birth rates, intensive migration from rural areas to cities, a failed educational system and a hugely ill-educated youth population allow few prospects and can be easily subverted by fanatical religious leaders and corrupt politicians to further their illegitimate agendas.

The government's subdued response to the rising radicalisation and sectarian violence suggests that it does not want to rock the boat one way or another. Today, Pakistan is standing at the crossroads where it can either continue to follow the current trajectory or transform and undertake processes and decisions to restructure and reform its existing political, judicial, economic and societal faultlines and move towards stability and development. If it continues on its present course, then, as stated by Stephen Cohen "Pakistan could again become its own worst enemy".

To deter Pakistan's adventurism, India has to make the cost of war prohibitive for Pakistan. The Indian response has to be bold, audacious and disproportionate, employing all available means. The likelihood of military action by India may provoke a counter-offensive by Pakistan, hence, the need for own forces to be in a constant state of preparedness, poised to react to any contingency. Employment of punitive means to strike Pakistan by precision munitions, air strikes, armed / combat UAVs and UCAVs and cross-border operations are attractive options but the counter-strike capabilities of the enemy need to be factored into own defence preparedness.

Submitting to the lure of deploying tactical nuclear weapons to counter the threat of a conventionally superior force is an irrational assumption, not aligned to the realities on the ground. The US and China, as the main aid donors, and other international organisations, must urge Pakistan to refrain from nuclear proliferation and abandon such reckless brinkmanship, else face the adverse consequences.

Diplomatic efforts to shape the international environment to favourably support India's efforts in dealing with Pakistan are critical. The thoughtless deployment of TNWs in operational areas without ensuring adequate safety mechanisms and also lowering the threshold levels for a nuclear exchange is a dangerous trend. Nuclear weapons are political weapons and must be controlled by the political leadership, rather than delegating the responsibility

to military commanders, whose perceptions are myopic, limited to the battlefield and military warfare.

In the internal environment as existing in Pakistan, India today really does not need to wage a war against Pakistan. It can simply exploit the precarious situation prevailing in Pakistan by using its intelligence agencies, NCW and other covert and financial means. The dividends achieved would be much higher, with minimal risk of escalation compared to employing conventional means. Fortunately for Pakistan, India as a mature and responsible nation, has no hegemonic designs or military interests in Pakistan and does not intend to exploit Pakistani weaknesses. However, if pushed by Pakistan's persistent aberrant behaviour, India would be very much justified in responding to Pakistan in the same coin, besides employing other response options. Hence, Islamabad, instead of exporting hatred and destruction, should seek peace with India and work towards improving the relationship and restoring harmony between the two countries.

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