The US Department of Defense’s (DoD) Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report was released on February 1, 2010 amidst a great deal of expectations. A legislatively-mandated review of DoD’s strategy and priorities as it prepares to counter threats and conflicts in the future, the QDR has always been projected to set a long-term course for the Pentagon. The report is very significant vis-à-vis charting out a course and framework for the US military’s force structure, strategy and capabilities.
 
Following months of deliberation, this QDR is the Obama administration’s first, and lays out the Pentagon’s priority objectives till 2014 in terms of the US strategic world view and also recommends key capability development and investment priorities. The four priority objectives spelt out include: prevailing in today’s wars; preventing and deterring conflict; preparing to defeat adversaries while succeeding in a wide range of contingencies; and preserving the All-Volunteer Force.
 
The QDR crucially accepts that as a nation, America is at war by virtue of being embroiled in Afghanistan and Iraq. The document states, “With these realities in mind, the 2010 QDR advances upon two clear objectives… to further rebalance the capabilities of America’s Armed Forces to prevail in today’s wars… and reform the Department’s institutions and processes.” The Pentagon also proposes to “buy weapons that are usable, affordable and truly needed.”
 
Thus, it appears apparent that by means of the latest QDR, Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates intends to shape and outline the future role of the US military. However, while outlining  the approach of the US military to deftly deal with future conflicts, the document has chosen to exclusively focus upon routing the Al Qaeda/Taliban union in Afghanistan and abiding by the systematic security handover in Iraq, the top priorities of the Obama administration at this point.
 
Although, the QDR seems to make all the right noises by stating every now and then regarding what needs to be done, it fails to provide any clarity vis-à-vis plans to accomplish the same. This especially holds true in places where the QDR does not spell out lucidly its force structure and procurement plans. It would be central for the Pentagon to undertake these measures so as to reduce the existential divide between conceptual planning and realistic assessment of the DoD’s budget.
 
However, it is well accepted that the planning stage of future programme and missions finds strength and direction through budget support. The efficacy of the latest QDR should ideally have been reflected by virtue of a detailed analysis of the Pentagon’s budget which does not appear to be the case. The QDR as well as the fiscal year (FY) 2011 budget have not shown any significant procurement funding and on the contrary, the FY 2011 budget actually increases procurement funding by nearly eight per cent. In what comes as a surprise, the US Army, which has been at the centre of operations – both in the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq – has been allocated a lower overall budget as compared to the US Navy and Air Force.
 
The latest QDR noticeably finds a departure from the protracted concept of war being pursued by the Bush administration since 2001 and chooses to rally around deterrents which remain grounded in land, air, and naval forces capable of fighting limited and large-scale conflicts. Primacy has also been accorded to further strengthening the cyber and space capabilities, ballistic missile defence and counter-WMD technologies. Most importantly, contrary to the intense debate revolving around President Barack Obama’s vision of a nuclear weapons free world, the Pentagon firmly believes that until such a time comes, the US shall continue to maintain its nuclear capabilities as a core mission.
 
Additionally, the QDR is deficient in discussing ways and means of dealing with looming military threats to the US in the form of state actors like Iran and North Korea coupled with other non-state actors armed with asymmetric capabilities, although it does make a mention of rebalancing the military to address ‘unconventional enemies’.
 
A nation which often is touted as America’s next biggest challenge in the decades to come namely, China, could well be described as a conspicuous oversight. In what could be interpreted as a mention in the passing, “the distribution of global political, economic, and military power is becoming more diffuse with the rise of China… and India… will continue to shape an international system… in which the United States will remain the most powerful actor, but must increasingly work with key allies.” There appears to be a deliberate omission regarding any facet of China’s robust ongoing military modernisation programme.
 
Significantly, the Pentagon for the first time has acknowledged climate change and its impact into its long-term strategy. It sees climate change as a threat multiplier likely to cause instability in many regions.
 
There was huge anticipation regarding this document and that it would provide a new-fangled course for America’s defence strategy and priorities for the future, more so since it was the Obama administration’s first QDR. However, this report has nothing novel to offer and could well be treated as yet another conceptual document which fails to impress since its operational viability cannot be determined by the document itself.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).