
Chinese Perceptions of Various Territorial Disputes

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Introduction

China has common land frontiers with North Korea, Russia, Kazakhstan, Khirgizistan, Tadzikistan, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Vietnam and Laos. Small wonder that the Communists, on coming to power in 1949, recorded 119 border problems with the neighbours. Against India, what was essentially a semi-ratified Indo-Tibetan border problem, became a full-fledged Sino-Indian border dispute.

Both India and China are future global powers. It would be more appropriate to analyse their diverse perceptions on national interests, rather than the commonalities that exist. China's political and economic systems are state driven and far from being democratic, whereas India is seeped in democratic ideals and values. China does not encourage internal dissent, has a poor track record on human rights and is also accused of unfair trade practices and illegal transfer of nuclear and missile technology, while India has come out clean on these issues. China is already a permanent member of the Security Council, while India is aspiring to be one. In the present day world which is quite content within its borders and even talking of doing away with this artificial divide, China has not been able to break with its past and harbours intentions of recovering old territorial losses. India, on the other hand, has maintained status quo, has no territorial ambitions in its neighbourhood and has even retained its traditional links with the erstwhile colonial powers,

China's insistence on restoring its historic frontiers has played an important role in spelling out its national interests in today's environment, where geopolitics tempered with dynamic and pragmatic concepts is more relevant than

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historical claims. What is worrisome now is whether China's national reunification programme would override other factors such as its international image, economic growth and domestic political and cultural development. China's recent enhancement of its military capabilities, unambiguous claim over Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin, transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and scant regard for the international border (McMahon Line) while professing friendship cooperation and unhindered trade with India, are signs which can only be ignored at our peril.

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Chinese Tally of Known Border Disputes

China's known historic claims and border / territorial disputes with its 15 neighbours and maritime adversaries are not discussed. Only significant treaties are discussed in brief. China attributes the following disputes to history:

Russia

- Greater Northwest China seized by Imperial Russia under the Treaty of Chughuchuk in 1864. Today, these are parts of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan and Tadjikistan.
- Greater Northeast China, comprising Vladivostok, first in 1859 under the Treaty of Aigun and then in 1860 under the Treaty of Peking, lost to Imperial Russia.
- Sakhalin Island divided between Japan and Russia.
- Pamirs lost to Russia in 1896.
- Kuril Islands acquired from Japan, lost to Russia in 1945 under the Yalta / Postdam Agreements.

Great Britain

- Pamirs lost to Britain in 1896.
- Nepal annexed by Britain in 1896.
- Sikkim occupied by Britain in 1889.
- Bhutan lost to Britain in 1865.
- Assam forcibly ceded to Burma in 1826.
- Burma lost to Britain in 1826.

- Andaman and Nicobar Islands ceded to Britain.
- Malaya lost to Britain in 1895.
- Thailand placed under Anglo-French forces in 1904.
- Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) lost as a result of aggression to Britain.
- Sulu Islands lost to Britain.
- Hong Kong forcibly extracted on lease for 100 years.

France

- Amman lost to France in 1885.
- Thailand placed under Anglo-French forces in 1904.

Japan

- Senkaku Islands and Taiwan lost to Japan in 1895.
- Sakhalin Island divided between Japan and Russia.
- Ryukyu Islands lost to Japan in 1879.
- Korea declared independent but annexed by Japan in 1910.

Philippines. Spratly Islands occupied by the Philippines.

Vietnam. Border delineation disputes, Gulf of Tonkin and Paracel Islands.

Burma. Kachin State, Irrawady / Salween river basins and two other areas.

Laos. Adjustments required on its porous borders with China.

North Korea. Mt Paektusan area.

Portugal. Macao, the Portuguese trade settlement for almost three centuries, made an overseas province in 1844 in an agreement with China, annulled in 1928.

Resolved Border Disputes/Treaties

Sino-Nepal Boundary Agreement 1960

This was signed on March 21, 1960, between Chou En Lai and BP Koirala to delineate the border between Nepal and Tibet Autonomous State. The Chinese laid claims on Mt Everest but agreed to accept the North face only in view of strong and persistent Nepali claims to it as being Sagarmatha, their religious deity. The framework of the agreement was on the much hyped Panchsheel and high watershed principles, more or less conforming to the McMahon Line running from the Burma-India-China tri-junction to Nepal.

Sino-Burmese Border Treaty 1961

The Chinese accepted the McMahon Line based on the principle of high

watershed between Burma and China as the legitimate border, with minor modifications. China had made very modest territorial demands and gained very little territory. Why China considers this treaty as a model needs to be examined in greater detail. It is possible that the Burmese government had two aims in mind, viz to seal its own borders in the Kachin region bordering China against its own insurgents and also to get China to mop up its Nationalist Chinese gangs which were still active in that region.

The unresolved border disputes with India (Aksai Chin, Shaksgam Valley, Arunachal Pradesh) are the direct result of non-acceptance of the high watershed principle as the frontier between India and Tibet.

Treaty with Pakistan

In this treaty, Pakistan ceded 2,700 sq km of Shaksgam Valley in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) to China, way back in 1963. Except for a clause on the Kashmir dispute outcome, it is technically an invalid treaty as Pakistan had merged this area into its Northern Areas and not POK.

Treaty with Russia, 1990s

Serious border clashes took place during the ideological rift with the Soviet Union in the early Sixties and later. Both sides claimed three islands in the Amur and Argun rivers. Till 1995, no agreement could be reached as both sides maintained their respective positions. Taking advantage of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, China's tough stance paid off and the disputes were resolved in its favour. A border treaty was signed in 2004.

Treaties with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

Treaties signed with Tajikistan in August 1999 on border delineation, with Kazakhstan in October 2000 on sharing of river waters, and with Kyrgyzstan on boundary demarcation in November 2000. These were directed at addressing China's concerns on cross-border terrorism in its Turkestan province from the Muslims in the Central Asian Republics.

Sino-Vietnam Border Treaty

Disputes included the land frontiers of the adjoining provinces and the territorial waters demarcation in the Gulf of Tonkin, and ocean rights and interests over the Nansha Islands and their adjacent waters. These issues came

to the fore when the Soviet Union entered into an alliance with Vietnam. China then undertook its ill-fated punitive operations against Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia in 1979. Later, China and Vietnam signed the land border treaty and maritime agreement in December 1999 and December 2000, respectively.

Sino-Laotian Treaty on Border Regime

This was signed in October 2001 for better border management and included very minor border adjustments.

Sino-Mongolia Treaties

Though border delineation was not a major issue, the Soviets' influence was worrisome for China. China pushed through the signing of the boundary agreement in 1988 before the Soviet collapse and signed two more bilateral agreements in 1994 and 1996, basically to wean the country away from Russian influence. The last one, signed in April 1996, for enhancing military mutual trust, is aimed at prevention of cross-border terrorism, especially of the Muslims, which China perceives as a big threat, and assistance in coal mining in Mongolia.

Sino-Bhutan Agreement

Direct talks with Bhutan commenced in 1984 and sixteen rounds have taken place. Some issues such as border trade, cultural visits and peace and tranquillity on the borders have been ensured but no formal treaty has been signed. The Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949, which makes India responsible for Bhutan's defence, is always questioned by China.

Hong Kong and Macao

Both have reverted to China on the expiry of the leases / agreements with Britain and Portugal respectively.

Unresolved Border Disputes

India

The unresolved border disputes with India (Aksai Chin, Shaksgam Valley, Arunachal Pradesh) are the direct result of non-acceptance of the high watershed principle as the frontier between India and Tibet. It is pertinent to note that in the case of Burma (Myanmar), China accepted the McMahon Line as the border

between Burma and China up to the India-China-Burma tri-junction and applied the same high watershed principle to define its borders with Nepal, again along the McMahon Line ; yet it chose to leave two large gaps, to apply a different set of parameters when dealing with India. The reopening of claims on Sikkim by China cannot be entirely ruled out.

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Others

China is yet to resolve its disputes on the Spratly Islands with the Philippines and Paracel Islands with Vietnam. China still considers Taiwan a part of China but has accepted the one nation-two systems status for it. Though China has not yet taken up the issues with Japan on the Kuril Island and with Russia on the Sakhalin Islands, in the recent past, it has not conceded that the issues are settled.

Chinese Approach to Resolution of Border/ Territorial Disputes

General

Commentaries from media sources and official statements on the political strategy evolved for resolution of border/territorial disputes, bring out cogently that there were recurring themes and keywords which were hints for the smaller neighbours to resolve boundary disputes with China quickly before time ran out. The political leadership under Chou en Lai played a very significant role. As a part of a larger Chinese design, Nepal was rewarded with aid for signing the treaty and to wean it away from India. The New China News Agency, a tool of the government, improvises a clever, manipulative and purposeful approach for the execution of defence policy.

Identification of Disputes and Cartographic Aggression

By the end of 1950, China had indicated its intentions on the undetermined boundaries it controlled. The first step was to commence cartographic aggression. Some maps, were reproduced that originated when the Nationalist were in power, and some new ones depicted boundaries well beyond the established frontiers. To buttress its stake in the neighbourhood, well documented territorial claims were made. The first step was to annex Tibet and started laying claims to Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. All the border problems

were raised by China itself and not the other party to the dispute.

Status and Validity of Earlier Treaties

China questions the legality of treaties signed with the imperialist powers in the 19th and early 20th centuries and refuses to be bound by earlier territorial agreements. Admittedly, international norms do allow abrogation of perfectly concluded treaties when both parties agree, but not unilaterally. Therefore, a need to examine unilateral abrogation, *de novo*, can be ascertained from the International Court of Justice. However, it is very unlikely that China would accept its final decision. China's own interpretation / understanding of translations of various principles such as the high watershed principle, definitions of "mutually acceptable comprehensive settlement" and "border dispute" is not a problem of their understanding of the English language but of hardened attitudes.

Chinese Strategy

We notice that some trends/lessons have emerged from the manner in which border disputes have been resolved so far. This could form the framework of future negotiations with China:

- (a) The concrete outlines of a new treaty have always been based on China's proposals. Therefore, China adopts a tough line and floods the media and the target country with Chinese claims, proposals and counter-proposals.
- (b) All claims based on historical facts are prepared in a very painstaking manner by a special military cartographic department. Chinese archives have preserved all documents and they have been utilised very well to suit Chinese designs. China has used the most potent European concept of sovereignty for furthering its interests and ambitions in Tibet. The new geo-political scenario required the creation of viable Sinkiang and Sichuan states out of the unwieldy Greater Tibet which, in any case, was an autonomous but integral part of China.
- (c) The emphasis appears to be on signing of new bilateral treaties to replace the delegitimised ones or modified drafts of old ones. One can be sure that a basic framework of every new treaty is kept ready.
- (d) China believes that better bargaining comes from a position of strength. For that to happen, China has an infinite amount of patience. It waited for 42 years to assume a position of strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union to push through, and force, a decision to resolve its border disputes in the Amur river region.
- (e) China also believes in testing of the patience and reactions of its adversaries before launching its forces into an all out war. Against the Soviets, it first

threw broad hints by serving a notice that it had intentions to terminate the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1959 prematurely. Having massed its troops on the Sino-Soviet border, it stalled the Soviets' move to open a front against it and then launched its punitive war against Vietnam based on the USSR's inaction. It was a clear diplomatic victory for China for total abrogation, and no renewal, of its unequal treaty.

China has got this version of authoritative capitalism even before it has achieved some semblance of democracy.

- (f) China wishes to deal with the smaller neighbours first, and tackle the bigger ones later. It reserves the right to punish nations it perceives as weak, and may resort to punitive operations having limited objectives. Once the limited objectives are achieved, the bilateral dialogue is to be restarted, till an agreement is reached.
- (g) If the party to a border dispute is an adversary or a country perceived as a potential threat to China's security and economic interests, it would maintain a tough line to achieve moral, physical and psychological ascendancy in a prolonged no war-no peace status. China believes that massive build-up of forces and logistics infrastructure in target areas as well as display of economic clout in the region would extract sizeable concessions for itself.
- (h) State organised protests, virulent media propaganda and rallies against foreign missions form part of China's overall strategy. China spends good intelligence money in hiring supporters / overseas Chinese population to storm foreign missions, subvert opinions in target areas, and may go to the extent of organising hoodlums to counter protests against the government, as was done against the public outcry abroad during the Olympics torch rallies.
- (i) In the late 1980s, Deng Xiao Ping, to enhance China's world image, publicly exposed its adversary, the USSR as being just a "paper polar bear." This was crude diplomacy, though the first indication that the Soviet Empire was being threatened by internal dissensions, the state itself was an economic disaster, and a collapse was inevitable.

Possible Model for War for Territorial Claims

Setting for Conflicts

The Chinese Military Commission of which the President Hu Jintao is the chairman, is having second thoughts on fighting long drawn military conflicts as

an instrument of state policy. A short swift conflict which has no chance of ending in a stalemate is preferred. China, at present, would prefer to launch its operations in three stages. The first, is the consolidation stage when China would try to create a peaceful environment around its claims periphery, execute various safeguards to its own territorial integrity and build up confidence amongst locals in the target area. In the next stage, the shaping stage, it would endeavour to shape events in the region and wrest the balance of power, including military build-up, in its favour. Finally, in the “mean business” stage, it would create strategic imbalance and instability in the region by an economic *blitzkrieg* and diplomatic / political manoeuvres. Against India, its first stage along our northern and northeastern borders, may already be over, and the second stage may have just commenced. This could be followed either by a short and swift military campaign or an economic *blitzkrieg*, or both.

Economic Blitzkrieg

China does not believe in large scale attacks on military or strategic targets; instead, it has opted to neutralise the adversary’s financial, banking institutions and commercial establishments as well as administrative infrastructure nodes such as hydroelectric powerhouses, dams and water supply, and telecom networks by massive and continuous cyber intrusions. China may be engaged in excessive silting of the Parachu river that joins the Sutlej to render Nathpa Jhakri and Bhakra Nangal ineffective, and damming/diversion of waters of the Brahmaputra and Ganges rivers in Tibet. Assuming that Chinese business establishments would already have established links with Indian business houses, the computer codes would be cracked and viruses would be inserted over the complete establishment. Some universities, R&D organisations and semi-government links, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) would also be targeted to confuse us into believing that these were minor pranks. The timing of the real economic offensive would be carefully disguised in times of preoccupation, such as national calamities and general elections. This stage, perhaps is, yet to come.

China’s Vulnerabilities in Changed International Environment

Global Economics

World events of the last two decades have played their part in changing the Chinese psyche, chiefly the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the sole surviving superpower. There are no

two opinions on the fact that China had its share of successes too but its opportunist streak is clearly evident. In spite of accusations against China of unfair trading practices the world over, the US chose to make long-term trade investments in China. China's balance of payments position now is well above the \$225 billion benchmark of March 2006, and is set to increase even further, which makes the financial institutions in the US heavily dependent on cash flows from the People's Bank of China instead. It is an ironic situation today, with recessionary trends in the US economy in return for the huge investments in China ! The time to act to correct this imbalance is now, especially in the wake of the galloping crude oil prices and world food crises, and the recent setbacks to the Chinese economy due to the earthquake and the Olympic Games.

Authoritative Capitalism

The Chinese economy has seen a phenomenal double digit growth due to massive American investments, state driven economic measures and corporate governance and infrastructure which has been improving with time. China has got this version of capitalism even before it has achieved some semblance of democracy. Though such a version of capitalism defies all economic theories, it has accelerated China's immediate growth rate. In the long run, however, its growth rate may slow down after 2010.

Tibet's Future

Now, China could claim that the situation has changed in the last three decades. Its logistics are in place, the Lhasa-Golmud railway line is through, the Lhasa-Gormo oil pipeline is in place, and traffic on its Western Highway is passing unhindered through India's Aksai Chin. China has acquired the capability to mount massive military operations of up to three armies of 12 infantry divisions which could easily be sustained from the Tibet launch pads, all directed towards its potential trouble spots. China's forcible control of Tibet has made this possible. Tibetan protests/rallies against the Olympic torch continue the world over and the repressive actions by the Chinese in Lhasa confirm Beijing's nervousness in handling this tricky issue of its sovereignty over Tibet. The pressure of the US and European Union, the pacifist world backing the Dalai Lama, along with China's dreams of attaining superpower status may now force it to come to terms with the Dalai Lama. One thing is certain: the fruits of the Chinese economic boom are not coming to Tibet and this could be the start line for any counter-stroke from the Western world.

Recommendations for Own Approach

Review of National Interests

Both India and the West have contributed to legitimising China's illegal occupation of Tibet. The British withdrawal from the subcontinent totally ignored the balance of power which shifted towards Communist China. India's decision not to help the Dalai Lama, when the Chinese forced him to sign the 17-Point Treaty of 1951, also was a mistake. However, things have changed dramatically with the emergence of India as a strong power East of Suez. China perceives the beginning of the second Cold War, with a possible collusion of India and the US. We have been provided a window of opportunity to give a *de novo* look to our national interests. **Tibet holds the key to the resolution of India's long outstanding border disputes with China.** For this, India must persuade the world to recognise the Dalai Lama as the head of state of a legitimate Tibetan government. China's own preoccupations in Tibet and Xianjiang and the presence of newly independent Islamic states on its frontiers in Central Asia would make it think twice before it makes another move against this powerful alliance.

Resolution of Border and River Waters Disputes

The talks on these issues have gone on for twenty years plus and an ineffective treaty of peace and tranquillity has been signed. No progress has been reported during the last meeting. Such tardiness can only come when there is no fixed deadline for the outcome of the talks. Therefore, there is a need to lay down an upper time limit for the bilateral talks which could then be taken on by a UN appointed arbitrator whose decision should be final and binding on both sides. Appeals from both sides could be made to the International Court of Justice, The Hague, whose territorial jurisdiction China would have to first recognise. The issue can be resolved within a stipulated period with UN influence. Likewise, we must contest the Chinese actions in Tibet to dam, silt and divert river waters, in the International Court of Justice.

Victims of Aggression Principle

Every one talks of the Arabs being victims of aggression, but what about India? If we were victims of the Chinese aggression of 1962, what steps has the government of the day taken to recover the lost territories in Aksai Chin, Shaksgam Valley and across the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh? Have we carried out a review of our national interests and reminded our political bosses that to

safeguard our national interests, it is vital to recover lost territories? It is perfectly legitimate for any self-respecting nation to do so. Egypt did so in 1973 against Israel. Every Pakistan Army officer takes an official vow to avenge the 1971 defeat. One of our army chiefs had the temerity to comment that the actualities on the ground do not favour us and this would be an unrealistic goal to achieve, even over the next 20 years. If we haven't recovered the lost territories so far, we are a nation with a defeatist national pride and we do not deserve to keep this territory. Some other measures are discussed in the next three paragraphs:

- **Counter-Claims in Chumbi Valley.** Day after day, we react to the Chinese claims on the Tawang tract of Arunachal Pradesh being part of the Greater Chinese Empire. So timid is our reaction that even our prime minister deliberately avoids visiting Tawang so as to not antagonise the Chinese. We seem to have forgotten that Chumbi Valley in Tibet was once a part of the British Empire till 1907 when it was sold for Rs. 75 lakh to appease Tibet. Using this territory, the Chinese can drive a wedge through the Siliguri Corridor to dismember the eastern states from rest of India. Therefore, Chumbi Valley was, and will remain, absolutely vital for our national defence. A counter-claim must be established on the same criteria as the Chinese claim on the Tawang tract. If we do not recognise the sale by the erstwhile powers to Tibet, our claims over Chumbi Valley would appear legitimate. Once we have taken the decision for its return, we should bargain for the Tawang tract in exchange for Chumbi Valley.
- **Build up in Ladakh.** Aksai Chin, by all accounts, is with China now. Do we accept this as a *fait accompli* or contest the Chinese claim, or contest the claim and interdict / prevent the use of the Western Highway to China? For the last option, it may be too late now and would create a near war situation. We do not need a thumbs up from China to contest the Chinese claim on Aksai Chin and position more troops in a forward posture in Ladakh ahead of the so-called LAC (a creation of China that we do not recognise), create logistics infrastructure to maintain these troops in that area, and recommission Chushul, Fukche, Leh and Daulat Beg Oldi as forward air bases. We could later move the International Court of Justice for contesting the Chinese claims in this area. We stand a 50-50 chance of getting the territory back by arbitration. But even if the arbitration goes in our favour, would China vacate Aksai Chin? If we lose, it has been already lost and you can rest assured that the government of the day will not fall. Very few people are aware of the fact that we lost 350 sq miles of the Northern Rann to Pakistan in the arbitration. We need political will to take this step.

- **Legal Status of McMahon Line.** We signed the Simla Agreement of 1914 accepting the McMahon Line along the high watershed principle as the border between Tibet and India to which Tibet is a party (on behalf of China). China did not sign this treaty because it did not agree to the Sino-Tibet and Indo-Tibet borders. The legal status of this treaty needs to be ascertained from the International Court of Justice (more so because of the Sino-Burmese and Sino-Nepal agreements), and Tibet (China) must honour it .

Delimiting Spheres of Influence

China had been fomenting insurgencies in the northeastern states earlier and providing party to party support to the Maoists/Marxists. China has armed Pakistan, is busy building a naval facility at Gwadar on the Makran coast, and has provided it nuclear and missile technology. Have we achieved anything by sponsoring China's case for admission to the UN and helping it get its position as a permanent member of the Security Council in the Seventies? Agreed that Nehru had erred in his assessment of the Chinese aggressive designs and failed in the resolution of border disputes. That was in the 1950s and early 1960s. It is 2010 now. Today, our geo-strategic experts/think-tanks should review our national interests afresh and suggest new foreign policy initiatives on the Track 2 approach, different from the one that existed in the Sixties.

- (a) China is going the whole hog in wooing the African states, Southeast. Asian countries and Central Asian Republics. Can India outsmart China on the diplomatic plane to provide massive economic assistance programmes with better technology and relief programmes as a long-term investment in these regions? Should we only build up goodwill and not expect anything in return?
- (b) The West had advanced numerous reasons for the balkanisation of Yugoslavia, which apply here too. In addition, the right of self-determination and the repression of the minority Tibetans by the majority Han Chinese in their own country are other valid reasons for Tibetan autonomy. Agreed, there would be repercussions in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), where China may ally with Pakistan to seek the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris on similar lines. That is to be expected. Sino-Pak collusion has done enough damage to India and their retaliation to the grant of autonomy to Tibet cannot be worse than that.
- (d) We need to improve the demography of the border areas opposite Tibet by settling there our ex-Servicemen from hill tribes, like the Garhwalis, Gurkhas, Kumaonis and Dogras and the plainsmen from Assam. Some of

this has already taken place due to migration of Bangladeshis and locals from the borders to urban areas.

Formation of Regional Alliances and Agreements

- Strengthening of bilateral cooperation between alliances such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation need to be initiated to block China's unhindered entry into Myanmar. The ARF has both India and China as dialogue partners, but China has enlarged and strengthened its position in the member countries, chiefly Myanmar. The ARF must issue directives to restrict China's trade unless it improves its World Trade Organisation (WTO) malpractices, and human rights records.
- UN efforts to bring about peaceful transition to democracy in Myanmar should be encouraged, along with a massive reconstruction programme under SAARC, especially in the wake of the recent cyclone. This is a window of opportunity for India as well and must be exploited. The US must restrain China from entering the SAARC countries. Membership of SAARC to Myanmar must receive top priority.
- Nepal must be weaned away from China's influence by fresh initiatives from India to the Maoists. It is obvious that China has vested interests in cultivating them. Our transit treaty with Nepal needs to be renegotiated and China's long-term investments in Nepal neutralised by a SAARC initiative.
- The Central Asian Regional Security Forum needs to be revived, to include Turkey Iran, Afghanistan and the newly independent Muslim republics such as Kazakhstan, Khirgizistan and Turkmenistan. Our diplomacy to keep Iran on our side should bear fruit now with the reward of observer status for us. The US must be persuaded to change track on its Iran policy, on the same lines as North Korea. India could broker an attempt to bring the US and Iran together to pave the way for reconciliation.
- A Pacific States Organisation to include Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, the US and Canada, with observer status for the ARF, India and Australia is possible to counter China's designs in pursuance of its territorial ambitions.

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World Trade

China has been accused of unfair trade practices such as dumping consumer goods in Europe in violation of laws, broad based intellectual property thefts, industrial espionage and the artificial subsidy in the value of the yuan against the dollar. What the US expected on China's entry into the WTO was a dramatic increase in exports of its products and services in the largest emerging market in the world, observing the same trading rules as the other members of the WTO. Today, grave violations of WTO rules, burdensome red tape, discriminatory policies cum protectionism and language problems and loss of jobs haunt the American business, especially the medium and small entrepreneurs. Only giant multinationals like Boeing and Cargill appear to have benefited from bilateral trade with China. This calls for a review of China's membership of the WTO and imposing of economic/trade sanctions. The Federal Reserve, too, has to evolve a workable solution in such a manner that it clears the balance of payments deficit, putting China's galloping economy on hold and bringing the US economy back on the rails.

Leverage of Global Warming

China's polluting industries are the ones making consumer goods and machinery for the developed world. This year, China is expected to replace the US as the biggest producer of greenhouse gases in the world. Such unbridled pace of industrial development should be checked by the world body in terms of the Kyoto Protocol. The developed countries of Europe, Canada and the US should be persuaded to limit the import of Chinese goods on this account unless China improves its polluting records, not merely carbon credits scores.

Leverage of Beijing Olympics

Creation of disturbances during the Olympic torch run has at best been of a limited nuisance value but has brought the Chinese repressive measures in Tibet to the fore. The world sport bodies should not have allotted Beijing as the venue in the first place. Any boycotting of the opening ceremony by the heads of state of France, Germany and the US too will have minimal effect on the Games. Till China resolves the Tibet problem, and all human rights issues and does not improve its track record on WTO matters, all future allotment of venues of sporting fixture to China should be held in abeyance.

Indo-US Military Cooperation

We have an advantage of a growing economy which lost out to the Chinese on

globalisation. Here is a good opportunity to strengthen ties with the West and US at China's expense. Signing of the civil nuclear agreement with the US, expanding economic cooperation in Africa and Asia-Pacific to checkmate China, and restoration of the balance of power in South Asia would appear logical. Modernisation of strike forces for high altitude operations and for containment of terrorism in this part of the world should be high on our agenda. Use of naval power projection in the Indian Ocean to ward off Chinese influence would also assume importance. In fact, Indo-US military cooperation would automatically take care of the imbalance in South Asia caused by the Sino-Pak collusion.

Conclusion

China, the "international pariah" of yesterday, flouting norms of internationally recognised behaviour, is getting away with behaviour reminiscent of rogue states like Uganda and Libya. It is a strange paradox that the world body has accepted China as a permanent member of the Security Council even when China is unwilling to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Nations which do not honour international courts/treaties/agreements and violate all known codes of conduct are a threat to fellow members of the UN and to the entire world. We now need to evolve a workable global strategy against such nations, leverage world opinion and apply sanctions/pressure/impose war reparations where nations have used force to achieve territorial gains. In a civilised world, all bilateral issues could be better resolved by the International Court of Justice in a specified time-frame rather than allowing the use of misplaced national interests and past history as an excuse to restore frontiers.

It is pointless quoting the figures of the defence expenditure of totalitarian regimes like China and Pakistan in real terms while comparing it with India. Most figures quoted are fudged and, therefore, unreliable. China has spent three times India's expenditure every year, in the last decade. Going by this yardstick, it is not unusual to read about the China's military modernisation, which brings forth information of a successful conduct of an anti-satellite test, an aircraft carrier under production, acquisitions such as SU 30 fighter bombers, mid-air-to-air refuelling aircraft, multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), development of Hainan Island in the South China Sea as a nuclear naval base and closer home, the acquisition of a naval base at Coco Islands, off Myanmar coast, for eavesdropping on India's missile programmes.

China is again back to a Sino-centric orientation and **India is on its hit list**. This also does not augur well for other countries of the South Asian region. We

need to replace the Third World blinkered mentality by the x-ray vision binoculars of an emerging power. All Chinese moves in Tibet must be countered by the completion of our offensive and defensive preparations and upgrading of our logistics infrastructure in Ladakh, Uttarkhand, Himachal Pradesh, eastern Sikkim and Arunachal speedily. Apart from taking counter-measures, a possible ecoblitz, we also need to have a look at satellite imagery, surveillance bases and intelligence network in our border areas and harden our cyber and command control, communications, computers, intelligence (C4I) networks against hacking and other forms of intrusion. Having acquired the capability to hit the Chinese hinterland with the Agni III, the existing nuclear asymmetry can be rectified only if we muster the political will to sign the civil nuclear agreement with the USA at the earliest.