
Armies Do Not Fight Wars, Nations Do

Harjeet Singh

*The only excuse, therefore, for going to war is that we may live in peace unharmed.*¹

— Cicero

Introduction

For any country, a professional military force serves as the last and ultimate bastion. It is axiomatic that the purpose of utilising military force is to realise a political end. The military has been, and will remain, an instrument of national power. This instrument must be honed, calibrated, maintained and nurtured to deliver when required. Indian soldiers have been at war since independence. However, in India today, it is hard to comprehend that the nation is at war. Though a lot has changed in the homes of most Indians as we grow economically, there is little public debate or discourse about the national objectives, strategy, elements of power to be employed, end states and the duration of deployments in the various conflicts in the country. These issues never come to the fore even when operational casualties are announced.

The stark fact is that armies do not fight wars, nations fight wars. War is not a military activity conducted by soldiers, but a social activity that involves the entire nation. Yet, the armed conflicts that India is faced with are not even declared to be such. At most, the war-like situations along the conflicted borders are described as 'no war-no peace' or such other euphemisms, and internal conflicts are described as insurgency or left-wing extremism. When soldiers die

Colonel Harjeet Singh (Retd) is a national security analyst based in Chandigarh.

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in circumstances where others are shooting to kill them, it is war.

We are at a critical juncture in history, one in which the speed of information and advances in technology are merging to change the way armies operate, and also think about warfare and meeting security objectives through actions other than military operations. These changes have dramatically shortened decision and reaction times, and reduced the number of systems it takes to achieve desired effects.² Further complicating the environment in security operations is the uncertainty of what the future holds. We have never been accurate in predicting the next security challenge. The uncertainty of the security environment,

evolution of technology, proliferation of information flow, shrinking of decision cycles and blurring of disciplines underlies a need to change existing mind-sets.³

Old indicators are no longer a reliable guide to being at war. There are new characteristics which make the existence of war difficult to identify: undeclared, among the people, asymmetric, and against non-state actors. The defence and security implications of new threats such as trans-national criminals, climate change, refugee flows, and food, water and energy shortages are yet to be fully understood. Can we be confident that they won't lead to war or do not already reflect new types of war that are yet to be comprehended?

War has changed. Today, it is no longer exclusively defined by state, territory, industrial might, military involvement or political will. The proponents of "fourth generation"⁴ and "hybrid"⁵ warfare catalogue the changing nature of war, leading to the diminishing power of standing armies and the advantages of asymmetry. What are the indicators and portents that a nation is at war? If we fail to recognise these, we cannot decide whether a war is worth waging and if so, how to wage it effectively. "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."⁶

War Today

Today, Indian soldiers are deployed along troubled and contested borders, and in hinterland areas where insurgencies have sprouted, and on UN missions globally. There may be a concept of low-intensity war but there is no such thing as a low-intensity bullet. The highest peace-time gallantry award, the Ashoka Chakra, is routinely awarded each Republic Day. Around the country, families live on edge as their loved ones serve the nation in Kashmir, the Indo-Tibet border, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Tripura, and on United Nations deployments. “It’s an axiom in the army that soldiers write the cheques but families pay the bills.”⁷ Political leaders state that the nation is fighting terrorism for the long haul but society fails to honour those who have fallen in conflict and care for those who are wounded and maimed, even as new names are added to the war memorials.

War is no longer inter-state and large-scale. It has now become intra-state, smaller, persistent and pervasive. In 2009, there were 17 major armed conflicts active in 16 locations around the world. There have been no major inter-state conflicts for the past eight years⁸ —a far cry from the 20th century when wars were mostly over territory. In such situations, it is hard if not impossible to identify the enemy’s centre of gravity or a conflict’s meaningful ‘culminating point’, as military commanders have been trained to do. It is also difficult for governments to build a narrative that engages the population and convinces them of the need for war and for its patient continuation, over an extended period of time.

The longer an ill-defined conflict lasts, the more likely it is that public support will decline, as has been the case with the Indian public. Yet the places to which the Indian Army is currently deployed have been conflict zones for many years. Most current commitments began many years ago: from Nagaland in the Fifties to Mizoram in the Sixties; from Assam in the Seventies to Punjab and Jammu Kashmir (J&K) in the Eighties; from the Mumbai riots in the early Nineties to the Mumbai attack in 2008.

Internal threats to national security have assumed centre-stage in the debates today as they are arguably more serious than the external threats. They have a pan-Indian presence and are no longer confined to India’s north and northeastern frontiers. Yet, the charade of talks with insurgents goes on, even as

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each party to the conflicts continues to seek to alter the distribution of power on the ground.

Nations wage war to secure territory, maintain their way of life, resist aggression and show resolve to achieve a political outcome. India has preferred to fight in order to defend its national interests. Junagarh, Hyderabad, Kashmir, Goa, Ladakh, North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), East Pakistan, Sikkim, Siachen, Sri Lanka and Kargil are signposts. When considering whether we are at war, we must answer the inverse question: how do we know when we are at peace?

In times of peace, we feel secure. We are able to achieve a sense of economic, social, religious and political well-being. As a society, we don't feel compelled to do anything that we fundamentally don't want to do. As Cicero said, we live in peace unharmed. Today, India is not at peace. Its citizens are beset by war in many parts of the country where they suffer wrongs and their condition looks set to worsen. Obfuscation in the prevailing situation is made worse by the loose use of war terminology or a lack of understanding of what constitutes war. Apart from changes in its scale, nature and character, the language of war is also changing. Military doctrine, political statements and public commentary about conflicts are replete with euphemisms and terms baffling to non-specialists: small wars, limited wars, military operations other than war, stabilisation operations, peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-enforcement, low intensity conflict, conflict management, nation building, human security, humanitarian operations, information war, cyber war et al.

The following points regarding the war-like scenarios today merit consideration:

- **Declaration of War:** Insurgencies and terrorism, the most frequent forms of conflict today, are not heralded by formal statements of intent. Terrorist plots by their very nature are secret, although some groups regularly issue general statements of hostility against India.
- **Executive Commitment:** The prime minister, with the support of the Cabinet, makes decisions of war and peace. Given the ambivalence and confusion on decisions to commit military force to internal security, Parliament does not authorise or endorse such a decision by resolution. There is little open and transparent debate on the subject. The decision to deploy troops is important, and such decisions are seldom reviewed.
- **Mobilisation:** Not only the military but the country must be mobilised in support of a war effort. There has to be large-scale industrial, economic, political, social and emotional effort to support the military effort. The

political, social and economic responses to insurgency are inadequately resourced. There seems little political appetite and minimal capability is deployed to face emerging threats and the military is used as the default setting for action. Politicians need to engage more fully in a comprehensive effort to determine political, economic and geo-strategic solutions to the problem.

- **Mission Clarity:** Today, it is increasingly difficult to link a military mission with the political intent and national strategy. The objectives of war require effective military and civilian contributions. The objectives are unlikely to be achieved with the size and nature of the civilian resources currently committed to any security situation. The civilian contribution to our counter-insurgency strategy remains under-estimated and under-resourced.
- **Equipping the Military:** Providing modern and appropriate equipment to the military is the responsibility of the government. The rigours and necessities of war force significant changes to military weaponry, training, doctrine and organisation. Militaries are conservative organisations and in peace can be slow to adapt. As Liddell Hart said, “The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old idea out.”⁹ War accelerates technological advances and material acquisition cycles as the nation seeks to defeat emerging threats and gain advantage over the enemy. Bureaucratic and time-consuming acquisition processes need to be abbreviated when rapid acquisition becomes the norm, in order to adapt to emerging situations.
- **Safeguarding the Rights of Soldiers:** For India, another unresolved area is the rights and obligations of military personnel when operating in situations short of declared war. There should be no element of jaundiced views or *schadenfreude* in analysing the problems of the military at the governmental level.
- **Media Involvement.** During peace, the media shows little interest in the military. Apart from the odd foray into a personnel scandal, or an instance of speculation, or an acquisition debacle, journalists are seldom seen. During war, the media demands access and can be both a hindrance and a help. Reporters see it as a duty to inform the public and ‘hold the military to account’. This often brings heightened tensions and mistrust in relations among the government, military and media. Today, there is no wishing away the role of the media. The environment of instantaneous news, ‘web war’, citizen journalism and journalists with independent access to the battlefield

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is here to stay. The military and government need to adapt and adopt a more open and transparent approach to the media.

Today, we are at war. It is real and affects the lives of people when many suffer and die every day as a result of bullets and bombs. Some deny this is genuine war, but for those involved— military and civilian— it is real enough. A balanced civil and military response is required. This requires boots on the ground and people who can deal as adeptly with economics and culture as those that can fire an

assault rifle. A proper balance of soldiers and civilians with solutions to political, social and economic as well as military problems is required. All this means that today war needs to be waged through a balanced whole-of-the-government approach rather than solely, or even primarily, military means. There are limits to what the military alone can achieve in the kind of war faced today. Many of the tasks our troops perform today are not jobs for soldiers, yet it seems that only soldiers are available to do them. It used to be said that “war was too important to be left to the generals.”¹⁰ It now must be said that war is too important not to involve the civilians. If we make the decision to fight, then we should make a comprehensive national effort accordingly.

Today, policy-making is reactive, with little evidence of long-term planning and no integrated view of international developments that may impact our way of life. National interest is a combination of economic, cultural, political issues. There are considerable divisions from significant minorities who feel marginalised or alienated from the national government. Conflicts in India are the products of historical legacies mixed with internal divisions and external influences. The trajectory of the path to growth is, thus, significantly altered. Sub-national identity is the key to many of the disputes. Hesitation, lack of contingency plans, and the tendency to rationalise decision-making after the event create an impression of order, when none exists. Minimum force is a guiding principle in counter-insurgency operations, but large numbers of troops/paramilitary forces are deployed. The tactics generate further resistance.

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agile opponents satisfied with cheap and ever-evolving 80 percent solutions. India's festering border issues with its neighbours and hostile relations pose challenges to maintaining a "security approach" to guard them. Conversely, greater importance to land border management negates the importance of coastal security. Linking wider security to defence and preceding it with a proper strategic outlook is necessary to bring together themes that have too often, and detrimentally, been considered separately. In this context, the fatalities in India, due to terrorism, are given at Table 1.

Table 1: Fatalities Due To Terrorism in India: 1994-2005¹¹

Year	Civilians	Security Forces	Terrorists	Total
1994	1,696	417	1,919	4,032
1995	1,779	493	1,603	3,875
1996	2,084	615	1,482	4,181
1997	1,740	641	1,734	4,115
1998	1,819	526	1,419	3,764
1999	1,377	763	1,614	3,754
2000	1,803	788	2,384	4,975
2001	1,693	721	3,425	5,839
2002	1,174	623	2,176	3,973
2003	1,187	420	2,095	3,702
2004	886	434	1,322	2,642
2005	913	287	1,319	2,519
Total	18,151	6,728	22,492	47,371

(Data does not include fatalities in left-wing extremism)

The fatalities in the past five years are given at Table 2.

Table 2: India: Fatalities From Terrorism, 2006-2010¹²

Year	Civilians	Security Forces	Extremists	Total
2006	1,118	388	1,269	2,775
2007	1,013	407	1,195	2,615

2008	1,019	372	1,222	2,613
2009	720	431	1,080	2,231
2010	759	371	772	1,902
Total	4,629	1,969	5,538	12,136

The Contribution of the Indian Army

A nation reveals itself not only by the men it produces but also by the men it honours, the men it remembers.¹³ Leadership, organisational efficiency and discipline, objective-oriented commitment, clear aims, and willingness to get your hands dirty make the military stand out against any other institution though the military is not a monolith; it has variations in tradition and culture. Military personnel are imbued with a basic value system that is aimed at making them aware of a higher cause, where the person is relegated in the face of the mission or the calling of *esprit de corps*. To be in the military implies a noble life and a noble death. It needs sincerity of purpose, a commitment to service, selflessness, and a sense of nobility to lead a composite group of people of various societal levels and social standing.

Institutions are built not only on the basis of what is made available to them, but also on a clear enunciation of agreed objectives, of equal opportunity, of sharing the load of the testing times and committed leadership. The military remains the most robust national institution. It is imperative that society and the media refrain from weakening the institution by defamation and uncalled for efforts to belittle its positive contributions. How does the use of force fit into the larger use of national power? Let the statistics speak for themselves as the leading edge fighting in the conflict is often the bleeding edge. The casualties sustained by the Indian Army in various theatres, since independence, are given at Table 3.

Table 3: Casualties Sustained by the Indian Army

Conflicts	Casualties	
	Killed	Wounded
1947-48 Indo-Pakistan War	1,788*	3,152
1962 Indo-China War	3,128	1,697

1965 Indo-Pakistan War	2,862	8,617
1967 Indo-China clash in Sikkim	83	Not available
1971 Indo-Pakistan War	3,843	9,851
Siachen Glacier	720	Not available
Operation PAWAN	1,255	2,700
Operation VIJAY	527	1,211

* including state forces

Beyond our borders, India has contributed 8,783 troops, police and military observers to nine current UN peace-keeping operations and has suffered 133 casualties.¹⁴

In addition, the army is in the forefront, reaching out to people, rescuing them, and providing relief during natural disasters, while continuing to fight terrorism. But the army's effort is barely noticed despite the absence of other effective organs of state and society.

For far too long, now, the political discourse on terrorism and insurgency has been clouded by a wide range of misconceptions, a great deal of muddle-headedness and some self-serving pretensions. These have persistently stood in the way of evolving a coherent national policy against this scourge, even as they have obstructed the security forces time and again from taking necessary action. In numberless cases, at great costs and with untold sacrifices, the military has imposed a measure of order in areas of widespread violence. Instead of political settlement following military pacification, the advantage has quickly been wasted by political adventurism and unprincipled deals with extremist leaderships that have restored the sway of violent anti-state groups. Political leaders at the highest levels have repeatedly propounded the false sociologies of 'root causes' and the fiction that terrorists and other extremists, who have taken hundreds of innocent lives, are best treated as 'our children' who may have 'lost their way'. Some political parties are alleged to have entered into pre-election alliances to secure extremist support during the polls, against promises of a 'soft-line' in the post-poll order.

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The Counter-Terrorism Debate

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has articulated a sound and secure basis for a national counter-terrorism strategy and internal security policy. He has emphasised the dangers of terrorist groups, organised crime syndicates, drug trafficking and external forces interested in destabilising our polity, and urged leaders of all political parties to ensure that such forces and groups are kept away from our political processes. He has firmly stated that there can be no political compromise with terror, no inch conceded, no compassion shown... there are no good terrorists and bad terrorists. There is no cause, root or branch that can ever justify the killing of innocent people. No democratic government can tolerate the use of violence against innocent people and against the functionaries of a duly established democratic government.¹⁵ However, this point has kept on being repeated, without any concrete measures on the ground. He recently warned, once again, that serious challenges and threats to the country's internal security persist from left-wing extremism, cross-border terrorism and religious fundamentalism and ethnic violence.¹⁶

The prime minister confronts the challenge of integrating India's economy with the emerging global order, and securing for the country its rightful place among the 'great powers' of the future. For decades, expenditure on policing and internal security has been casually dismissed by planners as 'non-developmental expenditure' and, consequently, in some sense, wasteful. Instead, it has frequently been argued, massive investment in areas of strife would address the legitimate grievances and aspirations of the people, and wipe out violence. In order to preserve our constitutional democracy, civil and military leaders need to bridge the gaps as newer security paradigms emerge.

Another example is the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). In the Manipur disturbances of 2004 and the more recent ones in Kashmir, even as the state and central governments grappled to control the situation, politicians targeted the AFSPA, seeking its withdrawal. The government, which is the upholder of this Act and at whose sole discretion areas where it will apply are designated, and from whom the army derives its strength and authority, preferred ambivalence and promised to make the Act more humane. There were unstated insinuations by vested political and human rights activists about the army embracing the Act to indulge in human rights violations. There are three constituents that make for civil-military relations in a democracy: civil society, elected government and the military. Of these, it is only the military that has no public voice and is at a disadvantage when targeted in such complex issues.

The principal strategic challenge in any conflict comprises four elements: a realistic and accurate assessment of the threat; an objective assessment of the resources (institutional, financial, manpower and technological) for an adequate response; the acquisition of these resources within timeframes imposed by the conflict; and the sagacious deployment of these resources to secure the objectives of a coherent and clearly defined strategy.

The soldier in combat is under extraordinary stress and needs unconditional support, not savage censure and condemnation. “Combat fog obscures your fate – obscures when and where you might die – and from that unknown is born a desperate bond between soldiers. That bond is the core experience of combat. The willingness to die for another person is a form of love that even religions fail to inspire, and the experience of it changes a person profoundly.”¹⁷ Combat isn’t simply a matter of risk, though it’s also a matter of mastery... One of the beguiling things about combat is that it is so complex, there is no way to predict the outcome. That means that any ragtag militia, no matter how small and poorly equipped, might conceivably defeat a superior force if it fights well enough. Every action produces a counter-action on the enemy’s part. “Thousands of interlocking actions throw up millions of little frictions, accidents and chances, from which emanates an all-embracing fog of uncertainty.”¹⁸

When fighting a deadly enemy, war is about one thing—survival. Unfortunately, in our national life, we have learned to ignore and condone, tending not to make it our business how others promote their family and friends. Everyone from his position of power, be it the seat of government, television channel, newspaper, or any other platform, is pushing favourites, oblivious to the fact that performance is determined not by bloodline but by talent. Thus, success depends on who you know and not upon what you have done. We, therefore, continue to rationalise our failures. It must be remembered that, “it is useless for sheep to pass resolutions in favour of vegetarianism while wolves remain of a different opinion.”¹⁹

A recent US National Intelligence Council report²⁰ states that India has become the world’s third most powerful nation after the US and China. If we look at it in terms of blocs, India has become the world’s fourth most powerful bloc

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after the USA, China and the European Community. The report also says that India's clout would grow even more by 2025. Currently, most of the world power comes from the United States, China and the European Community – each has 16 per cent. India, Japan, Russia and Brazil share 8 per cent each but the scenario would change by 2025 by when the US' and European Community's share would be down while India and China will strengthen their respective positions. While the ordering may remain the same, the power balance will change drastically.

India's growing involvement in world affairs, rising trade, energy needs, security requirements, and its entry into major international institutions demand rapid capacity building – both intellectual and institutional. India also needs an integrated policy-making think-tank within the government that will bring together the diverse demands of political ties, external and internal security interests, commerce, technology, intelligence, resource needs, environmental policies, and regional engagements. The National Security Council ought to do this but urgently needs capacity building and the direct involvement of all the relevant ministries. India also needs a far more robust, integrated and modernised military and a reformed Ministry of Defence that brings together the civil and the military. Finally, it needs to sustain long-term quality growth in education, research, manufacturing, agriculture, water management and infrastructure. Without broad-based and sustained economic growth, India's international role will be a mirage.

Winston Churchill once said, "To improve is to change; to be perfect is to change often". A strategic review flows from strategic thinking about India's place in the world, the threats it faces and about how the government can be brought together to try to deal with them. A plan is not a plan if it doesn't take into account the resources available. It is a wish list and no general worth his salt bases his plans on wishful thinking. The military has a vast amount of experience in turning thinking into action and strategy into effect. It has the ability to analyse, plan and implement – often under great pressure – in a coherent manner, bringing together multiple streams of capability into one whole effort. The military can employ the same skills to good effect in assisting the government as a whole to apply strategic thinking and planning in national security work.

India remains fortunate in that its military has defended the republic successfully on the battlefield while avoiding threats to civilian control. However, it is important to reiterate that civil-military relations entail more than mere civilian control, important though that may be. Civilian control is constitutionally grounded in India and the principle is accepted without question in the military.

The more important questions of civil-military relations concern how to ensure effective strategies for the employment of the military instrument. To ensure this outcome to the benefit of Indian security requires discipline, a deliberate process, and a continuous dialogue between the civilian leadership and the military.

The dysfunctional confluence has created India's strategic deficit. Rectifying this situation requires that both parties to the civil-military bargain adjust the way they do business. On the one hand, the military must recover its voice in strategy-making while realising that politics permeates the conduct of war and that civilians have a say not only concerning the goals of the war but also how it is conducted. On the other hand, civilians must understand that to implement both effective policy and strategy requires the proper military instrument. They must also insist that soldiers present their views frankly and forcefully throughout the strategy-making process.

Conclusion

The most significant lessons of civil-military relations are not concerned primarily with the question of civilian control. They are about how informed civilian leaders are when they choose to commit the military, how well the civil-military pattern enables the integration of divergent and even contradictory views, and how this pattern ensures a practical-military strategy that properly serves the ends of national policy. Leadership today is about intervention and change. Leaders must have the skills, confidence and institutions with the ability to create a degree of stability out of apparent chaos. It is a participative challenge.

Even today, strategy only means military strategy and not a sum total of the comprehensive national power. India's strategic perceptions have undergone significant changes in the last decade, especially since its nuclear tests. The lack of a strong National Security Council forestalls change in Indian foreign policy, the formulation of a security strategy, and forward looking strategic planning and contingency planning. In addition, India's "stove-piped" ministries usually forestall inter-agency cooperation.

As technology has expanded, the line between conventional and non-conventional warfare has blurred. The definition of force, the classic marker of power, has now expanded with the rise of 'soft power.' The balance is shifting between force and the other instruments of statecraft. We, therefore, need to develop a new and different statecraft.²¹

"Issues relating to our internal security require sustained and coordinated attention of both central and state governments ...It is a critical issue which affects the pace and growth of development... we will only succeed if we are

united as a nation in addressing our concerns related to our internal security.”²²

It is useful to recall the 9/11 commission report’s now famous summary that the cause of that disaster was a “failure of imagination”. It’s time to do a bit of imagining as to how we can restructure our organisations and processes to best meet the conditions of the information age. This will not be easy and it is sure to upset many apple carts, but if we don’t do it, our adversaries will – and we have too much at risk to let that happen. It is easy to dodge our responsibilities, but we cannot dodge the consequences of dodging our responsibilities.²³

Finally, if we fail to attract and retain the very high quality people who historically join the armed forces, our prospects for the future will diminish markedly. They lie at the heart of military capability. Current commitments demand military endurance capability and test its resolve. In the end, the following quote defines the issue succinctly:

*Freedom is the sure possession of those who have the courage to defend it.*²⁴

Notes

1. Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De officiis*, Book 1, xi. Translated by Walter Miller. Loeb. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913).
2. Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula (Retd.), “Think Different,” *Armed Forces Journal*, November 2010; <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/11/4939123>.
3. Ibid.
4. Loss of state monopoly on warfare; the emergence of non-state opponents; the state is at a disadvantage; and growing conflict between cultures.
5. This involves multiple types of warfare being waged simultaneously by flexible and sophisticated adversaries.
6. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.88.
7. Gen Stanley McChrystal, Farewell Address to the U.S. Army, July 23, 2010, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
8. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010, retrieved July 2010 from <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/02/02A>, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Colombia, Peru, USA (i.e. US involvements globally), Afghanistan, India, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines, Philippines (Mindanao), Sri Lanka,(since concluded) Iraq, Israel, Turkey.
9. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Thoughts on War* (1944).
10. Attributed to Prime Minister of France (1917-20), Georges Clemenceau.
11. The figures are calculated from the following regions:

Region	Civilians	Security Forces	Terrorists	Total
Jammu & Kashmir	10,483	4,736	17,458	32,677
Northeast	7,287	1,978	4,930	14,195
Punjab	82	2	91	175
Others	299	12	13	324
Total	18,151	6,728	22,492	47,371

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal (<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/index.html>).

12. Fatalities include left-wing extremism.
13. John F. Kennedy; address at Amherst College, on October 26, 1963, just a month before his assassination.
14. Giving the information in the Lok Sabha in response to a written question, External Affairs Minister S M Krishna said that India is the third largest such contributor and that up to June 30, 2009, India had suffered 131 casualties in UN peace-keeping operations.
15. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's address at the Chief Ministers' Conference, New Delhi, April 15, 2005.
16. *The Hindu*, February 2, 2011.
17. Sebastian Junger *Combat Zone: Extracts from War* (UK: Telegraph Books, May 22, 2010). <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/7747039/Combat-zone-extracts-from-Sebastian-Jungers-War.html>> For 15 months, the writer, Sebastian Junger, was embedded with a US Army platoon in the Korengal Valley, the scene of the fiercest fighting in Afghanistan.
18. Ibid.
20. Global Trends 2025: The National Intelligence Council's 2025 Project (http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html).
21. "The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs"; speech by National Security Adviser, Shri Shivshankar Menon at the National Defence College, New Delhi, October 21, 2010.
22. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the Chief Ministers Conference, February 7, 2010.
23. Sir Joshua Stamp, quote taken from a talk delivered at the Lal Bahadur Shastri Institute of Management on October 2, 2002, by N. R. Narayana Murthy, Chairman of the Board, Infosys Technologies Limited, Bangalore, India on What We Must Learn From the West.
24. Pericles, 429 B.C. (Funeral Oration).