
Disarmament in Distress: Time for Ground Action

Swadesh M Rana

With little to celebrate on the reduction of nuclear weapons and much to disagree on over regulating conventional arms trade, 2010 ended as another grim benchmark of non-recovery for disarmament in distress. Not because of an overuse of the unchanged structure and processes at the United Nations, but due to sheer exhaustion of running in one place, without a forward movement. Displaying the UN's institutional resilience to adapt, the Security Council and the secretary-general are stepping forth to work around a mega- impasse in state to state dealings. This overview provides a thumbnail sketch of some known divisive issues, highlights the institutional response, looks beyond 2011 and concludes with some observations for direct civic action.

Little to Celebrate

The consensus document of the 8th Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) notwithstanding, the 65th session of the General Assembly, ended with little to celebrate. That consensus among the 187 NPT signatories is made conditional on its review by Egypt in 2012 unless there is progress on an early establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. As a nuclear power that neither acknowledges nor denies that status, Israel shows no more willingness to be a part of NWFZ now than in the years past. Without Israel, an NWFZ in the Middle East would be yet another exercise of willing suspension of disbelief that now overhangs all the three subsidiary bodies of the UN's disarmament structure erected by the General Assembly: the deliberative; the consensus building, and the negotiating.

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As its deliberative body, the open-ended Disarmament Commission has been languishing over lack of a workable agenda for almost two decades. As its consensus building body for multilateralism, the First Committee of the General Assembly still adopts between 40-50 resolutions every year. By 2010, close to half of them required voting instead of consensus, further eroding prospects of their universal compliance. As the UN's sole multilateral negotiating body, the 65-member Committee on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva continues to be stalemated over universal compliance with the treaties and agreements concluded before and since its establishment.¹

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None of the older nuclear five has so far carried out the agreed obligations to reduce nuclear arsenals and destroy stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To date, not a single one of an estimated 23,000 nuclear warheads collectively possessed by the US, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China has been actually destroyed. Nearly 22,000 of those warheads are with the US and Russia. The US has not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).² Russia is foot-dragging on the destruction of its chemical weapons that constitute the world's largest stockpile. As nuclear powers, Pakistan and India decline to accept a Fissile Material Control Regime (FMCR) unless preceded by universal ratification of the CTBT. Iran's nuclear intentions and North Korea's opting out of the NPT further dim prospects to overcome the impasse over lack of universality and non-compliance in the implementation of successfully negotiated treaties.³ Since 1996, no new treaty has been negotiated by the CD which works by consensus.

UN members remain divided over how, or whether, to revitalise it, while the CD itself turns into a spectator rather than a key actor to meet new challenges for multilateralism. One such turning point came over the post 9/11 concerns over access to radiological weapons by non-state actors operating outside the reach of legitimate state authority. Radiological weapons are more weapons of mass disruption than mass destruction. Such weapons could use plutonium or highly enriched uranium but can also be built with radioactive materials of which there are millions of sources used in medical and industrial facilities worldwide. The immediate devastation by a radiological or 'dirty' bomb would be proportionate to its basic explosive content and its radiation effects are likely to be limited. But

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the fallout could be far wider and longer lasting in the abrupt disruption of daily routine , economic damage, public alarm and the necessity for evacuating and decontaminating affected areas. That makes such bombs very effective tools of combat for non-state actors looking for simply assembled weapons that generate public panic out of proportion to their actual impact.

In December 2002, the German Foreign Ministry co-sponsored a seminar on radiological weapons and terrorism along with the UN Institute for Disarmament Research in the CD's conference room in Geneva. The issue at stake was whether the CD as the UN's sole multilateral negotiating body would take up a new item to ban such weapons. The seminar put the issue into the jurisdiction of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for global monitoring of weapons materials and not the CD for negotiating a treaty to outlaw such weapons. Aron Tovish, a veteran disarmament activist, now working with Mayors for Peace, recounts the event to question the usefulness of the CD:

What does one make of a body, attended by 66 nations... in which... during a scheduled plenary... not one country wishes to take the floor? How does one appraise a forum where, when delegates do address each other, more often than not it is to report on disarmament progress elsewhere? The CD is often inaccurately referred to as the world's "sole" multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. Actually, in founding it, the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament called it a "single" forum in the sense that the entire scope of disarmament issues could legitimately be addressed under a single roof. Of course, there was no way of prohibiting other fora from taking up disarmament issues, and that is quite naturally what has happened in many cases over the years.

Like the US-Soviet bilateral negotiations on the now elapsed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), major bilateral disarmament processes continue to be pursued outside the United Nations including the new START. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was put on the CD's agenda in 1963 only after the US, USSR and UK agreed on the general terms for the agreement to be negotiated. Major treaties

for the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones were negotiated outside the CD by the regional groups before making the UN their depository: the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America, the Treaty of Rarotonga in the South Pacific, and the Treaty of Pelindaba in Africa. In a cross-regional initiative, Germany chose the sidelines of the 2010 session of the General Assembly to announce the formation of a new inter-governmental group for total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only guarantee against their proliferating among states and falling into the hands of non-state actors. It was joined by Japan, Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Poland, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, all of which are non-nuclear powers like Germany.

Much to Disagree

While the CD is stalled over negotiating any new treaty due to non-compliance with some existing treaties for nuclear disarmament, the First Committee is faced with much disagreement over the expected outcome of a UN conference in 2012 to design a binding Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on conventional weapons. The preparatory process for ATT in 2010 did not move beyond an agreed compliance criteria based on objectivity, non-discrimination and resistance to political misuse.

For objectivity in monitoring international arms transfers, the UN already has an Arms Register for national reporting of seven categories of conventional weapons. Instituted by the UN General Assembly in 1991, with 173 states reporting to it at least once, the Register received only 69 national reports in 2010, including 30 with “nil” returns. This lowest number of national reports to the Register since its inception is promoting scepticism about the feasibility of instituting a reliable binding instrument to regulate global arms trade without a universal reporting system. Among those sceptical are major arms importers like China, Egypt, India, Israel and South Korea. Estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) place them as among the top 10 countries accounting for roughly 50 percent of the global arms imports: China 11 percent, India 7 percent, South Korea 6 percent, UAE 6 percent, Israel 4 percent, Greece 4 percent, Turkey 3 percent, Egypt 3 percent, Australia 2 percent, and USA 3 percent.

For non-discrimination in implementing a binding instrument, doubts have arisen over any connections between the formal ATT preparatory process and its informal linkage to the Japanese led initiative outside the UN to institutionalise a *de facto* export control regime of 45 countries. At over \$14 billion a year, even after

getting halved by the credit crunch, over 80 percent of the conventional arms trade is monopolised by 10 exporting countries with vast difference between the bottom 4 and the top 2: Sweden 2 percent, Ukraine 2 percent, Spain 2 percent, Italy 2 percent, Netherlands 3 percent, UK 4 percent, France 8 percent, Germany 10 percent, Russia 25 percent, and USA 31 percent. All of them, along with 35 other arms manufacturers, are members of one or more of four major arms control groups: the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australian Group, the Missile Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.⁴

As reasons for the resistance to political misuse, there are misgivings about the determination of likely misusers and the effectiveness of an enforceable instrument to deny them the tools of misuse. Violation of international norms on human rights, humanitarian laws and disarmament agreements against illicit arms trafficking are being mentioned as grounds for determination of misuse. In restricting or banning arms and/or arms-related material, including hardware, military advice and training to misusers, UN arms embargoes are mentioned as likely instruments to deny the tools of abuse. But the UN's experience in determining misusers and imposing arms embargos is mixed and remains fraught with serious differences. Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea situation, Iran, Iraq/ Kuwait situation , Libya, Liberia, Myanmar, North Korea, Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Yugoslavia , Zimbabwe are among more than 20 countries considered to be in violation on one ground or another, at some time or another. Of the 10 recent arms embargos actually imposed, two-thirds were violated both by those imposing them and by their targets.

Any attempt to adapt the UN Arms Register into "a catch-all conventional arms export control regime" at the ATT may face resistance both by the arms manufacturing UN members who do not belong to the *de facto* export control regime; and by the non- arms manufacturing countries whose national security needs for conventional arms are met by imports. As of now, less than half of the 98 arms manufacturing UN members belong to the *de facto* export control regime. Close to 100 UN member states do not manufacture the conventional weapons to meet their national security needs, including small arms and light weapons (SALWs) that are not covered by the seven categories in the UN Arms Register.⁵

Cryptically called the real weapons of mass destruction as the weapons of choice in 25 armed conflicts in 1994, the SALWs are regulated by three UN instruments created by the General Assembly: the politically-binding Programme of Action to Curb Illicit Arms Traffic adopted in July 2001; the legally-binding Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms which

entered into force on July 3, 2005; and the politically-binding International Instrument to Identify and Trace Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons adopted in December 2005. By early 2011, enough SALWs are still in unaccounted circulation to fuel low-intensity armed conflicts worldwide for two decades to come. Close to 25 percent of an estimated \$4.3 billion annual global trade in SALWs in 2009 is estimated to be through illicit arms traffic. Nationals, in defiance of the laws of their countries, and non-state actors like the terrorists, drug cartels, smugglers, and contraband traders make up a labyrinth of illicit arms traffic that eludes the existing

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UN instruments to monitor and curb it. The ATT in 2012 would be hard placed to institute another that cuts through the labyrinth without getting entangled in unravelling the operations of a shadow economy thriving on the margins of established state institutions within and across national frontiers. Fake documentation, anonymous brokers, front organisations, clandestine routes, barter exchanges, Diaspora's support, organised crime, political dissidence, individual disaffection are intertwined in this labyrinth that defies categorisation as a disarmament issue for global action through state to state negotiations.

Institutional Resilience

Stepping in to work around the divisive issues for the subsidiary bodies created by the General Assembly are two established organs of the UN: the Security Council and the Office of the Secretary General.

The Security Council swiftly took a unanimous decision to deny access to weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors as the General Assembly remained stonewalled over acts of terror committed in Southwest Asia by the Taliban, with explicit or tacit state sponsorship by Afghanistan and Pakistan. Adopted unanimously on April 28, 2004, Security Council Resolution 1540 is notable for two reasons. One, it recognises non-state proliferation as a threat to international security under the terms of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Two, it creates a mandatory obligation for all member states to modify, develop and enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures against the

proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, in particular, to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors.

On the face of it, the US led Security Council action on weapons of mass destruction seemed like a role reversal in execution of Article 11 of the UN Charter that authorises the General Assembly to consider general principles governing “disarmament and regulation of armaments” and make recommendations to member-states or the Security Council or both. In reality, Article 26 of the UN Charter entrusts the Security Council with the responsibility to formulate—through a Military Staff Committee—“plans to be submitted” to the UN members for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments. The Military Staff Committee never became actually operational during the four decades of the Cold War that ended abruptly after the sudden disintegration of the USSR. After more than a decade and a half of adapting itself to meet the fast changing post-Cold War threats to international security, the Security Council has finally put disarmament firmly as a priority item on its security agenda. At its Summit opened by President Barack Obama and attended by 14 heads of states in September 2009, the Security Council asserted its primary responsibility to address nuclear threats. By its unanimous Resolution 1887 of September 24, 2009, it is claiming that all situations of non-compliance with nuclear disarmament treaties should be brought to its attention. While doing so, the council acknowledges the role of the CD by calling upon it to quickly negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for explosive devices. To assuage the concerns over non-compliance with negotiated treaties, the council simultaneously calls upon all states to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions and to ratify the CTBT in order to bring it into force as soon as possible.

A year ahead of its 2009 Summit, Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon was already advocating a stronger role for the Security Council as a part of his 5-point proposal to reset the disarmament agenda for both the subsidiary bodies and the established organs of the UN with speedy action through⁶:

- A UN convened nuclear weapons convention to ban their production, use and proliferation all together in a single instrument or mutually reinforcing instruments for verifiable compliance with treaty obligations for deep reductions by the nuclear powers.
- A Security Council Summit on nuclear disarmament to give unambiguous security assurances by the nuclear powers to the non-nuclear-weapon

states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and through the establishment of an NWFZ.

- An immediate commencement of negotiations by the CD on fissile material control and urgently bringing the CTBT into force without conditionality on either process.
- The widest possible dissemination through the UN Secretariat of authoritative public disclosures by the nuclear weapon states about the size of their arsenals, stocks of fissile material and specific disarmament achievements.
- Fresh mandates by the General Assembly for elimination of other types of WMD and WMD terrorism; limits on the production and trade in conventional arms; and new weapons bans, including of missiles and space weapons.

Looking Beyond 2010

UN member-states are relieved that the 8th Review Conference of the NPT in 2010 did not relive the setback of the 7th Review that had raised serious concerns over its survival had it not been extended indefinitely in 1995. While not as effective a constraint as it could be, the NPT is still the cornerstone of a global non-proliferation regime. In 1963, when only four states had nuclear arsenals, the US government sources predicted that the following decade would see the emergence of 15 to 25 more, with others putting that number as high as 50. As of 2010, only 8 states are known to have nuclear arsenals. Along with the IAEA, the NPT has slowed the predicted rate of proliferation by: a normative taboo against the production, use and proliferation of these weapons; an admission of benefitting from nuclear technologies with oversight; and through constant monitoring of the potentials of rivals to discourage avoidable nuclear arms races.

The Secretary-General's High Representative for Disarmament, and a veteran of disarmament diplomacy from Brazil, Sergio Duarte looks back in expressing cautious optimism for looking ahead. "Grand efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament in one comprehensive arrangement have given way to pragmatic agreements on parts of the greater cause. Hence, international treaties have been drawn up to create nuclear weapon-free zones in all major regions of the world," he says. "Such weapons have been banned from being tested above the ground and, when the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) enters into force, even that option will finally be closed. In this connection, it is heartening to note that no tests have been conducted for over 10 years by

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When asked how he rates the prospects of progress on the new initiatives by an assertive Security Council and a proactive secretary general, Randy Rydell compares it to “a boat being oared in two directions” to add “let’s hope they do not pull harder.” The brain behind Ban Ki Moon’s 5-point proposal as Sergio Duarte’s senior political aide, Rydell sees the member-states as deeply divided between a step by step and a leap ahead approach to disarmament. “Remember Noel Baker,” he recalls the Nobel Laureate’s undated quip that became a political cartoon with two men standing on the edge of a chasm. “Ever crossed it in two steps?” one asked another.

A clear demonstration of the deep divide between a leap forward and step by step approach is the latest voting on a Costa Rican proposal, supported by Ban Ki Moon, for a UN convention to abolish nuclear weapons:⁷

in favour 140; abstaining 22; and opposed 30. Among the 8 nuclear powers, China, India and Pakistan voted in favour; France and the United Kingdom voted against, more with scepticism than outright opposition; Israel, Russia and the US voted against, with only the US explaining its opposition in unequivocal terms. It argues that a nuclear weapons convention is not achievable in the near term and, thus, not a realistic alternative to a step by step approach to disarmament currently underway. Trying to combine all the issues into a single negotiation would be a formula for deadlock by distracting “energy and attention from other practical and achievable steps.”⁸

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supporter of a nuclear free world and a non-nuclear state sees a nuclear weapons convention as premature. Despite a conviction that there will be a need to develop such a convention or legally binding instrument, Norway, a NATO member, votes against it out of concern over it being negotiated in the CD whose “functionality and universality” is in question. The non-aligned votes vary from strong advocacy by Malaysia and Bangladesh, to qualified support by India on behalf of 20 others, making it conditional on a time-frame, to a general espousal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. Numerically still the largest among the UN members, the 118 members of the Non Aligned-Movement (NAM) now are more un-allied than non-aligned as they were in 1961 when NAM was founded. Or when they were less than half in number and many times more effective in voting en bloc as they did in setting the agenda and preparing the consensual Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament.⁹ Now they are “dysfunctional” according to Hannalore Hoppe, the deputy high representative of disarmament.

Having served as the executive secretary of the CD in Geneva, the chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, and a director of disarmament, Ms. Hoppe’s institutional memory rates Ban Ki Moon as the most proactive in disarmament among the five during her close to four decades of experience in the UN Secretariat: Kurt Waldheim, Javez Perez de Quellar, Boutrous Boutrous Ghali and Kofi Annan. She finds Ban Ki Moon’s five-point proposal as central to his vision of working around the stalemated subsidiary bodies in the disarmament structure and processes. As she sees it, his peripheral vision includes a more active civil society “to go beyond advocacy to direct actions” that do not require state to state negotiations for every disarmament issue. This aptly captures the prevailing mood of greater advocacy for nuclear disarmament and the unexplored potentials for direct action in regulating conventional arms transfers.

For several high profile initiatives led by governments, military-political leaders, the scientific community and women in the forefront, the year 2010 was a benchmark in advocacy for a world without nuclear weapons by: the international Global Zero movement; the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament; the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom; and the International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons.¹⁰ But when it comes to conventional disarmament, it saw no direct action comparable to April 2008 when South African dock workers refused to offload an arms shipment from the Chinese para-statal Ocean State Shipping company heading for Zimbabwe while

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anchored at Durban. Again, in February 2009, when the same group protested against the violence in Gaza by blocking Israeli arms shipments through Durban.

Direct Action

For direct action in 2011, the choice is first between advocacy for protracted multilateral negotiations for an already overextended disarmament agenda in distress and an active engagement that can make a difference without necessarily calling for state to state negotiations. And then a determination of a disarmament issue with an ascertainable outcome in a reasonably attainable time-frame. High profile advocacy groups have already opted for nuclear disarmament for which they cannot give reasonably attainable time-frames. Howsoever technologically sound time-frames they commit to, advocacy groups cannot reduce or destroy a single warhead in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons. Only governments can, thereby precluding direct action by advocacy groups. This is an inherent constraint on advocacy for total elimination of nuclear weapons. It makes a step by step approach more realistic in calling for speedy compliance with existing treaties for which 2015 is mostly seen as the next timeline to coincide with the 9th five yearly review of the NPT. A possible entry point in 2011 could be a commitment to a symbolic event in 2015 like the march by one million people on the First Avenue for nuclear disarmament during the otherwise deadlocked UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-II) in 1982.

The conventional arms regulation field is more open, with reasonable chances of making an impact. The critical determination here is of an issue of immediate concern to a sub-region directly affected. The combined legacy of surplus weapons and improved explosive devices (IEDs) from the inconclusive war on terror in Southwest Asia is one such issue. The Pak-Afghan border on both sides of the Durand Line is a virtual warehouse of discarded, unexploded, and cheaply sold small arms and light weapons, with some going for a penny to a dollar. Tens of thousands of assault rifles, AK 47s, hand grenades and other hand-held weapons were amassed during the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. And since the 2001 US led military action, many more weapons have been added to this open armoury: stolen weapons; weapons mistaken for exploded; weapons resold by small business contractors in the surplus industry;

and weapons simply unaccounted for. A 2009 report of the US General Accounting Office estimated that over one-third of the 242,000 light weapons donated by the US government to the Afghan forces were unaccounted for and might have ended up with the Taliban. The Pentagon expects its military forces to demolish, downgrade as scrap, or sell the surplus to contractors who commit to destroy them. But among the nearly 400 contractors for the US weapons surplus in Afghanistan and Pakistan, some admit that they commonly find useful or new items among those discarded as scrap. Of the 30 rifle magazines removed recently from dead insurgents, for example, more than half contained cartridges or rounds identical to those used by some of the troops in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

The Afghan-Pak theatre is also a flea market for scrap metal: one of the handy materials for crude assembly of IEDs along with ammonium nitrate and radioactive waste. Earlier last year, the ISAF located a vehicle carrying more than 900 kg of ammonium nitrate in the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar: enough to make 2,000 kg of explosive material. The mystery over truck loads of ammonium nitrate appearing and disappearing in India in 2010 remains largely unresolved—except for those actually located to the Naxalites, ranging anywhere between 10 to 16 tonnes in a single haul around Chhattisgarh.

Dirty bombs made with radioactive and other toxic chemical and biological substances are now seen as deadlier IEDs in the making than the roadside bombs used by the Taliban with landmines, ammonium nitrate and metallic connectors from artillery shells. About twenty million consignments of radioactive materials in all container sizes are routinely transported worldwide each year under stringent international regulations by the IAEA and the Dangerous Goods Code developed by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) that is independent of the material's intended application and end use. Consequently, there are hardly any reported accidents in which a container with highly radioactive material was breached or leaked. That

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record does not preclude a probability of theft from loosely guarded or rummaging through negligently discarded radioactive medical waste. Liquid chloride, a common substance in medical use, for example, could be used for producing life-threatening clouds of gas with deadlier fall-out than the shrapnel blast and fire effect of other IEDs.

A recent and random internet survey on IEDs yields over 650,000 entries on the history, current usage, impact, and measures to detect, survive or deal with the effects of their usage. Lethal in causing indiscriminate damage, there has been a 400 percent increase in their use to become the number one cause of death for the ISAF in 2010. Much is said about IEDs in the context of restraining the post 9/11 Taliban militancy. But amidst all this attention to their lethality, not much

is said about IEDs as symbols of the limits of military power in the inconclusive outcome of the decade-old field operations of the US-led ISAF in Southwest Asia. This double neglect ignores the ground reality that much of the militancy in the densely populated South Asia pre-dates 9/11. And that, after their effective use against the ISAF, as easier to assemble, harder to detect and causing more collateral damage, IEDs maybe the killer tools of choice to replace light weapons used by the militants in South Asia; by the Tajiks and Pushtoon Muslims in Afghanistan; by those supporting an army dominated political stability and those asking for greater power sharing among the five provinces of Pakistan; by the ideologically driven Naxalites who shun political participation in the electoral process in India; by the Maoists first participating in the electoral process and then holding up the Constitution making to defend a right to armed rebellion in Nepal; and, the expatriate driven *madrassas* preaching religious extremism in Bangladesh.

Exposed equally to the looming threat or existing danger of IEDs, the South Asian governments need to come to an agreement on a shared position to put it as a new issue on the multilateral agenda of disarmament in distress. Their other unresolved bilateral differences notwithstanding, there is much they can do nationally by:

- Licensing the production and sale of ammonium nitrate to keep this substance from falling into the hands of politically motivated terrorists, profit driven pirates and other groups or individuals flouting or thriving on the margins of state authority.
- Undertaking research to reduce the permissible quantity of ammonia for its agricultural and industrial use. South and Southeast Asia currently produce close to 40 percent of the global supply of ammonium nitrate with direct application for fertilisers in agriculture and other uses such as refrigeration, pulp making, textile treatment, woodwork and household cleaners.
- Taking a closer look at the IAEA's regulations and IMO's Dangerous Goods Code on radioactive materials to close any loopholes for applicability to the storage and disposal of medical waste by the hospitals using radioactive materials for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes.
- Articulating a demand at the 2012 UN Conference on an Arms Trade Treaty for a global standard on inventory taking of the weapons brought into, and taken out of, an area of insurgency by an external power directly engaged in counter-insurgency operations.
- Encouraging the business community to get actively engaged in mitigating the risk of misuse of otherwise harmless materials that go into the making of IEDs. Dealers in scrap metal, processors of ammonium nitrate for agricultural and industrial use and managers of medical waste would be the obvious stakeholders to gain by getting associated. The profit they make now would be insignificant to the promise that an IED immune work place gives them a longer life span to keep reaping the benefits.

Notes

1. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) was established in 1979 as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the UN as a result of the first Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly held in 1978. It succeeded other Geneva-based negotiating fora, which include the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962-68), and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969-78)
2. To date, 182 nations have signed and 151 ratified the CTBT. Its formal entry into force requires ratification by 44 states named in its Annex II. US ratification is essential but not sufficient to win the support of all those yet to ratify: China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. Indonesia and China are likely to ratify it if the US does.

3. The CD and its predecessors have negotiated major agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, the Seabed Treaties, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling and Destruction of Biological and Toxic Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
4. The 45 countries belonging to one or more of the export control groups are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.
5. Small arms and light weapons are used by all armed forces, including internal security forces, for, *inter alia*, self-protection or self-defence, close or short-range combat, direct or indirect fire, and against tanks or aircraft at relatively short distances. Broadly speaking, small arms are those weapons designed for personal use, and light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew.
6. SG/ SM/ 11881/ DC by the UN Department of Public Information; The 5-point proposal was first announced on October 24, 2008, at a side event of the UN General Assembly's First Committee attended by Mohamed Elbaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Henry Kissinger, former US secretary of state and Sergey Kislyak, ambassador of the Russian Federation to the United States.
7. First submitted by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica in A/C.1/51/7 (1997) and revived since 2007 with strong support by Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, the proposal would eliminate nuclear weapons all together in a single convention to overcome the persistent differences over universal and binding compliance with existing treaties and agreements to reduce and destroy existing stockpiles while banning their proliferation to states and non-state actors.)
8. US Statement at the NPT Review Conference, New York, May 10, 2010.
9. A Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) is a high level world summit of the UN General Assembly. Of the three SSODs held so far in 1978, 1982 and 1988, SSOD-1 was the only one to reach consensus on a comprehensive disarmament strategy embodied in the Final Document with the highest priority accorded to nuclear disarmament. Since 1995, when the General Assembly decided to convene an SSOD-IV in 1997, there has been no agreement over its proposed agenda.

10. The international Global Zero movement was launched in the United Kingdom in December 2008 by 300 people working for the phased, verified elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide. More than 400,000 people have signed for the Global Zero with 70 chapters on college campuses worldwide; a joint initiative of the Australian and Japanese governments, the International Commission on Nuclear Non- proliferation and Disarmament was established in June 2008 in the context of the NPT Review 2010 and beyond. It advocates that nuclear weapon powers give them up, non-nuclear powers neither want nor be able to acquire them, and both to join in stopping terrorists from getting anywhere near them; the Nobel Prize winning Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs started in 1957 after the release of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto of 1955 that prodded the scientific community worldwide to denounce nuclear weapons; the oldest of women organisations and founded in 1915, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) launched Reaching Critical Will in 1999 to work for the abolition of nuclear weapons through a sustained and knowledge based public engagement; launched in Austria in 2007, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons is a grassroots movement joined by 200 organisations in 60 countries to advocate a nuclear weapons convention as proposed by Costa Rica.