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# India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement: Ramifications for India's Security

Sanjay Bhardwaj

The traditional notion of a state has been, and remains, state-centric with its military supremacy. No doubt, safeguarding territorial integrity from external aggression and protecting its citizens is vital for the existence of a nation-state. Inter-state relations are also marked by a kind of turbulence on account of several transnational non-traditional security threats and ethno-cultural conflicts. The demand of self-determination by the separatists and insurgents groups with the support of external actors has made the question of state security an even more complex phenomenon. Military defence and economic regulations have traditionally been central border concerns, but many states are retooling and reconfiguring their border regulatory apparatus to prioritise policing. These priorities of border management have become one of the most serious critiques. The policing objective of a state is to deny territorial access to undesirables, whom Peter Andreas terms “Clandestine Transnational Actors” (CTAs).<sup>1</sup> The cross-border movement of violent non-states actors has spoiled the environment to the extent that cross-border firing and killing between or by border security agencies has become a regular phenomenon.

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The role of a state has remained to be a cohesive entity. In this juxtaposition, cordial and constructive bilateral relations between countries have become hostage to irritants at the border.

In last two decades, a common question that arose for both the novice reader and experienced analyst was: who is this policing of the border for? Is it against the innocent civilians living athwart the border or the CTAs who are involved in illegal trade, terrorism, drugs, human and small arms trafficking? Such questions have not

only spoiled the domestic environment but also led to development of deep mistrust in the region. The Indian government has ratified the long delayed land boundary agreement with Bangladesh specially to address the issues of security and development between the two countries.

### **Borders: A Conceptual Understanding**

Borders or frontiers between states are institutions and processes.<sup>2</sup> As institutions, they are established by political decisions and regulated by legal texts. As a preliminary matter of vocabulary, three terms are in common use: *frontier*, *boundary* and *border* (these are often used interchangeably by political geographers, but there are technical differences between them,)<sup>3</sup>. 'Frontier' is the word with the widest meaning, although its original meaning had a military overtone—it was the zone in which one faced the enemy. In contemporary usage, it can mean the precise line at which jurisdictions meet, usually demarcated and controlled by customs, police and military personnel.<sup>4</sup> Historically, 'border' has been an equally all-embracing term and is now accepted as a synonym of 'frontier'. Unlike the above two terms, 'boundary' has a

fairly well accepted meaning. It is a line without width, often having endured the process of demarcation and, thus, the equivalent of the ‘frontier line’. If its status has to be indicated, one may qualify it as either “demarcated” or “undemarcated” boundary.<sup>5</sup> ‘Boundary’ represents the line of physical contact between states and affords opportunities for cooperation and discord. Boundaries are the frameworks of the nation.<sup>6</sup> A frontier, on the other hand, signifies a zone or region having width as well as length, whereas a border denotes a line.<sup>7</sup>

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In the operational aspect, Peter Andreas has categorised borders as military, economic and police borders.<sup>8</sup> These are the realist views of borders and territorial security and, thus, are fundamentally about inter-state rather than transnational relations. Throughout history, states have constructed walls and fortifications in their respective frontiers to face the problem of military threats, illegal trade, migration, insurgency, trafficking and smuggling. However, in the last few decades, boundaries have become irrelevant with the advent of state-of-the-art weapon technology (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles—ICBMs, etc.), the communication revolution (Information and Communication Technology—ICT) premised on satellite and computer technologies and the consequence of globalisation and liberalisation of the economy and culture. Thereby, the concept of border security has also undergone a sea-change. The relevance of military and economic borders has declined significantly, however, there is growing vulnerability to, and transnational activities of, the CTAs, not only on the land borders but also along the coastline and in air space, and the policing border has expended considerably.

The CTAs are as dramatically varied as their motives. They may be driven by high profits and market demand. They may be highly organised or disorganised and operate regionally or globally.<sup>9</sup> What has changed over time is the organisation of the CTAs and their methods and speed of cross-border movement. With manoeuvrability and scope for strategic alliances with like-minded groups, they are able to undertake surprise terrorist strikes.<sup>10</sup> The ‘hot’ to ‘tepid’ eastern Indian border also faces severe security threats from these CTAs.

### **India-Bangladesh Border: The Historical Background**

Pre-independence, India consisted of small princely states that were individually taking care of violations on their respective borders till the British established the ‘buffer system’. After independence, India, like any other country, has been adequately conscious about its borders and has reacted and defended its boundary and territory—politically and militarily. It has also signed peace and friendship treaties or boundary agreements with Bhutan (1949), Nepal (1950), Myanmar (1967), and Bangladesh (1974, protocol 2011 and ratification 2015). The partition of India in 1947 had drawn political boundaries without considering the ground realities and the people’s socio-economic needs. The body responsible for delineating the boundaries came to be popularly known as the “Radcliffe Boundary Commission.”<sup>11</sup> According to the report of the “Radcliffe Award,”<sup>12</sup> there were pressures and counter-pressures that Radcliffe had to weigh against each other. He had to appear even-handed to all sides, while keeping in mind the imperatives of the British policy for the future of the subcontinent.<sup>13</sup> Inevitably, his award pleased no one entirely, but there is little doubt that it displeased some less than others. Immediately after the partition, border disputes arose between India and Pakistan regarding certain territorial claims.

Some of the disputes were resolved by the Bagge Awards of 1950, Nehru-Noon Agreement of 1958, and Swaran Singh-Ahmed Sheikh

Agreement of 1959. In the process of the implementation of the Nehru-Noon Agreement, the Indian Parliament adopted the 9th Constitutional Amendment Act and Acquired Territories (Merger) Act in 1960. However, implementation could not be effected because of a series of writ petitions filed in the Supreme Court of India challenging this legislation. The state of West Bengal was firmly opposed to the implementation of the Nehru-Noon Agreement, especially as regards the transfer of any portion of Berubari to Pakistan.<sup>14</sup> The Supreme Court's decisions made it clear that the executive could not on its own cede any portion of Indian territory, and the necessary constitutional amendment for approving changes in the boundary of India required that, along with a two-thirds majority, the agreed maps of the territorial changes had to be placed before Parliament.<sup>15</sup>

After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) of 1974 between Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was an attempt to resolve the border problems. However, due to the Radcliffe Commission's 'blunder', the disputes remained unresolved.<sup>16</sup> The LBA (1974) included three distinct issues: exchange of enclaves, adverse possessions of land, and settlement of 6.5 km of undemarcated land border.<sup>17</sup> It was only in 1996, when Sheikh Hasina became Prime Minister, that the LBA issues were revisited once again. In April 1997, the list of enclaves, along with maps, was jointly reconciled, signed and exchanged between the two governments. In 2000, both governments also agreed to establish the Joint Boundary Working Group (JBWG).<sup>18</sup> In July 2001, the West Bengal government agreed to grant access to Bangladeshis between the two enclaves of Dahagram and Angorpota through the Tin Bigha Corridor under the Lease Agreements of 1982 and 1992. In the fourth JBWG meeting, both sides expressed satisfaction at the electrification of Dahagram and Angarpota. Both countries also implemented 24-hour unfettered access through the Tin Bigha Corridor, and put in place all the necessary arrangements, including infrastructure and security, expeditiously in the later years.

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Notably, Dahagram-Angarpota is the large Bangladeshi enclave that has not changed hands in the swap between India and Bangladesh by the protocol on LBA 2011. The enclave exchange treaty has brought Tin Bigha and the Dahagram-Angarpota enclave into focus once again, with a section of the Indian population in Mekhliganj sub-division of Cooch Behar, particularly in Kuchlibari, demanding its transfer to India. Several organisations have already observed *bandhs* and processions, and petitions have been filed with the Indian government.<sup>19</sup> It was under the aegis of the JBWG that the crucial decision on joint visits to all disputed border areas and territories, including enclaves and adverse possessions, was taken. These joint visits began in 2007, but picked up pace and momentum only in 2009, after the ninth parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. Years of painstaking work paid off by August 2011, when India and Bangladesh were able to agree upon, and sign, joint border maps, settling decades of differences relating to each of the LBA issues. Finally, a protocol to the 1974 LBA was signed in September 2011 during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Dhaka. Once again, the Bangladesh Parliament ratified the protocol. However, due to the differences, the process of passing the necessary constitutional amendment through Parliament was not initiated till 2013. The people of Bangladesh repeatedly expressed their great disappointment. Finally, with the new government, the 100th Constitutional Amendment Bill was adopted in May 2015. The operationalising of the India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement has become a game-changer in India-Bangladesh relations.

**Land Boundary Dispute: Nature and Agreement**

After a long statutory and diplomatic battle, the protocol of the Land

Border Agreement of 2011 had included four aspects concerning border demarcation and exchange of enclaves. The first Article of the agreement states that the provisions of this protocol form an integral part of the 1974 agreement. The second Article of the protocol deals with the major disputed areas between India and Bangladesh and exchange of enclaves. Article 2 Clause (II) proposes the exchange of the enclaves. There are 111 Indian enclaves (17,258.24 acres) on the Bangladesh side and 51 enclaves of Bangladesh (7,083.72 acres) on the Indian side. The agreement holds that exchange of enclaves should be done as per the jointly verified cadastral enclave map signed in April 1997. These would be exchanged without claiming compensation for the additional areas going to Bangladesh. The inhabitants of the enclaves did not enjoy full legal rights as citizens of either country, or basic facilities like electricity, schools and health care. Law and order agencies did not have proper access to these areas. A joint headcount estimated the population in the enclaves as around 51,549 (37,334 in the Indian enclaves within Bangladesh). In the exchange of the instrument of ratification (2015) between India and Bangladesh, both governments agreed that the Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and Bangladeshi enclaves in India would be exchanged pursuant to the 1974 agreement and the 2011 protocol and shall stand transferred to the other with effect from midnight of July 31, 2015. However, prior to this appointed day, both governments would have completed all the formalities of exchange of people and their citizenship rights<sup>20</sup>.

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Article three of the protocol talks about redrawing of the boundary in the adverse possession areas in the states of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura. In fact, Indian “adverse possession” refers to territory within Indian control, but which is legally part of Bangladesh. Residents of these

adverse possessions are Indian citizens. The same applies to Bangladeshi adverse possessions. India is to receive 2,777.038 acres in respect of adverse possessions, and transfer 2,267.682 acres to Bangladesh.<sup>21</sup> The reality, though, is that the area is already in Bangladeshi possession, and its handing over is merely a procedural acceptance of the *de-facto* situation. For the legal transfer of land, India and Bangladesh exchanged 1,114 maps. As per the exchange of the instrument of ratification, the ground demarcation of the boundary as per the interim strip maps will be completed by the respective survey departments of the two governments by June 30, 2016.<sup>22</sup>

Most notably, the two governments have agreed to resolve the issue of the undemarcated 6.5 km of boundaries which spread into three sectors. First, in the Assam sector (2.5 km of the Lathitila/Dhumabari area, approximately 135 acres of land), India and Bangladesh insisted on applying different maps and data as the basis for demarcation. However, the protocol (2011) concludes that the line drawn by Radcliffe from Boundary Pillar 1397(point Y) i.e. the last demarcated boundary pillar position, straight southward to the tri-junction of Mouzas Dumabari, Lathitilla and Bara Putnigaon i.e up to iron bridge, and thence shall run generally southwards along the midstream of the course of Putni Chara, as already demarcated on the ground, till it meets the boundary between Sylhet (Bangladesh) and Tripura (India) i.e. Boundary Pillar No. 1800. The villagers of these areas had been paying tax to the Assam government regularly.

Second, in the West Bengal sector (1.5 km of Berubari sector at Mouza Daikhata-56 Khudipara-Singhpara, around 56 acres of land), both sides agreed on using the Sui river as the demarcation. According to the protocol (2011), the boundary in this segment shall be drawn as a fixed boundary from the existing Boundary Pillar 774/32-S in the strip sheet 444/6 along the *mouza* boundary of Daikhata-56, as surveyed in 1997-98 and thereafter will follow the southern boundary of Daikhata-56

(from east to west) up to Point No 18 and therefrom it will follow the western boundary of Daikhata-56 (from south to north) till it meets the centre of the river Sui at Point No 15 and thereafter, will run along the centre of the river Sui up to Point No 1, the points as depicted in the sketch map jointly prepared and mutually agreed on August 03, 2011. Thereafter, the international boundary shall follow the already delineated boundary through Main Pillar 775.<sup>23</sup>

Third, the Muhuri river of the Belonia sector is part of the Tripura Naokhali/Commilla sector. In this 2.5 km boundary, due to changes in the course and the formation of the Shashaner *Char* (46 acres in Indian territory), Bangladesh was unwilling to apply the present river course as the boundary line<sup>24</sup>. However, the present agreement states that the boundary in this segment shall be drawn westwards from the existing Boundary Pillar No. 2159/48-S along the agreed line, as depicted in the index map prepared jointly, till it meets the southern limit of the Burning Ghat as shown in the jointly surveyed map of the Muhuri river area in 1977-78<sup>25</sup>. Thereafter, it shall follow the external limit of the Burning Ghat in the southwest direction and then turn northwards along the external limit of the Burning Ghat till it meets the centre of the existing Muhuri river. Thereafter, it shall run along the mid-stream of the existing Muhuri river up to Boundary Pillar No. 2159/3-S. This boundary shall be the fixed boundary. The ground demarcation of the boundary based on these interim strip maps will be completed by June 30, 2016.<sup>26</sup> The flows of 54 cross-border rivers constitute approximately 1,000 km- long riverine borders. When the velocity drops, sedimentation rates increase, and the rivers change their course, braiding into multiple channels. The shifting river roots, soil erosion and frequent floods pose problems for demarcation of borders and fixing of pillars, especially when they form numerous islands and *chars*, leading to a host of disputes. This generates difficulties in establishing ownership of the newly created territories.

## **Ramifications for India**

The nature of the border, the increasing regional security threats and the transnational terrorism-insurgency nexus compelled the Indian state to re-strategise its border management techniques. In this backdrop, the Ministries of Home Affairs and Defence are trying hard to ensure internal security from external aggressions. On the other hand, the Government of India is in the process of implementing the LBA successfully.

### ***Porous Border and Migration***

The India-Bangladesh border is the longest land border that India shares with any of its neighbours. It covers a length of 4,096.7 km abutting six Bangladeshi divisions (Chittagong, Dhaka, Khulna, Rajshahi, Rangpur and Sylhet) and five Indian states viz. West Bengal—2,216.7 km, Tripura—856 km, Meghalaya—443 km, Mizoram—318 km, and Assam—362 km along with a maritime border of 180 km.<sup>27</sup> The border includes plains, mountain ranges, rivers, wetlands, jungle terrain, agricultural lands, national parks, sanctuaries, reserve forests, large estuaries, *char* lands, and enclaves with a remarkable biological and climate diversity. As the border was not fully demarcated on the ground, resultantly, it was cutting through rivers, mountains, *char* lands, agriculture lands and public institutions. This unique intermix of habitation as close as on the boundary itself leaves the border areas heavily populated with a density, at some places, of approximately 900 per sq km on the Indian side and 1,100 per sq. km on the Bangladeshi side. Similarly, the people of both countries work in close proximity and are using the last inch of land for cultivation purposes which leads to missing permanent boundary pillars, creates patrolling problems, and allows the violent non-state actors and smugglers to cross the border for their nefarious activities.

The conditions on the border have become rather difficult due to the increase in the density of the population. The main reasons for the increase in the population in the border areas are the overall increase in

the population of the country and the influx of the illegal migrants from Bangladesh. Economic disparity, poverty, unemployment, religious intolerance<sup>28</sup> and frequent political standoffs in Bangladesh are the major causes of the illegal migration. These factors compel the people to move towards an emerging India in the search for work and food security. However, the people

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living in the low-lying areas along the rivers often move up towards the mainland during times of floods and these internally displaced populations are also termed as *illegal migrants*. It is interesting to note that not only Bangladeshis, but Indians also have been crossing the border for one reason or another. Initially, many of the land and railways linkages were functional, but after the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, these were discontinued. People still keep making efforts to access the borders but due to legal issues and tightening of controls, particularly after 9/11, this has become more difficult. Policing of the border has been significantly expanded to manage, and deal with, the emerging threats from CTAs. The numbers of border killings have become a concern for the people of the border areas. In the last decade, more than 900 Bangladeshi and Indian nationals have been indiscriminately killed by Indian border security forces.<sup>29</sup>

The Ministry of Home Affairs is aware that guarding the border in such close proximity to the human population creates a difficult situation for the border security forces. There are, at present, 802 Border Out-Posts (BOPs) along the border. In order to reduce the inter-BOP distance to 3.5 km, a proposal for the construction of additional 383 BOPs, at an estimated cost of Rs. 1,832.50 crore, was approved by the government in 2009. The project was targeted to be completed by 2013-14<sup>30</sup>. However, the work has been delayed due to constraints like public protest, delay in land acquisition, statutory clearances, etc.

### *Security Threats*

Many of the South Asian states are witnessing conflicts in which ideological, ethnic, communal and political issues are intertwined. In recent years, 75 percent of *terrorism* related casualties in the world occurred in South Asia. The worst part is that the increasing transnational coordination of the terrorists, insurgents and radical groups has added a critical dimension to the security of nations. These linkages across the border support, encourage, train, arm and often direct terrorists and insurgent groups for their own ends.<sup>31</sup> Proxy wars have, consequently, thrown up a number of challenges before the border security agencies. Transgressions along the border were, in the past, often localised in nature and had no major security implications. Now, the pattern of border crimes has changed. The intricate relationship among narcotics smuggling, International Financial Corporation (IFC) rackets, small arms proliferation and terrorist activities now have far-reaching implications for internal security.<sup>32</sup> The fanatic religious ideologies help to foster polarising values in terms of right and wrong, good and evil, which has been coopted by terrorist organisations to convert a “seeker” into a lethal killer. The Islamist militant groups such as Islamic State, Ansarullah Bangladesh, Jama’at-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (with close links with Afghan *jihadis*), Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami Bangladesh (with close links with Al-Qaeda) and Hizbut Tohid in Bangladesh have consolidated and expanded their institutional transnational networks.<sup>33</sup> Bangladesh’s land has also been used by the Indian northeast insurgent groups like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), and Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA), that started getting training in Bangladesh since 1992.<sup>34</sup>

### *Difficulties in Border Fencing*

In order to prevent the above activities from across the border, the Government of India had sanctioned the construction of border fencing

with floodlights in two phases. The total length of the Indo-Bangladesh border sanctioned for fencing is 3,326.14 km; out of which about 2,828 km of fencing has so far been completed (up to December 31, 2014). There have been some problems in the erection of the fencing in certain stretches on this border due to riverine/low lying areas, habitations within 150 yards of the border, pending land acquisition cases and protests by the border population, which have led to a delay in the completion of the project<sup>35</sup>.

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The “Joint Indo-Bangladesh Guidelines, 1975”<sup>36</sup> were framed for the border guarding forces of both countries. The aim of these guidelines was to ensure cooperation between the two border guarding forces to enable exchange of information and intelligence at appropriate levels. But in reality, the guidelines just hindered both sides from carrying out development work of any nature, including building roads, bridges and fencing. Substantial parts of the fence constructed under Phase I in the states of West Bengal, Assam and Meghalaya have been damaged due to adverse demographic and climatic conditions and submergence. Accordingly, the Government of India has sanctioned a project (Phase III) for the erection of a 861-km fence in order to replace the entire fence constructed under Phase I, at an estimated cost of 884 crore. So far, 790 km of fencing has been replaced and the remaining work of replacement of the fence along the length of 71 km has been held up due to litigation, public protests, etc. However, in the process of overcoming this dichotomy, India has prioritised the conclusion of the Land Boundary Agreement.

### **Implementation of LBA: Quest for Cooperation**

- Migration and national security have become intertwined in this

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age of globalisation. Granting special work permits in some cases can be one of the effective mechanisms to control the migration caused conflict in India, which can also range from creating awareness programmes among the border area inhabitants and allocating them Unique Identity (UID) cards as soon as possible. Detection, deletion and deportation is virtually impossible.

- Holding meetings of the JBWG on a regular basis will also ease the border

tension between the two countries. During the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Bangladesh, both sides agreed to share information, conduct joint patrols to check terrorism, smuggling and trafficking of women and children, and also not to fire on innocent people. They have also agreed to take up programmes to develop awareness about obeying rules among the people of the border. Such bilateral mechanisms for the exchange of information on border areas, implementation of a single information system with data bases, intelligence gathering, joint training and certification of personnel directly involved in border control activities would ensure a stable and peaceful border.<sup>37</sup>

- However, in addressing the problem of terrorism, IFC nexus and drugs and human trafficking more effectively, a three-layer security network between the security agencies of the two countries is essential. First, at the regular flag meetings between the border security forces, India's Border Security Force and the Bangladesh Border Guards (BSF and BGB), the concerned Station House Officers (SHOs) of the bordering districts must be invited. Second, at the eastern commander's level meeting,

the Superintendent of Police (SP) of the concerned district should be invited. They should also exchange their telephonic contacts for urgent communications. Third, at the state level meeting, all the intelligence officers [Central Intelligence Department (CID) and National Intelligence Agency (NIA)] and border security officers and district police officers should be connected among New Delhi-Kolkata-Dhaka through video conferencing in a highly secure network.

- In a comprehensive and integrated developmental policy perspective, India and Bangladesh should take up joint projects, particularly for infrastructure building and rail, road and sea connectivity. India and Bangladesh have agreed, in principle on transit facilities to connect with Nepal and Bhutan and India's northeastern states. These programmes would help in filling critical gaps in the social and physical infrastructures on both sides of the border and also inculcate a sense of security and integration among the population of the eastern South Asian sub-region. The Indian government has initiated an integrated scheme under the Border Area Development Programme (BADP), which is focussing mainly on social and economic development of the border areas.<sup>38</sup> Bangladesh should also come forward for capacity-building, skill development and employment-generation in the border areas.

**Given the vital need for developing the eastern part of the country, the Indian government has made non-reciprocal concessions on the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) 2015.**

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## Conclusion

The persistent threats to the safety and security of the people generated by violent conflicts, terrorism, arms, drugs and human trafficking

have been widely considered in border management tactics. Given the vital need for developing the eastern part of the country, the Indian government has made non-reciprocal concessions on the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) 2015. In fact, India is taking the lead in settling all existing irritants and disputes. The LBA will certainly minimise the security concerns of India and facilitate in tightening the security mechanisms along the border. It will also help to curb illegal movement of humans, drugs, funds and small arms. At the same time, the security agencies of the border areas need to be modernised and well-equipped. Indian federal governments must look beyond their narrow political gains and ambitions while handling the issue of illegal migration where violent non-state actors are taking advantage of the issue being morphed into a political rather than a national one. However, it is important to recognise the role of India's border-state governments, that have shown magnanimity and extended unreserved support to the LBA 2015. This in itself is an indicator of how much these states have been subjected to illegal activities due to the undemarcated land boundary and adversely possessed land and enclaves. Nevertheless, constructive unilateralism has been identified in the neighbourhood policy. This was initiated by then Prime Minister I K Gujral in the form of the "Gujral Doctrine" and the lenient approach adopted by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, and the legacy is being taken forward by the present National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government.

This will certainly help to develop the border areas and pave the way for construction of fencing of suitable height. However, the execution of the LBA may be easier said than done. Numerous challenges will have to be faced when the question of implementation of the LBA will arise. The exchange of adversely possessed land and successful rehabilitation of the people of the enclaves, giving them full citizenship rights, will be a great test for the central as well as state governments. In the deliberations,

a few stakeholders will gain and a few others will certainly lose. But, it will address the broader security issues of India and defuse the bilateral irritants between the two countries.

## Notes

1. Andreas defined CTAs as non-state actors who operate across national borders in violation of state laws and who attempt to evade law enforcement efforts. Peter Andreas, "Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century," *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 2, Autumn 2003, pp. 78-111.
2. The theoretical understanding on border issues was developed in the discussions with Prasanta Sahoo in the completion of his Ph. D thesis on "Indo-Bangladesh Land Border Management and India's Security Concern," School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2009.
3. Daniel Power and Naomi Standen, eds. *Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands (700-1700)* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1999), p. 13.
4. Fredrick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York: Dover Courier Publications, 1996).
5. Surya P. Sharma, *Delimitation of Land and Sea Boundaries Between Neighbouring Countries* (New Delhi: Lancer Books, 1989), pp. 1-6; also see, T. S. Murthy, *Frontier Change Concept* (New Delhi: Patil and Patil Publishers, 1978), p. 17.
6. V. Adami, *National Frontiers in Relation to International Law* (London: Behrens, 1927).
7. L. K. D. Kristof, "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 49, 1959, pp. 269-271.
8. Andreas, n. 1.
9. Ibid.
10. Abridged MRP, "Border Management," *Trishul*, Vol. 45, No. 2, Spring 2001, pp. 1-3.
11. See M.N. Das, *Partition and Independence of India* (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1982), p. 156.
12. As cited in *The Statesman* (Calcutta), August 18, 1947.
13. Partition Proceedings Vol. VI, Partition Secretariat (New Delhi: Government of India, 1950), pp. 119-120.
14. Veena Sikri, "The Modi Factor," *The Daily Star*, June 06, 2015.
15. Ibid.
16. Sanjay Bhardwaj, "India and Bangladesh: Border Issues and Security Perspective," in Farooq Sobhan, ed., *Bangladesh-India Dialogue* (Dhaka: BEI-UPL Publications, 2006), pp. 111-129; and the updated version of this and other writings of the author.
17. Shib Shankar Chatterjee, "International Border Disputes and Adverse-Possessions of India -Bangladesh International Border," White Paper on Land Disputes and Land Swap Deal Between India and Bangladesh, available at <http://newsblaze.com/report/Secret-Dossier-of-Land-Dispute-Between-India-and-Bangladesh.pdf>

18. The JBWG was set up in December 2000 to resolve matters relating to the demarcation of the undemarcated boundary and other outstanding issues pertaining to the territories in adverse possession, enclaves and also erection of permanent boundary pillars; also see, Sikri, n. 14.
19. As cited in *The Indian Express*, June 09, 2015.
20. LBA, Instrument of Ratification, 2015.
21. Protocol on LBA 2011.
22. For more, see n. 20.
23. For more, see n. 21.
24. As per Ministry of External Affairs Documents, 2002.
25. Chatterjee, n. 17.
26. For more, see n. 21 and n. 20.
27. *Annual Report*, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2007, pp. 35-41.
28. Abul Barkat, Safique uz Zaman, Azizur Rahman and Avijit Poddar, *Political Economy of the Vested Property Act in Rural Bangladesh* (Dhaka: Land Reform and Development, 1997).
29. *Human Rights Watch Report*, 2010, "Trigger Happy: Excessive Use of Force by Indian Troops at the Bangladesh Border," [www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org)
30. *Annual Report*, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2014-15.
31. Ajai Sahni, "Survey of Conflict and Resolution in India's Northeast," *Faultlines: Writings on Conflict and Resolution*, Vol. 12, May 2002, pp. 39-112.
32. "Problems of Border Management: Need for Involving Local Population," *The Tribune*, October 21, 2002; South Asia is also positioned between the world's two major opium producing regions—the Gold Crescent and the Golden Triangle.
33. "Transnational Security: Threats to Bangladesh," Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies, *Issue Brief*, No. 8, June 2010.
34. *Ibid.*, also see, *The Sentinel*, December 07, 2002; and *The Hindu*, November 23, 2002.
35. n. 30.
36. N.S. Jamwal, "Border Management: Dilemma of Guarding the India-Bangladesh Border," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 28, No. 1, January-March 2004, p. 8.
37. As per the Joint Declaration 2015.
38. n. 30.