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# Resurgent Radicalism in Pakistan: A Case Study of Jamaat-ud-Dawa

Wilson John

## Introduction

Pakistan has been witnessing resurgence in radicalism for the past seven years, a period which ironically coincides with the US-led global war on terrorism, and the rule of President Pervez Musharraf. There are, for instance, more terrorist groups in Pakistan today than in the past. The recruitment base for these groups has widened, expanding beyond the traditional southern Punjab and northern parts of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). Many of these groups have developed independent sources of income and support, weakening the control of the Pakistani state which originally created and supported them. Some of these groups like Jamaat-ud Dawa (JuD), parent organisation of one of the most feared, and organised terrorist groups in Asia, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT), have expanded their activities into non-terror areas like education and charity, thus, increasing their support base as well as strength.

This paper attempts to study the steady growth and increasing influence of JuD across Pakistan with the objective of understanding how, and why, such groups have continued to carry out their activities despite Pakistan's commitment to root out terrorism as part of the US-led war on terrorism effort, and the threats such a development poses to the region as well as the world.

## Birth of Lashkar

In 1986, Hafiz Saeed, along with his colleague in the Islamiyat faculty of UET, Prof. Zafar Iqbal, founded Markaz Dawat wal-Irshad—MDI (Centre for Proselytisation and Preaching), an Ahle Hadith organisation following the Saudi brand of Islam (Wahhabi) and devoted to raising armies for the *jihad* in Afghanistan. Its headquarters was in Muridke, Lahore. Osama bin Laden gave

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\$200,000 as seed money to the group for running an office of the Afghan Service Bureau, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) front to run the logistics of the Afghan *jihad*, from Muridke. Saeed's maternal uncle Maulana Hafiz Abdullah played an important role in setting up the organisation, especially its armed wing, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba. Abdullah was a teacher at

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India's Aligarh Muslim University before partition and taught Islamic Studies at Bahawalpur Degree College, till he became its principal. He was closely associated with the Muslim League and Muhammad Ali Jinnah.<sup>1</sup> Abdullah's sons, Abdur Rehman Makki and Abdul Mannan, married Saeed's sisters. Makki later became Saeed's deputy in LeT. Saeed gave the reason for setting up a new *jihadi* organisation. "Many Muslim organisations," he said, "are preaching and working on the missionary level inside and outside Pakistan, but they have given up the path of *jihad* altogether. The need for *jihad* has always existed and the present conditions demand it more than ever."<sup>2</sup>

His eight-point agenda for *jihad*, as articulated in a manifesto called *Hum Jihad Kyon Karte Hain* (Why do we do *jihad*?), is:

1. to eliminate evil and facilitate conversion to, and practice of, Islam;
2. to ensure the ascendancy of Islam;
3. to force non-Muslims to pay *jizya* (poll tax, paid by non-Muslims for protection from a Muslim ruler);
4. to assist the weak and powerless;
5. to avenge the blood of Muslims killed by unbelievers;
6. to punish enemies for breaking promises and treaties;
7. to defend a Muslim state; and
8. to liberate Muslim territories under non-Muslim occupation.

Within a year, LeT began sending its recruits to terrorist training camps in the eastern Afghanistan provinces of Kuntar and Pakhtia. Saeed and Iqbal left no stone unturned to promote their cause. MDI soon became a transit point for Arab and Afghan Mujahideen. Several thousand young men were recruited from small towns and villages of Punjab as well as from cities like Lahore and university campuses. The recruitment methodology was deceptively simple: Saeed used the group's impressive organisational network, which included schools, social service groups and religious publications, "to stir up outrage against the injustices meted to Kashmiri Muslims,"<sup>3</sup> stoking passion for *jihad*

among the old and young alike. He exhorted new recruits with visions of peace and honour in paradise. Quoting the Prophet, he said: "On the day of judgment, every martyr will be allowed to take 70 persons to paradise. It is a big gift."<sup>4</sup>

The group's Wahhabi connections attracted considerable funding and donations from Saudi Arabia where, when he was a student in Riyadh, Saeed had developed close connections with several members of the business and royal family, many of whom later became his patrons. A prominent donor was Abu Abdul Aziz, well known as a patron of Islamic militant organisations across the globe. Aziz built a house for himself in the Muridke complex and gave a donation to Rs 10 million to construct a Jamia mosque. Many believe Aziz was none other than Osama bin Laden himself. Rich Pakistani businessmen supported Saeed with generous donations and grants; some gave hundreds of thousands of rupees each month, while others donated in kind. A producer of cereals, for instance, sent truckloads of specially formulated cereal for the young recruits receiving military training.

The men who joined the organisation also helped raise funds both in Pakistan and from other countries. During Eid, for instance, the volunteers collected the hides of sacrificial animals which were subsequently auctioned for tens of millions of rupees. After the ban on its activities in 2002, the group collected Rs 710 million in anonymous donations and gifts, besides generating contributions worth over \$280,000 in Britain, where over 675,000 Muslims of Pakistani origin lived.<sup>5</sup> In Kuwait and other Gulf states, the group had developed links long before. The group's ideologue, Abdul Rahman Makki, has been making trips to Kuwait for several years, addressing Pakistanis and Indian Muslims about the need for a *jihad* to protect Muslims from the Indian state. The group has also been distributing its house journal, *Majallah al-Dawa*, since the late 1990s at a mosque in Salmiya, Kuwait, and generating funds for the group.<sup>6</sup>

## **Expanding Influence**

Within a decade of its existence, LeT expanded rapidly in Pakistan, setting up a sprawling headquarters in Muridke, and about 2,200 offices across the country. Till the global ban on it in 2002, Muridke remained the nerve centre of the organisation where all its organisational, *jihadi* and educational activities were planned and carried out. The centre expanded to house, in addition to the existing facilities, a hospital, a market, a large residential area for the scholars and faculty members, a fish farm and agricultural tracts cultivated the year round. The centre was always heavily guarded with gunmen patrolling entry points round the clock.<sup>7</sup> The centre's activities also grew with its popularity and

resources. It ran 200 secondary schools called Ad Dawa Schools, 11 *madaris* (seminaries), two science colleges, an ambulance service, mobile clinics and blood banks<sup>8</sup>, besides a charity organisation called Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq, which played an important role in funnelling to the group relief funds meant for the victims of the October 2005 earthquake which destroyed large parts of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK).

Lashkar's expansion plan included buying properties in "every district" of Pakistan. After its activities in Punjab came under a scanner following 9/11, Saeed has been expanding his group's network in Sindh, setting up *madaris* and training camps in the interiors of the province. The group ran about 20 *madaris* and 30 schools in Sindh. A sum of \$ 300 million had been budgeted for Sindh. Properties were acquired in Gumbat, Khasmore, Larkana, Mahrabpur, Shahdadkot and Sukkur, with plans

to buy land in interior Sindh subsequently. Vacant properties for setting up new training camps were also being acquired. One such camp, Markaz Mohammad bin Qasim, has come up near Shehdadpur. The group is planning to set up at least four such centres in Sindh.

Pakistani commentators<sup>9</sup> have documented how Saeed and his group managed to hoodwink the authorities to defy sanctions despite Pakistan's "commitment" to support the US in its war on terrorism. The group's posters were seen in urban and rural areas of Pakistan's Punjab urging young men to join the *jihad*. The posters carried the telephone numbers of the group's scores of offices. *Jihadi* publications reported that between January and June in 2003, groups like LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) recruited more than 7,000 youngsters aged 18-25 from various parts of Pakistan. LeT and JeM, in particular, claimed to have recruited more than 3,350 and 2,235 boys, respectively. At one point of time, the LeT website claimed that around 800 youngsters had embraced "martyrdom" while fighting the Indian Army in 2002. These are clear indications of the state patronage the group enjoyed several years after the world recognised it as a terrorist group. Saeed was even paid severance pay by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to lie low, when the peace process with India began taking shape.<sup>10</sup>

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Most of his recruits were not from *madaris*, as was widely believed, but from regular schools and colleges in Punjab. According to Naveed Qamar, an LeT activist and a graduate of the Lahore University of Engineering, “Those coming from the universities and colleges are much more motivated and conscious of what they are doing.”<sup>11</sup> The group was not averse to tapping the criminal world for *jihad* either—a murder accused was made in charge of the organisation’s prisoners’ welfare and a heroin addict was trained and sent to Kashmir where he was promptly killed. It also held special recruitment drives for the deaf and dumb in several parts of Punjab. An Indian newspaper even talked about LeT recruiting “two-brigade” strength of *jihadis* for Iraq, although subsequent events did not support the claim.<sup>12</sup>

### **Kashmir Jihad**

Even after September 2001 and the severe restrictions on its activities, Saeed travelled far and wide to draw more recruits and funds to his cause. In 2002, before he was arrested, Saeed addressed a select gathering in Islamabad at the Ahl-e-Hadith mosque in the I-8 sector, an exclusive residential colony of Pakistan’s top civil bureaucracy: “General Musharraf is the lackey of George Bush — just like Tony Blair. The rulers have abandoned *jihad*. They have sold out the blood of *Mujahideen* to their American masters. Since the establishment has taken a U-turn on *jihad* and is toeing Washington’s line, therefore, it becomes your religious duty to dedicate your life and property to keep the *jihad* alive.”

Saeed has laid down a policy about sending recruits to Kashmir—every candidate had to get permission from the family, and convince them of the utility of his mission. That was one of the reasons why the death of a *jihadi* was not mourned by the family. The news of ‘martyrdom’ was conveyed by a group of senior LeT leaders which visited the family and ‘congratulated’ them. “In nearly every case, rather than mourning, the family celebrates the occasion by serving guests with food and receiving congratulations.”<sup>13</sup>

In line with this policy was another, one that was very diligently implemented. The LeT cadre was infused with the belief that death in the battlefield was preferable to surrender. “Only those of our men are captured who faint during the fight,” says Khalid Walid, an LeT office-bearer. “Otherwise, we fight until death and do not surrender at any cost.”<sup>14</sup>

Many of the LeT cadres killed in Kashmir were buried in anonymous graves as *mehman shaheed* (guest martyr) preceded by the *namaze janaza* (funeral prayer). Almost every village in Kashmir has such separate graveyards, and

according to LeT, more than 350 cadres (1998) were buried in such graveyards. In Lahore, LeT organised the last rites of the killed cadre in *ghaibana namaze janaza* (funeral prayer in absentia) which often turned into another occasion to project the virtues of *jihad*. Such funerals generated recruits for the group and, in many cases, relatives offered more young men from the family.

### **Recruitment**

The group's main recruitment took place during the three-day annual congregation organised in Muridke every winter. These meetings were attended by several thousand men and women from all over Pakistan and were addressed by religious scholars and *jihadi* leaders. To top it all, Osama bin Laden's taped address was aired to the audience on several occasions.

Once a candidate was selected for *jihad*, he was sent to one of the several training camps which the group maintained across the country. A majority of the recruits were from Punjab and NWFP, but a significant number came from Sindh, especially Karachi. "Several of them came from rich families; in fact, one recruit, Sohail (an alias), an 18-year-old college student, drove his own car to reach the LeT office in Islamabad to sign up for training. Being a student of an English-medium institution, he could hardly speak Urdu. The recruiting procedure was simple. He was told to come to the office on any Saturday evening to be taken to the camp."<sup>15</sup>

The training in the camps located in PoK and NWFP was conducted in two stages. In the first level, the recruit was given a basic weapons training for three weeks. The second stage of rigorous guerrilla training was restricted to those who were fully committed to *jihad* and were practising Muslims.

The group relies heavily on its publications to spread its name and ideology across Pakistan, especially among the young. The first magazine which MDI or JuD (aka LeT) launched was *Majallah al-Dawah* a monthly which combined its religious content with conventional news coverage. First published in 1989, the Urdu magazine's circulation rose from the initial 5,000 to 70,000 within a decade. The readership was mostly young, from cities and towns in Punjab. The

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magazine carried stories about the Mujahideen and Kashmir *jihad* with special emphasis on the 'exploits' of the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba in Kashmir.

The group subsequently expanded its publication wing and published several magazines, all in Urdu—*Ghazwa*, *Zarb-e-Tayibah*, *Tayibaat* and *Nanhe Mujahid*, etc – except one in English, *Voice of Islam*. A sample reading from an issue (February 2007) of its children's magazine, *Nanhe Mujahid* (child warrior) reveals that the group has given an entirely new dimension to children's literature; it goes, "*Jihad* is unique tourism. In other types of tourism, one spends money. But in *jihad*, one earns a lot of money, female slaves and concubines in paradise, When a Muslim conquers the land of infidels, he becomes owner of their property. He becomes owner of their women..."

The group has been actively promoting its activities, ideology, opinions through a website with two addresses— <http://www.jam atuddawa.org> and <http://www.jamatdawa.org/>, in both Urdu and English. The website may be a very basic one, in terms of content, structure and navigation, but it shows the group's decision to make its presence felt on the cyber highway in pursuit of its more unstated than stated objectives. In March 2003, the group relaunched its website,<sup>16</sup> removing the hate material and news articles and photographs of LeT's activities in Kashmir. The new web projected the JuD's overnight transformation into a charity organisation, showing off the group's deep pockets despite the ban. The site attempted to bridge the gap between traditional Islamic teachings and modern technological innovations like emails and websites, so as to further its agenda of *jihad*, especially in India. Its sister charity organisation, Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq has an English web presence on <http://www.dawakhidmat.org>. The group also runs an FM station, Ad Dawa Radio, accessible from its website and broadcasts Saeed's sermons and statements, besides speeches by other religious and extremist preachers.

## **Political Influence**

After the 2002 ban, Saeed's organisation shifted its main offices to Chauburji Markaz in Lahore, retaining a university campus, a science college and laboratory, a separate college for women, and four residential privately-owned colonies at Muridke. Reports suggest that the group has been building a full-fledged university and a medical college at its <sup>17</sup>Muridke campus, where a huge residential area has been earmarked exclusively for JuD members. Televisions, tape recorders, pictures and cigarettes are not allowed in the compound. JuD spokesman Yahya Mujahid said the people choosing to live within the compound "voluntarily avoided such forbidden things."<sup>18</sup>

The evidence of JuD openly moving into the political space left unoccupied by the absence of a legitimate political process in Pakistan has been evident for quite some time. The group's charitable activities helped the group to project itself as a non-governmental charity organisation, a move that was helped in great measure by the establishment. Some of the ministers in the Musharraf junta were unequivocal in their praise of the organisation. For instance, Federal Minister Zubaida Jalal accompanied UNICEF officials to the JuD hospital on October 17, 2005, and held meetings with Hafiz Saeed. Saeed reportedly demanded helicopters to ferry relief materials and the injured in the earthquake. Within a week, the JuD-run hospital was visited by Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat. Hayat praised JuD and its leader Hafiz Saeed profusely for the relief and rehabilitation work.

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Saeed's political influence was never in doubt, though. Even as a university teacher, he had such powerful supporters in the ISI and army that he would often "insult the government in power and denounce democracy as an un-Islamic system." In 1999, when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif fell foul of Saeed, the army (led by Gen Musharraf) forced Information Minister Mushahid Hussain to meet Saeed in Lahore along with the Punjab governor to sort out the differences.<sup>19</sup>

Saeed had another plus point: he was more amenable to the establishment's control than any other *jihadi* and had willingly tapered down his group's terrorist activities in Kashmir<sup>20</sup> after President Musharraf's much-publicised promise to President George Bush. His group, thus, remains a handy tool for the army-ISI combine for reigniting the Kashmir *jihad*, if and when required.

The growing clout of Saeed's terrorist group in Islamabad is clearly indicated by the freedom with which he leads Friday prayers at a Lahore mosque, where he exhorts his followers to take up the path of *jihad* against India and the US with renewed vigour. He hosts parties for political leaders.<sup>21</sup> His group freely distributes *jihadi* literature in government offices where they have a sizeable readership among senior officials.<sup>22</sup>



The most worrying aspects of the LeT today are its growing strength and an expanding base in Pakistan, India and elsewhere in the world,<sup>23</sup> besides a marked willingness to enter into politics as well as alliances with other terrorist and extremist groups in different parts of the continent. Saeed revealed his modified vision in an interview to an Urdu daily, *Khabrain*, on July 20, 2005, where he said that his group “would extend support to the organisations active in *jihad* anywhere in the world.”<sup>24</sup>

### **Schooling Extremism**

What makes Saeed’s group more dangerous than other *jihadi* groups in Pakistan is not its strength or the ideology. It is the far-sighted and insidious methodology for capturing the minds of the young and the gullible through an elaborate network of schools and colleges: within the cocoon of modern subjects and outlook is ensconced the worm of its real intent – inculcating the spirit, the “virtues of *jihad*”. The educational curriculum of these schools and colleges is guided by Hafiz Saeed’s philosophy, that to achieve *jihad*, his students must not only imbibe the great values of Islamic principles, but also be adept in science and technology. His colleague and co-founder, Prof Zafar Iqbal, said: “We will continue to work in the twin fields of education and *jihad*. *Jihad* is carried out to establish the system of Allah in the world. But this system cannot be established without education. Therefore, education is equally important.”<sup>25</sup>

With the public school system in Pakistan in complete disarray, groups like JuD stepped in to “fill the hybrid spaces,” with schools that were neither *madaris* nor private English-medium schools, but nevertheless offered better facilities than public schools. JuD (in fact, its previous *avatar* MDI), within three years of its establishment, set up a network of educational institutions throughout Pakistan “for training the new generation on Islamic lines.”<sup>26</sup> The first course, organised by Saeed’s colleague, Hafiz Abdus Salam bin Mohammad, was a one-year course for the teachers and former *madrassa* students in 1992. The course focussed on the teachings of the Quran and Hadith. In 1993, the group expanded the course to a six-year one and the first batch of students graduated in 1998. The objective of the course was to produce the *ulema* who would not only lead the Muslims by spreading the *da’wah* (call to Islam), but also participate in the *jihad*.

These *madaris* are part of Ja’miah-ad-Da’wah-al-Islamiah (Ad-Da’wah Islamic University) with its main campus in Markaz-e-Tayyibah, Muridke. Each one of these schools is called *Mahad* (Arabic). It has 14 affiliate institutes. The university was established in 1992 in Muridke with only 50 students. By 2004,

the number reached 2,900, with the students studying in 14 affiliate institutes spread over all major cities, including Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Multan, Pattoki, Okara, Bahawalpur, Daska, Quetta, Kasur, Gujrat, Jhelum, Farooqabad, and Jaranwala. More 500 students have graduated from the university and “are giving *da’wah* (preaching and calling to Islam) across the country.”<sup>27</sup> About 400 of the students are foreigners.

The backbone of Saeed’s education system are the Ad-Da’wah schools, based on a premise which he once articulated as, “Children are like clean blackboards — whatever you write will mark them for ever.”<sup>28</sup> The first two Ad-Da’wah model schools were founded in March 1994, in Muridke and on Multan Road in Lahore. The primary objective of setting up such schools is “to get rid of the old, English schooling material in the syllabus, which was responsible for the development of a slave mentality; thus, avoiding oppressive pits of moral degradation, and introducing a blend of scientific, material, and spiritual knowledge.”<sup>29</sup> The students from the schools are expected to “occupy important positions in the party, after completing their education, as it grows and expands with the passage of time. Some of them are also likely to replace the JuD leadership in the future because they make up the educated core of the group.”<sup>30</sup> The group today runs 173 educational institutions with approximately 20,000 students and 987 teachers. Five of these schools cater exclusively to girls, with 5,000 students on the rolls. A close associate of Saeed, Villayat Ullah, the first director of the department of education, believes that the schools should promote “the idea of *touhid* (monotheism).”

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### **Syllabus of Hate**

The group, which has a full-fledged education wing under Prof Iqbal, prepares its own syllabus and publishes text-books which it claims are prepared by “a special panel of education experts whose sole work is to produce books that are to be taught in these schools.” The panel had approved and published more than 500 books by 2007. Many of them “have become so popular that other schools.... have also begun using these books.”<sup>31</sup> The government of Azad Kashmir or PoK has approved some of the text-books for its schools. JuD claims that at least 1,000 private schools in Punjab and elsewhere have adopted its

syllabus.<sup>32</sup> Another 42 books are in the pipeline.

These text-books reveal the ideological moorings of the group, which has been at pains to project itself as a benign, charitable organisation. For Class I students of Ad-Da'wah schools, four text-books are recommended; one of them is Ad-Da'wah Way to English Rauza (nursery prep) Step 1; it is a book of the alphabet and in its preface, says, "At Ad-Da'wah system of schools[,] we aim at inculcating a true Islamic spirit among our students. We earnestly desire to enable our students to view Islam as a complete way of life rather than a mere set of rituals." Thus, in this book, the associated words for the alphabet are altogether different from the universally accepted ones. For instance, A is not for Apple but Allah, K is for Ka' bah, P is for Pistol, M is for Mosque, Q is for Quran and R is for Rocket. The Urdu primary reader takes it a step further; here, it is Alif for Allah, Bay for Banduq (gun), Tay for Talwar (sword), Tay for Tank, Jeem for Jahaz (fighter plane) and Khay for Khanjar (dagger). The text-books contain specific instructions to Class I teachers: "Ask two questions—how do *Mujahideen* make homes in jungles? How do *Mujahideen* communicate with us?" The teacher has to narrate any incident of *jihad* and make children shoot balloons.

Prof Iqbal, who runs a Teachers Training Institute at Muridke, holds a different opinion: "In an Ad-Dawa school, it is necessary for each teacher to go to *jihad* once, or at least he should have *jihadi* training...The teachers carry out all their religious duties with utmost sincerity. They also have a pre-service training that goes a long way in predisposing them for *jihad*. So, when they enter our school, they are perfect in all aspects."<sup>33</sup>

With the success of the Ad-Dawa schools, JuD has now launched a new chain of schools called Taqwa Model School with the first school opening in Karachi.<sup>34</sup> These schools have air-conditioned classrooms and transport facilities, and charge high fees, unlike the Ad-Dawa schools or *madaris* run by JuD. The school's website says that the school "is an emerging revolution in the education which aims to correlate the modern educational standards with Islamic frame of reference." The school has been set up under the overall supervision of Prof Zafar Iqbal, who heads JuD's education department and Prof Suahil Fazil Usmani, associate professor and controller, student affairs, NED University of Engineering and Technology, Karachi. The school has already published 12 text-books and appointed teachers "who are not only professional in their subjects but also strict followers of Quran and Sunnah."

## Pursuit of Jihad

The singular failure of the US-led war on terror was the manner in which LeT, often referred to as an Al Qaeda clone, grew in strength and influence across Pakistan. Even in June 2008, when the world was fast realising President Musharraf's blatant duplicity in dealing with terror groups, Saeed was quite actively promoting the cause of *jihad* from his mosque in Lahore. In his Friday sermon (June 20) at Jamia Masjid al-Qadsia in Lahore, Saeed said: "*Jihad* is not terrorism. It is the biggest source of establishing peace on earth. The state of the world's affairs is changing rapidly because of the sacrifices offered by the Muslims. The Muslims must remain steadfast." Saeed's group, despite the ban on JuD's assets by the US Treasury Department, was openly soliciting funds for *jihad* through its weekly, *Ghazwa*. In an advertisement, the group sought *ushr* from farmers. Islamic customs urge farmers to keep aside a 20th of their wheat crop for charity, i.e., *ushr*. JuD said *ushr* was needed to support *jihad* in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Iraq. "Your *ushr* will support *Mujahideen*, their widows, their families, etc. It will also be used in buying weapons for *Mujahideen*," ran the advertisement.<sup>35</sup>

The *Daily Times*, in a harsh editorial, laid bare the government's posturing on tackling terrorism<sup>36</sup>:

The truth is that at least three terrorist-*jihadi* organisation (whose members tried to kill him earlier) have functioned quite openly, and a usually sympathetic Urdu press has been referring to them freely after realizing that the government did not mind such reporting too much. At least one leader in Lahore (Hafiz Saeed) steadily appears on the pages of the Urdu press with statements condemning President Musharraf's "pro-US and pro-India" policies. So powerful is his "renamed" organisation that he invites opposition politicians to his impressive gatherings at a new venue in the city, which the Punjab government has allowed him. Another "leader", personally close to Osama bin Laden, has never left the comfort of his luxurious house in Islamabad. Although he has been "picked up" periodically, he has never been de-commissioned. In the meta-history of *jihad* in Pakistan, the big seminaries have been used by Islamists organising terror in the name of Islam.

It is equally undeniable that since the beginning of the war on terror, Pakistan has been finely balancing its need for the "reserve capability" of *jihadi* groups with its strategic compulsion to be part of the US-led global war on terrorism<sup>37</sup> This reworking of the strategy is reflected in the fact that terrorist recruitment and training have become "more covert" and "Pakistan can reverse course at its discretion."<sup>38</sup>

The terrorist training camps today are manufacturing a new 21st century brand of *jihadis*, for whom fighting the *kafirs* or infidels is just the battle, not the war. They see themselves as the warriors in a global war to establish the supremacy of Islam over the world. These men, as they train, are patiently biding their time to replace the conventional institutions that support and sustain the Pakistani state – the pillars that have been crumbling rapidly due to the avarice and apathy of the political leadership. As an English monthly pointed out, “These men are like misguided missiles,”<sup>39</sup> waiting to be recruited by Al Qaeda. Looking at the whole canvass of terror vs peace and the direction in which the situation is developing, one gets an uncanny sense, a hollow feeling that it may just be too late to do anything to prevent these men from turning “South Asia into the world’s most volatile region—and Pakistan into what the United States views as the world’s most explosive country.”<sup>40</sup>

## Notes

1. Sheher Bano Khan, “Crossing the T Zone,” *Dawn Magazine*, July 16, 2006.
2. Zaigham Khan, “Allah’s Army Waging Jihad in Kashmir,” *Herald*, January 1998.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Mohammad Shehzad, “Banned LeT Collects Millions in Charity, Hides,” *South Asia Tribune*, Issue No.35, March 23-29, 2003, ([www.satribune.com/archives/mar23\\_29\\_03/P1\\_hides.htm](http://www.satribune.com/archives/mar23_29_03/P1_hides.htm)). The weekly is no longer in existence.
6. Praveen Swami, “Lethal Remittance,” *Frontline* (an English fortnightly published from India), January 3-16, 2006.
7. Muhammad Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan* (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004).
8. Amir Mir, *The True Face of Jihadis* (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004).
9. Two excellent references are Rana’s, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan* and Mir’s *True Face of Jihadis*. Both these books are published by Mashal Publications, Lahore, Pakistan. Mir’s book has been reprinted in India by Roli Books.
10. Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan Between Mosque and Military* (Lahore: Vanguard Publications, 2005).
11. Zahid Hussain, “Inside Picture of Jihad”, *Newsline*, February 2001.
12. “Lashkar Raising Islamist Brigades for Iraq,” *The Hindu*, June 22, 2003. The newspaper in March had reported one incident of an LeT operative, Danish Ahmed, getting caught in Iraq.
13. Khan, “Allah’s Army Waging Jihad in Kashmir”.
14. Ibid.

15. Hussain, "Inside Picture of Jihad,"
16. Alyssa Ayres, "Jihad.Org," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 12, 2003.
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