



The Pakistan Diary: 22 Years of Kargil



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Introduction

Twenty two years ago, on 13 July 1999, the Indian Army had pushed back Pakistani intruders from a number of main dominating heights that were occupied by them in different sub sectors in Kargil, such as Tololing Complex, Tiger Hill, Pt 4875 (Batra Top) Complex, Bajrang Post, Khalubar, Jubar, Muntho Dhalo, Kukarhang, and Haneef Uddin Point 5990 (almost 19900 feet). About 95 percent of the areas were cleared of Pakistani intrusions. At the behest of Pakistan, the Director General Military Operations (DGMOs) of both countries had met on 11 July at the Attari Border. Further withdrawals by Pakistan's Army commenced from 14 July onward.

While the genesis of Pakistan undertaking the misadventure of occupying the dominating heights in Kargil lies in more reasons than one,

Shuja Nawaz, the acclaimed author of Pakistan, suggests that there are clearly many sides to the story of the 'Kargil Battle 1999'. The stories are from: the Indian side, the Pakistani

Key Points

- This paper highlights primarily the Pakistani side of the story, narrated largely by their authors, and gathered from other means; and gives briefly India's response and operational preparedness beyond Kargil.
- The dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 and pre-emptive occupation of the Siachen Glacier in April 1984 had a deep effect on the Pakistani psyche.
- Although several plans and / or attempts were made to occupy the dominating heights in the Kargil sector, it was General Musharraf who decided to execute the plan in 1999 with the 'clique of four' by employing regular troops.
- He maintained total secrecy, in which even the Prime Minister, other service chiefs and other organisations were not kept informed.
- Pakistan's military leadership failed to analyse the Indian response; thus, failed miserably. Although there are several takeaways, it was a political, diplomatic, and military victory for India.
- National Outlook for National Security.



side, and within the Pakistani side – the story told by General Musharraf and his supporters on one hand and Prime Minister Sharif and his supporters on the other hand.¹ The article aims to highlight the Pakistan side of the story, narrated largely by their authors, and statements by the prisoners and captured documents, and briefly looks at operational preparedness beyond Kargil.

Pre-emptive Actions

After the humiliating defeat in the Indo-Pak War of 1971 and the dismemberment of Pakistan, the Pakistani Army further suffered yet another setback. This was when the Indian Army pre-empted the occupation of main passes and heights of the Salto Ridge in the Siachen Glacier (Sia La and Bilafond La) on 13 April 1984. It also resulted in the loss of face in front of their populace. Nasim Zehra, the celebrated Pakistani author, justifiably stated in her Book that Pakistan's 1971 surrender in East Pakistan had inflicted the deepest of cuts on the Pakistani psyche. Further, she states, "*For some, the shame and anger had lingered*".² Three years later, in September 1987, Nasim Zehra mentions that 'Pakistan lost the Quaid post, strategically located on the Siachen Glacier, to the Indians.'³ This was followed by operations in Dalunang and Qamar sectors. The Siachen Glacier had been a bone of contention, as the delineation of territories beyond the last demarcated Point along the LoC - NJ 9842 - was not clearly defined. While Pakistan's interpretation was that their territory continued northeast from Point NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass, India maintained its position in letter and spirit based on the Shimla Agreement which gave the alignment beyond NJ 9842, as "*thence north to the glaciers*".

Operation Badr. General Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan between 1978 and 1988, could not do anything to prevent Indian Army from occupying the Siachen Glacier in April 1984. Although he felt helpless at that point of time, he did not leave it at that. He gave instructions "to reclaim Siachen and met the army's request for military equipment".⁴ Gen Zia-ul-Haq conceived 'Operation Badr' in mid-eighties to sponsor a proxy war, with the aim to destabilise India in general and Jammu and Kashmir in particular. Although Gen Zia-ul-Haq was killed in a mysterious plane crash near Bahawalpur on 17 August 1988, Pakistan resorted to a full-blown proxy war and cross border terrorism from 1989. It may be of interest to note that the name 'Operation Badr' had been used in 1973 by the Egyptian in the successful crossing of the Bar-Lev Line in the Yom Kippur War against Israel.



Earlier Plans

Many reasons have been advanced for launching operations in the Kargil sector by different authors. Interestingly, besides the weakening of insurgency in Kashmir, “the idea that civilian leadership should make the decision to overhaul Pakistan’s Kashmir policy worried these generals”.⁵ At different points of time, Pakistan had made several plans and attempts to occupy dominating heights along the LoC and Siachen Glacier to avenge the pre-empted occupation of the Siachen Glacier. Having studied the large gaps in the defences in Kargil sector, one of the aims of occupying the dominating heights of Kargil was to cut off the National Highway 1A joining Srinagar- Zoji La- Dras- Kargil- Leh. In 1990, Maj Gen Zaheer ul- Islam Abbasi was the Force Commander Northern Area (FCNA). As the FCNA, he made a failed attempt to occupy the heights of Kargil. ‘Maj Gen Abbasi, a dedicated Islamist, had earlier been expelled from India as Defence Attache after he was implicated in a botched attempt to gather information from a double agent’.⁶ He had launched an attack on the LoC without taking clearance from the Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg. Due to the botched-up operation, ‘Pakistan lost some 50 men and 10 officers in that encounter, and Maj Gen Abassi was removed from command’.⁷

In 1996, Mrs Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and General Musharraf was the DGMO. According to a written account, General Musharraf had suggested to her a military operation to resolve the Kashmir dispute. His fundamental argument was: *“The time window for the resolution of Kashmir dispute is short. Because, with passage of time, the India-Pakistan equation, military equation, and economic equation is going against us. Therefore, if at all, we have to do anything, we should be planning to do it in a short while. [...] She did not like that”*.⁸ During an interview, in the summer of 2006, Mrs Benazir Bhutto recalled, *“[...] I was opposed to the idea on the concrete grounds that it was not a political reality to think that you could go into Srinagar and put a flag...”*⁹ Perhaps, she had realised the consequences of a military operations to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan feared that it could result in an all-out war. In August 1965, General Ayub Khan had launched ‘Operation Gibraltar’ to foment an insurgency amongst the Muslim-majority population in the Kashmir Valley to finally annex J&K, and failed miserably.

Both India and Pakistan had tested their nuclear weapons in May 1998 and were declared nuclear weapon states. The nuclear test bomb explosions at Pokhran had resulted in a variety of sanctions against India by a number of major states, including the United States. Many military leaders in Pakistan saw an excellent opportunity to draw political mileage from it.



Significantly, the new Chief of General Staff, Lt General Aziz Khan, who had successfully launched the important Dalunang Operation (Kargil Sector) across the LoC in 1988 was a strong proponent of Pakistani troops crossing the LoC and occupying heights on the Indian side. Having been the Director in Pakistan's spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), he was an experienced hand on Kashmir and Afghanistan. The self-proclaimed geopolitical strategist, Lt Gen Aziz Khan, proposed a plan to General Jehangir Karamat to occupy the Kargil heights that Indians would have vacated during the winters. General Karamat, an apolitical and professional military leader, was the Army Chief during 1996-98. General Karamat is said to have asked two key questions on the proposed plan: First, what would be the expected reaction of India? Second, what is Pakistan's capability and preparedness to deal with such like situation? He did not accept the proposed plan. Although a highly professional and balanced Army Chief, General Karamat was dismissed from service by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on 6 October 1998. Sartaz Aziz, Pakistani economist and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, maintained: "*Blunder of firing of General Karamat; others will blame Nawaz Sharif for many mistakes he made. But in my view, the most serious of these mistakes was Nawaz Sharif's decision to remove General Jehangir Karamat as Chief of Army Staff in October 1998*".¹⁰

General Musharraf Arrives

With General Musharraf taking over as the Army Chief on 7 October 1998 and his preconceived plans to occupy the heights in Kargil, the Army leadership was fully convinced that despite India's conventional superiority, the Indians will not fight back. Many authors have reiterated the same thought in their writings. This is what shall be termed as the 'Ostrich Vision', which would generally spell disaster to any military commander. The fundamental tenet of warfare which says that 'one must not underestimate one's enemy', was ignored once again.

Within hours of taking over as the Army Chief, General Musharraf had appointed select generals, each one of them to a key position: one as Chief of General Staff in the GHQ; second as the GOC 10 Corps who was responsible for the entire stretch of Advance Ground Position Line (AGPL) and LoC from Siachen Glacier to River Chenab; third, Commander, Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA), was retained, as he was expected to execute the operation. With these appointments, Musharraf had installed his men in the top command and staff positions directly dealing with the LoC and FCNA.

Musharraf builds his case that, "*India had been 'creeping forward' across the LoC even after the Shimla Agreement [.....] India was considering more offensive operations*".¹¹ It is



undisputed that General Musharraf was carrying the 'Kargil Plan' with him ever since his tenure in the FCNA. He was aware that a similar plan had been rejected earlier by Army Chief General Jehangir Karamat, his predecessor. As the Army Chief, he had got that long awaited opportunity. As the 'clique of four' had served in the strategically important areas along the LoC in the Northern Area and /or FCNA in different capacities, Gen Musharraf's belief was reinforced by the confidence in his specially selected commanders and that "the Indians would never fight back".¹²

Within a few days of taking over as the Army Chief, by mid – October 1998, they had decided to launch a cross LoC operation, called 'Operation Koh Paima' (Op KP)¹³ (Mountaineering Trip) – a Trip that was to prove to be disastrous for Pakistan. Upbeat about the successful nuclear blast by Pakistan in May 1998, and the deterrence value, the 'Kargil clique of Four' decided to put into force Operation KP and were confident of success due to three main reasons: First, the 'Clique of Four' had all served in the Northern Area and / or FCNA and had identified the gaps which could be exploited; Second, they were convinced that they could win Kashmir by bringing India to its knees and the world opinion on the side of Pakistan; and third, the Indians would never fight back. Perhaps the most important member of the clique was its fourth member, Maj. Gen. Javed Hassan, who presented himself as a "geopolitical strategist", and was also the Commander, FCNA. To give credibility to the success of his plan, he had raised his hands to his throat and said, 'If anything goes wrong, my neck is available'.¹⁴ Soon after taking over as Commander FCNA in October 1997 and completing the reconnaissance of the area around the LOC, Javed Hassan's general refrain to his officers was "get offensive, we have to cross the borders". A year later, this thought started to move at a breakneck speed immediately after Musharraf took over as the Army Chief. Zehra blames 'the Gang of Four' for the Kargil debacle.¹⁵


Operation KP: Clear Suicidal Note Dismissed

Interestingly, Shuja Nawaz brings out the mindset of the military commanders and the ill-considered favourable thought when he commented, "Pakistani Army started reinterpreting its earlier defeats as victories".¹⁶ It is true that Pakistan was worried over the weakening of insurgency in J&K, which was detrimental to their long-term proxy war. However, post the nuclear tests in May 1998, the deep state in Pakistan believed that with the success of Op KP and a 'measure of nuclear blackmail', the world powers would intervene to resolve the unsettled J&K issue in Pakistan's favour. Nasim Zehra also highlights that some young officers from within Pakistan's 10 Corps (responsible for all areas North of Chenab), fearing that this operation was "clear suicidal", even urged the General (Chief of Staff) to abort the

operation. Despite such resistance, the plan was approved, as conceived. Yet again, a huge miscalculation on Pakistani generals' part, particularly after the dismal failure of 'Operation Gulmarg' in 1947-48 and 'Operation Gibraltar' in 1965, both of which were launched with a view to annex J&K. This miscalculation was further reinforced by General Musharraf's and his commanders' belief that "incremental discovery (of intrusions) would largely rule out an all-out Indian war [...]. India would not be able to militarily dislodge the Pakistani from the strategic heights they had occupied before the onset of winters".¹⁷ It was concluded by the generals that the military and diplomatic success of operation KP was guaranteed.

According to Nasim Zehra, the soldiers of Northern Light Infantry (NLI) battalions started moving across the LoC, onto the ridges and heights dominating the Dras bowl by end October 1998 itself. On the contrary, General Musharraf has categorically stated that he was kept informed of all movements of the 'freedom fighters'¹⁸ from March 1999 onward when they started reaching the heights at the watershed. Further, he reiterates that by end of April, the unoccupied gaps along 120 kilometres of the LoC had been secured by over 100 new posts of ten to twenty persons each.¹⁹ The broad details of initially planned intrusions and subsequent expansion are given in an annotated map.

Map 1: Op Koh Paima



Source: Nasim Zehra, "From Kargil to the Coup: Events that Shook Pakistan" (2018)

Annotated by Author



While attending the National Defence Course, Musharraf narrates and compliments himself, “I think my strength in mathematics facilitated my comprehension of the main elements of war – time, space, and relative strength”.²⁰ The Indians were completely oblivious of Pakistan’s deployment along the LoC till early May 1999. Little did he realise what was to follow once the Indians became aware of the intrusion! Following the fall of Tololing, the commander FCNA decided to sack Lt Col Mansoor Ahmad Tariq, CO of NLI 6. The CO, who had been all along been critical of Op KP, had decided to withdraw troops from the Tololing post after the Indians had launched an air, artillery, and land attack on the post.²¹

Dichotomy: Period of Launch

There is a major dichotomy in the account given by Nasim Zehra and General Musharraf. To note, Nasim Zehra is perhaps correct to the extent that the troops of the Northern Light Infantry had started moving forward by end October 1998 to forward bases along the LoC on Pakistan side, in low altitude places like Gultari, Shaqma, so that they could move up to the dominating heights in early 1999. Surprise factor would also be ensured. Given the severe snow and the wind chill cold conditions, Musharraf may be correct that the regular troops, not freedom fighters as mentioned by him, started moving forward to the heights on the watershed in March 1999, which he monitored personally. Thereafter, they would have started preparing ‘Sangars’ (temporary fortifications based primarily on stones and boulders) and fetched up the necessary logistics. Several sangars were found on the mountain top post their withdrawal.

Total Secrecy

Musharraf admits that ‘The terrain and resources were to India’s advantage for a race (to the watershed). Our information therefore was shared on a “need to know” basis.’²² It was more than evident that Pakistan had laid overwhelming emphasis on maintaining total secrecy about Op KP. It has been asserted that even the Prime Minister of the country was not informed of the plan and its likely implications, leave aside taking approval. During Sharif’s briefing at Kargil, it was “just a face-showing, where not a word on Kargil was uttered”.²³ The other two sister services air force and navy were also kept in the dark.

For the Operation KP, Pakistan Army leadership decided to induct NLI²⁴ only in local tribal attire with light weapons so as to give it the semblance of mujahideens. They continued to maintain routine military activities and did not induct any additional troops from the hinterland. No military traffic indicating movement of troops was permitted from Rawalpindi to Gilgit and beyond.²⁵ Several instructions were issued to maintain secrecy and deception:



strict control on radio transmissions, ISD and STD facilities, censorship on letters written by troops, and civilians, and media were not permitted to move beyond a particular alignment. The military leadership gave no indication to the political leadership about their sinister designs even when the then Indian Prime Minister Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee had proceeded on a peace mission, by bus, to Lahore in February 1999. Musharraf laments and considers this to be a very unfortunate perception. While admitting that the Naval and Air Chiefs were not informed '*until the Indian response bordered on war hysteria*' (meaning later part of May), Musharraf argues that the Prime Minister was briefed in Skardu in January and in Kel in February 1999 about the defensive manoeuvres being undertaken in response to Indians' actions.²⁶ Yes, it is possible to convince a political leadership by the line of argument given by Musharraf, wherein he states that these were defensive operations against Indians' offensive designs. But it contradicts his own version that there were large gaps in the Indian defences in the Kargil sector as there were no deployments. Where was the question of any 'unreasonable escalated response' or offensive manoeuvres being undertaken by Indian troops? Nasim Zehra (2018) leaves no doubt about the Prime Minister having no clue that hundreds of Pakistani troops had started moving closer to the LoC, and subsequently crossing the LoC.

Events Leading to Pull Back of Troops

While the US was aware of the intrusion before May, but did not expect the situation to get 'dangerously out of control'.²⁷ President Bill Clinton had a direct conversation about Kargil with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, after which the latter decided to go to the US to meet him. Around 2 July, before going to meet President Bill Clinton at Washington DC, Prime Minister called for Gen Musharraf and specifically asked him whether Pakistan should withdraw from Kargil. Based on the essence of their long conversations, on two occasions, Shuja Nawaz wrote, 'Musharraf could have taken a firmer position against the withdrawal but apparently did not.'²⁸ From the recorded conversation in the book, it is evident that he did not at any stage say emphatically state that the Pakistan Army was in command of the situation. As on 2 July 1999, Indian Army was certainly in command of the operational situation! Nasim Zehra records that Pakistan was in a relatively difficult situation due to poor logistics...and troops holed up on tops were in a precarious situation.²⁹ General Musharraf repeated that it was a political decision which the Prime Minister may take. Nawaz Sharif wanted to avoid a national conflict with India at all costs. During a meeting with President Clinton, one – on – one, Sharif did not contest the basic issue in Kargil. He admitted that Pakistan had, in fact, crossed the LoC. The author mentions that Clinton apprised Nawaz Sharif of his reliable information that nuclear weapons were being prepared and Sharif agreed that Indian would



also be doing the same.³⁰ Sharif was warned against any such use. Undoubtedly, pulling back from the LoC was a huge loss of national face both at home and globally.

India's Reactions

Initial reactions of the Indians to the intrusion across the LoC were slow. The intruders were initially observed on the heights on 2-3 May 1999, which was also confirmed by the Pakistani writers. We certainly had our inherent fault lines in the Kargil Sector: of inadequate troops to man the entire stretch of the LoC, inadequate surveillance of the LoC, intelligence failure at the national and operational levels, it took time to analyse the exact nature and extent of the intrusion, and delayed synergy in application of war effort against the enemy. Subsequently, India reacted to the intrusion with a robust movement and deployment of formations from the Kashmir Valley, which were deployed for counterinsurgency / counter-terrorist (CI/CT) operations. 'Operation Vijay' was launched by the Indian Army. One of the biggest challenges for the commanders was to change the mindset of the troops who were committed in intense CI/CT role to an offensive role in extreme high-altitude terrain. The all-important part of training, equipping the troops, briefings, intelligence gathering etc. followed under uncertain conditions. The IAF also joined in with 'Operation Safed Sagar' on 26 May 1999, and proved lethal to the intruders without crossing the LoC. Pakistan military commanders failed to appreciate the likely reactions of India: in not allowing Pakistan to cut off NH-1A; to pursue its strategy to internationalise the J&K issue; and to increase the tempo of proxy war in the Valley. The Kargil conflict dispelled the prevailing traditional perception that nuclear armed countries cannot fight a conventional war. Also, the generals' clique was dismissive of diplomacy's role in resolving the J&K issue. Finally, it was the grit, and determination of the troops who physically assaulted each position, with effective artillery fire support at all stages, to recapture and teach the intruders and their leaders a lesson. It was a political, diplomatic, and military victory for India.

Admiral Wylie emphatically suggests, "*Despite whatever effort there may be to prevent it, there may be a war*".³¹ Given the rapid changes in the geopolitical, economic, technology, and strategic landscape, Admiral Wylie's thoughts are even more relevant, albeit with changes in the character of conflicts. The fundamental question that needs an answer is whether we are prepared to face challenges of the future threats – external, internal and hybrid – on the Indian sub-continent. Henry Kissinger had described deterrence as a product of our capability, our resolve, and the opponent's belief in our capability and our resolve to use it.³² The resolve must be communicated to the opponents in equal measure. Peace can only be achieved through strength. The military stand offs between Indian Army and China's



PLA at Doklam in 2017, and Eastern Ladakh since May 2020, remind us that both our disputed borders lie predominantly in the mountainous terrain – LoC against Pakistan, and Line of Actual Control (LAC) against China – are active. They are a source of friction and conflict. It requires a periodic review of our doctrines, strategy, war fighting concepts, and the organisational structures.

National Outlook for National Security

Having seen the planned occupation of dominating heights by Pakistan Army in Kargil in 1999, and multiple points of contact and selective transgressions across the LAC by the PLA, the Indian Armed Forces, under such circumstances, must first take punitive military actions against the enemy threatening our sovereignty and sanctity of borders, rather than informing the world of the violations. During the Kargil conflict, Pakistan had intruded across the LoC on a wide frontage, from Mushkoh to Turtok. It was almost a 200 km frontage. The sanctity of the LoC and our territory was violated in the most deceitful manner. Under such circumstances, unmindful of the LoC, we must impose heavy cost on the enemy by way of trapping, and destroying in detail. Pre-emption and proactivity should be central to our thinking. Otherwise, we would always be reacting to situations, which are far more costly in resources, and success is not always assured. Concurrent to punitive actions, measures should be taken to maintain strategic balance in other sectors.

At the national level, we must build our Comprehensive National Power (CNP), strengthen our economy and military muscle, formulate national security and military strategy, improve our ISR capabilities on and across the borders, ensure synergy in application of war effort by integration, and invest in indigenous technology to produce weapon systems (drones, autonomous weapon systems, direct energy weapons, counter drones technology, etc). Simultaneously, focus on cyber, space and information warfare. Though India has the largest defence industrial base (DIB) among the developing countries comprising 51 DRDO laboratories, 41 Ordnance factories, and 9 Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), India is still the second largest arms importer in 2016-20, according to a report by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).³³ Therefore, our DIB requires to be transformed on priority to produce own defence systems, and niche technology systems, and finally be an export oriented industry. One of the vital lessons of the Kargil Conflict and the more recent operations in Eastern Ladakh with the PLA, was that all elements of national power have a role to play to fight together against an enemy who threatens our sovereignty, and sanctity of our territory. All our actions should therefore be guided by 'National Outlook for National Security' to make our armed forces the most operationally effective organisation.



End Notes

- ¹ Shuja Nawaz (2009), *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within*, p. 510.
- ² Nasim Zehra (2018), *From Kargil to the Coup, Events that shook Pakistan*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, ISBN 10969353137 X.
- ³ Ibid, p. 38.
- ⁴ Ibid, p. 36.
- ⁵ Ibid, p. 121.
- ⁶ Shuja Nawaz (2009), *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within*, p. 509.
- ⁷ Ibid, p. 509.
- ⁸ Ibid, p. 511.
- ⁹ Ibid, p. 511.
- ¹⁰ Sartaj Aziz (2009), *Between Dreams and Realities: Some Milestones in Pakistan's History*, Oxford University Press, p.408, ISBN 978-0-19-547718-4.
- ¹¹ Pervez Musharraf (2006), *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*, Free Press, New York, pp.89-90.
- ¹² Nasim Zehra (2018), *From Kargil to the Coup, Events that shook Pakistan*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, ISBN 10969353137 X.
- ¹³ Ibid, pp.17-18.
- ¹⁴ Nasim Zehra (2018), *From Kargil to the Coup, Events that shook Pakistan*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, ISBN 10969353137 X.
- ¹⁵ Nasim Zehra (2018), *From Kargil to the Coup, Events that shook Pakistan*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, ISBN 10969353137 X.
- ¹⁶ Shuja Nawaz (2009), *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within*.
- ¹⁷ Nasim Zehra (2018), *From Kargil to the Coup, Events that shook Pakistan*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, ISBN 10969353137 X, pp. 120-124.
- ¹⁸ The Pakistan Army had initially denied the involvement of its regular troops in the intrusion. However, based on captured documents, and those killed in action, as also media reports that two soldiers were awarded the Nishan-E-Haider – the highest gallantry award – and a large number of soldiers were also given gallantry awards. Most of them were awarded posthumously. In addition, recorded conversation between Lt Gen Aziz and General Musharraf also confirmed regular army's role in the intrusion and subsequent operations.
- ¹⁹ Pervez Musharraf (2006), *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*, Free Press, New York, p.90.
- ²⁰ Ibid, p. 67.
- ²¹ Nasim Zehra (2018), *From Kargil to the Coup, Events that shook Pakistan*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, ISBN 10969353137 X, p.200.
- ²² Pervez Musharraf (2006), *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*, Free Press, New York, p.90.
- ²³ Nasim Zehra (2018), *From Kargil to the Coup, Events that shook Pakistan*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, ISBN 10969353137 X, p.154.
- ²⁴ In 1973, the three regiments (Gilgit Scouts, Karakoram Scouts, Northern Scouts) were formed into NLI, with their regimental Centre at Bunji, near Gilgit. These troops belong to the Northern Areas. In addition, a few persons of Special Services Group were also inducted along with the NLI.
- ²⁵ Nasim Zehra (2018), *From Kargil to the Coup, Events that shook Pakistan*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, ISBN 10969353137 X, p. 40.
- ²⁶ Pervez Musharraf (2006), *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*, Free Press, New York.
- ²⁷ Shuja Nawaz (2009), *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within*.
- ²⁸ Ibid, p. 520.
- ²⁹ Nasim Zehra (2018), *From Kargil to the Coup, Events that shook Pakistan*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, ISBN 10969353137 X, p. 145.
- ³⁰ Shuja Nawaz (2009), *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within*, p. 522.
- ³¹ Admiral Wylie (2014), *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power*, Rutgers University Press, 1967; Reprint, Naval Institute Press.
- ³² James Holmes (2014), *Deterring China = Capability x Resolve x Belief*, The Diplomat, June 19.
- ³³ Chaitanya Mallapur (2021), *India: 2nd largest arms importer in 2016-20, imports down by 33%*, SIPRI.

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