

Civil Military Relations in India

Raj Shukla



Centre for Land Warfare Studies
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Editorial Team

Editor-in-Chief : Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch (Retd)
Managing Editor : Ms Pallavi Ade

**Centre for Land Warfare Studies**

RPSO Complex, Parade Road, Delhi Cantt, New Delhi 110010

Phone: +91.11.25691308 Fax: +91.11.25692347

email: landwarfare@gmail.com website: www.claws.in

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Kalpna Shukla

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“Regardless of how superior the military view of a situation may be, the civilian view trumps it. In other words, civilians have a right to be wrong.”

— Peter D Feaver

Introduction

Vital issues of statecraft and national security are determined by the pattern of institutional interaction between the civil and military components of a nation's polity. The ordering of civil – military relations (CMR), therefore, lies at the heart of a nation's security framework. While being rooted in the firm and unambiguous political control of the military, a robust and vibrant relationship produces a polity that is alive to the nuances of national security and wise to the uses of military power. Nations which develop the right balance in their pattern of CMR have a great advantage in their search for security, with an increased likelihood of reaching the right answers to the operative issues of state policy. Those which fail to develop such a balance tend to get enveloped by stasis, squander scarce resources and run uncalculated risks. India is mired in the latter paradigm and hence the urgent need to gravitate towards the former. The Naresh Chandra Task Force on Defence Reforms¹ affords yet another opportunity to address the central issue of integrating the armed forces into the Indian polity, correcting thereby the skew in its CMR discourse. It needs to be emphasised that when viewed in the context of the broader framework of defence reforms that the committee has been mandated to address, such integration, is the most critical. India's national security apparatus, which by structural design and accompanying bureaucratic handiwork seeks to exclude the armed forces from its ambit, is not only antiquated in terms of its ability to address modern day security challenges, but also likely to falter in the eventuality of crisis . Given the edifice of the proven apolitical nature of the Indian armed forces and the firm political control that they are subject to, it is time for the Indian security framework to move towards a more mature construct wherein civil and military talents work seamlessly

towards greater national purpose in line with such trends in other modern, liberal democracies.

The Theoretical Framework

A brief reference to the evolving framework of CMR worldwide, may be pertinent in order to measure the health of CMR in India. The pioneering scholarship in CMR, of course, came from Samuel Huntington whose seminal book *The Soldier and the State*, sought to ease the tension between military professionalism and liberal politics. The touchstone of the Huntington thesis is the concept of 'Objective Civilian Control' which limits the authority of the military to matters military but also requires self – limiting by civilians to stay out of the military realm – an impermeable layer demarcating the division of labour between the civilians and the military. In a variation to the Huntington model, Michael Desch espouses a construct with a thin permeable layer operating between political ends and military means – substantial military autonomy in the military, technical and operational realms (how to fight wars) in return for complete subordination to civilian control of politics and grand strategy (when, and whether, to fight them).² The thin permeable layer, permits substantial but only exceptional room for civilian intervention in what would normally be the military realm and vice versa (he even allows limited room for the military to act politically). Desch also believes that there is good civilian control when civilians prevail in the event of civilian and military preferences diverging.³

The 'Subjective Control' theory seeks civilian control by blurring but not destroying the distinctions between the military and civilian realms. Morris Janowitz, a leading scholar associated with this school of thought, stresses the need for a military leadership that shares civilian values⁴ – control occurring as a consequence of shared values, education and the military's deep sense of self-esteem and moral worth. In a similar vein, 'Fusionism' and 'Concordance' are models conceived to control the military by eroding the differences between the two traditional spheres and merging their responsibilities.⁵ Rebecca Schiff, a proponent of the concordance theory, argues that cooperation gained through dialogue, accommodation and shared values among the military, the political elites and society will keep the military from interfering in politics.⁶ Yet another variant – the 'Assertive

Civilian Control' theory, challenges the virtues of military autonomy and military professionalism, while relying on institutional mechanisms and civilian interventions to aggressively maintain civilian dominance in the crafting, shaping, management and implementation of military policy. Peter Feaver applies the principal – agent framework to push the civil-military problematique beyond the stale coup / no-coup dichotomy while replacing it with a working-shirking continuum that captures rich variations in the pattern of civil-military interaction.⁷ His theory treats day-to-day civil-military relations as an ongoing game of strategic interaction in which civilian principals vary the intrusiveness of their monitoring, and military agents vary their compliance with civilian preferences. Feaver contends that in practice, CMR is much messier than traditional theory would admit and is often about bargaining, monitoring and strategic calculations over whether to work or shirk. Determined military actors can and will exploit the weaknesses of civilian principals at crucial points and will do so without launching a formal coup or precipitating a full blown crisis in the relationship. Civilian principals, however, can manipulate the cost–benefit calculations even of very reluctant military agents, and, thus prevail if they are sufficiently determined.⁸ He further opines that sound and democratic civil – military relations require that civilian leaders are always obeyed even when they are wrong about what is needed for national security. Eliot Cohen in a fascinating study of the intersection of war and politics, *Supreme Command : Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime*, for instance, calls for a more intimate form of civilian control with military commanders being subjected to a dialogue in which the political leaders coax, bully, interrogate or probe, not a course of action to be ratified with no more than formal consideration with their political superiors.⁹

What is most important is that while the above theories may give the impression of merely being treatises on methodologies to control and bring a somewhat recalcitrant military to order, a detailed read of even the most assertive models reveals that they advocate the structuring of a sophisticated framework wherein the civilian principals and their military leaders wrestle aggressively even as the military viewpoint is afforded more than adequate space. In that sense the word “control” is deceptive, sometimes even offensive¹⁰; “interface” may be more appropriate. Eliot Cohen, in his book

Supreme Command, while exploring the interaction between four wartime statesmen (Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion) and their generals alludes to a complex range of behavioural patterns and emotions at work – “Lincoln exercising guile masquerading as rustic simplicity; Clemenceau breathing defiance and resolve; Churchill dazzling and exasperating with his genius and wit and Ben-Gurion studying and hectoring in equal measure.”¹¹ He goes on to say,

Interestingly enough, none of these men dictated to their subordinates. They might coax or bully, interrogate or probe, but rarely do we see them issuing orders or acting like a generalissimo. Each tolerated, indeed promoted men who disagreed with them, forcefully. (Generals) Grant, Foch, Brooke and Yadin were not weaklings and did not hesitate to argue ... What occurred between president or prime minister and general was an unequal dialogue – a dialogue, in that both sides expressed their views bluntly, indeed, sometimes offensively, and not once but repeatedly – and unequal only in that the final authority of the civilian leader was unambiguous and unquestioned – indeed, in all cases stronger at the end of a war than it had been at the beginning.¹²

In recent times too, the infamous US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld has posited the need to subject his generals to severe interrogation,

I made a practice of challenging my challengers. I wanted to be sure people disagreeing knew what they were talking about. When a challenger failed to support his views, I did not pretend to be impressed. But, in my view no professional let alone a three – or four – star military officer, should be intimidated into silence by a boss who asks questions and expects sensible answers.¹³

Equally, while so engaging and interrogating their generals the civilian principals took great care to ensure that they, themselves, were suitably equipped. In the words of Cohen,

Each (of the statesmen) exhibited mastery of detail and fascination with technology. All four were great learners, who studied war as it were their own profession and in many ways mastered it as well as did their generals.¹⁴

As if it were not enough, the statesmen went to great lengths to underscore the need for sound military liaison through able military interpreters. In the words of Cohen,

All these leaders had to understand the modes of thought of their military subordinates and needed skilled assistants to translate their wishes into directives, orders, requests and suggestions. In the shadow of each of these figures stood a military interpreter – a Halleck, a Mordacq, an Ismay and a Yadin (all professional soldiers). During World War II, Admiral William Leahy served this role by acting as Chief of Staff to the President. He had no operational responsibilities, no cumbersome staff to manage, no line responsibilities of any kind. In fact, he was military assistant with only one constituency, the President.¹⁵

Civilian control of the military is not simply about subterfuge or a periodic cracking of the whip, as seems to be the case being made out by some commentators in India, but a great deal about intelligent outreach by the civilian principal, predicated on the development of a very nuanced set of skill sets.

Global Models and Debates

Conflict between the civil and military components may not always be manifestly visible but it is the underlying theme across the politico-military histories of nations. In that sense, CMR is an exquisite dispute, embody as it does, myriad complexities and nuances of the relations between civilian and military leadership. By way of illustration, in the USA, since World War II, there have been seventy eight documented instances of major conflicts between the civilian and military leadership, each with its own set of drivers and consequences. The critical difference between the Indian experience and parallels abroad, however, is that while conflicts in the latter case have

been followed by intense introspection and substantive reforms leading to constant evolution of the civil – military relationship (however imperfectly), in the case of the former we are largely stuck in denial predicated on the assertion, ‘that the system has done well and, therefore, must be preserved.’ This is a cause for some worry but also a huge opportunity for the Naresh Chandra Committee to deliver, because if India has done well, it is despite and not because of the system and in any case sagacious systems need to constantly evolve.

A study of various global CMR models throw up some interesting features. In some of the pacifist powers of Asia and Europe, the control over the military has been so strangulating that the defence services therein, are more like ‘civilians in uniform,’ unschooled and untrained in hard combat and the use of force. There are other examples from American History where a strong urge to assert civilian control over the military (Mcnamara and Rumsfeld) has led to embarrassing military failures (Vietnam and Iraq). The right balance in civil–military relations continues to elude advanced nations like the USA, despite the very sophisticated structural instruments for interface and oversight at their disposal. Israel is another fascinating case study where labyrinthine relationships have evolved between Israel’s military professionals and civilian political leaders and institutions, to keep a powerful Israel Defence Forces (IDF) subject to equally powerful civilian control,¹⁶ by the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the Knesset and increasingly even the Supreme Court. A potent military and robust political control are not exactly antithetical. Authoritarian China is pursuing its own distinctive trail in CMR, enabled by a unique relationship between the Party, the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). While the PLA is undoubtedly on the path of professionalism; it does not seem to be depoliticising.¹⁷ The relationship between the Party and the PLA is changing from one of symbiosis to that of interest sharing, posing acute challenges.¹⁸

The traditional position of political commissars on CMR too is undergoing transition, with their perception as professional soldiers greatly exceeding that of party cadres. The South Asia region too, offers vignettes of both, the negatives and positives. While, at the one end of the spectrum it offers models of a very undesirable politicisation of the military (Pakistan and Bangladesh); at the other end is Nepal, which throws up the moot question of whether,

sometimes, legitimate assertion by the military is necessary to preserve the professionalism of the force. Equally, it highlights the difficulties of integrating revolutionary armed cadres with the regular military in a surcharged political atmosphere. In some ways it also exemplifies the coming together of the military, the judiciary and sections of the political class to preserve the military ethos and character in the larger context of national interest.

Across the globe, there exists an inherent tension between senior military leaders and their civilian overseers. According to Michael Desch, the civil-military rift during the Vietnam War was driven by debates about the use of force, with (contrary to popular perception) reluctant warriors being pitted against hawkish civilians.¹⁹ The decision to intervene in Vietnam, was driven largely by the civilian leadership: Presidents John F Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy. From the beginning, the senior military leadership was unenthusiastic about committing the US ground forces. Even after the civilian leadership persuaded them that vital national interests were at stake, the military leadership had serious reservations about Washington's strategies for the ground and air wars. By the summer of 1967, military discontent had reached such a level that the then Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) reportedly considered resigning en masse.²⁰ Even though this crisis was avoided, many military officers in the USA came to believe that their unquestioning obedience to civilian leaders had contributed to the debacle and that in the future, senior military leaders should not quietly acquiesce when the civilians in Washington start leading them into strategic blunders.²¹ Colin Powell and his Vietnam colleagues (career captains, majors and lieutenant colonels seasoned in that war) went so far as to vow that when their time came to call the shots, they would not quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons.²² The resounding success of Operation Desert Storm was a possible consequence. The subsequent quagmire in Iraq, brought about in no small measure by the Rumsfeldian²³ obsession of reasserting civilian control, initiated a rethink on the useful limits of such control. The focus, of course, was on Rumsfeld and his civilian cohorts in the Department of Defence (DoD) who used the principle of civilian control, to ignore and subvert sound military advice.

Excessive control could also do the damage of promoting a deeply divided and supine military leadership which does not serve the nation's interests well. The American military experienced this during the Vietnam and Iraq wars, while it happened to India in the build up to the Chinese conflict of 1962. In America's military circles, there is much rancour about how their professional concerns in Afghanistan and Iraq were ridden roughshod by Rumsfeld and his associates. Such rancour, however, needs to be given a reality check – did the American armed forces meet their own standards outlined in the Carlisle Survey of the 1970s, post Vietnam? If they didn't, they must take a large part of the blame for the debacles in Afghanistan and Iraq. Focus must also be put on the needless Rumsfeldian obsession of re-instituting civilian control which in time lead to a military shriveled in stature and spirit. As a result, in the build up to the Iraq conflict,²⁴ amongst the 950 odd three / four stars that the American armed forces boasted of, only two generals – Gregory Newbold and Eric Shinseki – summoned the courage to express their 'precise dissent' against the manner in which the war was being prosecuted. The rest (948 odd which gives us a mere 0.21 percent as dissenters, reflects rather poorly on the exalted military ethic) did eventually go along with the plans of the civilian leadership. So all this screaming, later, of how professional opinion knew all along that the plans were flawed is really not fair. Civilian leaderships and CMR experts, the world over, more than their military counterparts need to take note that the need for a strong ethical climate that discriminates between 'pliant, going along' and 'principled professional opposition' is often the difference between defeat and victory. Encouraging a timid military may be good for civilian ego trips, but equally, shows poor strategic sense. Neither is, 'distancing from military working' the answer nor is the Rumsfeldian 'resort of scheming, screaming and bullying' the prudent way.

The principal lesson from the above account is that even the most advanced democracies such as the USA need to continuously re-work and re-calibrate their principles, structures and tools for civilian control – a more sagacious choice for the office of Secretary of Defence than Rumsfeld for instance,²⁵ may have made all the difference to the war in Iraq and the Bush presidency.²⁶ Interestingly, in this instance too, intrusive civilian control, in the fullness of time, consumed the civilian principals themselves – Donald

Rumsfeld would make way for a more respectful Robert Gates, Douglas Feith, the under-secretary at the Pentagon would move to academe while Paul Wolfowitz the deputy defence secretary would be sidestepped to the World Bank.²⁷

While comparing global CMR models with the Indian model, a peek at the evolution of the CMR process in the USA may also be useful for future policy-making. In debates within the strategic community in India, comparisons with developments in the USA often draw the refrain “Oh! But we are not America.” Yes, largely India is not, but in some critical ways India is. The US Constitution was framed by men distrustful of standing armies and any concentrated power.²⁸ Indian political leaders at the dawn of independence were perhaps, similarly distrustful of the armed forces.²⁹ Both nations have grown into vibrant democracies with militaries that are extremely loyal and subordinate institutions. The harbingers of change in both countries – the civilian principals – voters, legislators and political leaders are not particularly well informed on military matters (even though in the USA, the situation is decidedly better). Yet, despite similar characteristics and constraints of the CMR structures, equations and processes in the USA have produced evolutionary change and reform whereas, the track record of India is rather banal.

A possible reason for the American success could be that historically, the political executive, Congress and the armed forces in the USA, aided by strategic think-tanks and sections of the academia and media have consistently engaged and wrestled vigorously on strategic and military issues. Over the years, as the CMR equations acquired energy, confidence and maturity, myriad dimensions of the relationship between the civilian leadership and military came to the fore, especially in periods of stress and crisis. While, in some cases, the contests were the traditional ones between the civilians on one side and the military on the other (for instance, the McNamara revolution and the Rumsfeld transformation); in many others, the divide was merely one of ideas with ideational alliances of civil – military groups pitting themselves against each other. It was these cross cultural exchanges (as distinct from traditional divides) that led to innovative ideas getting noticed, discussed and fiercely contested before becoming accepted wisdom and, finally, leading to transformative measures.³⁰ For instance, the views of Congress, along with

some senior military officers, prevailed over the most determined opposition of the executive branch, even over objecting military leaders (of the stature of Gen Douglas McArthur), to integrate the military through path breaking measures such as the Barry Goldwater-Nichols Act . The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was similarly driven.

Another feature of the American system is that the US armed forces have been so greatly pressurised by their two masters (the political executive and the Congress) to reform that they have often felt compelled to turn to one for relief from the other. In India, the opposite is true – repeated entreaties from the armed forces to their two civilian principals for change have largely gone unheeded. The lessons for India are obvious: one is, of course, that civilian control in India is overly tight, it is barely utilitarian and certainly does not induce change . Secondly, it is only when the CMR equations and processes get more energised, vibrant and cross-cultural, will like-minded people across the civil and military spectra be able to even get a whiff of the need and wisdom for change. Thirdly, these structural stovepipes that India operates in, these layered hierarchies – the Services, the civil bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defence (MOD), inter-ministerial bureaucracies like the Committee of Secretaries and apex structures like the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the National Security Council, each operating mostly like sanctum-sanctorums with the political class as detached overseers, only perpetuate the perception and the reality of the civil–military divide. If India does graduate to cross-pollination and integrates cross functional expertise through the length and breadth of these structures, it may, in the manner of the Americans come to realise that in many critical areas the divide is not the traditional one (civilians on one side and the military on the other) but only one of ideas with conjoint civil–military alliances ranged against each other.

What about legitimate military dissent? The accepted contours of military dissent have swung widely, depending on the personalities involved, the security of principal–agent relationships and, sometimes, the force of public opinion. CMR analysts like Don Snider have tried to make a ‘calculus of dissent’ an explicit component of the military’s professional ethic in an attempt to enlarge options beyond the traditional ones of blind obedience or resignation.³¹ Two recent episodes involving General Sir Richard Dannatt

and General Stanely McChrystal saw the envelope being pushed further while throwing up valuable lessons for effective CMR management.

Gen Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of General Staff (CGS) of the British Army from August 2006 to August 2009, while still in service, went public about his disagreements with Prime Minister Gordon Brown over the resourcing of the military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan,³² going so far as to accuse the PM of violating the military covenant (the bond between a nation and its military) while earning the sobriquet of being the most outspoken British Army Chief in decades. Ironically, even as Gen Dannatt had public opinion on his side, the ratings of Gordon Brown plummeted.³³ On the strategy in Afghanistan, the redlines were pushed even further – the Prime Minister, the Secretary of Defence, the Shadow Secretary of Defence and the CGS used the platform of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, to air differing views on the unfolding situation in Afghanistan, suggesting thereby that the parameters of free speech and military dissent could be wide, varied and even public.³⁴ Gen Dannatt's extraordinary dissent did fulfill a useful national security function – funding for the British mission in Afghanistan improved considerably with an upshot in troop morale. The political response to Gen Dannatt's charge of violation of the military covenant has also been sagacious and quick – the covenant is now in the process of being enshrined in law after some useful exchanges between the PM David Cameron and the Royal British Legion representing the armed forces community.³⁵ The covenant will apply to all three services and is expected to set out rights to healthcare, housing and education for the families of the armed forces personnel, including a doubling of tax relief. The Royal British Legion, which has been instrumental in pushing the process through, said that the announcement marked "a historic breakthrough" and would benefit servicemen and their families "for generations to come."³⁶ The Director General of Royal British Legion, Chris Simpkins, observed: "This is an impressive package of support, but even more impressive is the irrevocable legacy of at last getting the principles of the armed forces covenant written into law."³⁷

General Stanely McChrystal's (Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A) from June 15, 2009, to June 23, 2010) very public participation in the Obama administration's internal debate about its Afghanistan strategy

drew multiple reactions. Gen McChrystal first waded into the strategy debate with the leaked assessment of the situation in Afghanistan (recommending that the strategy be shifted to population security with an additional commitment of about 40,000 troops). Later, in an address at the IISS in London, he went on to dub Vice President Joe Biden's strategy of cutting US losses and prosecuting the campaign using Predator and cruise missile strikes as shortsighted. This sparked off a vigorous debate, while raising a series of questions: Was the General pressuring the President in public to adopt his strategy and, thus, plainly violating the principle of civilian control? Should the General have been more nuanced in his approach to this sensitive matter? Was he too blunt and impolitic? Were the leaks deliberate, as part of an orchestrated strategy to undercut opposition to the proposed surge? Should military advice rendered in confidence, be leaked for political ends? And if that is justifiable, can you then berate the general for going public with what should have ideally been advice up the chain of command? Given the fact that the General's address at the IISS had prior political clearance (during the address he refused to answer persistent questions on the surge, citing the pending Presidential decision), could he be faulted for giving his professional views on the counter terrorism strategy simply because his answer, by implication, trashed the Vice President's view? Were not the ones now berating the General for being upfront, the very people who had criticised generals for not being vocal enough on Rumsfeld's plan for the invasion of Iraq?³⁸ Has not the US administration, in the past used op-ed pieces by Generals in newspapers (General Petraeus's piece on the progress the Iraqi security forces were making, in the Washington Post of 26 September 2004 for instance) to justify policy decisions?³⁹ So what was this brouhaha about McChrystal going public all about? Did all this tantamount to abuse of military professionalism for partisan political purposes? Had Gen McChrystal's views been Administration friendly, would he not have been quoted ad infinitum, with nobody even bothering about the public nature of his advice? In the event of professional differences developing, does not the veiled threat of Generals going public exert subtle pressure on the politicians to be accommodative of their views, thus, furthering the cause of national security?

The vibrant debates brought to the fore the many complexities, nuances and shifting redlines in the legitimacy of military dissent. Despite the apparent

discord, it may not be wise to perfunctorily dismiss these debates as they do have substantive value. What may pass off merely as military dissent is of immense value in the sense that the issues and the multiple nuances that get thrown up, help in providing new insights in bridging the civil-military divide. The 'McChrystal saga' did not end there – he was relieved of command in Afghanistan in June 2010, after the Rolling Stone magazine, quoted him and his subordinates as disparaging senior civilian leaders. The episode notwithstanding, American Defence Secretary Robert Gates attended his farewell ceremony and paid warm tributes to him as “a prodigious talent and one of America’s greatest warriors.” Speaking at the ceremony, McChrystal himself asserted that the “misperceptions” that exist about him or his staff would ultimately be corrected.⁴⁰ Corrected they were – in April 2011, he was invited back to public service by the Obama administration to help oversee a high-profile initiative in support of military families called “Joining Forces,” to encourage companies, schools, philanthropic and religious groups as well as local communities to recognise the unusual stress that is endured by families of active-duty personnel, reservists and veterans and to strive to meet their needs. Soon, the Pentagon announced that an inquiry by the Defence Department Inspector General into the magazine profile had cleared the general, his military aides and civilian advisers of any wrong doing in the Rolling Stone episode. Gen McChrystal’s redemption once again reveals the sagacity, incisiveness, responsiveness and maturity of the process in the USA.

In western countries, the views of the top military official on national security matters are welcomed. The speech of British Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in Dec 2011 is expansive in its sweep as it analyses foreign policy and defence challenges around the world from the Euro zone crisis, the Arab awakening, transitions in American foreign policy, developments in Iran et al; it reads like, ‘A State Of The Union Address.’ In India, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) has only to state his views on Pakistan or make a reference to a stated capability and some noted journalists and strategic affairs analysts, cry foul. The leading Indian dailies like the Indian Express protest even louder, referring to the Chiefs as ‘loose cannons.’ Are media and the larger polity too cagey about military dissent in India?⁴¹

Stasis in the Indian Context

The one outstanding success of CMR in the Indian context is that we haven't had a military takeover, even though there is no evidence to suggest that there was ever a serious threat. Although, a state's safety from coups is hardly an adequate measure of healthy civil-military relations.⁴² In any case, a lack of coups (or the threat of the same) is far too low a bar for a liberal republic founded on the principle of the rule of law.⁴³ If one were to move the dipstick of success, therefore, beyond the coup or no coup debate, CMR in India would not have many successes to boast of. In fact, much that is amiss in India's national security framework today, could be attributed a civil-military relationship which has failed to grow and mature in step with the needs of modern-day security challenges. The resultant dissonance has severely impaired the tone and tenor of India's national security discourse, adversely impacts not only the larger issues of war and peace but also the strategic decision-making process, nuclear strategy, war fighting capabilities, conventional operational readiness, long term defence & operational planning, procurement processes, morale, and human resource management in the defence services.

These rumblings and irritants in the day-to-day business processes have led to periodic eruptions of clashes between the civilian and military leadership, as evident in the Vishnu Bhagwat episode and the controversy over the Sixth Pay Commission anomalies. Even though the afore stated events acquired other unsavoury overtones, in essence, these events highlight the need for the inclusivity and integration of the defence services within the decision making polity. For a while after the Bhagwat episode and the Kargil conflict, there was widespread expectation in the Indian strategic community that the MOD and associated reforms would be ushered in with speed. Even though some changes were made, these changes were albeit only cosmetic – the central issue of integrating the armed forces with the civilian framework, still remains unaddressed.⁴⁴ Pragmatist urgings, concurrently, have led to resigned acceptance from the forces, with the services seeking to work around the obstacles, rather than working collectively with the civilian authorities to restructure and dismantle the warps in the existing framework. Even as dialogue has broken down time-and-again and repeated urgings to restructure and reform have fallen on deaf ears, a false equilibrium seems to have been

reached. This false equilibrium is particularly dangerous because beneath the all-is-well public posture, lie misapprehensions, and a zealous guarding of own stated positions and turfs.⁴⁵

A certain amount of tension between the principal (the political class) and the agent (the military) is inevitable; creative tensions, as evident in civil-military disputes across the globe, may even be helpful in refining existing structures and responses. What distorts the relationship in the Indian context, is the ungainly role the civil bureaucracy plays in in the civil-military relationship. The systemic flaw has been alluded to most recently by the former COAS Gen VK Singh who, while asserting that there was not a single difference between him and the defence minister,⁴⁶ asserted that the system as a whole was not responsive.⁴⁷ Using civilian control as a lever, the bureaucracy has arrogated to itself a gargantuan role – one that is rooted neither in prevalent theories nor in the many models that are in practice around the globe. The resultant skew has given fillip to a bureaucratic system which seeks to exercise control over the military by isolating soldiers from their political masters through a layered labyrinth.⁴⁸ In an accurate, though somewhat colourful description of the system, a perspicacious Nirad C Chaudhuri once observed that, the bureaucracy in India, for its own advantage, has placed the military firmly in a cage; leaving the latter to fret, fume and flap their wings against the bars of that cage. Such a dispensation goes against the grain of the modern security dynamic, which does not permit the luxury of laborious interface between India's generalship and the political class through a non-specialist bureaucracy. It is also a misnomer, if not a deliberate canard, that India's political leadership is neither sufficiently interested nor informed to deal directly with the military, necessitating thereby, that the bureaucracy perform that role, by proxy.⁴⁹

The first step to restore equilibrium in the civil – military relationship will be to correct the prevalent distortion by constraining the civil bureaucracy and liberating the armed forces from the clutches of bureaucratic control. As per established tenets and global practices, while the civilian principal has many avatars – political leaders, legislative oversight and even the electorate (as the ultimate civilian principal it has an obligation to punish the elected civilian leaders if they do not manage the military responsibly and purposefully); the civil bureaucracy was never conceived as a principal in this equation (the role

that it has arrogated for itself in India) but like the military, merely, an agent to execute the wishes of the political principal. More reasonably it could be a vital monitoring mechanism, albeit, as part of a multi-disciplinary, integrated hierarchy and not as a stand-alone fiefdom.

The desired hierarchical structure, therefore, must always be two-tiered: multiple principals in the top tier with the military and civilian bureaucracy as agents responsible to the multiple principals in the bottom tier and not three-tiered, as is presently the case, with the political principals in the top tier, the bureaucratic principal in the second tier and the military agent at the bottom of the pit. Civilians invented the military, contracting with it, to protect society from enemies because liberty must be defended with its very antithesis: coercion and military force. Concurrently, control mechanisms need to be devised so that the military does not threaten civil society itself. Equally, these mechanisms if allowed unbridled power, acquire an insidious purpose and weaken the military instrument so as to defeat the very *raison d'être* for its creation. It makes little sense to painstakingly and assiduously build a military organization and combat ethic in the first place and then proceed to trample its very institutional strengths with layers and layers of bureaucracy.⁵⁰

In yet another travesty of Feaver's worker-shirker framework, the shirker in the Indian context may not be the usual suspect, the military, but the civil bureaucracy which has stalled all attempts at reform, even the most substantive recommendation of the Kargil Review Committee and the Group of Ministers (GoM) on National Security Reforms, namely integration of the MoD.⁵¹ Central to the CMR dynamic in India is the question of constraining a bureaucracy which continues to tweak lofty principle (of civilian control of the military) to petty purpose (self – preservation), because, as Peter Feaver argues, “a priority for observers of civil – military relations must be an effort to hold civilians accountable with the same or greater vigour with which military agents are held accountable.”⁵²

India also needs to transit, in the manner of modern defence systems (in 67 countries across the political spectra, most notably the USA and UK) to integrated structures for military management. Modern security challenges demand a politico military framework, wherein political leaders ask their military searching questions (through a process of direct and robust

interface), while being equally responsive to their needs. There is also the need to address the integration impasse with fairness – prevalent skews and deficiencies must be addressed squarely. The integrated structures that we seek to put in place must be fair, equitable and shorn of humbug. It was hoped, the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) would integrate the armed forces with the governmental decision making process, while also integrating the three services amongst themselves. While the former has been put in some kind of limbo, all kinds of attempts are being made to rush through with the latter. Meanwhile, there are periodic reports doing the rounds regarding a proposal to elevate the Defence Secretary to Principal Secretary, defence citing difficulties of 'coordination' in the MoD. This story was corroborated by Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd), while writing in the Indian Express of 27 August 2007.

Erroneous references are made to similar changes having been made in the UK MoD, while ignoring the attendant reality that in the UK, such a change was preceded by a long process of MoD integration and reform. In the UK, for example, a unified MoD with the three service ministries assimilated under a single Secretary of State for Defence was created way back in 1964. The Heseltine Reforms of 1985 refined the process further by developing the model of, 'Integrated Hierarchies' with policy making concentrated in the MoD Headquarters i.e. military and civilian staff working together [analogous to a Director in the Naval Headquarters (NHQ) reporting to a Joint Secretary (JS) (Navy) who in turn reports to the Vice Chief of Naval Staff (VCNS)]. India, has to, also, have before itself the American model where the Secretary of Defence (Defence Minister) is advised by a Military Assistant and a Civilian Assistant, both with equal access and authority, thus, providing the necessary balance in advice and perspective in matters of national security. The critical point, is that control over ministerial time, routine access and file process is equalised and more evenly balanced between civilian and military officers. In the Indian context, while there is no denying the fact that the civilian bureaucracy in the MoD, headed by the Defence Secretary, is a vital element in the higher management of defence, encompass as it does the wider ambit of defence functions – defence finance, Research and Development (R&D), defence production among other functions, there is also no escaping the fact that by clever positioning and manipulation of

the rules of business and file processes, the power equation in the MoD is greatly skewed in favour of the civilian bureaucracy. That by itself is not a great disaster, but the resultant skew results in the political leadership receiving sub-optimal and stilted bureaucratic advice, with adverse security repercussions. If the decision making polity is so configured that the military dimension is not adequately integrated and specialist military decisions are taken by a generalist bureaucracy on its behalf, it is only natural that the quality of those decisions will lack in military robustness.

What is being witnessed today, however, is precisely the opposite – the generalist tenor in the Indian MoD is increasing exponentially – if the acquisition processes are not functioning well, put in place a DG Acquisitions from the Indian Administrative Service (IAS); if there is trouble with Ex – Servicemen Welfare a Secretary level post for the IAS is created; to optimize management of ministerial time addition of a Joint Secretary level officer from the IAS takes place. For every trouble in the MoD, the trouble shooting business is passed onto the bureaucrats, who have limited or no knowledge of defence. The swaddle grows in step with the problems even as outcomes continue to elude the decision-makers in India. Contrast this with the degree of cross-pollination in the acquisition processes in the British MoD for instance – see how the armed forces drive processes as part of both: capability definition processes and delivery organisations. Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Capability is responsible for capability definition, spelling out the customer requirement and budget control of the agreed equipment plan and the head of the Defence Equipment Support (DES) is responsible to translate the customer requirement into a viable arms and equipment supply. The two appointments together help in strengthening the customer – supplier relationship in the UK MOD. The heads of both the arms, capability definition and equipment supply – DCDS Capability who lays down aspirational objectives and DES who trades off practical concerns are three star officers from the three services. And who is the overseer of acquisition processes? A professor from Cambridge, Bernard Gray, who first drafted a widely acclaimed report on defence acquisition reforms and was later inducted into the ministry to oversee the implementation of the reform process.

The recent reform initiatives in the UK: acquisition reforms, the task force on the armed forces covenant and the ongoing defence reforms are being

steered by independent professionals, academics, corporate and strategic personas of the eminence of Bernard Gray, Professor Hew Strachan and Lord Leven. India needs to recognise that specialisation and cross-pollination in the Ministry of Defence is important, as issues related to defence need as much specialisation as do any of the economic ministries. In matters of national security, it is important to have a specialised understanding of the issues and complexities involved that only a mind schooled in the ways, needs and ethos of the military can provide (Eliot Cohen's concept of military liaison and interpreters). Today, the economic ministries are steered by dyed in wool economists or generalist bureaucrats who over the years have specialised in economic matters; similarly in the MoD, the generalist tenor must give way to a specialist one. Once these steps are taken, a specialist atmospheric will begin to prevail, and thus giving motivation for a generalist bureaucrat to specialise. It also needs to be very clear that, integration and jointmanship is as much about political–military integration at the apex, as well as direct and robust interface between the military and the political leadership, as it is about combat and functional efficiencies in the field. If you are shut out at the top, you cannot be efficient at the bottom. The former must precede or at least accompany the latter. It is in this context that the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as the principal military adviser to the political leadership is critical. If the policy-makers in India were to restructure civil-military relations with honesty and sagacity in which, the political leadership while working with the institutional support of both the CDS and the Defence Secretary, benefits from the right kind of operational and administrative policy advices and inputs (professional military acumen tempered by generalist bureaucratic advice), incremental benefits to India's national security will accrue. Increased representation of uniformed personnel in the MoD at mid and senior levels, with a view to enable greater coordination between the civil and defence services in a partnership bereft of competition for primacy as also to allow the political leadership to benefit from conjoint military and bureaucratic inputs, is essential.

The sheer logic of institutional performance of the Indian armed forces must be also considered. If, after 62 years of independence, the Indian armed forces are widely perceived to be the nation's most trusted institution, reward for performance and a superior track record must be forthcoming

by way of greater inclusivity in the decision-making process, especially when it comes to matters of national security. There is also need for the Indian polity to grow out of its obsession of keeping the Indian armed forces in a peculiar limbo. For a mature polity, secure in its liberal traditions, it does seem churlish, even a little puerile, that its military be so relegated to the fringes of decision making. The defence services argued and fought for the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) – the apex hierarchy of the national security bureaucracy, today, however, in terms of the National Security Adviser and the two Deputy National Security Advisers are former members of the Indian Police, Administrative or Foreign Services; the Armed Forces, however are strangely under-represented. The armed forces, as the principal stakeholders in national security should be included in the apex decision-making body such as the NSC. From mere implementation, the services need to graduate to being active participants in determination of national security policies.

In the USA, 80 percent of intelligence and national security posts, including internal security, are held by service officers of the armed forces; almost every third National Security Advisor is from the military. Of the twenty eight directors of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), eight have been from the military. In the UK, advisors to the British government on terrorism have been former Admirals such as Admiral (Retd) Sir Alan West. Colin Powell, the Vietnam War veteran, was military assistant to three Deputy Secretaries of Defence, Senior Military Assistant to Secretary Defence and a National Security Adviser even before becoming Commander-in-Chief, US Army Forces Command (C-in-C FORSCOM) and thereafter Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁵⁵ Veterans Affairs in USA are in the hands of a former General – Eric Shinseki. India's national security bureaucracy needs surgical correction: it needs to graduate to a model based on cross-pollination, drawing on the collective strengths of the bureaucracy, the armed forces, academia, the strategic community and multi-faceted professionals; less and less of the civil bureaucracy (because they already have a disproportionate share of appointments) thus ensuring organizational and policy balance. Such a system, with diffused power, will also lessen Indian decision-makers irrational obsession with turf and nudge India towards greater productivity.

India's inspirational glide path to growth and prosperity is lined with challenges – economic, infrastructural, societal, socio-political and ones that impinge on its national security. India's economic reforms, howsoever halting, have acquired a certain irreversibility. The pressures of electoral politics will make sure that the social inequities get addressed, howsoever slowly; and the dynamic of the marketplace will similarly make sure that India's infrastructural reforms continue. The arena of national security, however, while posited with equal challenges, in the absence of similar drivers (market forces, electoral push) tends to lapse into comfort zones leading to sub-optimal structures and performance.

A vibrant CMR process will help to push, prod and cajole India out of the inactivity of defence reforms. Critical to such a process is the role of the strategic community and the voluminous but untapped talent that lies outside the government, even as government officials complain of lack of useful inputs. Official cussedness has led to a kind of strategic brain drain with reputed strategic commentators and analysts such as Ashley Tellis, Fareed Zakaria, C Raja Mohan, Kanti Bajpai, Rajesh Basrur, Sumit Ganguly, Harsh Pant and SW Kapur, to name only a few, parked in think-tanks and universities abroad, with the Indian government and think-tanks finding no place for them. The prevalent situation, in some ways, is a throwback to the stifling environs of the licence-permit raj when much of India's entrepreneurial, scientific and business talent was abroad until liberalisation got it back. We need a strategic liberalisation (opening up of strategic positions in government and in think tanks to cross-cultural talent), to attract such talent back. A good place to begin is the strategic think-tanks in India, which should open up apex positions to the strategic community and academia, and reverse the current trend of think tanks becoming *sarkari* (government) hotbeds. It is only if the think-tanks show the way, can they set an example for the government. It should also be a matter of some concern for India that the emerging global hub for strategic studies should be at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and not in India,⁵⁶ that a country with no significant security threats should find the energy, time and resources to facilitate the growth of such an institution of excellence, while think-tanks in India (a country with far greater threats and challenges) should be relatively moribund. Should not think-tanks in India also become persuasive drivers of change? After all

amongst the more prominent actors in the push for integration in the USA were think tanks like the Hudson Institute and the Heritage Foundation.⁵⁷ Since the CMR equations in India are not vibrant enough, especially in terms of the necessary cross-cultural interface, Indian academics are neither inspired, nor equipped to investigate core military issues with the necessary rigour and depth; on many critical issues, therefore, there is very often only, a superficial scraping of the surface, with little understanding of the deeper nuances.

The integration debate in India is a case in point. Most discussions in India about integration tend to revolve around the issue of a CDS, the consequential power that may accrue to the armed forces and the associated inter-service rivalries. While the CDS, if and when the position comes about, will be a valuable top down driver, in the ongoing debate it is often the red herring, if not the false debate. The real issue is the integration of the military in the decision making dynamic at the top and then all the way to the bottom. The US, after all, has had a Permanent Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff [PCJCS] since the 1950s. The turning point in the integration story, however, was the 'Barry Goldwater & Nichols Act' of the 1980s, which was driven by two factors. One of course, was the April 1980 Desert One fiasco in Iran, where an attempted rescue operation went horribly wrong due to lack of institutional interface and other simple inadequacies like communication frequencies among the three services not matching. The other was the critical realisation that the benefits of integration would far exceed the utility of perpetuating inter-service rivalry as a fire alarm in the CMR process.⁵⁸ Hence the Act was driven by both, civilian and military minds, secure in their CMR relationship, and imposed over the opposition of some of the most powerful voices – Secretary Defence Casper Weinberger, Secretary Navy John Lehman and some of the most powerful Admirals in the Pentagon who raised imaginary fears over the re-emergence of the Prussian General Staff.⁵⁹ The Chief of Naval Staff (CNO), Admiral James Watkins, ran out of all agreements, simply flew into a rage and said "You know this legislation is so bad ... it is simply un-American."⁶⁰ But once the act came about, it ensured that an operationally empowered Chairman JCS, not only brought to politico-military decision making a strong operational dynamic, but also helped in removing sloth across the military establishment, resulting in such

outstanding military successes such as Operations Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi freedom. Even in the Indian context, defence integration will be similar to the liberalization moment in our economic trajectory, when India's entrepreneurial talent came alive once after the stifling economic controls in pre-liberalised India were done away with. The integrative energies will never quite flow to the soldier /sailor / airman in the field, unless reformatory steps are taken to integrate the armed forces in the apex decision-marking. If India does not integrate, it will never be able to fully exploit the benefits of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and the space and aerospace revolutions. This is the more substantive issue and not the juvenile fear and blatant implausibility about whether a five star CDS (in any case that is not what the Arun Singh Task Force proposed – other variants are available) will nurse ambitions about a coup. India's leadership needs to seriously introspect. To drive these change processes, India needs more and more academics and specialists in diverse domains – military history, military sociology, military effectiveness, military capability and military readiness – each an ocean by itself, waiting to be intellectually explored and dissected. We need to create a talent pool of men of the calibre of Michael C Desch, Richard H Kohn, Lawrence J Korb, Richard K Betts, Ahmed Hashim, Martin Crevald, Michael Handel, Bruce Catton, John Keegan, Risa Brooks, Stephen Biddle, Dan Reiters and the likes, civilians who understand the military better perhaps than many military men themselves; yet investigate it in depth, before proceeding to bash it.

The CMR equations also suffer from the inadequacy of strategic vigil. The inadequacy becomes glaring when contrasted with India's superintendence of economic issues. In a country where the rise and fall in every percentage point of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth or inflation is analysed threadbare and every micro-economic detail is examined before we pronounce macro-economic judgment, it is a matter of great surprise that when India's defence expenditure plummets to 1.9 percent, against recommendations of successive finance commissions that India spend 3 percent and even against the somewhat consensual figure of 2.6 percent, the matter doesn't get the attention needed. Some think-tanks are asleep or what is worse, through a process of convoluted mathematics, even go on to conclude that the average defence spending is just right. Such an attitude

appears a little callous, especially when India's biggest neighbour China is in the midst of the most massive military modernisation in the history of mankind. This is largely, because the debates on India's defence preparedness are just not as deep, informed and passionate as its economic debates.

And so the story goes on – when it comes to the Indian defence industry, India continues to indulge in contorted sloganeering but is also excruciatingly slow when it comes to acknowledging domestic inadequacies.⁶¹

India also lacks the prescience to take note of the changing nature of global debates – trends in conflicts and defence acquisition processes and therefore the military, bureaucracy and the wider strategic community fail to bring them to the notice of the political masters. In the UK, for instance, a committee headed by a multi-faceted gentleman (media professional, business leader and strategic analyst), Bernard Gray, recently came up with a report that seeks sweeping reforms in acquisitions, recommending that the leitmotif change from obsessive procedure and probity to one of timely operational deliverance.⁶² The report has been substantially accepted by the British government and Bernard Gray has also been asked to oversee its implementation. India seems to be immune to its impact and central message, and the civilian bureaucracy continues to fan the politicians' fears with regard to financial scandals. If India doesn't take the necessary steps to ensure timely modernisation in an evenly spread out manner, India will be faced with three possible prospects – either its armed forces will not be prepared for challenges when they emerge, else India will rush to make hasty purchases in the manner of the Kargil conflict, in near desperation thus exposing itself to manipulation by arms sharks, or it will end up resorting to frenzied modernisation to make up for the lost years, thus whipping up needless war hysteria, as is currently the case with China.⁶³ Each of these scenarios, make little or no strategic sense. As is evident from the British experience, while the need for probity is great, the need for operational deliverance is greater. Incisive democracies like India need to take note. But for that to happen, first the vigorous, informed debate must occur, but unfortunately it does not, because the various components of the civil–military dynamic are not sufficiently energised.

The manner in which liberal and conservative ethics are juxtaposed in the Indian civil society and political spectrum also has a bearing on its

CMR drivers. Contrary to some perceptions, the military is not composed entirely of hawkish war-mongers or even those with a conservative leaning; the military ethic, strides both, the liberal and conservative divides. The military ethic, however, does play a significant role in building a robust strategic outlook. It advocates for instance, focused capacity building that will either deter war in the first place, or, at the very least, ensure the utilitarian use of force, in the event that peace is breached. In the USA, one of the reasons why the armed forces play such a defining role, is because of the strength of their representation in the Congress and the Cabinet. In India, such representation is conspicuous by its absence. When compounded by a similar lack of representation in the realm of bureaucratic policy-making, there emerges a strategic landscape where the national security decision-making lacks the required strategic, operational and military dynamics. It even translates into a disdain for the health of instruments of force as a somewhat unnecessary burden.⁶⁴ This may in part explain why we have a system that in the words of C Raja Mohan is “a sack of potatoes,” unable to build roads to defend its borders and incapable of even shopping for weapons with potentially deleterious consequences.⁶⁵ India needs to introspect: the liberal tradition must become the founding glue for a robust national security architecture and not an impediment.

What about the military itself? Is it above reproach? Certainly not. How do we place the role of the military, especially its officer cadre in perspective? In the initial years after independence, then Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru took a dim view of the military’s officer cadre as one that was shallow, westernized, a British-aping product of the British Raj lacking somewhat in intellectual capacities.⁶⁶ Even when it came to military legends like Gen KM Cariappa and Gen KS Thimayya, while they were seen as men of outstanding integrity, moral fibre and other qualities that the military profession demanded, in the intellectual domain, the general view was that these Generals did not quite match up to Prime Minister Nehru’s stature. The Prime Minister veered, therefore, towards civilian bureaucrats from the foreign and civil services, to rely on important policy matters, thus creating a void into which the bureaucracy dug deep. Nehru and his contemporaries were also perhaps excessively influenced by the unseemly clash between Viceroy Curzon and Commander-in-Chief Kitchener at the turn of the century, a clash

from which the military gained constitutional ascendancy.⁶⁷ A number of unnecessary measures were consequently taken to downgrade the military rather than assimilate it into the machinery of government. Over the years, what was clearly an aberration has now become an institutionalised system of bureaucratic control. There have been periods when through sheer dint of personality, men like Gen Sam Manekshaw, have ridden roughshod over the system to purposeful effect. Other attempts like that of Gen Thimayya and Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, did not quite succeed. Some like Gen BC Joshi simply did not live long enough while potential transformers like Lt Gen SK Sinha were done in by bureaucratic chicanery. There is, of course, the valid critique that military officers simply do not think, read and write enough. We have not quite had a Rupert Smith or a Tony Zinni capping their professional careers with military masterpieces like *The Utility Of Force – The Art Of War In The Modern World* and *The Battle For Peace* respectively. The system should through a radical overhaul of its structures and processes encourage the intellectual tradition,⁶⁸ that produces soldiers of the stature of Gen David Petraeus, whom the American Defence Secretary Robert Gates has acknowledged on more occasion than one as a “soldier–statesman.”⁶⁹ That should be the aspirational ideal of the Indian military officer cadre without in any way subtracting from the bedrock of operational deliverance, ethical and other regimental virtues that define the Indian military tradition. While conceptualising the military intellectual tradition,⁷⁰ a caveat may be in order. Will the rest of the system, mainly the civil bureaucracy, be able to withstand the vigour that such an intellectual tradition will bring to the table? After all the last time such a gentleman – Gen Krishnaswamy Sundarji (somebody who, by many accounts, was a man simply ahead of his times) was at the helm, the system was quite out of its depth in responding to him. And, lastly, what is most worrying about the health of the military agent, is the visible decline in the military ethic and the apparent bureaucratization of the military, with some officers making peace with the powerful bureaucracy and getting subsumed by its byzantine ways.

A word about the CMR interface in the field of diplomacy. Largely due to India’s growing economic prowess, youthful demographics and even some creative diplomacy, the global perception of India has begun to change. It is no longer seen as a local power in South Asia tied down by its perennial rivalry

to Pakistan. In the emerging balance of power, India occupies both, a strategic locale as also a position of coveted primacy. The foremost challenge in the years to come will be the wisdom and sagacity with which India approaches its own inevitable rise to power. The adroitness with which India meshes its instruments of force and diplomacy, will be the foremost challenge for Indian statecraft.

An integrated politico-military-bureaucratic dispensation that understands and is adept in the use and application of force is central to such an enterprise. India's policy-makers must begin to see the advent of meaningful military diplomacy – not to jackboot around the region, but as a way to police India's vital interests in various corners of the globe through a benign but precise power projection capability. Hard power could also be nuanced suitably for soft purposes and deft politico – military signalling. What is needed is a willingness to integrate mindsets and structures. An op-ed in the Indian Express on 11 July 2011, by Gen VP Malik and Anit Mukherjee urging defence reforms, was carried alongside another piece by Ila Patnaik urging economic reforms, prompting comparisons in nuance and substance. While Ila Patnaik made a persuasive case for fundamental legal, governance and institutional reforms if India were to sustain high growth, Anit and the General, cherry picked on the issue of CDS while posing the rhetorical question, “ Do we need a Chief of Defence Staff?” India certainly does, provided the creation of the CDS is rooted in broader, more fundamental defence reforms. Just as Ila argued that while ‘reforms by stealth’ were good enough to unleash India's growth story, but they are inadequate to sustain it. Similarly, the CDS by itself will be of little use unless defence reforms are packaged in a more substantive framework. If India is serious about the latter, it doesn't need the Naresh Chandra Committee to nudge it; the decision-makers merely need to dust the Kargil Committee Report and the subsequent GoMs Report and implement their two most fundamental recommendations: MoD Integration, the essential pre-cursor to kick start the process, and the appointment of CDS, the logical corollary, in that order. Having done so, the committee could address other emerging domains in the national security dynamic – the larger issues of war and peace, strategic decision making, nuclear war fighting, cyber security / warfare, the global commons, force packaging, procurement reform, et al. Creating a CDS in this stand-alone manner, will not even

produce 'reforms by stealth' that the economic reforms of 1990 brought about. The CDS debate, however, is useful in that it re-ignites the debate on the integration impasse while focusing yet again on the need to integrate the various players in the national security architecture. What, why and in which manner does India need to integrate is the key question. Simply put, India needs to integrate the civil and military components of its national security apparatus so as to maximise national security outcomes. The CDS that India needs is one who will not only integrate the workings of the three services, but more importantly, one who, duly anointed as the principal military advisor will provide the political agent – PM and the RM – with a military ally who shares a ministry-wide, non-parochial approach, putting an end to the trivial, civil-military nature of disputes that currently characterise the MoD. That will happen only when the CDS that India creates is one rooted in broader, more substantive changes in the MoD, as discussed.

Recommendations

It is quite apparent that in the face of modern security challenges and in the light of the wider international experience, India's CMR framework is heavily skewed in favour of the civilian bureaucracy. If the defence services, the key players in the national security matrix, are excluded from the decision-making process, the discourse is bound to be troubled. Since the defence services have a major stake, they should also have a legitimate say in matters of national security. There is clearly a need for the CMR discourse to move towards more secure relationships, premised on proximate and direct political control of the military as against the current mechanism of bureaucratic control. Bureaucratic control is not a stale debate as some would aver, but the grim reality in Delhi as also the principal roadblock in the CMR discourse, the need for root and branch reform is something that a perspicacious political class can no longer shy away from.⁷¹ Inclusivity has to be the driver, leading to integrated and vibrant structural mechanisms wherein diverse talents drawn from disparate subcultures work alongside and steer the national security discourse towards greater purpose. Adoption of an integrated system itself, will throw up natural checks and balances, obviating in the fullness of time, the very need for control. Such integration, however, will occur only if there is a fundamental change in the CMR discourse by

allowing the military greater participation in policy determination based on the principle of equal dialogue and unequal authority, with the final authority lying unquestionably in favour of the political principal.⁷²

It is hoped that the Naresh Chandra Committee has looked at the issue, in depth, and addressed three major infirmities in the CMR discourse. One, civilian control of the military purports unambiguous political control and not bureaucratic control. The huge and gross distortions that have crept into the Indian system on account of the latter, needs to be corrected surgically and with dispatch. Two, the discourse must move towards far greater inclusivity of the armed forces, academics, domain experts, consultants and corporate talents, while eliminating cronyism – a near total domination of the security processes and apex positions in the national security structures by the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Foreign Service. Three, apoliticality must not be allowed to become the veneer to ostracise the armed forces. There is need for the civilian elite and military to engage robustly, through modern democratic mechanisms and structures. The following facilitatory steps may be initiated right away.

- Integration of the MoD to be undertaken forthwith as the essential precursor for reform. Advice rendered to the defence minister must be integrated, based on a single file system, with ministerial time and access being shared equally by the service and civil officials. Independent consultants must also be brought in to drive critical processes such as acquisitions. The need to integrate is not merely an obsession of the defence services in India but the need of the hour. Sample what Sir Bill Jeffrey, the British Permanent Under Secretary(PUS) at the UK MoD (the ministry's top bureaucrat) had to say, during his address at RUSI in December 2009, on the benefits of integration and the need to take the process even further,

I scarcely need to make the point at RUSI, but one of the things that is not widely understood outside the defence community is that, compared with most Defence Departments internationally, we operate an extraordinarily integrated model. The Head Office of the MoD combines the functions of a Department of State and a strategic military headquarters. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) – who made

his own very profound lecture here – and I have different roles: his to lead the Armed Forces, provide strategic command for deployed operations, and provide Ministers with military advice; mine to be Head of Department, Accounting Officer, to lead the civil servants, and to advise on policy, just as my opposite numbers do elsewhere in Whitehall. But he is my closest colleague, and at every level in the MoD one encounters similar relationships. Defence depends on them. At their best, they are mutually supportive, and the whole effect of the military and civilians combined, is a great deal more than the sum of the parts.⁷³

India has not as yet taken even the first baby step towards integration (something the British did as far back as 1964). India is light years away from the issue that the UK PUS highlights, that of refining integration further by way of better role-clarity and accountability for the different actors involved in the CMR process. Only if we jump the first hurdle will we get to the second. The Naresh Chandra committee must provide the critical springboard – India simply cannot afford to waste any more time with defence reforms. A substantive amendment to the Allocation of Business Rules must also be undertaken, forthwith, so as to integrate the services with the apex structure of the Government of India from their current position of subaltern outliers.⁷⁴

- Having integrated the MoD and only then, must a Permanent Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (PCJCS) be appointed as the Principal Military Adviser to the government. The PCJCS (a four star), chosen from amongst the serving Single Service Chiefs with a fixed four year tenure, will be a key strategic player and a bridge between the strategic and operational levels. As the Prime Minister's principal military adviser, he will be in the policy-making loop of all national security organizations like the NSC and ministries concerned with security like home, external affairs and finance.⁷⁵ The PCJCS and the Chief of Integrated Staff Committee (CISC) together, may be entrusted with the responsibility of driving the process of jointmanship, that of developing close working relationships among the three services and the development of joint capabilities especially in the field of cyber

warfare and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). At some point in the future, India may even upgrade this position to a five star CDS, with a four star Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) (CISC rechristened), to drive jointness and strategic processes.

- Concurrently, India must move towards significantly enhanced cross-pollination in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the National Security Council (NSC), with much wider representation for the military. Until now only IPS and IFS officers have held the position of the National Security Adviser, maybe it is time for the government to pass on the baton to a military officer. One of the Deputy National Security Advisers, should, in any case, always be from the defence services. The practice of having a Lieutenant General or equivalent as a Military Adviser, in the NSC, because only secretary level officers can hold the appointment of Deputy National Security Advisor is a clever bureaucratic ruse that should not fool the political class. The key determinant must be expertise and competence and not clerical notions of equivalence – if the civil services so deem fit they may offer only Secretary level officers for the posts, in so far as the Defence Services are concerned, any Lieutenant General or equivalent should be eligible, domain expertise and personal competence being the clinching criterion.
- The strategic community must be energised with a view to develop domain specialties, encourage deep debates and ensure constant strategic vigil. India must move from a 'sarkari hotbed' approach to one based on cross-functional expertise. It may be a good gesture to invite a renowned strategic affairs expert, of the calibre of C Raja Mohan, Amitabh Mattoo, Sumit Ganguly or Manoj Joshi to head the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).⁷⁶ In UK, strategic thinkers and independent consultants are being brought in to drive processes in the MoD. In India's case, they are being kept not only out of MoD but also out of strategic think-tanks. The Naresh Chandra Committee will do well to address the anomaly.
- Within the MoD, authority, responsibility and accountability must be comprehensively reviewed. At the apex level, a Defence Board consisting of the Defence Minister, the Minister of State for Defence, Independent Consultants, the CDS / PCJCS and the Defence Secretary

may be constituted to provide strategic direction and determine the defence requirements. Concurrently, substantial delegation of powers and authority to Service Chiefs must take place – they must be made entirely responsible for operational plans and equipment, albeit with precise budgetary backing as also the authority to flex their budgets. Having been allowed greater control of their allocated budgets the Service Chiefs must drive capability planning and determine the best balance between manpower, training, equipment and support, etc, that are needed to deliver the defence requirement.

- India can no longer afford to continue its indolent roll without an incisive survey of the dangers and opportunities in its security path. The process of forward planning must be subjected to far greater rigour. The refrain that it is not in the Indian ethos to carry out such planning is lazy, self serving rubbish and must be abandoned. India may like to take inspiration from the ongoing churning in the UK defence and do likewise.⁷⁷ A National Security Strategy Review, a Strategic Defence and Security Review and a Defence Review,⁷⁸ in that chronological order but with the express purpose of one complementing the other, with clearly enunciated remits, must be initiated forthwith if the nation's security is to move from flaccidity to greater strategic purpose. These reviews will help India create a usable hard power capability that provides viable strategic options in crisis situations. Such options may not deliver every time but they will often enough. It will also enhance the credibility of India's strategic restraint as a carefully chosen alternative and not as a forced choice.⁷⁹
 - **National Security Strategy Review (NSSR):** Such a review must help sketch whole of government approach to security, while challenging legacy assumptions about the nature of the security environment encompassing threats from the immediate to the distant – terrorism, conventional threats from India's adversaries in the neighbourhood, the prospect of destabilising wars in places that matter to India, the possible loss of political influence in regions from where India sources its energy, the prospect of military competition, the emerging threat of state-on-state cyber attacks, the manner in which India should address threats and

opportunities in the global commons, the fact that there can no longer be a distinction between home and abroad – the need to integrate external and internal threats in a seamless fabric are some of the issues that the proposed NSSR must address. Having defined the threats and explored the ways to manage risks, the NSSR must seek to link the roles and missions of the armed forces to the government's wider foreign and security policy and help deduce the grand-strategic and military-strategic tenets of planning and direction. In sum, the NSSR must try and establish the contours of the evolving strategic context.

- **Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR):** The SDSR, after drawing from the NSSR, must attempt to take the process further and arrive at the precise capabilities India needs to invest in, in order to ensure effective delivery of national security policy. Such a review must seek to bring defence policy, plans, commitments and cross governmental resources into balance, while identifying the capabilities the nation should invest in the future.
- **Defence Review:** The Defence Review must focus on the management, structure, organisation, process and work culture in the MoD with the specific purpose of delivering the precise capabilities outlined in the SDSR. The same will entail a paradigm shift from 'bureaucracy' to 'empowerment and discretion.' Key decision makers (Service Chiefs /Vice Chiefs) must be empowered to take decisions, allowed greater discretion to make these decisions while being held responsible and to account for their decisions – both for the choices they make and the choices they defer. Accountability for the correctness of choices made must be determined not by the strength of processes but by the viability of outcomes. To be properly accountable, one also needs the power to act, therefore, accountability must be matched with commensurate decision-making powers.
- **Acquisition Reform:** Reform acquisition processes and the defence industry, in accordance with global trends, sound management practices and pragmatic choices such as self-reliance in strategic high end areas, a viable domestic industry based on inherent strengths,

private sector participation and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as also global off-the-shelf purchases where essential and feasible, must form the edifice of our approach.

Institutional equity, which is the principal argument of this paper, will pave the way for greater strategic acuity. In doing so, the civil–military relationship in India will also graduate from infancy to adolescence. All these years, the detachment of the political class has given the bureaucracy necessary wriggle room to push the military to the fringes of decision-making. It is incumbent, therefore, on the same political class to make amends and restore the balance. Such restoration must be predicated on the twin principles of unambiguous political control and intelligent outreach. India is in a moment in its CMR discourse when it needs sagacity more than anything else to bring an antiquated framework in line with modern sensibilities; we may also like to take note of the Kautilyan adage that the chariot of state is a many wheeled mechanism and therefore cannot rest on one wheel alone. The military and civil wheels conjointly must provide the national security underpinnings to drive the chariot of state. Sixty five years since independence, we need to breathe new life into the barren relationship between the political principal and the military agent. Dismantling the levers of bureaucratic control may be a good way to begin.

Notes

1. A committee constituted in July 2011 under the chairmanship of Mr. Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary, to recommend reform in the national security architecture. The committee has recently submitted its report which is under consideration by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).
2. Foreign Affairs, “Obama and His General – Should McChrystal Salute and Obey?”, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65662/michael-c-desch/obama-and-his-general>, accessed on 11 August 2012.
3. Michael Desch, *Civilian Control Of The Military : The Changing Security Environment*, (John Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp 4 – 5.
4. Derek S Reveron and Judith Hicks Stiehm, *Inside Defence – Understanding the US Military in the 21st Century*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 179.
5. *Ibid*, pp 179 – 180.
6. *Ibid*, p. 180.
7. Peter D Feaver, *Armed Servants – Agency, Oversight and Civil – Military Relations*, (Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 285.
8. *Ibid*, p. 282.
9. Eliot A Cohen, *Supreme Command – Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime*, (The Free Press, 2002), p. 209.
10. See preface to, Dale R Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency, Civil – Military*

Relations from FDR to George W Bush, (University Press of Kansas, 2005), p. xii, where the author is irked by the constant emphasis on the word 'control' through literature on CMR in the USA.

11. Eliot A Cohen, *Supreme Command – Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime*, (The Free Press, 2002), p. 208.
12. *Ibid*, p. 209.
13. Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown, A Memoir*, (Sentinel Publishers, 2011), p. 432.
14. To witness the lengths that the statesman went to master military detail, see Eliot A Cohen, *Supreme Command – Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime*, (The Free Press, 2002), p. 214.
15. *Ibid*, p. 214.
16. See Yoram Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room – How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy*, (United States Institute of Peace, 2006).
17. For a detailed account see, Andrew Scobell, *China's Evolving Civil – Military Relations*, in Nan Li (ed.), *Chinese Civil – Military Relations – the transformation of the PLA*, (Routledge, 2006), pp 25-39.
18. You Ji, *Beyond Symbiosis : The Changing Civil – Military Relationship after Mao*, in Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (ed.), *China and the New International Order*, China Policy Series, (Routledge, 2009), p. 120.
19. Michael C Desch, "Bush and the Generals," *Foreign Affairs*, May / June 2007.
20. For another view, see HR McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, (Harper Perennial), 1997, p. 329, where the author opines that the CMR relationship was one of deceit, with both McNamara and the Chairman JCS complicit. "When the Chief's advice was not consistent with his own recommendations, McNamara, with the aid of the Chairman JCS, lied in NSC meetings about the Chief's views."
21. For another persuasive read on the subject see David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*, (Ballantine Books, 1993).
22. Colin L. Powell, *My American Journey*, (Random House Publishing Group, 1995), p. 148.
23. A coinage to describe the seeming overdrive on the part of the former US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, to control the military with apparently deleterious consequences.
24. For an eloquent defence of Rumsfeld's initial strategy (light, mobile forces) in Iraq as a bold new vision of joint warfare see Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, (Regan Books, 2004). For a damning critique of what went wrong subsequently (including CMR), see Thomas E Ricks, *Fiasco*, (Allen Lane, 2008). As to why and how, the surge under the watch of Secretary Defence Robert Gates and General Petraeus (a partnership of mutual regard and trust), worked brilliantly see Thomas E Ricks, *The Gamble*, (Allen Lane, 2009).
25. For a critique of Rumsfeld as a supreme bureaucratic warrior and somebody who lacked intellectual scruple, see Andrew Cockburn, *Rumsfeld : His Rise, Fall and Catastrophic Legacy*, (Scribner, 2007). The Indian reader will see shades of their very own Krishna Menon.
26. For a spirited defence of his actions, see Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown: A Memoir*, (Sentinel Publishers, 2011).
27. Jason Burke, *9 / 11 Wars*, (Allen Lane, 2011), p. 269.
28. Charles A Stevenson, *Warriors and Politicians : US Civil – Military Relations Under Stress*, (Routledge, 2006), p. 3.
29. See Fareed Zakaria, *The Post American World*, (Penguin, 2008), p 148, where he talks of Nehru turning furious merely at the sight of uniformed officers in the defence ministry.
30. Charles A Stevenson, *Warriors and Politicians: US Civil – Military Relations Under Stress*, (Routledge, 2006), p. 164.
31. Mackubin Thomas Owens, *US Civil – Military Relations After 9 / 11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain*, (The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), p. 79

32. See Times Online, "Gordon Brown facing fresh pressure on helicopters for Afghanistan", <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6717873.ece>, accessed on 13 March 2012.
33. See Sun Online, "Brown and out in polls", <http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/2619400/Tory-landslide-predicted-at-next-election-in-crucial-Sun-poll.html>, accessed on 14 March 2012.
34. See biography of Sir Richard Dannatt, *Leading from the Front*, (Bantam Press, 2010), pp 343 – 379.
35. For an interesting account of how the General brought the issue of the Military Covenant back into balance see General Sir Richard Dannatt, *Leading From The Front*, (Bantam Press, 2010), pp 264 – 290.
36. The Royal British Legion, "Armed Forces Covenant 'an historic breakthrough'", <http://www.britishlegion.org.uk/about-us/media-centre/news/campaigning/armed-forces-covenant-'an-historic-breakthrough'/>, accessed on 15 March 2012.
37. Ibid
38. Eric Etheridge, writing in the New York Times of 06 September 2009, for instance held the view that McChrystal's intervention in essence said two things – either send the troops or redefine the mission, making it difficult for the President to fudge a decision. It, therefore, served a useful purpose.
39. Washington Post, "Battling for Iraq", <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49283-2004Sep25.html>, accessed on 16 March 2012.
40. New York Times, McChrystal to Lead Program for Military Families http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/11/us/11military.html?_r=1 accessed on 16 March 2012.
41. Witness the reactions the former Army Chief, General Deepak Kapoor's comments at a closed door seminar at HQ ARTRAC (whose primary purpose is to conceptualise doctrine and capacities) about the need to develop a two front capability have drawn (when that is the widely held strategic wisdom). It does seem a little churlish that the same should be equated with war-mongering. A defence analyst in Pakistan went so far as to conclude that a tectonic shift had occurred in CMR with the weight shifting in the favour of the military (pot calling the kettle black?) – See, The Filter Coffee, "What General Deepak Kapoor really said," <http://thefiltercoffee.wordpress.com/2010/01/05/what-general-deepak-kapoor-really-said/>, accessed on 18 March 2012.
42. Derek S Reveron and Judith Hicks Stiehm, *Inside Defence – Understanding the US Military in the 21st Century*, (Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 175
43. Also see, Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 20, where the author opines that the problem of the modern state is "not armed revolt but the relation of the expert to the politician."
44. For a stinging indictment of the government for continued inactivity in this regard (integration of MOD and appointing a CDS) see the Report Of The Standing Committee On Defence (2009 – 10), *Second Action Taken Report on Unified Command For Armed Forces*, released on 14 December 2009.
45. For another view of the poor state of CMR in India, see, Arun Shourie, *We Must Have No Price And Everyone Must Know That We Have No Price*, (Rupa & Co, 2010), pp 73 – 81.
46. See an interview of Gen VK Singh with the news magazine, *The Week*, 25 March 2012.
47. See an interview of Gen VK Singh with the news magazine *Outlook*, 12 March 2012.
48. See DK Palit, *War in High Himalaya*, (Lancet International, 1991), pp 420 – 421, for an insight into the consequences of organic separation of the services from the government – lack of intimacy of thought and information, the prospect of subterfuge, the fact that the civil – military interaction is ritualistic and mechanical, not innate and pervasive, the manner in which isolation leads to the Service Chiefs being denied critical determinants

- for formulating defence policy – the interrelation between threat perceptions, policy constraints, force structure and economic realities, etc.
49. See report of The Standing Committee On Defence (2009 – 10), Second Action Taken Report on Unified Command For Armed Forces, composed of Honourable Members Of Parliament representing the disparateness of India's politics and its many conundrums – Mr. Satpal Maharaj, Mr. Kamal Kishor 'Commando,' Mr. Varun Gandhi, Mr. Kalyan Singh, Mr. Asaduddin Owaisi, Prof PJ Kurien and Mrs. Shobhana Bhartia (to name just a few). The report is remarkable for its unanimity, insight and perseverance, possibly, because of the more direct nature of interaction(formal and informal) between the legislators and the military, therein.
 50. See, Jaswant Singh, *Defending India*, (Macmillan, 1999), p. 109, where the author alludes to the relationship between the civil bureaucracy and the military as 'combative,' one in which the MOD becomes the principal destroyer of the cutting edge of the military's morale. Ironic considering the very reverse of it is their responsibility. The sword arm of the state gets blunted by the state itself.
 51. See Dr. Raja Ramanna, *Years of Pilgrimage*, (Viking, 1991), p. 99, where Dr. Ramanna echoes a similar view in his statement that "all decisions good or bad are examined by these power brokers in view of their vested interests."
 52. Peter D Feaver, *Armed Servants – Agency, Oversight and Civil – Military Relations*, (Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 302.
 53. Report Of The Standing Committee On Defence (2009 – 10), Second Action Taken Report on Unified Command For Armed Forces, p. 20.
 54. The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) is the administrative civil service of the Government of India. Indian Administrative Service officers hold key positions in the Union Government, State governments and Public Sector Undertakings. Over the years, officers from the service have come to dominate decision making in the government hierarchy.
 55. Colin L. Powell, *My American Journey*, (Random House Publishing Group, 1995). For a fascinating account of how skillfully the armed forces have been integrated into the politico-strategic dynamic, this book is a must read. The book also reveals as to how by drawing the Armed Forces into the decision making dynamic and creating institutions like the Chairman JCS, civilian control of the military has only increased, not decreased. The latter is also the contention of India's own strategic doyen, Mr. K Subrahmanyam.
 56. See, interview with Kishore Mahbubani in *Indian Express*, 11 January 2009, where he says, "If Singapore can set up a world class institute of international studies, then India can do much better." He goes on to quote the example of the Lee Kuan Yew School, which has got a place for itself globally (first league) in less than four years.
 57. Charles A Stevenson, *Warriors and Politicians : US Civil – Military Relations Under Stress*, (Routledge, 2006), p. 170.
 58. Peter D Feaver, *Armed Servants – Agency, Oversight and Civil – Military Relations*, (Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 82.
 59. Earlier, the legendary Douglas Macarthur had opposed even the initial baby steps towards integration
 60. C Stevenson, *Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress*, (Taylor and Francis, 2006), p.165.
 61. See *Indian Express*, 04 January 2009, Will Antony finally Revamp DRDO? The P Rama Rao report on DRDO Restructuring that has recommended that, the organisation focus on eight to ten critical technologies of strategic importance and drastically downsize the 51 laboratories that aim to produce everything from juices to mosquito repellants and dental implants, even as 70% of India's military requirements continue to be imported and India continues to produce duds galore . Over the years, the Nehruvian concept of self reliance in critical high end strategic areas, gave way to clichéd sloganeering and

- consequent sloth. India has, also, not been inviting enough of private sector participation and have consistently ignored sensible proposals to restructure its defence industry from strategic commentators like Bharat Karnad.
62. The Bernard Gray Review Of Acquisition was released by the British Defence Secretary, Bob Ainsworth on 15 October 2009. The study was commissioned by the UK MoD and was undertaken by Bernard Gray. For details, visit www.mod.uk
 63. Shekhar Gupta, "Opportunity, Made in China," Indian Express, 07 November 2009.
 64. An orientation exemplified by the reported views of Mr. Pranab Mukherjee likening India's weaponised nuclear posture to paste squeezed out of a tube that could not be pushed back in. For this see, Bharat Karnad, *India's Nuclear Policy*, (Pentagon Press, 2009), p. 92.
 65. See C Raja Mohan, "The Deciding Decade : 2010-2020 – Foreign Policy," Indian Express, 01 January 2010.
 66. See DK Palit, *War in High Himalaya*, (Lancer International, 1991), p. 21.
 67. In 1905, the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon of Kedleston, was forced to resign as a result of a disagreement with his Commander-in-Chief, Lord Kitchener of Khartoum. What began as a mild bureaucratic affair soon escalated into a major power battle, and the scene of the struggle shifted, in turn, from the narrow confines of Indian bureaucracy to the exalted chambers of Imperial decision-making. For a more detailed account, see Stephen P. Cohen (1968), *Issue, Role and Personality: The Kitchener- Curzon Dispute*. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Cambridge Journals, Vol 10, Issue 3, pp 337-355.
 68. For an interesting view on the state of training of officers, see Brigadier SS Chandel, "Training of Higher Commanders," *Infantry Journal*, August 1988.
 69. The Daily Beast, "Petraeus's Next Battle," <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/07/17/general-david-petraeus-on-leaving-afghanistan-and-going-to-cia.html> , accessed on 17 March 2012.
 70. *A Military – Intellectual Tradition: A military that is focused not entirely on the nitty-gritty of operations and tactics but is also engaged in the larger conceptualisation of national security issues.*
 71. For a sound trashing of the 'all is well' view see Adm (Retd) Arun Prakash, "Three Invisible Men," *FORCE*, Vol. 9, No. 4, Dec 2011.
 72. Richard K Betts, Michael C Desch and Peter D Feaver, "Civilians, Soldiers and the Iraq Surge Decision," *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 3, Winter 2011.
 73. Royal United Services Institute, "Members' Lecture –The Challenges Facing Defence" <http://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E4B0D16ADB75AF/> , accessed 18 March 2012.
 74. For an incisive analysis of the status of the Service Chiefs and their marginal contribution in decision making see Adm (Retd) Arun Prakash, "Three Invisible Men," *FORCE*, Vol. 9, No. 4, Dec 2011.
 75. Pravin Sawhney, "A Case for CDS," *FORCE*, August 2011, p. 94.
 76. The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), based in New Delhi, is a non-partisan, autonomous body dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security. Its mission is to promote national and international security through the generation and dissemination of knowledge on defence and security-related issues.
 77. For a detailed read of ongoing reviews, see UK mod website www.mod.uk, TSO Publications UK (www.tsoshop.co.uk) and the RUSI Website www.rusi.org
 78. The reviews suggested are driven and modeled on the ones currently underway in the UK. For the ensuing debate, see, Mark Philips, "Policy Making in Defence and Security – Lessons from the SDSR", *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 157, No. 1, Feb - Mar 2012.
 79. KS Bajpai, "Our Grand Strategy", Indian Express, 31 December 2009.
 80. Nagendra Singh, *The Defence Mechanism of the Modern State – pg 430* : Asia Publishing House, 1964.