

**International Relations and  
International Security in  
The 21st Century:  
The World In Transition**

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Centre for Land Warfare Studies  
New Delhi



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KW Publishers Pvt Ltd  
New Delhi

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Published in India by

Kalpana Shukla

KW Publishers Pvt Ltd

4676/21, First Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi 110002

Phone: +91 11 23263498 / 43528107 email: [knowledgeworld@vsnl.net](mailto:knowledgeworld@vsnl.net) • [www.kwpub.com](http://www.kwpub.com)

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# Introduction

It must be recorded at the very outset that with the end of World War II in 1945, the vision and the global perspectives ensconced in the temporal nature of history created and crafted the role of International Relations (IR) worldwide as never before in the history of mankind. Apart from the evolution of modern diplomacy, there arose the issue of implementation of the efforts to synergise not only the relationship of cooperation amongst the nation-states but also to enhance the process of bridging the gap between the realm of ideas and the domain of public policy-making to safeguard the integrity and the core values of all the nation-states.

This paper is restricted to theories of IR. Ultimately, readers will be the judges in determining their relevance to the real world and happenings as they are occurring now e.g. Crimea and Ukraine. There is a need for an exposure to the larger dimensions of IR. Unfortunately, across cultures and in the international arena, every diplomat thinks that he knows all about the world and that his memories, based on his service experience, are good enough to be perpetuated. On the other hand, every academic in the field of international relations or political science thinks he knows how foreign policies should be made. He does not lose a minute if he can get in front of the media to propound his knowledge. With 202 nation-states, the world is a much more complex entity. Human security is on the top of the agenda across the international system. Neither diplomacy and negotiations nor a strategic approach based on geo-economics or geo-politics can solve the volatility of the present international relations that exist between states. I cautiously accept (but not fully), the observations of some of the Western strategic analysts, that up to the first decade of the 21st century, the world lived tactically, but 2014 onwards, the world will have to live strategically. If that is so, then we are in a for real paradigm shift in the IR perspectives. Such a shift, should it come around with consensus, will change the entire role of politics amongst nations.

The aim of this paper is not to propound an all-inclusive content analysis of international relations that has applicability across the East-West or the North-South divide nor to make a policy-oriented deliberation on what could be rather than what should be. Though limited in space and content, the paper attempts to make the readers understand the relevance of theory, define what theory is and what is expected out of theory, bridge the gap among theory, experience and judgment, define the difference between method and methodology, and, lastly, bridge the gap between the realm of ideas and the domain of public policy making. While the theme is micro focussed, it has a major spillover in the macro dimension of strategic affairs where the use of force, understanding of the shifting balance of power and the issues related to geo-economics and geo-politics have to be assessed to empirically measure the vitality of a nation-state for conceptualising the framework of power in the politics amongst nations interacting in the dynamics of international relations unfolding in the 21st century.

The deliberations in this paper are in six parts:

- Part I : Development of IR
- Part II: Key Contending Theories of IR
- Part III: How Theory Explains Events in IR
- Part IV: From 1945 to 1990
- Part V: Challenges of the 21st Century
- Part VI: International Relations and Constructivism.

Plato, in his celebrated 'dialogue' stated, "**Only the dead have seen the end of all wars.**" My personal observation is even more telling. If we could compress the entire evolution of the universe into 24 hours, then 'man' appears only in the last few seconds of that evolutionary period. Ironically, within this short span, man has become the greatest danger to man himself. Similarly, the field of international relations, which is a sub-field of political science, has emerged in the last few seconds of that evolutionary timeframe which has covered nearly three millennia of development of political thought and political practices. IR is perhaps still in a non-paradigmatic state and is still very much a problem area like the area of defence and strategic studies. Little wonder then, that over 67 theories have emerged to cover the field of international relations.

The field of IR<sup>1</sup> owes its intellectual moorings to the Greek historian Thucydides (460-395 BCE) as a political activity and it developed in its present form in the early 20th century to become a discrete academic field within the structure of political science as an interdisciplinary field of study. Considering the theoretical dimensions, as Hobbes recognised, that man in the state of nature is eternally aggressive, the scope and expanse of IR encompasses state sovereignty, international security, nuclear proliferation, nationalism, international political economy, development, terrorism, foreign interventionism, human rights and human security. In other words, IR incorporates the entire gambit of securitising the non-strategic and strategic dimensions of security, including the rights of the unborn. IR, in general and particular, draws intellectual material from the various core disciples of social sciences, gender studies, cultural studies, science and technology, including life sciences.

# Part I

## Development of International Relations

The history of IR based on sovereign states, can be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which began the development of the modern state system. Between 1500 and 1789, one witnesses the rise of independent sovereign states and the institutionalisation of diplomacy and Armies. The French revolution added to this the idea that neither the princes nor an oligarchy but the citizens of the state, defined as the nation, should be defined as sovereign. Hence, the state in which the nation is sovereign would be termed as a nation-state as opposed to a monarchy or a religious state.

The term republic increasingly became its synonym. An alternative model of the nation-state was developed in reaction to the French republican concept by the Germans and others, who, instead of giving the citizenry sovereignty, retained the princes and nobility, but defined nation-statehood in ethnic-linguistic terms, establishing the rarely, if ever, fulfilled ideal that all people speaking one language should belong to one state only. The same claim to sovereignty was made for both forms of nation-state. (It is worth noting that in Europe today, few states conform to either definition of nation-state: many continue to have royal sovereigns, and hardly any are ethnically homogeneous.) The particular European system supposing the sovereign equality of states was exported to the Americas, Africa, and Asia via colonialism and the “standards of civilisation”. The contemporary international system was finally established through decolonisation during the Cold War. However, this is somewhat oversimplified.

While the nation-state system is considered “modern”, many states have not incorporated the system and are termed “pre-modern”. Further, a handful of states have moved beyond insistence on full sovereignty, and can be considered “post-modern”. The ability of contemporary IR discourse to explain the relations of these different types of states is disputed. “Levels of analysis” is a way of looking at the international system, which includes the



individual level, the domestic state as a unit, the international level of transnational and inter-governmental affairs, and the global level.

What is explicitly recognised as IR theory was not developed until after World War I. IR theory, however, has a long tradition of drawing on the work of other social sciences. The use of capitalisation of the “I” and “R” in International Relations, aims to distinguish the academic discipline of International Relations from the phenomenon of international relations. A theory is useful and accepted to the extent that (a) it explains the happening and phenomenon more fully and clearly; (b) It helps us to predict the likelihood of occurrence of the events, which have yet to take place. In other words, it must help us to understand the past and the present, and guide us in dealing with the future. This prediction is not in the nature of astrology but dealing with the events taking place. It is best to remember that no single theory by itself covers the entire spectrum. Even in physics, in which human will and preferences do not play any part, there are several theories to understand the physical world, for example, theories of quantum physics are not relevant while dealing with vast expanses of time and distance

It will not be wrong to state that the realist theory legacy can be traced back to Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War* (6th century BCE), Thucydides *History of the Peloponnesian War* (5th century BCE) and Chanakya’s *Arthashastra* (4th century BC). Contract theorist Hobbes’ *Leviathan* and Machiavelli’s *The Prince* provided further elaboration for the development of this school in later times.

Similarly, liberalism<sup>2</sup> draws upon the work of Kant and Rousseau, with the work of the former often cited as the first elaboration of democratic peace theory. Though contemporary human rights is considerably different from the type of rights envisioned under natural law, Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius and John Locke offered the first accounts of universal entitlement to certain rights on the basis of common humanity. In the 20th century, in addition to contemporary theories of liberal internationalism, Marxism had been a foundation of international relations till the end of the Cold War.

Initially, international relations as a distinct field of study was almost entirely British-centred. IR only emerged as a formal academic ‘discipline’ in 1919, with the founding of the first ‘chair’ (professorship) in IR – the Woodrow Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth, University of Wales (now Aberystwyth University<sup>3</sup>) from an endowment given by David Davies,

became the first academic position dedicated to IR. This was rapidly followed by the establishment of the Departments of International Relations at US universities and in Geneva, Switzerland. In the early 1920s, the London School of Economics' Department of International Relations was founded at the behest of Nobel Peace Prize winner Philip Noel-Baker, and was the first institute to offer a wide range of degrees in the field. Furthermore, the International History Department at the London School of Economics (LSE), developed and primarily focussed on the history of IR in the early modern, colonial and Cold War periods.

The first university entirely dedicated to the study of IR was the Graduate Institute of International Studies (now the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies), which was founded in 1927 to produce diplomats associated with the League of Nations, established in Geneva some years earlier. The Graduate Institute of International Studies offered one of the first Ph.D. degrees in IR.

## Part II

# Key Contending Theories

To reduce ambiguity about the role that theory plays in the field of IR, a few issues need clarification. The term “theory” has different conceptualisations. When focussed, theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism have a paradigmatic status. In the American school, theory has a socio-scientific bias with an assumption that it can be rigorously tested to achieve a predictable outcome. In the European school, theory has a much more general application, loosely structured, which is meant to systematically organise data and structure questions with a view to establish a logical set of interrelated concepts. It has been argued by Acharya that deliberation on Asian IR is “a-theoretical” in terms of American construct of theory. He infers the lack of pursuit in Asian IR theory as due to the dominance of area specialists. Area specialists in all developing countries belong to government organisations having access to sensitive information on such matters as religious compositions, castes, tribes, socio-anthropological database, etc.

Asian scholars, at times, take an extreme viewpoint by not being convinced of the application of the classical theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism to provide a framework of analysis of studying IR in the Asian context. However, it will be worthwhile to record that the mainstream of IR theory has influenced every sovereign nation-state in the world. These grand theories had a direct relationship with the political thought and ideologies that governed the states under differing and different circumstances and vice versa. Nothing was more stark than the period of the Cold War when the world was uniquely bipolar in nature. It was a tussle between the US, which professed an open system of government, as against the former Soviet Union, which came under the sway of Communism and, hence, followed the route of a centrally governed state.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the two superpowers in the post 1945 period brought to the forefront the concept of a permanent enemy where one superpower considered the other as evil and, similarly, the other considered the inevitability of a war between the proletariat and the

capitalist class. Hence, the Marxist Leninist theory as propounded, led Stalin to believe firmly that war was inevitable, in theory, possible, and in practice, winnable. It was the realisation of the futility of a nuclear war that made Khrushchev start the process of revisionism, which propounded that war between the proletariat and the capitalist class was inevitable, in theory, possible but in practice, perhaps not winnable. Finally, it was Gorbachev who ultimately carried out a total revision of the thought, strategy and process of international relations when it was officially accepted that war is neither inevitable, nor in theory, possible or in practice, winnable.

The entire theoretical construct of IR theory<sup>4</sup> is very large. However, it is important to touch upon at least the dominant theories of IR as they explain why states behave as they do, in the international system. The three dominant theories that have shaped the world politics and globalisation are Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism, with Marxism now taking a back seat after the end of the Cold War. Apart from the dominant theories, a further 67 theories of IR have emerged as a sub-set to explain or substantiate the dominant theories. It must be noted, however, that these dominant theories do not operate in a water-tight paradigmatic state and have the capacity to overlap into other domains.

### **Realism**

Realism is the dominant theory of IR, because it explains the state of war, which has remained a constant factor or condition of life in the international system. The history of realism begins with the deliberations amongst the utopian or idealist writers of the period from 1919 to 1939, who concentrated all their efforts to understand the cause of war in order to find a remedy for its occurrence. This particular view of the world, or paradigm, is defined by the following assumptions. *The international realm is anarchic and consists of independent political units called states; states are the primary actors and inherently possess some offensive military capability or power which makes them potentially dangerous to each other; states can never be sure about the intentions of other states; the basic motive driving states is survival or the maintenance of sovereignty; states are instrumentally rational and think strategically about how to survive.*

However, modern realism, which is known as neo-realism, separates itself from the political rules which are situated in human nature and its

characteristics, and takes the view that the structure in which states exist in international relations is anarchic due to the absence of an overarching 'sovereign' authority (Waltz, 1979, p.103). Neo-realists, thus, explain that states serve their own interests in the international system by following a strict code of self-help due to the absence of any authority above them. Neo-realism also puts forth a theory for relative peace to be achieved by suggesting the concept of mutually assured destruction based on the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence—a concept that helped maintain peace during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, courtesy their possession of the nuclear weapon (Sagan & Waltz, 2010, p.91). While nuclear deterrence never proposes to establish world peace, it does work towards the maintenance of relative peace between two nuclear powers. As states are seen as maximisers of security, nuclear weapons are the last resort to seeking security in a world which offers none on its own. If a state feels sufficiently scared or threatened by the actions of another state in the system of anarchy, then it can pursue the stockpiling of nuclear weapons, as they are the ultimate deterrent and providers of security (Sagan & Waltz, 2010, p.92) The concept of mutually assured destruction functions on the basis of fear of whole scale destruction between two nuclear weapon states. If one state launches its nuclear weapon, it can be assured that the other one will respond in kind via its second-strike apparatus, thus, ensuring destruction of both, courtesy the highly destructive powers of the weapon in question (Sagan & Waltz, 2010, p.92b). Since World War II, no two nuclear states have fought against each other. The example of India and Pakistan is seen as a primary one in this regard, outside of the deterrence which existed between the US and the Soviet Union. Despite fighting three large scale wars against each other since 1947 over the territorial dispute of Kashmir, Pakistan and India have not fought against one another since the Kargil conflict in 1999, which too remained localised. This further underlines the 'peaceful' powers of nuclear weapons and the theory of mutually assured destruction.

The balance of power theory is yet another one that sheds light on the possibility of peace inside the neo-realist paradigm. The balance of power theory stipulates as to how states can achieve a balance of power against their rivals in the anarchic system of politics by internal and external efforts. Internal efforts include increasing economic and military strength whilst

external factors include alliance formation (Waltz, 1979, p.118). The balance of power once achieved puts both the alliances/competitors on an equal footing and, thus, from there on, it is a game of preserving the balance of power to ensure the survival and preservation of the unit actors such as states. However, for such equilibrium to be formed, states that are in an alliance must accept the restraints on them due to the framework that they are a part of, to achieve mutual goals and interests. As Waltz states, “Only if states recognise the rules of the game and play for the same limited stakes, can the balance of power fulfill its functions for international stability and national independence” (Waltz, 1979, p.120). Instability in IR occurs when there is a real or imaginary sense of outrage or grievance, which is largely shared by the populations. That is how World War II flowed out of World War I and the Cold War out of World War II.

### ***Liberalism***

This is political theory founded on the natural goodness of humans and the autonomy of the individual. It favours civil and political liberties, government by law with the consent of the governed and protection from arbitrary authority. In IR, liberalism covers a fairly broad perspective ranging from Wilsonian idealism through to contemporary neo-liberal theories and the democratic peace thesis. Here, states are but one actor in world politics, and even states can cooperate together through institutional mechanisms and bargaining that undermine the propensity to base interests simply in military terms. States are interdependent and other actors such as transnational corporations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations play a role. It is a political theory founded on the natural goodness of humans and the autonomy of the individual. It favours civil and political liberties, government by law with the consent of the governed, and protection from arbitrary authority.

Liberalism identifies one main problem in international politics: war. To solve this, it proposes three solutions. The first is democracy: liberals argue that democratic states are more peaceful with all other states and never go to war against other democracies. This is the argument of the democratic peace theory. The main reason for this is that states’ leaders are accountable and they fear that they may not be reelected if they go to war: “When

the citizens who bear the burdens of war elect their governments, wars become impossible” (Doyle, 1986, p.1151). The second solution is economic interdependence. Liberals affirm that international trade binds states together, as the interests of a state become those of other states. Thus, war appears too costly for states and they prefer to cooperate. International institutions are the third solution proposed by liberalism. The theory implies that institutions enhance cooperation between states and, therefore, make war less likely. Neo-liberal institutionalism particularly looks at this solution: it argues that international institutions promote cooperation and limit the effects of anarchy. However, we see for ourselves that the democratically elected government in Dhaka does not seem to be acceptable to the rest and it would appear that democracies do not necessarily guarantee peace.

Later, in response to the domination of neo-realism in the late 1970s, a distinctive school of thought was created: neo-liberalism. Indeed, neo-liberals accept the existence of anarchy within the international system, but that does not prevent cooperation. Keohane (1984) presents three advantages of international institutions under anarchy: they lower coordination costs, they raise the cost of cheating, and they diffuse information. Furthermore, neo-liberals believe that states are more concerned with absolute gains rather than relative gains. States conceive of their gains not in comparison with other states but looking towards the total gains, which enhances cooperation between them. Therefore, international relations may be a positive-sum interaction, where each side benefits from cooperation. Eventually, Keohane and Nye (1998, p.83) developed the notion of “complex interdependence”, “a world in which security and force matter less and countries are connected by multiple social and political relationships”. They found three conditions of complex interdependence: an increasing number of channels of contact between societies, the fact that governments reluctantly use military force, and that security is no longer the main issue in international relations.

Some of the classical texts that one should endeavour to read over a period of the next two decades are given below:

- Maurice Cranston, (1967). “Liberalism” in Paul Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press), pp. 458-461.

- Gerald F. Gaus, *Contemporary Theories of Liberalism: Public Reason as a Post-Enlightenment Project* (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2003a).
- Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, edited by Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1651).
- Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace" in, Hans Reiss, ed., *Kant's Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1795).
- John Locke, Peter Laslett, eds., *The Second Treatise of Government in Two Treatises of Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1689), pp. 283-446.
- John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, edited by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1706).
- Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses*, translated by L. Ricci and C.E. Detmold (New York: Random House, Inc, 1513).
- John Stuart Mill, *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, edited by J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963).
- Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1945).
- John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
- John Rawls, *Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999a).
- John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, revised edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999b).
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762), *The Social Contract and Discourses* translated by G.D.H. Cole (New York: Dutton, 1993).
- Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

### **Marxism**

Marxism is a body of thought inspired by Karl Marx. It emphasises the dialectical unfolding of historical stages, the importance of economic and material forces and class analysis. It predicts that contradictions inherent in each historical epoch eventually lead to the rise of new dominant classes. The era of capitalism, according to Marx, is dominated by the bourgeoisie and will give way to a proletarian, or working class revolution and an era of



socialism in which workers own the means of production and move toward a classless, Communist society in which the state, historically a tool of the dominant class, will wither away. However, Marxism better explains the class war within the states rather than wars between states. Marxism could not have predicted the reunification of the Germans nor did Marxism predict an interior overreach of the former Soviet Union. A number of contemporary theorists have drawn on Marxian insights and categories of analysis—an influence most evident in work on dependency and the world capitalist system [P Viotti, and M Kauppi, eds., *International Relations Theory* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987)].

### **Constructivism**

Constructivism is a social theory and not a substantive theory of international politics. Constructivists also examine how actors make their activities meaningful. Constructive theory is explanatory theory and, hence, the constructivists are concerned with human consciousness, treat ideas as structural factors, consider the dynamic relationship between ideas and material forces as a consequence of how actors interpret their material reality and are interested in how agents produce structures and how structures produce agents. Constructivists postulate that power can be understood not only in the ability of one actor to get another actor to do what he would not do otherwise but also as the production of identities and interests that limit the ability to control their fate. Although constructivism and rational choice are generally viewed as competing approaches, at times, they can be combined to deepen our understanding of global politics.

Constructivist theory rejects the basic assumption of neo-realist theory that the state of anarchy (lack of a higher authority or government) is a structural condition inherent in the system of states. Rather, it argues, in Alexander Wendt's words, that "anarchy is what states make of it". That is, anarchy is a condition of the system of states because states in some sense 'choose' to make it so. Anarchy is the result of a process that constructs the rules or norms that govern the interactions of states. The condition of the system of states today as self-helpers in the midst of anarchy is a result of the process by which states and the system of states was constructed. It is not an inherent fact of state-to-state relations. Thus, constructivist theory

holds that it is possible to change the anarchic nature of the system of states. (See Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It”, *International Organization*, 46, 2, Spring 1992.)

### **Constructivism and Global Change**

Constructivists focus on how the world hangs together. Constructivism claims that what exists, need not have, and need not – that is, it invites us to think of alternative worlds and the conditions that make them more or less possible. It is attentive to issues of transformation. As indicated earlier, constructivism scolded neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism for their failure to explain contemporary global transformation. Hence, constructivism recognises that the world is socially constructed and constructivists can investigate global change and transformation.

# Part III

## How Theory Explains Events in International Relations

Structural realism, which is an integral extension of neo-realism propounded by Kenneth Waltz in 1979, can be used to explain various international security issues. K E Jorgensen considers structural realism to be a “significant rupture” in the realist theory<sup>5</sup> and Keith Shimko views it as a “fundamentally different conception of international politics”.<sup>6</sup> While structural realism does explain some important international events, it is not able to explain all. Conversely, classical realism, established by Hans J Morgenthau, can explain many of the contemporary events by taking into consideration a wider range of factors. Therefore, it must be understood that a single theory is not sufficient to analyse IR; there is a necessity to use multiple approaches to understand the complexities of the world we inhabit.

Whilst maintaining the centrality of the state, structural realism reaffirmed the logic of power politics within an international system lacking authority to govern state behaviour; this was termed the “anarchic structure.”<sup>7</sup> The extent to which you value either classical or structural realism depends to a large extent on how you define a theory. Waltz believes that theories are “statements which explain laws”.<sup>8</sup> In constructing theories, we must recognise the importance of some factors above others and “single out the propelling principle, even though other principles operate”.<sup>9</sup> Thus, Waltz claims that whilst structural realism cannot explain every aspect of IR, it explains certain “important things”. Whether or not we view structural realism as successful in explaining the *most* important phenomena in international relations, goes a long way to determining whether we deem it suitable as a tool for analysing current affairs.

Although limitations exist, the structural approach still has much explanatory power concerning the prominence of the state within interactions at the global level and also regarding the continued abuse and manipulation of international institutions, including international law. The fact that these

institutions play such a large role in the conduct of IR means that structural realism is a useful tool in analysing at least one important aspect of current affairs and, thus, must not be disregarded completely. Although some would argue that the institutionalisation of international law nullifies Waltz's claim to anarchy, this is not the case. The most powerful nations continue to "bend" and "break" the rules of international law in order to secure their own national interests.<sup>10</sup> Although some argue that states do follow international law in numerous cases,<sup>11</sup> when violations occur, the fact that they usually have serious ramifications for the international system as a whole cannot be ignored.<sup>12</sup> Despite this, structural realism does have its limitations. Since the end of the Cold War, it has proved unconvincing in its explanation of wars, foreign intervention or the changing relations between states. In contrast to classical realism, Waltz's failure to take account of ideology, domestic factors, non-state actors, and the complexities of interdependence all limit its ability to fully analyse current affairs. Although still relevant, it is too simplistic to be used on its own. Consequently, structural realism must be used as part of a pluralistic approach when analysing international relations.<sup>13</sup>

In the case of international law, current events would appear to justify Waltz's claim that the anarchical nature of the international system causes the major powers to pursue their own interests. If and when the major powers act in accordance with international law, this is in large part due to the fact that they, as leading powers, were generally involved in the very creation of that law and, consequently, stand to benefit; thus, it is in their best interest to follow it. When a great power acts within the boundaries of international law, it is merely acting within the boundaries it helped to create and, thus, serve its own interests. Furthermore, many great powers have a "selective engagement" with international law.<sup>14</sup> Participation only occurs when it is deemed conducive to national interest. For example, the US favoured the proposals of the Uruguay Round as they would lead to an increase in US exports by reducing tariffs abroad more than in the US.<sup>15</sup> However, it refused to sign the Ottawa Treaty regarding the use of landmines, which was perceived as detracting from US security interests.<sup>16</sup> Due to the uncertainty regarding other states' intentions, inherent to the anarchical system, which John Herz aptly labels the "security dilemma", powerful states also use the enforcement of international law to influence the policies and behaviour of

other states<sup>17</sup>. Scott highlights the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as an example of the US and the existing nuclear powers negotiating agreements weighing heavily in their own favour and thereby maintaining their superior military capabilities.<sup>18</sup>

Waltz refers to the continued existence and extension of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) alliance beyond its original purpose to highlight how international institutions have become “subordinate to national purposes”.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, Britain’s involvement in the European Union (EU) is a further example of a state involvement purely to an extent that is beneficial. Despite being a leading member of the EU, Britain based its decision not to join the euro on the fact that it was not deemed in the nation’s economic interest.<sup>20</sup> This further highlights how the most powerful states can, and do, act in a manner conducive to the preservation of their power. For example, the fear and mistrust caused by a ‘self-help’ system often translates into a justification for violations of international institutions; as a result, national interests are often hidden in the rhetoric of self-defence. The Israeli bombing of suspected Syrian nuclear facilities in 2007 was clearly a violation of international law.<sup>21</sup> Although Israel did not attempt to provide any legal justification for its action, many have drawn comparisons to the Israeli action against Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, which was justified as a right to “anticipatory self-defence”. It is clear that Israel used the *perception* of potential Syrian aggression as a justification for the decision to strike. Therefore, we must also consider states’ perceptions of each other’s behaviour to fully understand changes in the international arena. As Alexander Wendt claims, “Anarchy is what states make of it”.<sup>22</sup> Much of international relations is strategy; as Milner claims, this draws attention to issues of communication and information and, thus, perceptions.<sup>23</sup> A consideration of perceptions combined with an understanding of the impact of anarchy creates a deeper understanding of states’ behaviour.

Furthermore, although the 2003 invasion of Iraq can be used as an example of the anarchic system causing powerful states to violate international law to suit their needs, structural realism does not explain the *variety* of factors which caused the need to invade the country, and the subsequent war.<sup>24</sup> The motivations for war in many cases lie much deeper than just the system level. As Michael Byers argues, when states consider unilateral or multilateral

action, “various forms of political, economic and military pressure... can be brought to bear in international affairs”.<sup>25</sup>

The 2003 invasion was a result of an idealist American foreign policy, which does not make sense from a realist perspective.<sup>26</sup> However, classical realism goes much further in analysing such an event than structural realism, as it takes a wider range of factors into consideration. Morgenthau recognised the importance of ideology and nationalism, which are key themes of the rhetoric of the “war on terror”.<sup>27</sup> He claimed that politics, by its nature, “compels the actor ... to use ideologies in order to disguise (his) immediate goal”.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, analysis of state behaviourism is impossible without considering the influence of nationalism, particularly as it is in the ascendancy.<sup>29</sup> Morgenthau recognised that “universalistic nationalism” enabled a state to claim “the right to impose its own values and standards of action upon all the other nations”.<sup>30</sup> Thus, without considering a wider range of factors than structural realism will allow, it is impossible to fully understand the motivations for war.

Additionally, the international system is much more complex than a single cause and effect, which Waltz claims. It is wrong to assume that states are always free to act without any constraints.<sup>31</sup> Exchanges within an interdependent system, such as the global economy, are “mixed motive games”.<sup>32</sup> Structural realists have failed to take into account the rise of the European Union and underestimated the dynamics of European integration and governance upon state behaviour.<sup>33</sup> For example, the recent use of the veto power by Russia and China regarding the proposed UN intervention in Syria, which America was keen to push through, could be viewed as just one of the constraints upon state behaviour. Thus, it is clear that structural realism is unable to adequately analyse the politics and economics of one of the key areas of world politics. As Helen Milner argues, the effect of interdependence upon states’ behaviour needs to be given at least equal consideration to anarchy.<sup>34</sup>

Similarly, whilst it is possible to view Britain’s support of American foreign policy as the former “balancing”, which appears to confirm the structural realist theory that states align with more powerful states in order to protect themselves,<sup>35</sup> a purely structural analysis cannot explain issues such as foreign intervention or changes in state behaviour. To understand both of these, we must consider the power of economic factors. During the “Arab Spring”, the

UN chose to intervene in the oil rich nations such as Libya, yet failed to come to the aid of Syria. It is possible to suggest that if Syria had the raw materials of Libya, both China and Russia may have been more willing to intervene and, therefore, have a share in the spoils, as France saw “fair and logical” in the case of Libya.<sup>36</sup>

Furthermore, structure alone is not enough to explain the changing relationship between Britain and Libya and, more specifically, how a former sponsor of international terrorist activity became a ‘poster boy’ of nuclear non-proliferation less than twenty years later.<sup>37</sup> Such an explanation would fail to consider the lifting of US trade embargoes and more controversially, the prisoner transfer agreements, including the release of Abdel Baset Ali al-Megrahi.<sup>38</sup> It would also overlook the fact that such transfers were organised in return for the signing of oil exploration treaties favourable to British companies. Thus, whilst these events fit within the ‘power politics’ dimension of realism as a whole, the complexities of such changes are unable to be accounted for by structural realism alone, emphasising the fact that we must consider a much broader scope when analysing international relations.

Thus, while structural realism no longer explains *all* of ‘the big important things’, Dunne and Schmidt argue that with the rise of China, Brazil and India, states may actually have to become “more realistic” in order to survive<sup>39</sup>. It is likely that this will be in a neo-classical realist form as opposed to a structural one. Whilst structural realism is useful in analysing states’ behaviour towards certain institutions, it is not always as well equipped to explain other major events. National interest is becoming increasingly complex and states are being forced to take a variety of factors into account when deciding upon the appropriate course of action. Until there is an effective means of authority above the state level, states will continue to act in a self-interested manner. Thus, structural realism remains a valuable approach. However, it cannot be used on its own or as a sole determinant of state behaviour.

Although efforts have been made to include a wider variety of factors and move away from the purely ‘structural’ interpretation, for example, Stephen Walt’s ‘balance of threat’ concept,<sup>40</sup> more needs to be done for realism to survive. Areas we should incorporate into our research include religion and culture. Such studies would emphasise how a variety of factors

is at work at different levels in the interaction between nations. It is fair to say that no one theory can explain every phenomenon in world history; consequently, for the time being, we must incorporate both structural and classical realism into a 'plurality of theories' in order to accurately analyse contemporary international relations.<sup>41</sup> Due to the likely increased changes brought about by further globalisation in the future, unless structural realism moves away from its focus purely upon structure, its utility as an analytical tool will disappear completely.

To conclude the deliberation of this part, the theories of IR have utility of the kind that principles of war have for the conduct of military operations. They help in better comprehension and for the purpose of revalidating the decision-making after decisions have been made but before they are implemented, if they can create a suitable frame of mind in which the quality of decision-making can be reviewed and modified or confirmed.

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## Part IV

# 1945 to 1990

### *The Cold War*

Before dealing with the 21st century, it is essential to see the transformation of the world during the last half of the 20th century. The international system between 1939 and 1990 underwent specific transformations. Between 1939 and 1945, the strategic consideration during World War II,<sup>42</sup> was to win the war. Technology reigned supreme to produce maximum destructive power, culminating in the production of the biggest weapon in the form of the atomic bomb. The United States led the alliance system and demonstrated the political will to use the atomic bomb with the conviction that it would bring the war to an end with the surrender of Japan. While the war ended, it also ushered in a classical unipolar world in which the United States maintained a complete monopoly over nuclear weapons.

Hence, the first paradigm shift that occurred as World War II ended was the emergence of the United States from amongst the Allies as a single, true superpower, with monopoly over the possession of the nuclear weapon. The second paradigm shift took place with the former Soviet Union having produced its own atomic bomb to usher in the concept and reality of a bipolar world. Thus, the international system between 1945 and 1950 underwent two paradigm shifts having a deep impact on international relations globally. The third paradigm shift was the institutionalisation of the new security alliance system in the form of NATO led by the USA, and the Warsaw Pact led by the former Soviet Union. A new global order emerged in which a strict bipolar system became institutionalised. The governance of the bipolar world was on ideological grounds, related to capitalism, on the one hand, and Communism, on the other. This bipolarity lasted until 1990. Hence, in the period 1945-90, fundamental changes took place in politics, technology and ideology, with enormous consequences on world affairs. The onset of the Cold War saw the creation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the end of European imperialism.

The period 1945 to 1990 was greatly influenced by the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, each of which emerged as a 'superpower' in the bipolar world. The ideological, political and military interests of these two states and their allies naturally extended across the globe. Hence, the central question that remained cardinal for discussion, debate and negotiation was the extent and manner in which conflict in Europe, Asia and elsewhere was promoted or prevented by the Cold War. In addition, in this period, it became essential to analyse how the process of decolonisation became intermingled with Cold War conflicts to understand many wars and conflicts in the 'Third World'. To add to this debate was an examination of how dangerous the nuclear confrontation between the East and the West was. Did nuclear weapons keep the peace between the superpowers or did they provoke conflict and risk global catastrophe? The exposition of IR amongst nation-states globally and, more specifically, the relationship between nuclear weapons development and the phases in East-West relations, first with *detente* and then with the deterioration of Soviet-American relations in the 1980s, are all part of the history of the Cold War which is well known. It is mentioned in passing here, to bridge the gap for continuity, to understand the strategic challenges of the 21st century IR and politics.

To sum up, the Cold War was composed of five different levels of reality:

- A strategic confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.
- An ideological stand-off between capitalism and Communism.
- A geographical and military confrontation that kept Europe and Germany divided.
- An ongoing struggle for the future control of the Third World countries.
- A wider opposition between two material civilisations, both of which insisted that they, and they alone, represented the wave of the future.

### ***End of the Cold War: Conceptual Issues***

The Soviet balkanisation saw the end of the Cold War and raised specific conceptual issues. It represented the end of an agenda, end of a perceived permanent enemy, loss of bipolarity, and a notion of an emerging new world order. The emerging European integration raised many questions of an evolution of a super state. The questions raised were:

- Was Europe on the way to replace the former Eastern Bloc?
- What was the world view of Europe?
- How to undertake damage assessment?
- What about the future of the nation-state?
- In the 'so-called' new world order, how do we empirically calculate:
  - The demise of the 'collective leadership', 'state capitalism' and 'welfare state'.
  - Technology and development.
  - Technology and ethics.
  - Trans-nationalism.
  - Governance:
    - People, including human rights.
    - Government, including the bureaucracy.
    - Technology, including the environment.
  - Management to include international organisation and resource distribution and other strategic considerations.
  - Concept of power.
  - Concept of the use of force.
  - Waging of humanitarian wars.
  - Future of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and China.
  - Future of Russia and the role of Europe.
  - Future of Asia and the role of China.
  - Emerging China as a major power.

# Part V

## IR Challenges in The 21st Century

### ***The Theoretical Construct***

Conceptually, one can identify two main theories that explain the post Cold War world. Liberalism and proponents of liberal persuasion like Francis Fukuyama, a former US State Department official and expert on Third World politics, shot into prominence by writing one of the most effective articles titled “End of History” in 1989. His thesis consisted of a set of assertions. These were:<sup>43</sup>

History, since the end of the French Revolution, has been driven by the core dynamic conflict between the forces supporting collectivism and those endorsing ‘bourgeois’ individualism.

- With the Russian revolution in 1917, the balance began to tilt toward ‘collectivism’.
- By the late 1970s, the tilt began to go towards ‘individualism’ as the various efforts at economic planning in the Third World started to ‘show signs of fatigue’. This was seen more prominently in the Soviet Union after Gorbachev assumed office in 1985 and began to challenge the former Soviet assumptions.

Gorbachev finally abandoned Eastern Europe, and the people of those states opted for ‘bourgeois’ democracy and market economics. Thus, the Cold War ended in terms favourable to the West. *This, according to Fukuyama, was a victory for the forces of individualism, and he termed this point of time as the ‘end’ of one phase of history and the beginning of another, where liberal economic values would prevail globally.* Hence, there was no alternative to ‘bourgeois democracy’ taking over globally.<sup>44</sup> This view was supported by three key liberal arguments. The first was to do with democracy in the Kantian sense, which, in essence, stated that while authoritarianism bred war, democracies ushered in peace. Hence, the greater the number of democracies, the greater was the possibility of a peaceful world. This assertion was linked with

another hypothesis concerning the role of institutions. This notion asserted that institutions help organise the world in a more efficient way by mediating conflict between states. This, in turn, supported the third hypothesis that by overcoming the logic of anarchy, the cause of peace rested on the existence of capitalism.<sup>45</sup> While the liberals did not underestimate the dark side of capitalism, they argued that as world trade grew, financial interdependence between different geographical areas and countries investing more in each other's economies, would create a strong incentive to get along with each other. While the possibility of conflict remained, in an integrated economic system, the likelihood of conflict will naturally diminish dramatically.

While the liberals painted a more peaceful world, the realists painted a bleaker picture. They foresaw occurrence of much more chaos and conflict because the international system continues to be competitive and anarchic and history reveals the failures of building of new world orders (like after the end of World War I) or the assessment of the world as it became after 1989, with all the barbaric wars, failed states and collapsing regions. The inference, hence, was that there was nothing to be too optimistic about. The three main political thinkers of the realist school to challenge the liberals were John Mearsheimer, Professor of political science in the University of Chicago, Robert D Kaplan, and Samuel Huntington of Harvard University. Mearsheimer concentrated on the analysis of the structure of the international system during the Cold War in line with Kenneth Waltz's thesis on bipolarity which produced stability in the post World War II era and, therefore, its collapse could generate new problems, especially as it could increase nuclear proliferation—the most dangerous problem. Mearsheimer also postulated that the division of Europe and Germany after 1946 had created a new continental order and, hence, their unification would usher in uncertainty. He argued that with the collapse of Communism in the East, the old ethnic hatred would resurface, to thrust the continent back into chaos and bloodshed.

Kaplan, in his study of the Cold War, worked on the assumption that economics and human collapse in parts of Africa were as relevant to our understanding of the future character of world politics. Kaplan felt that in his real world, old structures and traditional certainties were fast disappearing, producing chaos and misery. Samuel Huntington, the third scholar from

Harvard placed realism in the forefront of the post Cold War debate.<sup>46</sup> He warned about the world after 1989. He refuted the liberal argument by stating that the world now faced the Cold War clash of secular economic ideologies, which meant no end to conflict as such. He postulated that conflict would assume a new form defined as the “clash of civilisations” as an evolution of conflict in the modern world. He argued that this conflict would be between the West and those other countries of the world and regions of the world that did not adhere to such values as respect for the individual, human rights, democracy and secularism. Identity and culture were, thus, the core issues to create antagonism and these would form the new fault lines in the post Cold War world, pitting the USA and those nations in Western Europe which embodied one form of ‘civilisation’ against those in the Middle East, China and Asia, post Communist Russia, where the value system was profoundly different.<sup>47</sup> He further warned that unless the West recognised this reality, it would not be able to deal with it wisely.

### **Global Trends**

It is interesting to note that since the beginning of the 21st century, a series of global trend reports, comprehensive and elaborate in nature, have been published. “Global Trend 2010” was released in 1997 and the latest “Global Strategic Trend 2040” is a comprehensive view of the future, produced by a research team at the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). This edition of “Global Strategic Trends” is benchmarked at January 12, 2010, and must be studied. There is also a report on “Global Trend 2025”<sup>48</sup> that indicates both the strategic and non-strategic dimensions of human security in a multi-dimensional format. These trend reports are windows to the challenges that IR will face in the 21st century. The key trends in the post Cold War era are:

- Globalisation of capitalism.
- The US – from decline to hegemony.
- Russia – reform or decline.
- China – a regional threat.
- European integration, expansion and paralysis.
- 9/11 and after.
- Migration.

## **Challenges in the 21st Century**

The major challenges that IR faces in the 21st century are:

- Emerging new global order.
- Terrorism.
- Nuclear proliferation.
- Post Cold War humanitarian intervention.

### ***Emerging New Global Order?***

Two questions need to be addressed. First, has a specific pattern of global order emerged in the post Cold War period? If so, what are its principal constituents? Second, is this order to be defined in terms of globalisation?

There is obviously a pattern in the new international politics in the post Cold War stage as compared to the one that existed prior to the end of the Cold War. The second question enables us to understand whether this contemporary order can be ensconced within globalisation. There is a major debate raging on this in order to understand the exact meaning, and on the process of globalisation. However, what is beyond doubt is that some kind of transformation is already under way. It, hence, needs to be fathomed as to how it is to be discerned and what this will mean in practice.

Serious study to determine the overall character of the post Cold War order is still in its infancy. We do not know how it will culminate. It is still not an 'enclosed' period with a determinate ending, like in the case of the period between the two World Wars. This makes it difficult to assign particular characteristics. While there have been individual aspects of the present order (ethnicity, identity, peace-keeping, humanitarian intervention, globalisation, integration, financial instability, terrorism and the war against it, weapons of mass destruction, regime change, etc), there is still a lack of any general evaluation of its essential nature. In the earlier period, the interest in the international order was largely 'negative' and lay in ensuring that no threats emerged from it. Today, there is a high level of integration and interdependence and, hence, the interest is 'positive' which makes the international order act as a great provider of large numbers of social good. The international order today can deliver information, access to global social movements, economic resources, human rights, interventions, action through non-governmental organisations at both national and international levels, and sharing of cultural artifacts.



It will be important to state that the new order which is unfolding is being pulled in a number of different directions. At one end of the spectrum, it continues to be largely state-centric, concerned with the structure of the balance of power, the polarity of the international system and the current form of collective security. At the other end is a widening agenda of order, which encompasses the relationship between the economic and political dimensions, new thinking about human security, examining the consequences of globalisation, human rights and environmental security. In an address to Congress on September 11, 1990, President George Bush spoke about his vision of the new world order as follows:

A new era—freer from the threat of terror, stronger in pursuit of justice and more secure in quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world... can prosper – a world where the rule of the law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognise the shared responsibilities for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.

Hence, it is difficult as of now to determine the characteristics of the contemporary world order because we live in the midst of it, thus, making it hard to get a historical perspective.

### **Terrorism**

Terrorism has emerged as a major challenge to the emerging new world order. Terrorism is characterised, first and foremost, by the use of violence. Such violence occurs in the form of hostage taking, bombing, hijacking and other indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets. One can observe four different types of terrorist organisations: left wing terrorists, right wing terrorists, ethno-nationalists/separatist terrorists and religious terrorists. During the era of trans-national terrorism, the technologies associated with globalisation by the use of communication technologies, capabilities to use physical technologies to move great distances, communicate and coordinate individual or multiple attacks in different countries simultaneously, ability to retain coordination in the face of tactical setbacks, capacity to obtain advanced weapons to conduct attacks have given a lethal capacity to terrorists across regions and theatres of operation. However, it is not yet

clear as to why terrorists have not acquired and used radiological, biological or chemical weapons so far. Experts believe that the terrorists understand that more lethal attacks would lead to the likelihood that a state or the international community would focus its efforts on hunting them down, and eradicate them. Terrorism, however, seen as the darker side of globalisation, will continue to pose a major challenge to IR in the 21st century.

### ***Nuclear Proliferation***

Considerable attention has been paid to the theoretical aspects of nuclear proliferation. The question that has been asked is whether nuclear proliferation refers to a single decision to acquire a nuclear weapon or is it part of a process that may stretch over a period of several years or even decades, consequently leading to the fact that no one identifiable decision can be located. The proliferation puzzle, thus, has embraced an increasingly complex array of variables (Davis and Frankel, 1993; Meyer, 1984; Lavoy, 1995; Ogilvie-White, 1996). Much of the literature endorses the proposition derived from political realism, which asserts that in an anarchic international environment, states will seek nuclear weapons to enhance their security. Insights from other theoretical propositions have become more commonplace in recent years. This has led to the following questions:

- What is the appropriate 'level of analysis' while studying nuclear proliferation?
- Should the focus be on the individual?
- Should the focus be on organisations?
- Should the focus be on cultural groups?
- Should the focus be on the state, the international system or some combination of these?

Another issue that has been regularly debated is about the 'non-use' of nuclear weapons since 1945. This debate started very early in the nuclear calendar. Bernard Brodie argued that nuclear weapons were useful in their non-use (Colin Gray, 1996, Brodie, 1946). However, the main explanation of the non-use has centred on the notion of nuclear deterrence; states have been deterred from using nuclear weapons because of the concerns of retaliation in kind by adversaries. Motivations to acquire nuclear weapons,

the technological determinism, the complexities of the actions of sub-state, or trans-national actors, the issues of nuclear smuggling, nuclear terrorism, nuclear capabilities and intentions like South Africa declaring on March 24, 1993, that it had six nuclear weapons but had dismantled them prior to its signing the NPT, will long focus on the challenges that IR will face in the 21st century.

### ***Post Cold War Humanitarian Intervention***

Humanitarian intervention poses the toughest challenge and test for an international society built on the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of force. The society of states has committed itself in the post holocaust world to a 'human rights culture', which outlaws genocide and mass killing. However, these humanitarian principles can and do conflict with those of sovereignty and non-intervention. Sovereign states are expected to act as guardians of their citizens' security, but what happens when states behave as gangsters towards their own people, treating sovereignty as a licence to kill their own people? Should 'tyrannical states' be recognised as legitimate members of the international society and be accorded the protection afforded by the 'non-intervention principle'? Or should such states forfeit their sovereign rights and be exposed to legitimate intervention by international society? Related to this is the question of what responsibilities do other states have to enforce global human rights norms against governments that massively violate them? Armed humanitarian intervention was not a legitimate practice during the Cold War period. There was significant shift of attitude on this issue during the 1990s, especially within liberal democratic states, which led to the pressing of new humanitarian claims within international society. In the General Assembly in September 1999, the United Nations declared that there was a "developing international norm" to forcibly protect civilians who were at risk of genocide and large-scale killing. The character of this new liberal interventionism, its moral limitations and its likely evolution in a post 9/11 world are central questions that will emerge as main challenges to IR in the 21st century.

## Part VI

# International Relations and Constructivism

Having attempted to understand the challenges to IR in the 21st century, it is essential to go ahead and see the ramifications of constructivism which is playing a central role in IR. Therefore, the role of the constructivists who tend to see differently from the mainstream IR theorists, allows us essentially to find a new window in which constructivism constitutes the 'middle ground' between mainstream IR research traditions and critical theory. Constructivism occurs between individual actors, is a social theory not a substantive theory, of IR. Structural realist thoughts view IR as 'state centric' and 'structure oriented'. Since the concept of 'sovereignty' and 'territory' revolves around 'power' and 'politics', critical theory concentrates on individual, groups, society and the international community. Therefore, the critical theory has spawned critical security studies, which incorporate approaches created by the Frankfurt School and the Welsh School, where emphasis is laid on safeguarding 'society' and the 'state'. Constructivism concerns are on 'identity' and 'norms'. This brings both critical theory and constructivism to follow similar paths to approach the issues related to 'security studies'. Thus, understanding of critical theory and constructivism in relation to IR theory will be absolutely essential for security studies in the 21st century. It is hoped that the young professionals in the field of strategic studies will take much wider interest to understand the role of theory as in the words of Keith Krause, "The purpose of theory is not explanatory, but understanding". It is worthwhile at the end to quote M J Vinod, "Constructivist political theory holds that the structures of interactions are determined by shared ideas. Hence, 'identities' and 'interests' are constructed by 'ideas' (Samuel S Stanton, 2002). Constructivism is not seen as a theory of security. Rather, it has brought the assumptions of constructivism into security studies. In other words, it is perceived as an approach rather than a theory".<sup>49</sup> While this paper endeavours to provide a bird's eye view of the vast area covered under IR in the 21st century and the challenges it faces as a part of the international system, it is by no means complete. The problems remain enormous and will continue

to engage scholars attempting to generate a grand theory that will explain the behaviour of states in the international system. For the research students in the early 1970s, the question posed was, “IR: In quest for a Theory?” It was then a mystery and remains so even today with more complexity.

## Reference

Prof Gautam Sen has extensively consulted and utilised the writings of Jack Donnelly, Michael C Williams, Martin Griffiths, Chris Brown, Dr Kirsten Ainley, Hedley Bull, M Cox, Robert Cooper and SM Walt.

## Notes

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2. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Stanford Press). Retrieved March 05, 2014
3. <http://www.aber.ac.uk/en/interpol/> Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University
4. See a tabulated list of IR theories that have been developed so far in alphabetic order: Balance of Power Theory, Behaviouralism, Chaos Theory, Classical Realism, Collective Defence, Collective Security, Complex Interdependence Theory, Constitutional Order Theory, Constitutive Theory, Constructivism, Cosmopolitanism, Critical Social Theory, Defensive Realism, Democratic Peace, Dependency Theory, Deterrence Theory, Emancipatory International Relations, Empirical Theory, Ethnic Conflict Theory, Evolutionary World Politics, Feminism, Fourth World Theory, Frustration-Aggression Theory, Functionalism, Game Theory, Globalisation, Globalism, Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention, Hegemonic Stability Theory, Idealism, International Political Economy, International Regime Theory, Just War Theory, Legal Positivism, Liberalism (Liberal Internationalism), Marxism, Modernisation Theory, Neoliberal Institutionalism, Neorealism, New War Theory, Normative Theory, Offensive Realism, Parallelism Theory, Peripheral Realism, Pluralism, Policy-Relevant Theory, Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making, Post-modernism, Power Transition Theory, Pragmatic Idealism, Prisoner's Dilemma, Prospect Theory, Rationalism, Realism, Security Dilemma, Social Constructivism, State Cartel Theory, Traditionalism, Traditional Historical Materialism, Trans-nationalism, World Capitalist System, World-System Analysis.
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